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Abstract 
This dissertation examines combat leadership in the American Expeditionary Forces 
(AEF) in infantry and machine gun units at the company level and below to highlight the 
linkages between the training and professional development of junior officers and 
noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and the army’s overall military effectiveness in World War I.  
Between 1865 and 1918, the growing lethality of the battlefield had forced changes to tactics and 
formations that placed novel demands on small unit leaders.  The proliferation of new weapons 
in infantry companies and the thinning and extension of formations required junior officers and 
NCOs able to exercise an unparalleled degree of initiative and independence while also 
mastering new tactical and technical skills.  When the United States entered World War I, the 
Regular Army was still grappling with how to reconcile its traditional expectations of small unit 
leadership with the new “skill sets” required of junior leaders in modern warfare.  Faced with the 
need to produce officers and NCOs to lead its rapidly expanding mass army, the regulars 
improvised a system for identifying, training, and assigning company-level leaders.  
Unfortunately, the Regular Army’s unpreparedness to wage a modern war, and the host of 
systemic problems associated with raising a mass army, meant that much of the training of these 
key leaders was so ill-focused and incomplete that the new officers and NCOs were woefully 
unprepared to face the tactical challenges that awaited them in France.  These problems were 
only compounded when unexpected casualties among officers and NCOs in the summer and fall 
of 1918 led to a further curtailment in leader training the U. S. Army.  The end result of the U. S. 
Army’s failure to adequately train and develop its junior leaders was that its combat units often 
lacked the flexibility and “know how” to fight without suffering prohibitively high casualties.  
When the junior leaders failed, faltered and bungled, the AEF’s battles became confused and 
uncoordinated slugging matches that confounded the plans and expectations of the army’s senior 
leaders.  The heavy casualties that resulted from these slugging matches further undermined the 
AEF’s effectiveness by reducing the morale and cohesion of the army’s combat units and 
hindering the army’s overall ability to learn from its mistakes due to the high turn-over of junior 
officers and NCOs.    
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Chapter 1 
Combat Leadership in the AEF: A Tale of Alvin and Charles 
 
 The day was not going well for the 82nd Division’s 328th Infantry.  As the regiment 
attempted to seize the Decauville railroad in the early morning of 8 October 1918, German 
riflemen, snipers, and machine gunners on Hill 233 and the Champrocher Ridge caught the 
Americans in a vicious crossfire that quickly halted the momentum of the assault as the 
doughboys sought shelter from the defenders’ remorseless firepower.  The assault itself had been 
rather clumsy and ill-coordinated. It was a frontal attack into an open valley and the attack had 
been preceded by little effort to suppress the German defenders with artillery or machine gun 
fire.   The American attack degenerated into a confused effort by individuals and small clumps 
of doughboys to move forward by running from shell hole to shell hole.  Part of the confusion 
was caused by a general shortage of leaders within the regiment.  The two previous days of 
fighting had already taken a heavy toll on the regiment’s commissioned and noncommissioned 
officers (NCOs).  The loss of these key leaders meant that many of the unit’s companies and 
platoons were being led by junior officers and NCOs with little or no experience at the levels of 
command into which they had been thrust.  For example, although G Company was fortunate to 
have begun the 8 October attack with its long-standing commander, Captain E.C.B. Danforth, the 
company’s 1st platoon was commanded only by a sergeant, and its squads were led by corporals 
hastily promoted to acting sergeants.1 
                                                 
 1 Edward G. Buxton, ed. Official History of the 82nd Division (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1919), 58-60. 
and Alvin C. York, Sergeant York: His Own Life Story and War Diary, ed. Tom  Skeyhill (New York: Doubleday, 
Doran and Company, 1928),  236-44.  
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 As the 328th Infantry’s attack stalled, its casualties began to mount.  Along with the rest 
of the 328th, G Company found itself bewildered by the enemy fire, heavy losses, and the 
inability of its officers to bring order to the chaos reigning on the valley floor.  It was not that the 
company’s leaders were not trying to reorganize the advance; in fact Second Lieutenant K.P. 
Stewart was killed by machine gun fire while exhorting his men to move forward, but the 
officers and NCOs faced a situation that little in their training or previous experience had 
prepared them to meet.  Heavy enemy fire had isolated Danforth from much of his company and 
his span of control extended merely to those soldiers in adjoining shell holes that were within the 
range of his voice.  G Company anchored the regiment’s left flank, and its 1st platoon held the far 
left of the American line.   
 The 1st platoon leader, Sergeant (SGT) Harry M. Parson, realized that the regiment’s 
position was precarious and that something had to be done to reduce the enemy’s fire.  He was 
out of contact with Captain Danforth, and thus, on his own initiative, ordered corporal-turned-
acting sergeant Bernard Early to take three squads and attempt to flank the German position and 
silence their machine guns.  Early’s small command of three corporals and 13 privates succeeded 
in surprising and capturing a number of Germans, but a more alert group of enemy machine 
gunners discovered the American detachment and pinned it with accurate fires. 
 After the German fire killed one corporal and severely wounded Early and another 
corporal, the command of the detachment devolved onto Corporal Alvin York.  York ordered the 
surviving squad members to remain under cover and guard their prisoners while he worked 
himself into a position where he could enfilade the German positions.  York managed to kill 15 
to 20 of the German defenders and then led his detachment back to the American lines, forcing 
the surrender of additional German units as they went.  The American detachment ultimately 
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returned with 132 German prisoners, completing a mission that gained York the Medal of Honor 
and the distinction of being the American Expeditionary Forces’ (AEF) most decorated soldier. 2             
 While York was winning his honors on the morning of 8 October, a different drama was 
being played out a less than two kilometers away.  Private Charles Clement, a scout with the 2nd 
Battalion, 328th Infantry’s intelligence section, had been moving throughout the morning 
delivering messages from the battalion headquarters and reporting on the conditions of the unit’s 
scattered companies.  Clement repeatedly braved the enemy fire that had done such grave 
damage to G Company and the rest of the 328th Infantry.  As Clement rushed forward from crater 
to crater with A Company, a German sniper on the ridge shot him in the forehead, killing him 
instantly.3  
 Although Clement was only one of several of the regiment’s privates to die that day, his 
story was unique.  This twenty six year old private had in fact previously been a captain in 
command of the battalion’s E Company.  Clement’s fall from grace was a sad tale of the 
systemic problems associated with the nation’s hasty mobilization and the pressures of command 
and leadership in modern war.  On the surface, Clement was everything that the army wanted of 
its new officers.  He was a 1912 graduate of Mercer University, a respected teacher at the Atlanta 
Boy’s High School, and a man whose peacetime college athletics and work with the YMCA 
embodied “muscular Christianity” and adherence to Theodore Roosevelt’s “strenuous life” that 
supposedly marked the “alpha male” of the Progressive Era.  After the army established a series 
of Officer Training Camps (OTC) to provide officers for the new draftee divisions, Clement 
                                                 
 2 United States Department of War, American Armies and Battlefields in Europe (Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1938), 229-30,  and York, 240-55.  
 3 Ernesto Bisogno, “The Life and Death of Charles Clement,” The American Legion Magazine, March 
1938, 50-1.  Bisogno was a close friend of Clement, he discovered and buried his body on the evening of 8 October, 
and complied his account of Clement’s death after interviewing those present at the event.  Bisogno story of 
Clement’s service was serialized in the January, February, and March 1937 editions of the American Legion 
Magazine.   
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signed up for the first iteration of the training in April 1917 to be held at Camp Gordon, Georgia.  
The Camp Gordon OTC was to provide the company grade officers for the nascent 82nd 
Division.  After his assignment to the 2nd Battalion, 328th Infantry, his commander, Major (MAJ) 
Edward Buxton praised Clement as a “indefatigable student” of war, “one of the hardest working 
men in the regiment,” and a person marked by “his higher ideals of helpfulness toward military 
service.”4  Unfortunately, Clement’s hasty training and the burden of making the life and death 
decisions left him ill-prepared to exercise effective combat leadership. 
 In late June 1918, the 82nd Division’s regiments rotated into the trenches of the quiet 
Langney Sector of the French line to receive their first combat seasoning.  On the night of 1-2 
July, shortly after his company had occupied their section of trench line, Clement ordered a small 
ambush patrol to be established in “no man’s land.”  Shortly before the patrol went out, Clement 
informed the patrol leader, SGT Cunningham, that he would accompany him on the mission.  
Cunningham noted that the captain was in “an intoxicated condition” and, with the aid of a 
lieutenant, tried to dissuade him from coming with the patrol.  Despite their efforts, Clement 
insisted on going.  The patrol was only in “no man’s land” for a short time before Cunningham 
returned to the American trenches, bodily carrying the stupefied captain.  Cunningham reported 
that “Captain Clement made so much noise that he thought it was foolish to stay out there.”5  
Because of his actions, Clement’s battalion commander felt that he had no other option but to 
bring the young captain before a courts martial for violation of the 85th Article of War: Officer 
found drunk on duty.  
 During his courts martial, Clement readily admitted his guilt.  He noted that he normally 
abstained from alcohol (a fact supported by his fellow officers), and was unsure exactly why he 
                                                 
 4 “Record of the Trial by General Courts-Martial of Captain Charles G. Clement, 328th Infantry” 15 July 
1918, U.S. National Archives, RG 153, Box 5977, Docket no. 120515, 17.  
 5 Ibid., 5.  
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had drank heavily from a bottle of Scotch on the night of the patrol.  In his last statement before 
the court Clement declared, 
 I am guilty, but if the verdict of this court be the death penalty, I have nothing to 
 say.  If it be, however, dismissal from the service, I have.  In “No Man’s Land” I 
 disgraced myself, my uniform, and my country, and in “No Man’s Land” I would 
 like to have the opportunity of redeeming myself, at least partially.  Take my 
 commission away from me, but allow me to go to my own company as a 
 private and allow me to serve there shoulder to shoulder with the men that I have 
 commanded.  Then, when this war is over let me serve any sentence out in a 
 penitentiary.6 
 
Although the board sentenced him to be dismissed from the service and to be confined at hard 
labor for five years, the members of the courts martial unanimously signed a plea for clemency 
for the disgraced captain.  Ultimately, the appealing authority granted Clement’s request and he 
was allowed to enlist as a private in the 2nd battalion’s headquarters company. 
 One of Clement’s friends, Private Ernesto Bisogno, noted that the busted captain 
frequently maintained that the drinking incident was not due to cowardice, but he never went 
further in explaining the cause of the binge.  Although he sometimes expressed bitterness at his 
fall, Private Clement remained true to his promise and repeatedly volunteered for patrols and 
other hazardous missions.  When he was last seen alive, Clement was forward of one of the 328th 
Infantry’s lead companies apparently seeking a blood sacrifice to redeem his lost honor.7    
 The experiences of the officers, NCOs, and soldiers of the 328th Infantry on 8 October 
1918 and the specific cases of Alvin York and Charles Clement offer an interesting window into 
the overall experiences of the AEF.  In a microcosm, these events and people highlight one of the 
American military’s greatest challenges in World War I: how to build a cadre of combat leaders 
at the company level and below capable of fighting a modern industrial war without sustaining 
                                                 
 6 Ibid., 18. 
 7 Bisogno, “The Life and Death of Charles Clement,” The American Legion Magazine, January 1938, 52. 
and American Legion Magazine, March 1938, 51-2. 
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prohibitively high casualties.  The 8 October attack reveals some of the realities that made 
combat leadership such a challenge for the U. S. Army in the First World War.  These included 
inadequately and or inappropriately trained officers and NCOs, leader inexperience with the 
tools and techniques of modern war, the use of lumbering and ham-fisted tactics, organizations 
too ungainly to be controlled by novice leaders, the innate challenges of command and control in 
a pre-radio communications army, and the inability of units to learn from their mistakes due to 
heavy losses in their leader cadres.   
 In the actions of Sergeants Parsons and Early, themselves inexperienced and only 
partially-trained, we see a battlefield initiative born more of desperation and a sense of survival 
rather than the cool and deliberate actions of battle wise and professional NCOs.  Parsons later 
admitted that, “It was an awful responsibility for a non-commissioned officer to order his men to 
go to what looked to be a certain death.  But I figured it had to be done.  I figured that they had a 
slight chance of getting the machine guns.”8   Of Parsons’ actions, York noted, “He didn’t know 
how many of them [the Germans] there were.  He didn’t know for sure where they were hid.  But 
he figured it was the only chance.”9  In York’s case, his actions reflected more of his individual 
pre-war marksman and stalking skills than of his strength as a leader.  He admitted that during 
the battle, “I hadn’t time to give orders nohow” and that he limited his actions to targeting “them 
there Germans machine gunners and give them the best I had.”10   
 In the tragic case of Charles Clement we see the psychological toll that the burden of 
command took on individual leaders when the coping mechanisms of training and experience 
have not adequately prepared and armored them for the realities of combat.  Clement was 
everything that the army sought in selecting its new officers, yet he clearly recognized his own 
                                                 
 8 York, 241. 
 9 Ibid., 222. 
 10 Ibid., 226-7. 
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limitations and uncertainties and made a mistake that could have been costly to the men under 
his command.               
  Leadership is the bedrock of all armies.  It is the leader who forms the discipline and 
cohesion of the unit and directs it towards a collective effort to achieve the unit’s assigned 
mission.  In many ways, combat leadership is a rather nebulous thing to classify.  To paraphrase 
Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, it is difficult to define, but one knows it when one sees it. 
Perhaps the most simple and accurate definition of “combat leadership” is that it is the art of 
getting soldiers to do willingly what instinct and society has programmed them not to do: to 
place themselves at mortal risk and to kill others (with greater emphasis on the former concern) 
while engaged in battle.  One of the best descriptions of the role and importance of combat 
leadership comes from the sociologists Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz.  In their 
groundbreaking study of cohesion and military effectiveness in the Wehrmacht, they noted… 
 The non-commissioned officer and the junior officers are the agents on whom 
 the individual soldier depends for his relationship with the rest of the army outside 
 his immediate group, and in his relations with the outer world (the home front 
 and the enemy).  They have charge of his safety, and they are the channels through 
 which flow food, equipment, and other types of supplies as well as chance symbolic 
 gratifications such as decorations, promotions, leave, etc… [The leader] must look 
 after his men’s needs, and be able to do all the men’s duties better than they 
 themselves in training and under combat conditions.  The men also must be sure 
 that their officer is duly considerate of their lives: they must know that he does not 
 squander his human resources, that the losses of life which occur under his 
 command will be minimal and justified.11 
 
Thus, combat leadership is based on a social contract between the leader and the led.  In return 
for their subordinates’ obedience, battlefield leaders must show a genuine concern for their 
welfare and demonstrate a level of tactical competency that assures soldiers that their lives will 
not be placed at unnecessary risk.   
                                                 
 11 Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II” 
in The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer, 1948), 297. 
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 Ultimately, battlefield leadership rests on a foundation of mutual trust and confidence 
between the soldier and his superiors.  The cornerstone of that confidence is the subordinates’ 
faith that their leaders have mastered the technical and tactical aspects of their jobs and that the 
leader can provide the basic requirements of food, clothing, shelter, ammunition, and medical aid 
that hold together the body and soul.  The last point should not be downplayed, for it is part of 
the social contract of leadership and a foundation of unit cohesion and effectiveness.  The 
soldiers expected that their leaders could do these routine things routinely, and when leaders 
proved unable to produce those basic necessities, unit discipline and cohesion suffered.12  
 The study of American combat leadership during World War I is interesting and 
important because the conflict occurred against a backdrop of massive changes in warfare.  
These changes had their greatest impact on the tactical level of war and brought with them novel 
demands, requirements, and expectations for junior leaders.   As Williamson Murray and 
MacGregor Knox note in The Dynamics of Military Revolution, the First World War ushered in 
the greatest military revolution in the 20th century.13  The war melded the popular passions and 
nationalism that had been unleashed by the French Revolution, with the ability to field and 
sustain immense armies that resulted from the Industrial Revolution, and the ability to mobilize 
and direct these new titanic forces using the skills that derived from the managerial revolution.  
 The result of this “train wreck of revolutions” was a new form of mass industrial warfare 
that eclipsed all previous wars in its scope, breadth, and deadliness.  The realities of this mass 
industrial war on the Western Front tended to erase the separation of the tactical, operational, and 
                                                 
 12 The idea of the need for officers to do “routine things routinely” comes from a series of discussions held 
between the author and Dr. Dennis Showalter while the later was a visiting professor at West Point in 1998.  
Showalter attributed this basic competency as one of the pillars of the German army’s cohesion and effectiveness in 
World War II.  
 13 Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox, ed., The Dynamics of Military Revolution (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 6-11. 
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strategic levels of war as military efforts focused on the key tactical question of how to “break 
in” to the enemy’s forward defenses and then how to transform the “break in” to a “break out” 
that would end the trench stalemate and return operational and strategic mobility to the 
battlefield.  Both the Germans and the Allies tried to solve these tactical conundrums through a 
host of new technologies, doctrines, and tactics.  However, the rock upon which all of these 
efforts were wrecked was the inability for commanders at all levels to gain an accurate 
situational awareness of battlefield events and exert effective command and control of their units 
to avoid unnecessary losses or to seize fleeting opportunities.   
 Given this lack of rapid and effective command and control at the regimental level and 
above, the First World War on the Western Front placed an unheralded degree of responsibility 
and initiative into the hands of junior officers and NCOs.  It was these junior combat leaders that 
ultimately decided how, and even if, the orders of their superiors would be carried out.  In 1914 
the infantry companies of all of the major combatants were equipped purely with rifles.  By 
1917, however, the need to give junior leaders the ability to exercise their new-found initiative 
had forced all the combatants to equip their infantry companies with an arsenal of new weapons 
such as rifle grenades, light machine guns, and automatic rifles.  The adoption of new weapons 
and tactics and the need for leaders to exercise sound tactical judgment at the lowest levels 
placed new demands and emphasis on the way that armies selected and trained their junior 
leaders.   
  With leadership so important to military effectiveness, the question of who would lead 
the legions was of paramount concern to the Regular Army’s leadership from the earliest days of 
World War I.  When the United States declared war on Germany in April of 1917, the army 
immediately faced the problem of how to obtain, train, and develop a corps of officers and NCOs 
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for an expeditionary force to fight in France.  By June the army was rapidly expanding from a 
peacetime strength of 209,000 officers and men (including the National Guard) to a force that 
would eventually reach four million men. Within weeks of the declaration of the war, army 
planners estimated that the nation would need to commission an additional 200,000 officers 
alone to fight Germany.  To understand the magnitude of the problem, one should keep in mind 
that on 30 June 1916, the Regular Army had only 4,843 officers on its active rolls and could call 
on only 3,199 additional officers from the National Guard.14  The army could, in theory, produce 
adequately trained riflemen within a few months; officers and sergeants, however, usually 
required years to master the tactical, technical, and leadership responsibilities of their positions. 
 Under the stress of time, the army’s short term solution to the leader shortage was to 
graduate the West Point Class of 1917 early, recall as many retired officers as possible, and 
federalize all fit and competent National Guard officers.  The army’s long-term solution was to 
establish three-month-long Officer Training Camps (OTCs) to commission new captains and 
lieutenants.  The army also chose to select and promote sergeants directly from the ranks of the 
Regular Army and selected draftees.  Although these solutions filled the required positions in the 
expanding National Army divisions, the company-level leaders’ abilities remained questionable.    
 Although commentators in the army’s professional journals had long stressed the need for 
the service to develop junior leaders able to cope with the demands of modern war, the Regular 
Army’s own efforts to address this issue had been haphazard at best prior to World War I.  While 
the United States pulled off a minor miracle by deploying a two million man army to France 
                                                 
 14 United States Department of War, War Department Annual Report (Washington D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1916), 242. and Leonard Ayres, The War With Germany: A Statistical Summary (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1919), pp. 16- 21.  By April 1917, the Regular Army officer corps had grown to 
5,791, but the increase reflected the hasty commissioning of barely trained officers from the newly formed Officer’s 
Reserve Corps.  
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within a period of nineteen months, this was accomplished only through a series of shortcuts and 
mistakes that ultimately carried severe consequences in terms of human life.   
 Unfortunately, the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) was a 1914 army trying to 
cope with the combat realities of a 1918 war. While one must not forget that no degree of 
military preparation was going to overcome the fact that World War I operated under an 
unsolvable attritional logic, the U. S. Army’s own shortsightedness, institutional uncertainty, and 
administrative missteps contributed greatly to the AEF’s costly and awkward tactical 
performance in the last six months of the war.  To a large degree, this poor tactical showing 
stemmed from the failure of the army to field officers and NCOs able to operate efficiently and 
effectively on the modern battlefield.   
 The systemic problems associated with mass mobilization, poor personnel policies, and 
incomplete or ill-focused training meant that the AEF’s combat companies where led by officers 
and NCOs that did not understand how to employ the new weapons introduced in the war, lacked 
basic skills such as map reading, and were largely unable to employ basic casualty-saving tactics.   
This lack of leader “know how” resulted in the formation of companies and battalions that often 
lacked a strong cohesiveness and were frequently incapable of executing offensive tactics 
beyond costly frontal attacks.  
 During the Meuse Argonne Campaign, America’s largest battle of the war, the AEF was 
worn and blunted by its headlong attacks against a skillful German defense, hamstrung by a 
hopelessly tangled supply line, and slowly bled by unexpectedly high casualties and the loss of 
upwards of 100,000 soldiers straggling behind the lines.  Although the AEF’s tactical 
effectiveness in some units painfully improved by late October and early November 1918, this 
was largely due to its surviving junior leaders gaining battlefield wisdom through the battlefield 
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school of hard knocks rather than, or even in spite of, the army’s efforts to rectify its previous 
mistakes in leadership development.              
   This dissertation will examine combat leadership in the AEF at the company level and 
below to illuminate the factors that influenced American military effectiveness in World War I 
and to broaden the body of knowledge of the nation’s participation in the war.  By focusing on 
leadership at the company-level this paper hopes to further the understanding of the American 
experience at “the sharp end” of the war.  Leadership at that most basic level was one of the 
most important factors in determining how Americans fought their Great War.   
 While Pershing and his corps commanders could plan operations and order their 
execution, in the end, it was the sergeants, lieutenants, and captains, far removed from 
Chaumont, who determined what would be accomplished on the battlefield.  When the junior 
leaders failed, faltered, and bungled, the AEF’s battles became confused and uncoordinated 
slugging matches that confounded the plans and expectations of the army’s senior leaders.  To 
understand how junior combat leaders influenced the overall effectiveness of the AEF, the paper 
will explore seven main questions… 
 - What were the pre-war Regular Army’s expectations of its junior officers and NCOs? 
 
 - How well did the army understand the realities of the “firepower revolution” of 1865- 
 1914 and its new demands on junior leadership? 
 
  - After the United States entered World War I, what steps did the army take to raise, train, 
 and develop its cadre of junior leaders? 
 
 - What systemic problems associated with mobilization influenced or hindered the 
 development of a trained and effective junior leader cadre?    
 
 - What “course corrections” did the army make during the war to the way in procured, 
 trained, and developed junior leaders due to the changing realities of the conflict? 
 
 -  What was the AEF’s mechanism for identifying, judging, and processing officers 
 accused of incompetence or being unfit for combat duty, and how well did it work? 
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 - How effective were the AEF’s junior leaders at meeting the demands of combat in  
 World War I? 
 
 This dissertation will also attempt to fill in some of the historigraphical gaps of how the 
AEF prepared for, and performed in, combat.  Of all the books and articles about the AEF none 
directly address the topic of junior leadership competency in the AEF.  Historians in the last 
twenty-five years have explored the larger issues of the AEF’s senior leadership and their 
attempts to build a tactical doctrine but have given scant attention to combat at the company-
level and below.   
 Much of this scholarship has been critical of Pershing’s leadership and the AEF’s 
operational effectiveness.  For example, James Rainey’s “Ambivalent Warfare: The Tactical 
Doctrine of the AEF in World War I” (Parameters, 1983) notes that the AEF’s problems on the 
battlefield resulted from Pershing’s inability to transform his nebulous concept of “open 
warfare” into a sound doctrine that could be used by battlefield commanders.  In a similar vein, 
David Trask’s The AEF and Coalition Warmaking (Kansas, 1993) contends that Pershing’s 
insistence on an independent American army, in spite of the AEF’s glaring training and 
readiness problems, hindered the Allied war effort in 1918 and may have led to his relief from 
command had the war lasted.  While these works are valuable in understanding the large 
overarching problems of the American war effort, they do not attempt to explain how these 
issues directly affected junior leaders and soldiers on the battlefield.  
 Timothy Nenninger, the National Archives’ military records archivist, has likewise 
taken a critical view of the AEF’s performance.   In “Tactical Dysfunction in the AEF, 1917-
1918” (Military Review, October 1987), he argues that the American disdain for “European” 
methods along with their own flawed training and personnel practices prevented the AEF from 
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becoming an effective fighting force.  Nenninger expands this argument in Allan Millett and 
Williamson Murray’s Military Effectiveness: The First World War.  In his chapter, “American 
Military Effectiveness in the First World War,” Nenninger concludes that while the United 
States was strong in the political-strategic arena, the nation’s overall ill-readiness to fight a 
modern war, and its subsequent rapid mobilization, undermined the AEF’s operational and 
tactical efficiency.   
More recently, Mark Grotelueschen has expanded on Nenninger and Rainey’s arguments.  
In The AEF Way of War (Cambridge, 2007), he argues that while Nenninger and Rainey were 
correct to note the bankruptcy of Pershing’s “open warfare” doctrine, its true impact was much 
less dramatic than previous historians had maintained.  By studying the training and actions of 
the 1st, 2nd, 26th, and 77th Divisions, Grotelueschen accurately argues that leaders at the division 
and brigade level disregarded the directives form the AEF’s General Headquarters (GHQ), and 
took a more pragmatic approach to operations than those proscribed by Pershing.  One of the key 
lessons that these divisions learned was to substitute the firepower of artillery and other 
supporting weapons for that of the individual rifleman. This embrace of a “firepower centric” 
doctrine ultimately allowed these divisions to achieve their missions without prohibitive 
casualties   He also maintains that the Americans’ training with the Allies was much more 
effective in preparing the AEF for the realities of combat than the AEF GHQ admitted.    
Although Nenninger, Rainey, and Grotelueschen all examine the tactical level of war, 
they give little attention to small unit leadership or its pervasive affect on the AEF’s operations 
and overall effectiveness.  Although the doughboys perhaps picked up valuable pointers from 
their French and British counterparts, it should be noted that the initial training of any unit or 
individual becomes their basic “default setting” in combat, and is thus, very difficult to supplant 
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with different methods.  By focusing on the division and brigade levels, Grotelueschen seems to 
have overlooked the pervasive influence of inadequate and poorly focused training on operations 
at the company level and below.  The ill-coordinated and costly frontal attacks that continued to 
characterize American infantry operations from Soissons through much of the Meuse Argonne 
seem to belie Grotelueschen’s assertions.  Also, since the 1st, 2nd, and 26th Divisions were among 
the handful of units that completed their full course of training and had the dubious benefit of 
seeing more combat than the divisions that arrived in France in the spring and summer of 1918, 
they simply had a longer matriculation in the “school of hard knocks.”    
  Other historians disagree with Rainey, Trask, and Nenninger’s contention that the AEF 
was a flawed and ineffective combat force.  Paul Braim, Edward Coffman, and Kenneth 
Hamburger argue that while the AEF had its problems, in the end the army was able to identify 
and correct its shortcomings and make significant contributions to the Allied war effort.  For 
example, in Learning Lessons in the American Expeditionary Forces (CMH Pub 24-1, 1997), 
Hamburger maintains that Pershing and the AEF General Headquarters were well aware of the 
army’s training deficiencies and took successful measures to correct them.  Hamburger points to 
the AEF’s school system and GHQ efforts to capture “lessons learned” as evidence that, as an 
institution, the AEF was able to correct its tactical imperfections by learning from its past 
battlefield mistakes.  Unfortunately, Hamburger and the others often fail to see the high cost in 
casualties and unit cohesion associated with gaining “lessons learned.” Hamburger also misses 
the point that the AEF’s efforts to correct its training problems often resulted in unintended 
detrimental consequences.  Thus, while the AEF school system had noble goals, it often took 
key junior leaders away from their units at the critical times when they could have been building 
unit cohesion and their own leadership abilities.  Furthermore, extremely heavy casualties among 
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infantry and machine gun junior officers greatly hobbled the process of “learning lessons” at the 
battalion level and below.  Too many junior leaders were killed or wounded before they could 
benefit from the “battlefield wisdom” of their combat experiences.    
Although the historiography of the AEF offers slim pickings on junior leadership, other 
works examining the issue in other Allied armies are more plentiful.  These studies allow us to 
compare American wartime practices of selecting and training officers and NCOs with those 
used in the British and French armies.  This is particularly useful in the case of the British.  As 
with the Americans, the British had to rapidly expand its miniscule peacetime regular and 
reserve forces, to include a precipitous expansion of its officer and NCO corps, to meet the 
demands of mass industrial warfare.   
In many ways, the British endured the same systemic problems of mass mobilization and 
the expansion of the role of its junior leaders that would plague the Americans.  The British and 
American regular officer corps moreover seemed to share similar attitudes and prejudices on 
junior leadership and citizen soldiers.  Also, the studies of leadership in the other armies offers 
greater insight into how they attempted to solve one of the greatest tactical challenges of the war: 
maintaining effective command and control of small units in offense in the face of massive 
defensive firepower.  The works of  John Baynes, G.D. Sheffield, Martin Samuels, Michael 
Ramsay, Leonard Smith and Lord Moran all grapple with the issues of combat motivation, small 
group cohesion, and the influence of military culture on leadership and tactics in the Allied 
armies of the Great War, and will be useful in the dissertation’s examination of the same issues 
in the American army.  Given their usefulness, it is important to devote some space to comparing 
their arguments.  
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 John Baynes’ 1967 work, Morale, was the first major historical attempt to examine the 
experience of the Great War from a sociological viewpoint.  Baynes’ focuses on uncovering the 
sources of morale and combat effectiveness by investigating the experiences of the Second 
Scottish Rifles Battalion from its posting in Malta in 1911 through its first major combat action 
at Neuve Chapelle in March of 1915.  He does an excellent job of recreating the social milieu 
and military culture of this regular army unit and the aspects of leadership, cohesion, and 
regimental esprit de corps that influenced its performance during the early months of the Great 
War.  Despite enduring the terrible conditions of trench warfare in the winter of 1914-1915 and 
its heavy losses at Neuve Chapelle, Baynes argues that the communal loyalty of the regimental 
system, excellent officer-enlisted relations, strong discipline (both imposed and internal), a 
highly developed sense of duty in all ranks, and efficient administration made the Second 
Scottish Rifles an effective and reliable fighting force.15 
 Although Baynes’ work was path-breaking for its time, the work suffers from a host of 
serious flaws.  One of the major issues is the author’s lack of academic distance from his subject.  
Baynes’ father had served in the unit in World War I and went on to command it in the 1930s.  
Having basically grown up in the regiment, Baynes himself served his own army career within 
its ranks.  He took serious issue with those veterans and historians that had previously portrayed 
the British army of the Great War as an ill-led, poorly administered, and rather dim organization 
whose blind callousness resulted in the death of a generation of Britons.  Although Baynes 
occasionally admits to there having been some tensions and discontentment in the ranks, he is 
quick to argue that the regimental system and the noblesse oblige of the officer corps kept most 
of the period’s Tommies in a state of fraternal contentment.  He often cites Lord Moran as a 
                                                 
 15 John Baynes, Morale: A Study of Men and Courage: The Second Scottish Rifles at the Battle of Neuve 
Chappelle, 1915 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), 153-4. 
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theoretical source for his ideas of morale and courage, and seems to have agreed with the 
doctor’s Edwardian ideas of honor, bravery, and class.  It is also interesting to note that Baynes 
chose to halt his investigation of the Second Scottish Rifles shortly after their decimation at 
Neuve Chapelle.  Perhaps the unit’s greatest test of morale, cohesion, and leadership was not 
getting its regular soldiers and officers to face their first major test of combat, but rather their 
subsequent reactions in repeatedly rebuilding the battalion after Aubers Ridge, the Somme, and 
Ypres. 
 Despite its flaws, Morale did show the possibility of viewing a military unit as a social 
organization capable of being dissected to uncover how well, or poorly, its separate parts 
functioned and interrelated.  Baynes’ path was quickly followed by a number of historians 
attempting to understand the key issues of how individuals and military organizations coped with 
the great military changes and the unprecedented carnage of World War I.  In Leadership in the 
Trenches, for example, G.D. Sheffield examines how the realities of trench warfare influenced 
wartime British military culture.  Sheffield argues that while the war somewhat loosened the 
army’s harsh discipline and the upper classes’ grip on the officer corps, the generally good 
wartime morale of the British army still rested on pre-war assumptions of officer paternalism and 
the social deference of the enlisted man.  He notes that despite the large influx of new officers 
promoted from the ranks or appointed from the civilian middle class, regular officers were 
largely able to inculcate their public school ideas of noblesse oblige, self-sacrifice and 
paternalism on the hearts and minds of their “temporary gentlemen.”16   
 Although the four week cadet courses that commissioned the rankers and civilians were 
woefully deficient in training critical combat leadership skills, Sheffield maintains that their 
                                                 
 16 G.D. Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches: Officer-Man Relations, Morale, and Discipline in the British 
Army of the First World War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 4-8, 38-40, 56-60, 68-83, 111-113 and 178. 
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focus on instilling the attributes and values of upper-class gentility within the candidates was 
perfectly suited to the military culture of the British army.17  Regardless of social background, 
officers able to provide for the physical needs of their soldiers, exhibit courage under fire, led 
from the front, and exercise a degree of tactical common sense met the “social contract” 
demanded of their men and thus buttressed the overall morale, discipline, and combat 
effectiveness of the army as a whole. 
 Not all historians agree with Sheffield’s rather favorable conclusions on the British 
officer corps and its relations with the average Tommy.  Michael Ramsay argues that the class 
consciousness and social assumptions of the pre-war officer corps largely hindered efforts by 
reformers inside the army to adequately deal with the massive changes that occurred in warfare 
between 1870 and the Great War.  In Command and Cohesion, Ramsay notes that the largely 
rural aristocratic and gentry-based officer corps believed that industrialization and urbanization 
had sapped the lower classes of their courage, manliness, and patriotism and had left behind 
dangerous strains of individualism and liberalism.  These attitudes and prejudices greatly colored 
the British army’s approach to combat leadership and small unit tactics through the opening 
years of the Great War.18  The pre-war debate on small unit tactics centered on how to balance 
the need for obedience and discipline in what many officers saw as a flawed pool of potential 
recruits with the increased demand for soldiers able to exercise individual initiative and 
judgment due to the changing nature of warfare.   
 Unlike Sheffield, Ramsay argues that the regular officer corps was ill-prepared to solve 
this “paradigmatic crisis.”  While Ramsay agrees that the officer corps was built upon the 
structure of gentility, he notes that it was also a group that consciously denigrated professional 
                                                 
 17 Ibid., 54-5. 
 18 M.A. Ramsay, Command and Cohesion: The Citizen Soldier and Minor Tactics in the British Army 
1870-1918 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 56-73. 
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study and tended to concentrate decision-making at the highest possible level.  Ramsay points 
out that the social distance between the ranks also limited the extent of officer paternalism.  
Using Darryl Henderson’s model for the sources of leadership authority (see below), Ramsay 
maintains that the officer corps lacked both the “expert” and “referent” power needed to 
effectively lead in modern war.19  
 Ramsay also correctly identifies some of the major shortcomings in Sheffield’s 
interpretations of the British wartime training of temporary officers.  He notes that the profound 
lack of small unit training for both NCOs and officer candidates led to small units commanded 
by leaders who were unable and unwilling to act without the direct orders or supervision of their 
superiors.  Although the British army tried to bridge this yawning gap in knowledge by 
establishing a host of tactical schools in France, the lack of a standardized training and tactical 
doctrine and a shortage of qualified instructors undermined the effectiveness of these efforts.  
When the poorly prepared temporary officers and NCOs failed to meet the “high standards” of 
the regular officer corps, senior leaders believed that their pre-war social assumptions were 
proven and responded with rigid lock-step and centrally controlled tactical plans.20   
 Ramsay notes that it was only after the massive casualties of 1915 and 1916 that the 
senior army leadership was brought kicking and screaming to the conclusion that they had to 
reform their tactical doctrine.  From 1917 to the end of the war, the British army continually 
pushed more heavy weapons to the platoon and squad level and also sought to promote unit 
cohesion and effectiveness by granting junior leaders more authority and initiative.21  While 
Sheffield’s “paternalism” thesis is compelling, Ramsay’s more critical interpretation provides a 
                                                 
 19 Ibid., 38-41 and 58-60. 
 20 Ibid., 159-171. 
 21 Ibid., 184-195. 
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far more objective and balanced view of how shortcomings in leadership, training, and tactics 
undercut the British army’s combat effectiveness. 
 Many of Ramsay’s findings on the problems of leadership and training within the British 
army are echoed by Martin Samuels.  In Command or Control, Samuels argues that during 
World War I the German army was much more effective in combat than its British rival.  The 
overriding difference between the two armies was in their basic assumptions about the nature of 
combat and the military culture of command, control, and training that was derived from these 
primary biases.  Samuels maintains that the Germans viewed combat as an inherently chaotic 
endeavor and thus developed a culture of “directive control” that expected leaders to exercise 
their initiative within the overall intent of their superior commanders.  The British, on the other 
hand, saw combat as an essentially structured activity that required commanders to exercise top-
down “restrictive control” to keep subordinates from derailing the higher command’s battle 
plans.22   
 As with Ramsay, Samuels notes that British pre-war and wartime training of soldiers, 
NCOs, and junior officers was far too scripted and unrealistic to prepare them to face actual 
combat conditions or to exercise individual initiative or any decentralized plan.  The Germans, 
however, sought to condition their officers and NCOs to act in the absence of orders when 
unexpected circumstances arose on the battlefield.23  Unlike the British, the Germans also strove 
to strengthen small unit cohesion by returning recovered wounded soldiers back to the units from 
which they came.24  Although Samuels downplays the difficulty the German army had in 
expanding their forces during the war and in maintaining the quality of their junior officers and 
                                                 
 22 Martin Samuels, Command or Control: Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German 
Armies: 1888-1918 (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 3-5 and 289. 
 23 Ibid., 77-80, 94-101, 118-121, 226-7. 
 24 Ibid., 224-5. 
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NCOs, he is correct to note how an army’s culture and social assumptions color its expectations 
of leadership, tactics, and its overall approach to war. 
 Issues of military culture are also the focus of Leonard Smith’s Between Mutiny and 
Obedience.  Smith examines the experiences of the French 5th Infantry Division to uncover how 
the social and military expectations of its soldiers influenced their response to the French 
mutinies of 1917.  Drawing upon Michel Foucault’s theory of “resistance and struggle” within 
power relationships, Smith argues that “from the first day of the war, a gray area existed between 
command expectations and what soldiers in the trenches determined what was possible.”25  To 
Smith, the relationship between the division’s junior leaders and soldiers and their senior 
commanders was one of constant negotiation to set the unit’s boundaries of command authority, 
soldier aggressiveness and allowable dissent.  While the French soldier truly wanted to win the 
war, they still believed that they had a social contract with their officers that sought to mediate 
the proportionality of their aggressiveness based on a calculation of risk and gain.26   
 Smith notes that while these tacit negotiations had buttressed unit morale and 
effectiveness though 1915, they quickly broke down under the relentless grinding of Verdun.  
The costly and protracted nature of fighting at Verdun left the division’s soldiers with a growing 
sense of helplessness, despair, and fatalism.27  Smith notes that after the bloody failure of the 
1917 Nivelle Offensive extinguished any lingering hope that the French soldiers had of quickly 
ending both the war and their misery, they launched a “soldier strike” to force “management” to 
renegotiate the balance of proportionality.  While Henri Pétain quickly moved to suppress the 
mutiny, he also worked to address the soldiers’ grievances.  Smith argues that Pétain was 
                                                 
 25 Leonard V. Smith, Between Mutiny and Obedience: The Case of the French Fifth Infantry Division 
during World War I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 14. 
 26 Ibid., 64-73 and 90-6. 
 27 Ibid., 139-156. 
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ultimately able to restore order in the French army by tacitly accepting the social contract of 
proportionality and severely limiting the scope and duration of French operations.  
 Between Mutiny and Obedience is an exceptionally thought provoking work.  Although 
Smith goes too far in his comparison of military organizations to labor unions, his concept of a 
military social contract of proportionality is perceptive and accurate. Although no professional 
military officer will readily admit it, the individual soldier has great individual agency in 
deciding the ferocity of combat.  Thus, while a general may order an attack, it is the junior 
officers, noncommissioned officers and privates that actually decide the degree in which the 
order will be carried out.  This being said, Smith is too quick to discount the coercive power that 
a nation grants its military to keep soldiers in line.  The ability of a military to punish its 
members pour encouragement des autres remains a powerful tool for enforcing discipline and 
motivating soldiers to face the harsh realities of battle. 
 Although it is not a work on the Great War per say, Lord Moran’s Anatomy of Courage is 
a critical exploration of the larger issue of why individuals and units fail to cope with the stress 
of combat.  Moran served as a frontline military doctor in World War I and was Winston 
Churchill’s personal physician during the Second World War.  Based mostly on his experience in 
World War I, Moran postulated that each soldier had a reservoir of courage that was slowly 
drained by the experience of combat.  The depth of the reservoir varied greatly from man to man, 
but once it was dry, the man was no longer an effective soldier.28  He argued that soldiers go 
through phases of courage and effectiveness during their time in combat.  After the first shock of 
battle, soldiers progress through a period where they feel themselves invulnerable to harm.  
However, as others around him fall, the soldier either descends into a state of fatalistic apathy or 
                                                 
 28 Lord Moran, Anatomy of Courage (London: Constable and Company, 1945), xvi and 61-5. 
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begins to slide into a pervasive sense of fear and foreboding that eventually ends his utility as a 
combatant.   
 Moran’s assertions are also borne out in the research of Samuel Stouffer and seven other 
prominent sociologists and psychologists in The American Soldier, an examination of the overall 
motivations, effectiveness, attitudes, and experiences of the American soldier in World War II 
based on an unprecedented survey of soldiers conducted by the U.S. Army Research Branch 
during the war.  They noted that the most effective period of combat performance in World War 
II infantrymen peaked at 3.5 to 3.9 months in combat for privates and at seven months for NCOs.  
After those peaks, the soldiers rapidly lost their combat edge and were then more likely to suffer 
combat fatigue or wounds.29   
 Although Moran offers insightful observations on why soldiers stop fighting, there are 
fundamental problems with his work which limits its utility to the modern historian.  While 
Moran accepted the view that all men exhibit fear to some degree in combat, he never truly 
defined the line between natural fear and cowardice.  Many of his assumptions on the soldiers 
that were most likely to break under the strain of combat were too deeply rooted in Victorian and 
Edwardian class and racial assumptions.  Moran argued that the Great War had been such a 
psychological shock to its participants because modern society had allowed them to become too 
sensitive and soft, and thus, lowered their “resistance to fear.”30  He maintained that men of 
“good stock” and race simply did not allow their fears to turn them into cowards and that 
courage was a moral quality that sprung from good character and willpower.  His subtext was 
that the lower classes lacked the innate characteristics to promote prolonged courage.  The 
masses needed officers of character and regimental culture to build up their resistance to fear and 
                                                 
 29 Samuel Stouffer, et al., The American Soldier, Vol. II, Combat and Its Aftermath (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1949), 286. 
 30 Moran., 11. 
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to save them from falling prey to their animal instincts for survival.31  The greatest utility of 
Moran’s work is that his beliefs and attitudes tend to mirror those of British and American 
officers in World War I.   
 Having examined the major historiographical works on the effectiveness of the AEF and 
leadership in the Great War, I will now discuss the parameters of the dissertation and the sources 
that have influenced my methodological approach for examining junior leadership in the AEF. 
Although the dissertation will touch on officers from a large array of commissioning sources, it 
will concentrate mainly on the officers commissioned through the OTCs.  The OTCs graduates 
comprised over 74% of the officers commissioned during the war and over two-thirds of the 
army’s line officers.  National Guard officers comprised only nine percent of the commissioned 
ranks while those of the Regular Army accounted for only five percent of the officer corps 
during the war.32  Also, while the study will touch on the experiences of all the combat arms, it 
will focus mainly on the leadership in infantry and machine gun units. Infantry officers and 
soldiers constituted the bulk of the troops in the AEF, and the army leadership from Pershing 
downward considered the infantry the core element of the army. Leadership, both good and bad, 
is also generally more discernable in the historical records of infantry and machine gun officers 
and NCOs.   
 While the thesis will touch on the leadership of African American officers in the AEF, 
this discussion will be, of necessity, brief.  African American officers faced problems in 
leadership training and professional development that were largely identical to those of their 
white peers, but the endemic racism of the period added a dimension of complexity to the 
                                                 
 31 Ibid., 183-200. 
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subject that could not be adequately addressed in this paper.  Without in any way slighting the 
contribution of African American officers in the war, it should be noted that they made up less 
than .07% of the wartime officer corps.33  All of the caveats applied to the officer corps will also 
apply to the dissertation’s examination of the AEF’s NCOs. Throughout the dissertation, the 
term “junior leadership” is meant to encompass all ranks within a company from captain to a 
corporal squad leader. 
 Before beginning the study, it is also important to delineate or describe the attribute of 
sound leadership and its linkage to unit morale, individual motivation, cohesion, and 
effectiveness. These things are inextricably connected.  War, at its heart, is about killing and 
dying.  Military leaders must motivate or coerce their soldiers to do what instinct, common 
sense, and peacetime moral and legal stricture tells them not to do: place themselves in mortal 
danger and kill their fellow man. Although this reality is as old as warfare itself, the lethality of 
the twentieth century battlefield brought with it new leadership challenges.  As military 
technology forced armies to spread and thin out their tactical formations and to seek protective 
cover, the traditional centralized Kadavergehorsam discipline of the muzzle-loading era was no 
longer possible. As the military sociologist Darryl Henderson notes, 
 Coercive motivation is based on the need of the individual to avoid severe 
 physiological deprivation, hardship, or pain for himself or for someone he values.   
 Such an approach is often termed negative motivation, and the individual is 
 alienated from the organization.  The limitation of this type of motivation for an  
 army is obvious…  No longer do soldiers enter combat in rigid formations 
 under the watchful eye of noncommissioned officers who are behind them with 
 swords drawn.  Modern weapons and tactics have made direct control of troops in  
 combat exceeding difficult if not impossible.  The dispersion, confusion, chance, 
 and danger that characterize modern battlefields have caused a significant historical 
 shift downwards in the locus of control…34   
                                                 
 33 Arthur F. Barbeau and Florette Henri, The Unknown Soldiers: Black American Troops in World War I 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1974), 58. 
 34 William D. Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat  (Washington DC: National Defense 
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As previously noted, the modern battlefield that emerged during the First World War placed 
much greater demands on the initiative, aggressiveness, and motivation of the junior leader and 
the individual soldier than had been required of them in earlier times.35   
 One of the first and most influential American theorists to explore the how changes in 
modern warfare altered the physical and psychological realities of men in combat was         
S.L.A. Marshall.  In his seminal work, Men Against Fire, Marshall notes that “The battlefield is 
cold. It is the lonesomest place which men share together,” and berated the Army for its failure 
to properly train and indoctrinate its infantrymen in World War II to meet the reality of the 
modern “empty battlefield.”36    As a result of poor weapons and leadership training, a general 
breakdown in communications throughout all levels of command, and flawed replacement 
policies that undercut small unit cohesion, Marshall maintains that the average American soldier 
was a singularly ineffective combatant.  After conducting post-battle interviews of soldiers in 
over 400 infantry companies, Marshall claims that only 15 to 20 percent of American 
infantrymen in World War II ever fired their weapons in combat.37  To counter this inertia, and 
the fear and sense of isolation that caused it, he argued that the Army had to focus its attentions 
on creating competent junior leaders and tightly knit small units where each individual had an 
important “social identity” that contributed to the overall survival and effectiveness of the larger 
group. To Marshall, the squad was the most important level for building unit cohesion; it was at 
that basic level where the individual developed the trust and confidence to overcome the 
psychological stress of battle.  With proper training in weapons and tactics, junior leaders and 
                                                 
 35 Peter Paret, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy, “Men Against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914,” 
by Michael Howard (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 510-526. 
 36 S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire (Glouchester, MA: Peter Smith Publishing, 1978), 42. 
 37 Ibid., 53-4. 
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soldiers would be able to exercise the “thinking initiative” that he saw as key to winning modern 
wars by increasing ratios of fire and enabling effective battlefield communications.38   
 Although Roger Spiller and John Whiteclay Chambers rightly take Marshall to task over 
his methodology and his conclusions, their criticism does not lessen the accuracy of his 
observations on small unit leadership and cohesion.39   His focus on the importance of junior 
leaders in the building of the individual soldier’s “social identity” within the small unit is 
certainly valuable in understanding unit cohesion and combat motivation.  Marshall accurately 
notes that leader competency, and the faith that members of a small unit have that each of their 
comrades can be counted on to contribute to the greater good of the group, are the major impetus 
for impelling soldiers to kill and risk death.   
 Marshall argues that effective leaders from the company to the squad level exercised 
diligence in the care of their soldiers, administered punishments and rewards by a “standard of 
resolute justice,” and demonstrated military bearing, courage, creative intelligence, and physical 
fitness.  Good leaders also had “a basic understanding of the simple fact that soldiers wish to 
think of themselves as soldiers” and were thus not adolescents to be dealt with in a “classroom 
manner.”  Lastly, Marshall maintains that sound leaders held an “innate respect for the dignity of 
the position and the work of other men.”40       
 Marshall’s belief that good armies are fundamentally built upon a foundation of good  
squads, platoons, and companies is also shared by Darryl Henderson.  In Cohesion: The Human 
Element in Combat, Henderson compares the combat performance of American, North 
                                                 
 38 Ibid., 86-94, 108, 127, 135, and 144-4.  
 39 Roger Spiller, “S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire,” Royal United Services Institute, Vol. 133, No. 4 
(Winter 1988), 63-71 and John Whiteclay Chambers III, “S.L.A. Marshall’s Men Against Fire: New Evidence 
Regarding Fire Ratios,” Parameters, Autumn 2003, 113-121.  Spiller argued that Marshall’s “ratio of fire” argument 
was based on too small of a sample to be accurate.  Both Spiller and Chambers noted that there was no evidence that 
Marshall approached the subject of ratios of fire in any systematic method and that it seemed to have been only a 
minor point in his combat interviews.  
 40 Marshall, 163-4. 
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Vietnamese, Israeli, and Soviet units at the company-level and below to uncover the factors that 
have enabled small combat units to retain their focus on achieving their military missions in the 
face of privation, fear, and death.  While the work was intended to support the author’s 
contention that the United States needed to replace the All Volunteer Army with a system of 
conscription focused on creating American soldiers with enough civic virtue, ideological 
commitment, and group identity to face their Soviet enemies, he offers useful insights into the 
importance of leadership and the socialization of the primary group in the building of effective 
and cohesive units.   
 Henderson argues that the small unit level is the key crucible of cohesion because it is the 
primary point where “the organization [the larger Army], the individual soldier, and the leader 
[junior officer and mid-grade NCO] come together.”41  In militarily effective units, the squad and 
platoon provide for its individual member’s physical, security, and social needs by supplying the 
basics of life (food, water, etc), establishing norms of behavior to regulate the group’s actions 
and relations with higher authority, giving the individual a sense that he has some control over 
his destiny, creating strong relationships with the unit’s leaders, and by providing sources of self-
esteem, group recognition, and mutual affection within the unit.42  To Henderson, the major 
sources of cohesion are leadership and the norms of behavior that the leader established within 
the small unit to regulate its day-to-day activities.  The normative power of the unit creates the 
expected behavior of the soldier in, and out of, combat by establishing the “ground rules” for 
performance and rewarding or punishing unit members based on their actions according to the 
unit norm. 
                                                 
 41 Henderson, 11-12. 
 42 Ibid., 13-21. 
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 As with Marshall, Henderson places a premium on leadership in building unit cohesion 
and military effectiveness.  However, Henderson delves much further than Marshall in 
identifying the characteristics of effective military leadership and the key roles that the leader 
must play in building and sustaining small unit morale and solidarity.  Henderson decries the 
baleful influence of “managerial” and “bureaucratic” forms of leadership that sought to treat men 
as mere commodities to be profitably spent to attain the goals of the military “corporation.”  To 
him, effective junior leaders had to emphasize the “personal, empathetic, and continuous face-to-
face contact with all soldiers in the unit.”43  This intimate contact between the soldier and the 
leader built within the unit the vital faith that the soldiers’ lives would not be risked needlessly 
and that the unit’s leadership earnestly cared about the well being of the individual.  It also 
served to assure the individual that they were not simply replaceable cogs within the 
“corporation” but were in fact key components to the success of the small unit and the larger 
military.   
 Ultimately, Henderson maintains that the key role of the leader is to create and use the 
norms within the small group to achieve the goals of the higher military organization.  The leader 
builds the internalized values that helps his soldiers cope with fear and thus achieve the mission, 
and also corrects any deviations by individuals of the unit’s norms.44 Henderson notes that the 
leader must always reconcile the needs of the individual with the demands of the larger 
organization.  This balancing act requires the leader to understand the ever changing limitations 
of the physical and mental needs of their soldiers and also his unit’s role within the missions of 
the higher organization. 
                                                 
 43 Ibid., 108. 
 44 Ibid., 111. 
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 One of the more useful aspects of Henderson’s work is his model explaining the sources 
of a leader’s influence within the unit.  He notes that the leader’s effectiveness and authority 
derives from his reward and coerce power, legitimate power, referent power, and expert power.  
Reward and coercive power gives the leader the ability to build and direct group norms by giving 
the individual positive and negative incentives to conform to the unit’s expected behavior.  
Rewards and punishment target the individual’s self-esteem, sense of security, and acceptance 
within the framework of the unit as a whole, thus giving the leader a great source of authority 
while also reinforcing the unity and loyalty of the group.  Legitimate power is derived from the 
culture, laws, and values of the larger society.  It gives the leader the “official” and legal right to 
exercise the authority of their position.  Referent power is the leader’s ability to control others 
based on the respect and affection that he receives from his soldiers.  The referent leader has 
built within his unit an “intense identification” between himself and his soldiers based on his 
intimate knowledge of his subordinates, his proven ability to deal with difficult situations, and 
his willingness to share the hardships of his men.  Expert power is given to the leader when he is 
“perceived as having superior knowledge and ability important to the soldier and his unit” that 
improves the group’s effectiveness or survival.45  Although Henderson argues that units led by 
officers using referent power tended to be the most cohesive, all of the sources of influence were 
critical to linking the goals of the unit to those of the larger organization.  Due to its clarity and 
completeness, Henderson’s model of leadership and influence will be the primary analytical tool 
used in this dissertation for exploring the effectiveness of the NCOs and junior officers of the 
AEF in World War I.   
 As the dissertation will also study the link between junior leadership, morale, cohesion, 
and combat effectiveness, in addition to Henderson’s model of leadership and influence, I will 
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also use John Lynn’s model of combat effectiveness to help explain the strengths and 
weaknesses of the AEF’s junior leaders and small units.  In Bayonets of the Republic, Lynn’s 
examination of the motivations and tactics in the armies of Revolutionary France, he argues that 
the relative combat effectiveness of military units derives from a complex interplay of individual 
interests, the unit’s motivational system, and the nation’s overarching military system.  Lynn 
defines individual interests as the mixture of compliance (based on coercion, remuneration, and 
symbolic or psychological reward) with the soldier’s self-interest in seeking his own well-being 
and survival.   
 The motivational system consists of morale created from societal attitudes, 
indoctrination, wartime opinions, conditions of the service, and esprit de corps; the group 
dynamics and shared values and attitudes that make up primary group cohesion; and the 
individual’s initial, sustaining; and combat motivation.  The overall military system consists of 
the disciplinary subsystem; the tactical system of weapons, doctrine, training, experience, and 
tactics; the administrative system of logistics, services, maintenance, and manpower policy 
(doing routine things routinely); the organizational system that establishes the size and 
composition of units; and the command system that controls the selection and promotion of 
leaders, command structure, and communications.  Lynn maintains that “in combination the 
elements becomes a whole, and as a whole they contribute to combat effectiveness…the inherent 
ability of a military force to overcome its enemy in battle.”46  Henderson and Lynn’s models are 
complementary and often overlapping.  Lynn is most useful in examining the larger systemic 
issues that play upon military effectiveness while Henderson is best when exploring the small 
unit realities that foster or hinder cohesion and efficiency.  
                                                 
 46 John Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984), 38.  Lynn explains 
his model of combat effectiveness on pages 21-40. 
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 Marshall, Henderson, and Lynn all emphasize the importance of primary group cohesion, 
and the critical role that junior leaders play in its creation and maintenance in building combat 
effectiveness.  Although Marshall describes a similar phenomenon in Men Against Fire, the 
notion of primary group cohesion originated with Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz. In their 
seminal 1948 study “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II”, they 
argued that the primary reason that German units maintained a greater degree of combat 
effectiveness over their Allied counterparts was the Wehrmacht’s deliberate policy of crafting 
and preserving a close-knit social identity within its squads and platoons.  This primary group 
identity satisfied the individual’s physical and psychological needs, and thus created a built-in 
resistance to the innate stresses of combat.  As they noted, 
 The ordinary German soldier…was likely to go on fighting, provided he had the  
 necessary weapons, as long as the group possessed leadership with which he could 
 identify himself, and as long as he gave affection to and received affection from 
 the other members of his squad and platoon.  In other words, as long as he felt  
 himself to be a member of his primary group and therefore bound by the expectations 
 and demands of its other members, his soldierly achievement was likely to be good.47           
  
It was only after casualties, especially among the unit’s leaders, began to erode the “face-to-face” 
familial relationship among the unit members, and the unit was increasing unable to meet the 
individual’s demand for physical survival (in terms of obtaining the necessities of life) that the 
effectiveness of the German soldier began a precipitous decline.  The importance of this study to 
the dissertation is that it offers a means for understanding how units function under the long-term 
duress of combat.  Heavy losses of leadership, poor personnel policies, and logistical 
shortcomings proved to be as great of a detriment to the maintenance of primary group cohesion 
in the AEF as it was in the Wehrmacht.  
                                                 
 47 Shils and Janowitz, 284. 
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 When combined together, Marshall, Henderson, Lynn, Shils and Janowitz provide a 
sound intellectual basis for evaluating the AEF’s junior leadership and its influence on the 
army’s cohesion and effectiveness. With the goals, parameters, and methodology of the 
dissertation now established, it is time to begin the examination of company-level leadership in 
the U. S. Army in the Great War.   
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Chapter 2 
“To Be Instructed in the Dark Art and Mystery of Managing Men”  
Junior Officers in the Old Army   
 
 In his 1888 short story Only a Subaltern, Rudyard Kipling wrote of his young subject, 
“He became an officer and a gentleman, which is an enviable thing.” In the story Kipling also 
noted that the subaltern was expected to sit at the feet of his veteran captain “to be instructed in 
the dark art and mystery of managing men.”1  To understand the First World War U. S. Army’s 
conception of company-level officership, we must first appreciate the pre-war Regular Army’s 
expectations for its junior officers: the roles, characteristics, skills and abilities that the Regular 
Army, as an institution, expected of those acting as “an officer and a gentleman.”   
 It is also important to understand the Regular Army’s systems and traditions for passing 
on to its young officers those leadership traits and skills -“the dark art and mystery of managing 
men”- that would allow them to command in combat.  This is a good starting point for a 
discussion of combat leadership in the AEF, for the Regular Army attempted to impose its 
institutional culture of leadership upon the National Guard and National Army officers and 
NCOs that fought in World War I.  Although its soldiers and officers were largely short-service 
conscripts and volunteers, the AEF was a child of the Regular Army.  Given the fact that Regular 
Army officers dominated the senior command and staff positions in the wartime army, it is no 
surprise that the selection and training of the AEF’s junior leaders were shaped largely by the 
attitudes, assumptions, and prejudices of the pre-war regulars.   
 This chapter will examine these pre-war Regular Army leadership attitudes, assumptions, 
and prejudices as a point of departure for explaining its later efforts to raise a corps of junior 
leaders during World War I.  To accomplish this goal, the chapter will examine several key 
                                                 
 1 Rudyard Kipling, “Only a Subaltern,” in Soldiers Three: A Collection of Stories (New York: John W. 
Lovell Company, 1890), 184.  
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questions.  What leadership, tactical, and technical skills and abilities did the Regular Army 
expect from company-level leaders (captain through corporal) from 1900-1917?   How did the 
Regular Army attempt to reform the training and professional development of junior leaders 
from 1900-1917?  How effective were these reforms?  What issues of junior leadership remained 
unresolved prior to World War I?   How did the Regular Army view the junior leaders of the 
National Guard and other reserve forces? What efforts had the reserve forces made in reforming 
the training and professional development of its junior leaders from 1900-1917?  How effective 
were these reforms?  The answers to these questions will provide the background and context for 
understanding the wartime army’s comprehension and expectations of its junior leaders. 
 The Regular Army that entered World War I was the product of thirty years of 
professional and operational ferment.  In the time between the Spanish American War and the 
American entry into World War I, the army was rocked by a series of shock waves that had 
changed the composition, direction, and culture of the institution.  The changes to the army’s 
structure caused by the war with Spain and the Philippine Insurrection were so great that the 
army was still coping with the repercussions of its expansion up to the eve of the Great War.  
The expansion of the army between 1898 and 1902 allowed it to accomplish its new imperial 
constabulary mission, but it also fundamentally changed the complexion of the military’s officer 
and NCO corps.   
 The army of the early and mid 1890s was a relatively pastoral organization led by long 
service officers and NCOs.  As late as 1897, Civil War veterans still composed over 46 percent 
of all infantry captains.2  Although Civil War era volunteer officers and wartime veterans 
                                                 
 2 This figure comes from my analysis of the captains in the army’s 25 infantry regiments drawn from the 
1897 edition of the Army Register.  The Register provides the birth dates, source of commission, and assignment 
history of every Regular Army soldier of the year in question.  See Adjutant General’s Office, Official Army 
Register for 1897 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 1, 1896), 104-178.  
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promoted from the enlisted ranks accounted for nearly half of all captains, graduates of the 
United States Military Academy (hereafter referred to as West Point or USMA) had finally 
began to reassert their dominance within the ranks of the army’s lieutenants.  In 1897, for 
example, West Point graduates accounted for over 67 percent of all infantry first lieutenants and 
73 percent of all infantry second lieutenants.3   
 Between the Civil War and the Spanish American War, it became increasingly difficult 
for enlisted soldiers and civilians to enter the officer corps. Congress tried to overturn this drift 
toward exclusivity in June of 1878 by passing an act that allowed for the “promotion of 
meritorious non-commissioned officers” to fill any annual second lieutenant vacancies remaining 
after the commissioning of the year’s West Point class.  To qualify for the position, the NCO had 
to be unmarried, between the ages of 21 and 30, be nominated by an officer, and pass an 
examination that judged his knowledge of English, arithmetic (to include algebra, logarithms, 
and geometry), American geography, American history, the Constitution, and the American 
governmental system.  The candidate also had to pass a physical examination and prove to a 
local board of officers that he had a “sound mental condition, excellent moral character, a good 
character for sobriety and fidelity,” and had previously exhibited “intelligent, energetic, 
judicious, and faithful performance as may have devolved upon him in the Army.”4   
 On 30 July 1892, Congress amended the act of 1879 by expanding the pool of those 
enlisted men seeking commissions to include any soldier who had at least two years of honorable 
service (thus making privates eligible), by giving the soldier himself, rather than his officer the 
power to initiate the proceedings, and by mandating that the army establish local or departmental 
preliminary examining boards to certify the candidates’ mental, moral, and physical 
                                                 
 3 Ibid. 
 4 Adjutant General’s Office, General Order No. 62, August 26, 1878.  
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qualifications, and an annual central competitive examination board that would test all 
candidates each September. These new directives were codified in the army’s General Order No. 
76 in November of 1892.5   
 Throughout the period, civilians could also compete for commissions to fill any second 
lieutenant positions still vacant after the commissioning of the year’s West Point cadets and 
enlisted candidates.  The only major difference between the enlisted and civilian examinations 
for commission was that the enlisted soldiers received an additional test of the knowledge of 
army and drill regulations and that the civilians only had to pass one examination board.  For 
both enlisted men and civilian candidates, these examining boards were far from being easy.  
One officer who had been too nearsighted to enter West Point but still managed to work his way 
into a Regular Army commission by serving in the National Guard and the U.S. Volunteers 
remarked, “Those examinations, to a college graduate, would seem trivial.  They were trivial in 
scope but in thoroughness they were alarming.”  In the end, the subjects of the examination 
“made a list that had taken months of work to properly prepare.”6  The practical part of the exam, 
where the candidates demonstrated their ability to command actual soldiers in the regulation 
infantry drill, was also daunting.  As George Rodney remembered, “I saw men whom I had seen 
in action, turn nervous and embarrassed when they had to raise their voice in command.  It seems 
laughable now. It did not seem so then.”7   
 Although the army and Congress periodically made slight revisions of the 1892 General 
Order No. 76, it remained the basis for commissioning enlisted soldiers up to the Great War.  
Although Congress had intended to offer an avenue for promotion by merit to the army’s enlisted 
men, few were actually able to make the leap to the officer ranks prior to 1898.  Between 1879 
                                                 
 5 Adjutant General’s Office, General Order No. 79, November 26, 1892. 
 6 George B. Rodney, As a Cavalryman Remembers (Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, 1944), 84-5. 
 7 Ibid., 86. 
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and 1898, only 171 enlisted men received commissions.  During the same period, the army 
commissioned 1042 West Point graduates and 113 civilians with no prior military service. 
Although historian Jack Foner maintains that the changes greatly increased the enlisted soldiers’ 
opportunity for obtaining a commission, for the most part, the officer corps of the 1880s and 
1890s remained an insular organization.8   
 This rather stable and exclusive arrangement was shattered by the war of 1898 and the 
army’s lingering counterinsurgency in the Philippines.  The War with Spain forced the army to 
immediately raise three volunteer regiments of cavalry, three of engineers, and ten of infantry.  
Although the government quickly disbanded these units following the peace with Spain, the 
ongoing pacification of the Philippines resulted in Congress raising 24 new U.S. Volunteer 
Infantry Regiments between 1899 and 1900.  Additionally, Congress permanently expanded the 
Regular Army by five infantry and five cavalry regiments.   
 These organizational changes had a dramatic effect on the army’s junior leaders.  Within 
a space of seven years, the number of infantry captains, lieutenants and sergeants doubled.  To 
fill the commissioned ranks of the volunteer and new permanent regiments, the army was forced 
to commission civilians in numbers that had not been seen since the Civil War.  This caused the 
army, as an institution, to recruit, train, assimilate, and acculturate large numbers of officers with 
little or no military experience, education, or training.  As there was no standard method for 
accomplishing these tasks, the absorption of these “outside” people into the heretofore closed 
ranks of the officer corps was ad hoc and, at times, painful.   
 The army’s greatest problem was certifying that their new officers had the proper 
intellectual, moral, and professional attributes for the positions that they held. The army further 
                                                 
 8 John J. Lenney, Rankers (New York: Greenberg Publishers, 1950), 122-135. and Jack Foner, The United 
States Soldier Between Two Wars (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), 69-72. 
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exacerbated its leadership challenges by rapidly commissioning a large number of sergeants and 
other enlisted men.  This basically “robbed Peter to pay Paul” and caused a void of NCO 
leadership within its small combat units as experienced, talented, and educated corporals and 
sergeants left the ranks to become lieutenants.  The massive change that overtook the officer 
corps become apparent when one examines the commissioning sources of the army’s company-
grade leaders in 1897, 1905, and 1915 (Tables 2-1, 2-2, and 2-3).9   
Table 2-1: Source of Commission for Regular Army Infantry Captains 
 Source of    
 
commission 
 
 
Year 
 USMA    
 Grad    
 and % 
 Enlisted  
 To RA   
 and % 
 National  
 Guard   
 officer   
 to RA   
 and % 
 Enlisted to 
 volunteer  
 officer to  
 RA and % 
 Volunteer  
 officer to  
 RA and %
 College  
 Grad  
 direct to  
 RA and %
 Civilian  
 appointment to  
 RA and % 
 
 
 
   Total 
 1897     86  
 (34.4 %) 
    37 (1)  
 (14.8%) 
  N/A      42 (2) 
  (16.8%) 
 
    43 (2) 
 (17.2%) 
 
   Not   
 specified  
 in Army 
 Register 
       42 
   (16.8%) 
   250 
 1905    291 
 (64.5%) 
    86 
 (19%) 
    7 
 (1.5%) 
   6 (3) 
 (1.3%) 
    7 (3) 
 (1.5%) 
     30 
 (6.7 %) 
      24 
    (5.4%) 
    451 
 1915   125 
 (25.7%) 
   135 
 (27.8%) 
  34 
 (7.0%) 
   45 (3) 
 (9.2%) 
    77 (3) 
 (15.8%) 
     26 
 (5.3%) 
    45 
   (9.2) 
    485 
(1) 31 of 37 were Civil War veterans. (2) All officers were Civil War veterans. After adding the officers listed in (1) 
and (2), 46.4 % of RA captains in 1897 were Civil War veterans. (3) All served as officers in U.S. Volunteer units 
raised for the Philippine Insurrection. 
                                                 
9 These tables are based on information drawn from the following, Adjutant General’s Office, Official 
Army Register for 1897 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 1, 1896), 104-178.,  The 
Military Secretary’s Office, Official Army Register for 1905 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
December 1, 1904), 215-346., The Adjutant General’s Office, Official Army Register for 1915 (Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, December 1, 1914), 292-436 and 440-458. These figures do not include the officers 
assigned to the Porto Rican Infantry Regiment or the Philippine Scouts.  In both cases, the Army considered these 
units to be a separate category of the regular establishment with set rules governing their employment.  The choice 
of these three years is intended to present “snapshots” of the Regular Army’s infantry junior officer corps before the 
changes of the War with Spain and Philippine Insurrection (1897), after the changes caused by those conflicts had 
occurred (1905), and before the changes to the officer ranks caused by the Great War (1915).         
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Table 2-2: Source of Commission for Regular Army Infantry First Lieutenants 
Source of   
commission 
 
 
Year 
 USMA  
 Grad   
 and % 
Enlisted   
 To RA  
 and % 
 National 
 Guard  
 officer  
 to RA  
 and % 
 Enlisted to 
 volunteer  
 officer to  
 RA and % 
 Volunteer 
 officer to  
 RA and %
 College  
 Grad  
 direct to  
 RA and %
 Civilian  
 appointment   
 to  RA and % 
 
 
 
   Total 
 1897     194  
(67.3 %) 
    50 (1) 
 (17 %) 
  N/A       1 (2) 
 (.03%) 
    0    Not   
 specified  
 in Army 
 Register 
    46 
  (15.7%) 
   294 
 1905      29 
 (6.5%) 
    119 
 (26.6 %) 
    45 
 (10.2 %) 
   80 (3) 
  (17.9 %) 
    95 (3) 
 (21.4 %) 
     26  
  (5.8 %) 
     51 
  (11.5%) 
    445 
 1915   198 
(41.4 %) 
   189 
 (29.5 %) 
    8 
 (1.6 %) 
   17 (3) 
  (3.5 %) 
    4 (3) 
  (.8%) 
     38 
 (7.9 %) 
    25 
 (5.3 %) 
    479 
(1) 2 of 50 were Civil War veterans. (2) Officer was a Civil War veteran. 
(3) All served as officers in U.S. Volunteer units raised for the Philippine Insurrection 
 
Table 2-3:  Source of Commission for Regular Army Infantry Second Lieutenants 
  Source of    
 commission 
 
 
 Year 
 USMA 
 Grad  
 and % 
 Enlisted  
 to RA and 
 % 
 National 
 Guard   
 officer  
 to RA   
 and % 
 Enlisted to 
 volunteer  
 officer to  
 RA and % 
 Volunteer 
 officer to  
 RA and %
 College  
 Grad  
 direct to  
 RA and %
 Civilian  
 appointment  
 to RA and % 
 
 
 
    Total 
 1897    157  
 (73 %) 
    46 
 (21.3 %) 
   N/A       0     0    Not   
 specified  
 in Army 
 Register 
     12 
  (5.6 %) 
   215 
 1905    108 
 (26 %) 
    222 
 (53.6 %) 
     4 
  (1 %) 
   9 (1) 
  (2.1 %) 
    2 (1) 
   (.5%) 
     42 
   (10 %) 
     27 
  (6.5 %) 
    414 
 1915   232 
 (52.4   
 %) 
   48 
 (10.8%) 
    0     1 (1) 
  (.2%) 
     1 (1) 
  (.2 %) 
      90 
  (20.4 %) 
    70   (15.8%)     442 
(1) All served as officers in U.S. Volunteer units raised for the Philippine Insurrection. 
 The figures illustrate that between 1897 and 1905 the expansion of the company-grade 
officer corps was accomplished mostly through the commissioning of enlisted soldiers and the 
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transfer of U.S. Volunteer Infantry officers to the Regular Army.  This also included those 
enlisted soldiers from the Regular Army or National Guard who were commissioned to fill 
positions within volunteer units and then later filled officer vacancies in the regular 
establishment.  The figures also show the long term effects of these commissioning practices 
over time.  The fact that there were only 29 West Point infantry first lieutenants on the rolls in 
1905 was due to their rapid promotion to captain between 1898 and 1904.  This was also 
demonstrated in the large number of West Point captains on the rolls for the same year. As the 
1905 non-West Point first lieutenants were promoted, their “bow wave” was reflected in the fact 
that they comprised over 52 percent of the infantry captains in 1915.  These massive changes in 
the officer corps accelerated the Regular Army’s on-going drive for professionalization and the 
linked reform of its educational system.  These chaotic years also influenced the army’s attitudes 
and expectations when confronting the need to expand the force in 1917.         
 As with other public institutions of the progressive era, the army was buffeted by internal 
and external demands for increased professionalism, efficiency, and modernization.  With the 
closing of its major campaigns against the Native Americans in 1890, the expansion of the 
nation’s overseas empire, the on-going militarization of Europe, and the Mexican Revolution, the 
army also faced the competing and contradictory demands of being an imperial constabulary, an 
internal guard of the reservation-confined Indians, a hedge against domestic social unrest, a 
border security force, and a military capable of waging full scale war against potential European 
enemies.   
 Given these conflicting demands and pressures, it is little surprise that the army’s world 
view was a complex mixture of long-held attitudes and assumptions and more recent and novel 
ideas about the military profession and its place in American society.  This was most apparent in 
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the Regular Army’s often contradictory attitudes and assumptions of its junior leaders.  On one 
hand, the army continued to follow eighteenth century ideas of leadership that focused on 
gentility, noblesse oblige, paternalism, a tradesman apprenticeship approach to war, the 
privileges of seniority, and deference to one’s superiors.  On the other hand, the army that 
entered the twentieth century also embraced professionalism and specialist education, 
meritocracy, and a drive for scientific management and efficiency.  To place this with the context 
of Darryl Henderson’s model of military leadership and cohesion, the Regular Army officer 
corps was attempting to reconcile the traditional coercive, legitimate and referent sources of 
leadership power with the emerging source of professional expert power.    
It was from this conflicted crucible that the officers and NCOs of the Regular Army 
developed their expectations of the attributes, proper background, and experiences needed for its 
wartime junior leaders, and the role that the army expected them to play in combat in World  
War I.  This milieu also forged Regular Army officers’ attitudes toward the greater American 
society and the nation’s National Guard and volunteer soldiers.   
 The army of the World War I era had no set doctrine to define, codify, or explain the 
organization’s views on leadership.  In fact, the Field Service Regulations of 1913, the army’s 
definitive doctrinal work at the beginning of World War I, made only vague and passing 
references to the command and management of soldiers in combat.10  This oversight was not lost 
on certain members of the officer corps.  In 1911, Robert Bullard, the future commander of the 
AEF’s  2nd Army, noted, “As far as I know, hardly a suggestion is contained in the whole West 
                                                 
10 U.S. Department of War, Field Service Regulations of the United States Army, With Corrections to May 
21, 1913 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1913), 51, 62, 161. 
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Point curriculum of the need or value to a young officer of knowing or understanding either his 
soldiers or his fellow countrymen.”11  Another regular officer bemoaned: 
We have lectures and manuals and treatises and textbooks on all 
sorts of technical subjects.  On the subject of how to manage men, 
the most important subject of all, the young officer will find pretty 
nearly a barren field.  A few paragraphs in Army Regulations, a 
few scattered magazine articles, and a general order or two 
compose the literature available.  Neither at West Point, or our 
service schools, has this subject received the attention that it 
deserves.12 
 
To a great extent, these officers exaggerated the want of leadership training and indoctrination of 
the officer corps.   
 Although the pre-war army lacked a set leadership doctrine, it still understood the 
centrality of leadership to combat operations and had developed its own institutional norms to 
define its expectations of officers and NCOs.  While they lived in a world of massive 
technological, economic, and social change, it is interesting to note the degree to which the 
Regular Army’s pre-war junior officers and NCOs were shaped by concepts of leadership based 
on paternalism, noblesse oblige, and social deference that dated back to the founding of the 
Republic.  Baron Fredrick von Steuben’s 1778 Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the 
Troops of the United States enjoined George Washington’s continental officers and NCOs to 
practice forms of duty, social obligation, and obedience that their early twentieth century 
counterparts clearly understood and practiced.  Von Steuben maintained that, 
  A Captain cannot be too careful of the company the state has committed  
                                                 
 11 Colonel Robert L. Bullard, “The Military Study of Men,” Infantry Journal, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (November-
December 1911), 327. 
12 Major General David C. Shanks, Management of the American Soldier (New York: Booklet published by 
Thomas F. Ryan, circa 1917-1918), 4-5.  MG Shanks, a veteran of the Philippine Insurrection with 33 years of 
service in 1917, commanded the Army embarkation port at Hoboken, NJ at the time of the booklet’s publication.  
The booklet itself was given free to officers departing Hoboken for France.  The material in the booklet was largely 
compiled from a set of articles that Shanks had written in the Infantry Journal from November 1916 through March 
1917.  See Colonel David Shanks, “Administration and the Management of Men,” Infantry Journal, Vol. XIII, No. 3 
(November-December 1916), 276-289. 
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  to his charge.  He must pay the greatest attention to the health of his men,  
  their discipline, arms, accouterments, ammunition, clothes and necessities.   
  His first object should be to gain the love of his men by treating them with  
  every possible kindness and humanity, enquiring into their complaints, and  
  when well founded, seeing them redressed…he must keep a strict eye over  
  the conduct of his non-commissioned officers; oblige them to do their duty  
  with the greatest exactness; and use every possible means to keep up proper  
  subordination between them and the soldiers: for which reason he must never 
  rudely reprimand them in presence of the men.13    
 
The Prussian drill master demanded that lieutenants, 
 
  …must be perfectly acquainted with the duties of the non-commissioned 
  officers and soldiers, and see them performed with great exactness.  He 
  should endeavor to gain the love of his men, by his attention to every thing 
  which may contribute to their health and convenience.  He should often 
  visit them at different hours; inspect into their manner of living; see that 
  their provisions are good and well cooked, and as far as possible oblige  
  them to take their meals at regulated hours.  He should pay  attention to their  
  complaints, and when well founded, endeavor to get them redressed; but 
  discourage them from complaining on every frivolous occasion.14  
 
 
While not officially codified in doctrine, von Steuben’s pre-industrial concepts of duty, 
responsibility, proper deportment, deference, and the correct social interaction between the 
leader and the led had been passed down and enshrined in the early twentieth century Regular 
Army’s conception of good leadership.   
 At all turns, junior leaders were bombarded with hoary maxims such as “familiarity 
builds contempt” and “always look after the needs and comfort of the men.”  In September of 
1900, General Order 125 reminded members of the Regular Army that, “Officers will always be 
exemplary in deportment and will exercise justice and impartiality and be considerate in their 
conduct toward all subordinates.”15  Frank McCoy, who would rise to command a brigade 
                                                 
 13 Frederick William Baron von Steuben, Baron von Steuben’s Revolutionary War Drill Manual (New 
York: Dover Publications, 1985), 135-6.  This edition is an exact copy of the 1794 edition of Regulations for the 
Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States. 
 14 Ibid., 138. 
 15 Adjutant General’s Office, General Order No. 125, September 29, 1900. 
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during World War I, reminded young lieutenants that “by law an officer is set down as an officer 
and a gentleman and with that high privilege there goes noblesse oblige.”16  In a similar vein, a 
captain writing into the Infantry Journal in 1909 observed, “Contentment among the men must 
be one of the aims of a company commander” and that an officer’s paternalistic care of their 
soldiers “indicates to the men in a convincing manner that the company commander is keenly 
interested in their welfare.”17   
 One also finds these institutional norms of paternalism and deference propagated in the 
semi-official manuals for NCOs and junior officers written by veteran Regular Army officers for 
commercial sale.  Since the army lacked its own doctrinal guides and manuals to instruct its 
company level leaders in the art of leadership, these books became a key source for passing on 
the military’s culture and institutional wisdom to its corporals, sergeants, and lieutenants.  
Works, such as James A. Moss’ Officer’s Manual, O. O. Ellis and E. B. Garey’s The Plattsburg 
Manual, M. B. Stewart’s Handbook for Noncommissioned Officers of Infantry, and the Collier’s 
National Service Library, transmitted the army’s internalized, if somewhat officially 
unspecified, views of “correct” leadership and subordination to the generation of regulars who 
would raise, train, and lead the soldiers of the Great War. These works also guided the war’s 
nascent volunteer officers in their quest for understanding the mysteries of combat leadership.  
For example, Ellis and Garey maintained that while an officer must look after the needs of his 
subordinates, the leaders should not, “be too intimate with your men.  Experience has shown that 
you cannot fraternize with an enlisted man one minute and then punish him for misconduct the 
                                                 
 16 Major Charles E. Kilbourne, ed. The National Service Library, Vol. 3. Principles of Training, by Major 
Frank R. McCoy (New York: F.P. Collier and Son, 1917), 144-5. 
 17 Captain George Haltzell, “The Proper Training of an Infantry Company,” Infantry Journal, Vol. V, No. 5 
(March, 1909), 640. 
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next.”18  The prolific military writer, James Moss also reflected the Regular Army’s social and 
leadership norms when he noted,  
  Treat your soldiers with proper consideration, dignity, and justice… 
  [however] In dealing with enlisted men, do not use the same standard of  
  intellect and morals that apply in the case of officers.  And remember, too, 
  that a thing that may appear small and trivial to an officer may mean a great 
  deal to an enlisted man …19  
 
Although some of the paternalism indicated in the writings of Moss, McCoy, Ellis, and Garey  
are perhaps timeless truisms that have always governed military leadership, their underlying 
presumption of the moral superiority and obligations required of officers reflect eighteenth 
century social assumptions that would surely have warmed the heart of the Prussian of Valley 
Forge. 
 Lingering eighteenth century notions of noblesse oblige and paternalism were also 
reflected in the Regular Army’s notions of good command climate and unit cohesion.  The 
bastions of tradition in the old Army maintained that a good and effective company was one 
modeled on a happy family where the commander and first sergeant were stern but benevolent 
parents.  In a 1903 article in the Journal of the Military Service Institution, Colonel J. W. Powell 
argued that a good captain should be a “Company Father” whose “high moral tone and behavior” 
and “absolute and unselfish attention to duty on his own part, and the care, comfort, and 
instruction of his men in their military duties” set the example for his soldiers.20  In 1908, Army 
Chief of Staff James Franklin Bell remarked, “The captain stands in the position of father to the 
enlisted men of his company, who look to him for everything connected with their comfort and 
                                                 
 18 O. O. Ellis and E. B. Garey, The Plattsburg Manual (New York: The Century Company, 1917), 217.   
 19 James A. Moss, Officer’s Manual (Menasha: George Banta Publishing Co, 1917), 50-1.  In the first two 
decades of the twentieth century, Regular Army officers seemed to have made a cottage industry of passing on the 
army’s collective wisdom. Moss, for example, published over 33 military books, and his Officer’s Manual went 
through seven editions between 1906 and 1929. 
 20 Colonel J.W. Powell, a “Comment and Criticisms” response to Robert Bullard’s “Moral Preparation of 
the Soldier,” Journal of the Military Service Institution, Vol. XXXII (1903), 123. 
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well-being.”21  James Moss took this analogy even further by noting, 
  With regard to his company the Captain stands in the same light as a father 
  of a large family of children.  It is his duty to provide for their comfort, 
  sustenance, and pleasure; enforce strict rules of obedience, punish the 
  refractory and reward the deserving…He should by word and act make 
  every man in the company feel that the Captain is his protector.22 
 
 This comparison of the company to a family was also used by the army in 1907 to argue 
for an increase in the pay and benefits of its first sergeants and other NCOs.  The army General 
Staff maintained the pay raise was important because it would retain long-service NCOs and thus 
continue to promulgate the desired command climate where the first sergeant was “the ‘mother’ 
of the company as the captain is the ‘father.’ ”23  In the end, army officers believed that the 
officer and NCO’s paternalism would be reciprocated in the loyalty and esprit de corps of their 
soldiers.  Thus, paternalism mixed both idealism and pragmatism.  Not only was it morally right 
to care for those under ones command, the officer corps also understood that healthy, trained, 
contented, and disciplined soldiers were critical to the army’s effectiveness on campaign.  
 In Fundamentals of Military Service, Captain Lincoln Andrews advised young officers 
that “soldiers are like children” and relayed an incident he observed during the Spanish 
American War to illustrate his views of proper leadership.  He noted,  
  On the battlefield of Santiago I saw a young second lieutenant put his  
  hand on the shoulder of a grey-haired old soldier and call him boy, and  
  there was confidence in the old man as he started alone on his mission.   
  This feeling of mutual sympathy and confidence will spring from  
  thoughtful leadership, and you should aspire to it, and make yourself  
  worthy of it.24 
 
                                                 
 21 War Department Annual Report, 1908, Vol. 1, 212. 
 22 Moss, 185. 
 23 U.S. Department of War, The Army as a Life Occupation for Enlisted Men (Washington D.C.: War 
Department, 1907), 92.   
 24 CPT Lincoln Andrews, Fundamentals of Military Service (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1916), 19.  
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However, the army also sent its junior officers a mixed message.  While veteran officers such as 
Moss, Andrews, and Powell demanded that young officers act like a father to their soldiers, they 
also stipulated that their subordinates should be treated as adult men.  Powell, for example, 
warned against treating soldiers as “immature youths struggling for light,” while Moss’ Jove-like 
pronouncement was to “Treat your men like men.”25  While pre-war Regular Army lieutenants 
had the benefit of experienced veterans and time to reconcile these conflicting visions of 
company leadership, those officers commissioned during the crush of 1917 and 1918 were later 
left to iron out these inconsistencies and nuances for themselves.  
   Closely linked to notions of noblesse oblige and paternalism, was the pre-war officers’ 
underlying assumption that all units eventually took on the attributes of its leaders.  If the 
commander was sloppy, indolent, and disobedient, those traits would be mirrored in the soldiers 
of his company.  If, on the other hand, the leader was brave, confident, dedicated, and loyal, the 
soldiers would do likewise.  An officer writing in the Infantry Journal in 1912 noted, 
  The first object for which the company officer must strive is the  
  unquestioned leadership and confidence of his men, and his success  
  in that matter will depend largely upon the degree of care and interest 
  which he devotes to all matters affecting the material welfare of the 
  men in his company.  His hold on the men is very dependent on his 
  zeal and personal examples in all military virtues of obedience, industry, 
  initiative, studiousness, cleanliness, sobriety, truthfulness, fairness, honor,  
  morality, and military courtesy.26    
 
In The Plattsburg Manual, Ellis and Garey informed their prospective officers that an American  
soldier, “wants his officers to be efficient and high-toned leaders.  It thrills him to have their  
actions pitched in a high key…He wants them to be neat, to dress immaculately, and to be  
                                                 
 25 Powell, 123, and Moss, 371. 
 26 Lieutenant William E. Parker, “The Company Officer and His Work,” Infantry Journal, Vol. IV, No. 1 
(July-August 1912), 72. 
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military in bearing.”  They also warned, “When there is peace and harmony and efficiency in 
your organization, you are responsible for it.  When there are grumblings, lack of enthusiasm and  
esprit-de-corps, be honest and sensible and see if you are also not responsible for it.”27   
 In a peacetime army where an officer could expect to serve at a post and at the same 
grade of rank for long periods of times, these beliefs in command personality and responsibility 
made perfect sense.  The army, as an institution, expected young (and not so young) lieutenants 
to serve an extended apprenticeship under a seasoned captain and commander long before they 
would actually be allowed to command a company for themselves.  An army study in 1908 
estimated that an officer would spend nearly seven years as a second lieutenant and nine years as 
a first lieutenant before being promoted to captain.28  Given the massive influx of enlisted men, 
civilians, and citizen soldiers into the Regular Army’s commissioned ranks between 1898 and 
1905, this reliance on “on the job training” also served as a means for inculcating these non-West 
Point “others” into the institutional culture of officership. Also, for better or worse, these were 
the concepts of command responsibility that Regular Army officers carried with them into World 
War I, and to some extent, governed their expectations of the volunteer officers that they 
eventually commanded.  
 The army culture that advocated noblesse oblige and the need to retain the “proper 
subordination” of its members to their superiors had long placed the regular military at odds with 
the egalitarian tenor and rampant individualism of the larger society.  For example, politicians in 
the Jacksonian Era frequently lambasted the officer corps’ aristocratic manners, dangerous 
                                                 
 27 Ellis and Garey, 216-7. 
 28 Edward M. Coffman, The Regulars: The American Army 1898-1941 (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2004), 151. 
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political conservatism, and un-republican treatment of their soldiers.29  During the Gilded Age, 
Civil War era veterans, such as John “Black Jack” Logan, often criticized West Point for being a 
nursery of traitors while also propounding the natural superiority of citizen soldiers and 
officers.30   
 Senior army officers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century frequently tried to 
bridge the gap between the rigidly hierarchical and paternalistic army and the larger 
individualistic society by reminding their junior officers that during any large scale war the 
army’s ranks would be filled with citizen soldiers.  Usually, however, these efforts merely 
placed a republican veneer on the army’s long-standing norms of leadership.  While serving as 
the commandant of West Point, John Schofield used an address designed to stop the hazing of 
plebes by first classmen to also remind his cadets of the proper form of discipline and leadership 
required of officers of the Republic.  Schofield repeated to his would-be officers that, 
  The very foundation of civil society is mutual respect for individual rights.  
  And nowhere is such mutual respect more strictly enjoined and rigidly enforced 
  than in military organizations.  Without it, tyranny on one hand and disaffection 
  and mutiny on the other must destroy the efficiency of an army.  Those who 
  wantonly inflict insult and abuse on their inferiors and those who tamely 
  submit to such treatment from those who may be placed over them, are 
  alike unworthy to be soldiers of a free country…. 
 
  The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not 
  to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment.  On the contrary, such treatment is 
  far more likely to destroy than to make an army.  It is possible to impart  
  instruction and to give commands in a manner and in such a tone of voice as to 
  inspire in the soldier no feeling but an intense desire to obey, while the opposite 
  manner and tone of voice cannot fail  to excite strong resentment and a desire to 
  disobey.  The one mode or the other of dealing with subordinates springs from 
  a corresponding spirit in the breast of the commander.  He who feels the respect 
                                                 
 29 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 
1957), 156-7, 203-8. 
 30 In Logan’s case, the criticism of the Regular Army rested on his accurate belief that the West Point 
monopoly on senior leadership had thwarted his promotion during the Civil War.  Logan, a very talented volunteer 
officer, was bypassed for promotion to corps command upon the death of James McPherson during the Atlanta 
Campaign, because William Sherman preferred to have a Regular Army West Pointer in command of the unit.  
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  which is due to others cannot fail to inspire in them regard for himself, while he 
  who feels, and hence manifests, disrespect toward others, especially his inferiors, 
  cannot fail to inspire hatred against himself.31 
    
Ever since the general’s address, West Point plebes have been required to recite the second 
paragraph of the quote (commonly known as Schofield’s Definition of Leadership) from 
memory.   
 Although Schofield intended to make his cadets mindful of the subtleties of leadership 
demanded by American soldiers, in the end, the message for junior officers was to watch one’s 
“Ps and Qs” and be mindful of their paternalistic obligations when working with the “inferior” 
hired help.  The great irony was that the influx of non-West Pointers into the officer ranks during 
the War with Spain and the Philippine Insurrection had made the junior commissioned ranks as 
democratic and inclusive as any period since the Civil War.  This fact, however, did not change, 
and perhaps even reinforced and solidified the army’s paternalistic ethos.    
 While Schofield and other senior officers tried to reconcile army leadership norms with 
the social realities of a free society, some turn of the century members of the officer corps began 
to argue that it was actually the larger society that was in need of reform using military methods.  
As with many of their European peers, several American officers argued that modern industrial 
society had made American manhood indolent, unruly, immoral, weak, and effeminate.  Officers 
pointed to the twin sins of narcissism and greed as the source of the nation’s decline.  On the 
brink of the Great War, one cavalry officer maintained, “Our country is in danger of being 
swallowed up in the maelstrom of materialism.  Prosperity has decentralized our thoughts from 
                                                 
 31 John M. Schofield, “An Address Delivered by Maj Gen J. M. Schofield to the Corps of Cadets, 
U.S.M.A., West Point, N.Y. Monday, August 11th, 1879”  Box 91, Lot C, 1-10, No. 10, John M. Schofield Papers, 
Library of Congress and Donald Connelly, John M. Schofield and the Politics of Generalship (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 232.  I thank Dr. Connelly for providing me a copy of the original 
address.   It is also interesting to note that the second paragraph of the quoted excerpt was also included in the 
World War I era Manual for Noncommissioned Officer and Privates of Infantry (Washington D.C: War Department, 
1917), 12. 
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consideration of the greatest good to the country to the greatest good of the individual.”32  An 
article in the September- October 1913 edition of the Infantry Journal lamented,  
  We are rapidly reaching the state where it will be the United States and not China 
  that will be held up to ridicule and derision by other nations as an example of 
  how patriotism can be subordinated to the scramble for the almighty dollar.  
  While the ordinary citizen is absorbed in the struggle for wealth, the peace  
  societies are carrying on their fight against the bugaboo of militarism hand 
  in hand with the socialists, trade unionists, and educational bodies…They also 
  fall into the fallacy of assuming that general peace can be brought about by 
  the suppression of military training and preparation; that the neglect of the  
  art of war will induce peaceful intentions and hasten the millennium.33 
 
 These opinions reached all levels of the officer corps.  In fact, Hugh Scott, who served as 
Army Chief of Staff from November 1914 to September 1917, noted that “The better informed 
officers of the old army had long been aware of the physical deterioration of the race in modern 
times.”  He hoped that the periodic military instruction of the nation’s youth, of course being 
overseen by the Regular Army, would enable the “Americanization and amalgamation of our 
foreign population” and would be “worth-while alone for the discipline enforced, with 
consequent respect for the law and the diminution of crime.”34  Scott’s vision did not stop at 
uplifting and Americanizing immigrants.  He also commented that “one of the greatest evils in 
modern American life” was that “children are no longer disciplined at home and grow up 
without knowledge of what the word means… [and a] lack of discipline is the foundation of our 
notorious disrespect for the law.”35 These sentiments were echoed by an officer who, after 
denouncing the popular “hair-brained talk about eternal peace,” decried, “Our millions are 
untaught, not only in the arts of war but [also] in the art of taking care of themselves. Fifty 
                                                 
 32 Editorial Staff, “The Soldier at School” Cavalry Journal, Vol. XXVII, No. 3 (January, 1917), 417.  
 33 Albert S. Jones, “The Decline in Patriotism in the United States- the Cause and Ultimate Effect” Infantry 
Journal, Vol. X, No.2 (September-October, 1913), 230-1. 
 34 Hugh L. Scott, Some Memories of a Soldier (New York: The Century Company, 1928),560-1. 
 35 Ibid., 444-5. 
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percent of them could not go fishing without endangering their lives through ignorance.” As 
with Scott, he urged the nation to embrace universal military service as the only sure means for 
the country’s males to truly achieve “the dignity of manhood.”36  In 1910, the editor of the 
Infantry Journal went as far as to argue,  
  The dreamer looks to universal peace to cure us from the ills of war, 
  forgetful or ignorant of the fact that in this world of struggle war has 
  not infrequently been necessary as a cure for the ills of peace.  Peace 
  is not a natural condition of the world.  It is an artificial condition 
  entirely in opposition to all human or animal instinct.37 
 
 In many ways, the beliefs of these officers mirrored the social Darwinism, Anglo-
Saxonism, and bumptious patriotism that was so popular among some segments of the civilian 
middle and upper classes of the early 1900s. Theodore Roosevelt, for example, shared the 
officers’ belief that war and military service were the cure for the nation’s societal ills.  The 
bellicose Rough Rider maintained that “no triumph of peace is quite so great as the supreme 
triumph of war” and concluded that serving in the ranks would end the threat of class warfare, 
turn the nation’s youth from the path of physical and moral decay, and reinvigorate democracy.38  
Although the shared passion for the “strenuous life” and belief that superior education and social 
standing brought with it great obligations united both military and civilian elites, it also 
heightened the Regular Army officers’ smug sense of their own moral superiority and 
righteousness.  These attitudes later shaped the regulars’ actions when it came to wartime 
selection and training of volunteer officers and its relations with the National Guard. 
                                                 
 36 S.M.C., “The Present Problem,” Infantry Journal, Vol. VI., No.2 (September, 1909), 250 and 255.  
 37 Editorial in Infantry Journal, Vol. VII., No. 1 (July, 1910),138. 
38 Quoted in Edward J. Reneham, Jr., The Lion’s Pride (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 25. 
also see, Nathan Miller, Theodore Roosevelt: A Life (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1992), 330-2 and 
H.W. Brands, TR: The Last Romantic (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 752-3 and 812-5.  
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 Given the importance that the Regular Army officer corps placed on the tone that its 
members set within their units, its self-imposed mantel as the protectors of American civic and 
moral virtues, and its need to retain its precarious social status in American society, it is no 
surprise that they developed fixed ideas of the personal characteristics that an individual needed 
to possess to gain entry into its ranks.  The most important of these characteristics were gentility, 
education, and an impeccable record of moral behavior.  Within the army’s culture, these 
characteristics were inextricably linked and mutually supporting.  In his Officer’s Manual, James 
Moss went as far as to enumerate the expected behaviors of a gentleman officer.  In doing so, he 
deliberately mimicked the British army’s viewpoint on gentility.  In the chapter “The Young 
Officer’s Don’ts,” Moss wrote, 
  DON’T, on joining your regiment, lose sight that you are now a young  
   officer and not an old cadet. 
  DON’T assert yourself or your accomplishments. 
  DON’T affect superiority over your brother officers, either as regards knowledge 
   or ignorance. 
  DON’T, however poor you may be, dress shabbily. 
  DON’T affect any singularity of dress. 
  DON’T, if you are well off, perpetually boast about the largeness of your   
   purchases. 
  DON’T sneer at anybody, either openly or behind their backs. 
  DON’T be captious. Your elders always think they know better than you…it is 
   graceful to be silent rather than to contradict them flatly. 
  DON’T forget small debts. 
  DON’T openly despise a man, of your own or other standing, whom you feel 
   to be your inferior. 
  DON’T recite your personal experiences too frequently, or with wearying detail. 
  DON’T do nothing because there is nothing to do. 
  DON’T parade a want of interest in things which may be engaging the attention 
   of your brother officers. 
  DON’T allow yourself to have tricks of manner, or habit; if you can help it.  
  DON’T set to undervalue on pedigree or family connections. Noblesse oblige 
   should be your patrician’s motto. 
  DON’T, as you value your existence, give men a handle to call you a toady. 
  DON’T rely upon what is termed “pull” for promotion or advancement. 
  DON’T be over-anxious to kick down the ladder by which you may have climbed. 
  DON’T talk loud at mess, or monopolize the conversation. 
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  DON’T, by any chance, mention a lady’s name at mess. 
  DON’T use strong language at mess.  Rudeness from a boy’s lips becomes an  
   insult from a man’s and its consequences are proportionately serious.39  
     
As Moss was the premiere disseminator of the Regular Army’s customs and collected wisdom to 
junior officers (as noted by the multiple printings and sales of his works), this list of “Don’ts” is 
a good reflection of the institution’s overall expectations of the proper deportment and character 
of its officer corps.40   
 Closely related to gentility, the army also expected its officers to possess the proper 
character as preconditions for holding their positions.  In 1916 Captain Richard Stockton wrote 
that a man “cannot be a good soldier unless he has certain essential characteristics as a 
foundation.  This foundation must be courage rather than cowardice, physical fitness in place of 
a lack of development, patriotism rather than self-interest, constraint rather than license, 
discipline rather than lawlessness, quick initiative rather than dullness, courtesy in place of 
boorishness.”41  The prominence that Moss gave these maxims in the various editions of the 
Officer’s Manual that he published between 1906 and 1918, and the fact that Stockton’s article 
was the Reeve Memorial Prize award winning essay for 1916, reflected both the Regular Army’s 
concern for acculturating the non-West Point “others” that entered the officer corps in the wake 
of the Spanish-American War, and its desire to stamp its modes of behavior on the would-be 
officers of 1917 and 1918.             
                                                 
 39 Moss, Officer’s Manual, 55-57. The list of “Young Officer’s Don’ts” appeared in the 1906 first edition of 
the work.  It was printed in all subsequent editions through 1918.  It is interesting to note that he chose to omit this 
list from the last edition of 1929.  Given the Regular Army’s return to West Point dominated “normalcy” in the 
1920s, perhaps he did not believe that officers of that period needed to be schooled on gentility.      
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 41 CPT Richard Stockton, “Military Training- Valuable and Valueless” in the Journal of the Military 
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 In addition to gentility, the Regular Army also used education as a discriminator for 
commissioning.  To the regulars, the proper education for officers generally meant attendance or 
graduation from a college or university.  As General John Schofield noted of this predilection for 
college men, “It is a feeling, and a very strong one, in favor of education (original emphasis), of 
qualification in all respects for the service which may be required.42   
 The Regular Army’s emphasis on college education stemmed both from the preeminence 
of the Military Academy at West Point in providing much of the pre-war army’s officer corps 
and of West Point’s underlying assumption that the best approach to warfare was one grounded 
in scientific examination and problem solving.  Schofield, in fact, had made the statement above 
to address those who criticized West Point’s near monopoly on new commissions in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century.  In his opinion, it was the college education provided at West 
Point, rather than its privileged position, that made its graduates the best source for the army’s 
officers.  Brigadier General J.P. Farley also reflected the regular’s assumptions on the 
importance of higher education when he noted, “in all walks of life the leaders are men from the 
educated class, at least men who have been trained to reason logically, men who must determine 
for themselves and for their subordinates the proper course of action in any special case.”43  
 Army leaders also believed that college graduates possessed the proper attributes required 
for good combat leadership.  As Captain Ira Reeves wrote in his influential Military Education in 
the United States,  
  The college young man makes the ideal officer.  His mental equipment is  
  usually such as desired, he is ordinarily a man of sufficient physical development 
  to meet the physical demands of an officer, and he is necessarily a man of 
  more than usual ambition and energy, otherwise he would not be in college. 
  The time of life when he is in college is the very best not only to instill habits 
                                                 
 42 John M. Schofield, Forty-Six Years in the Army (New York: Century Publishing Company, 1897), 535-6. 
 43 Brigadier General J. P. Farley, “Military Service for College Men,” Journal of the Military Service 
Institution, Vol. L (1912), 114. 
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  of discipline, respect and obedience toward others, but to demand them for 
  himself where he has been placed in a position of authority.44 
 
 In a nation that periodically blasted its officer corps for being a bastion of “aristocratic 
privilege” and touted the virtue and effectiveness of its citizen soldiers, the Regular Army’s 
insistence on college educated officers also provided a convenient shield to retain its monopoly 
on military leadership against the braying of populist politicians.45   
 The pre-war army’s built-in educational biases were also bolstered by progressive era 
beliefs that college schooling provided the expert knowledge required of all true professions and 
that education, in and of itself, was the key to solving the nation’s social ills by providing the 
middle class with the moral armor and know-how to address the problems of a rapidly 
modernizing society.46  Reflecting this progressive era reverence of college education, one 
officer noted, “The art of war has reached the point where college men or men specially trained 
are required to master it.”  He succinctly concluded, “When college men take hold of things they 
go.”47  The army’s desire for its officers to be college educated also stemmed from social 
prejudices and a desire to keep “the wrong sort” from obtaining commissions and undermining 
the efficiency and exclusivity of the officer corps.   
 Reacting to the flood of “low standard” outsiders who had joined the officer corps since 
1898, one engineer major noted in 1903, “the standard of education required for men appointed 
to commissions in the United States Army from the ranks and from civil life is distinctly low- 
lower than the general education of the youth of the country warrants.”  He went on to note that 
their lack of higher education “may fit them for the lower commissioned grades, but will not 
                                                 
 44 Captain Ira Reeves, Military Education in the United States (Burlington: Free Press Printing Company, 
1914), 106.  
 45 Huntington, 156-7, 198-9, and 204-5. 
 46 Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order: 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 113-121. 
 47 S.M.C., “The Present Problem,” Infantry Journal, 256. 
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enable them to fill advantageously the higher grades to which if they live long enough they will 
necessarily attain, under the present system.”48  An examination of the civilian educational levels 
of infantry company-grade officers in 1897, 1905, and 1915, demonstrates a constant or growing 
army prejudice in favor of college educated officers (Tables 2-4, 2-5, and 2-6) .49 
Table 2-4: Regular Army Infantry Captains College Education 
     College  
             attendance 
 
  Year 
 Non-USMA grad 
 Officers with    
 college 
  % of non-USMA 
  Grad officers with  
   college 
 USMA Graduates   Total officers with  
 college education  
 % of total officers  
 with college  
 education  
  1897   Not specified   Not specified          86  Not specified   At least  
   34.4 % 
  1905       61 (1)        38.7 %          291       353   At least  
   78.2 % 
  1915       76 (2)       21.9 %         125       204   At least  
    42 % 
(1) Includes 8 officers who attended the USMA but failed to graduate 
(2) Includes 17 officers who attended the USMA but failed to graduate 
 
Table 2-5: Regular Army Infantry First Lieutenants College Education  
 College Attendance 
 
  Year 
 Non-USMA  
 graduate officers  
 with college 
 % of non-USMA 
 graduate officers   
 with college 
 USMA Graduates  Total officers with  
 college education  
 % of total officers  
 with college  
 education  
 
  1897   Not specified   Not specified          194   Not specified   At least  
   67.3 % 
  1905       106(1)        25.4 %          29       135  At least  
  30.6 % 
  1915       60(2)       21.3 %         198       258  At least  
    53.8 % 
                                                 
 48 MAJ William Black, “The Education and Training of Army Officers” in Journal of the Military Service 
Institution of the United States, Vol. XXXII (1903), 31-2.  
 49 These tables are based on information drawn from the following: Official Army Register for 1897, 
Official Army Register for 1905 and Official Army Register for 1915. These figures do not include the officers 
assigned to the Porto Rican Infantry Regiment or the Philippine Scouts.  In both cases, the Army considered these 
units to be a separate category of the regular establishment with set rules governing their employment. The 
definition of college education used in these tables are any officer known to have received a degree from a West 
Point or another college or university, or an officer whose record shows that he attended at least a year of college 
prior to commissioning.  The Official Army Register for 1897 did not list non-USMA graduates’ previous college 
attendance, as was the case with the registers of 1905 and 1915.  As the later registers only noted the degree and 
college of those non-West Point officers that actually graduated from college, the actual college attendance of all 
non-West Point officers was probably higher.  The list of non-West Point college graduates is also not complete as 
given in the registers.  For example, the registers do not list Hugh Drum as a college graduate, even though he 
graduated from Boston College prior to his entry into the army.         
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(1) Includes 17 officers who attended the USMA but failed to graduate  
(2) Includes 12 officers who attended the USMA but failed to graduate 
 
Table 2-6: Regular Army Infantry Second Lieutenants College Education  
 College Attendance 
 
  Year 
 Non-USMA grad  
 officers with    
 college 
 % of non-USMA 
 grad officers with   
 college 
 USMA Graduates  Total officers with  
 college education  
 % of total officers  
 with college  
 education  
  1897  Not specified  Not specified          157  Not specified     At least  
      73 % 
  1905       88(1)        28.7 %          108       196    At least  
    43.3 % 
  1915       96(2)       45.7 %         232       328    At least  
     74 % 
(1) Includes 8 officers who attended the USMA but failed to graduate 
(2) Includes 17 officers who attended the USMA but failed to graduate 
 
 Although the expansion of the officer corps between 1898 and 1905 disrupted the general 
trend toward commissioning the college educated, it also seems to have strengthened the army’s 
educational prejudices in selecting its junior officers.  In his annual reports to Congress in 1901, 
Secretary of War Elihu Root lamented the general decline of both civil and military education in 
the officer corps.  He noted, 
  The imperative demand for the service of all officers since the spring 
  of 1898 has caused a practical cessation of all systematic education of 
  commissioned officers for nearly four years.  In the meantime, the 
  ordinary additions to the number of second lieutenants have been, 
  roughly speaking, about one-third from West Point and about two-thirds 
  from the ranks and civil life.  In the reorganization to enlarge the Army 
  about 1,000 new officers have been added to the volunteer force, so 
  that more than one-third of all the officers of the Army have been  
  without any opportunity what[so]ever for systematic study of the 
  science of war.  On the other hand, the rapid advance of military science… 
  the wide range of responsibilities which we have devolved upon officers 
  charged with civil government of occupied territory; the delicate  
  relations which constantly arise between the military and civil authorities; 
  the manifest necessity that the soldier, above all others, should be 
  familiar with the history and imbued with the spirit of our institutions- all 
  indicate the great importance of through and broad education for 
  military officers (emphasis added).50 
                                                 
 50 Department of War, Annual Reports of the War Department for 1901, Vol. 1, “Report of the Secretary of 
War” (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901), 20. 
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The Secretary also noted, “all other things being equal, the officer who keeps his mind alert by 
intellectual exercise, and who systematically studies the reasons of action and the materials and 
conditions and difficulties with which he may have to deal, will be the stronger practical man 
and the better soldier.”51   
 Root’s progressive faith that education was a prerequisite for dealing with the problems 
of an increasingly complex world neatly nested with the officer corps’ own growing desire to use 
education as a prerequisite for commissioning.  To reverse the decline in college educated 
officers that had accompanied the army expansion of 1898-1903, the War Department embarked 
on a number of changes to its commissioning procedures designed to lure civilian college 
graduates into the Regular Army’s ranks.   
 With the backing of President Theodore Roosevelt, in 1903 the army established a system 
for attracting more college men by rewarding the civilian or military colleges that maintained the 
best military training programs for the year.  Those colleges with military programs under the 
supervision of Regular Army Professors of Military Science and Tactics that performed the best 
in their annual army inspections would be designated “distinguished institutions” or “honor 
schools.”  The year’s six “honor school” colleges were allowed to have one of their top military 
training program graduates commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Regular Army without 
having to go through the examinations required of other civilians.52  Prior to World War I, the 
War Department raised the number of “distinguished institutions” to ten.  Not surprisingly, those 
colleges that most closely resembled West Point, (Norwich University, the Virginia Military 
Institute, and The Citadel), tended to head the list of “distinguished institutions” each year.  
 The army’s preference for college education was also demonstrated by alterations that the 
                                                 
 51 Ibid., 21. 
 52 General Order 6, 24 August 1903. 
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War Department made in its commissioning procedures in 1911.  Army Chief of Staff Leonard 
Wood admitted that the army changed its regulations for commissioning candidates from civilian 
life in order to “hold out special inducements to graduates of colleges and universities [and] at 
the same time extending special privileges to graduates of military schools and colleges of the 
several States.”53  In General Order 53 the army waived the requirement for “graduates of 
recognized colleges or universities” to take the “preliminary mental examination” that had 
previously been required of all civilian and enlisted applicants for commission.54  This waiver 
gave college graduates a marked advantage over other civilians and enlisted men seeking to 
become second lieutenants.        
 The linkage of college education and officership was far from new.  In the midst of the 
Civil War, Congressman Justin Morrill proposed a bill offering federal land grants to colleges 
and universities that offered education in “scientific and classical studies…and agriculture and 
mechanical arts.” In return for the federal government’s largess the colleges would have to 
provide their students some training in “military tactics.”55  Morrill envisioned the Land-Grant 
colleges as a more democratic, cost effective, and reliable source of wartime officers than the 
“treason tainted” Military Academy.   
 The 1862 Morrill Land-Grant Act unfortunately left many questions and issues of 
military training in the colleges unanswered.  The legislation was open to interpretation on 
whether or not the instruction was compulsory for the students and on the governmental 
organization that held ultimate oversight for the program’s implementation.  While the War 
                                                 
 53 Department of War, Annual Reports of the War Department for 1911, Vol. 1, “Report of the Chief of 
Staff” (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1912), 156. 
 54 General Order 53, 28 April 1911.  The “preliminary mental examination” was an evaluation of the 
candidate’s knowledge of English grammar and orthography, mathematics, history, and geography. 
55 Quoted in Gene M. Lyons and John W. Massland, “The Origins of the ROTC,” Military Affairs Vol. 
XXIII, no. 1 (Spring 1959), 3.  
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Department was responsible for providing instructors and equipment to support military training, 
the Interior Department was responsible for overseeing land grant funding and the overall 
administration of the program.  Faced with these ambiguities, and the realities of low post-Civil 
War budgets, the War Department did little to standardize or support military training in the 
Land-Grant colleges between 1865 and 1904.56 
The Spanish American War and Philippine Insurrection had demonstrated how 
unprepared the nation was to expand the existing officer corps. To prevent a reoccurrence of the 
ad hoc method of obtaining junior leaders in those conflicts, Root and his Chiefs of Staff were 
determined to transform the Land Grant Colleges into a viable source for officers.   The Army 
Appropriations Act of 1904 required the War Department to provide 100 Regular Army officers 
to support civilian educational institutions.  To qualify for the assignment of a Regular Army 
instructor, military colleges had to have 100 students over the age of 15 enrolled in their military 
programs.  Non-military institutions were required to have 150 students enrolled in their military 
programs.57  While these changes were intended mostly to build a cadre of reserve officers for 
any national military emergency, the regulars hoped to siphon-off the best graduates of these 
institutions to fill its “tainted” junior officer ranks.   
Although these steps were clearly in line with the Regular Army’s educational prejudices, 
it was never able to provide the officer-instructors required of the Appropriations Act of 1904 or 
subsequent legislation.  In 1904, only 36 regular officers were on duty at civilian educational 
institutions.  This number grew to 65 in 1908, but fell to 61 in 1911 and remained around that 
number until 1915.  The War Department tried to offset these shortages by asking regular 
officers on the retired list to serve as professors of Military Science and Tactics.  In 1911, for 
                                                 
56 Ibid., 3-5. and War Department Annual Report, 1913, Vol. 1., 189. 
 57 Reeves, 68. 
  64
example, 27 retirees were on duty at colleges and universities.58  Despite the army’s desire for 
college educated officers, in the first 15 years of the twentieth century it was constantly plagued 
by increasing demands for officers to fill important, but un-resourced, detached service 
assignments (see below).  The assignment of officers at educational institutions was only one of 
a host of competing demands.  In 1905 the army Inspector General went so far as to note that 
college details, “may be in the general interest of the advancement of military knowledge 
throughout the country; yet the teaching of boys is not what the officer is commissioned for, and 
his detachment for such work is a distinct loss in the line of efficiency of the regular military 
establishment.”59  Like so much of the pre-World War army, the issue of college education and 
officership reflected the deeply schizophrenic nature of the military in this period of massive 
change.     
 It also should be noted that while the officer corps viewed college education as a 
desirable attribute for a commission and sought college men for its ranks, it still retained a built-
in prejudice in favor of West Point graduates.  One infantry captain maintained, “it may as well 
be admitted at the onset that we obtain, as a rule, a better class of officers from West Point than 
we do from other sources.”60  This faith in the superiority of West Point education and culture 
even captured the imagination of Secretary Root.  In his efforts to increase the education and 
efficiency of the new officers that filled the army’s ranks in the aftermath of the Spanish-
American War, he stated that one of his goals was to give the novices “some degree of the 
educational advantages which the West Point men get before they are commissioned.”61 
                                                 
 58 War Department Annual Report, 1911, Vol. 1., 206. also, War Department Annual Report, 1904, Vol. 1.,  
2 ; War Department Annual Report 1908, Vol. 1., 9., and War Department Annual Report 1915, Vol. 1., 142.    
 59 War Department Annual Report, 1905, Vol. 1, 445. 
 60 Rhees Jackson, “Revision of Our System of Military Education,” Infantry Journal, Vol. VIII, No. 3 
(November-December, 1911), 375.  
 61 Department of War, Annual Reports of the War Department for 1902, Vol. 1, “Report of the Secretary of 
War” (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1903), 30. Although Congress allowed the army to increase 
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 This predilection for West Pointers can also be glimpsed by noting who were selected to 
serve as senior officers during World War I.  After subtracting 15 officers who reached the rank 
of general because of their medical credentials and the four civilian experts who gained wartime 
direct commissions, 454 officers served as generals during the war.  Of these, 355 (79 percent) 
were West Point graduates.  Of the remaining 99 generals, 46 were commissioned from the 
National Guard; 18 were commissioned from the ranks; four were officers who had transferred to 
the regulars from the National Guard prior to 1917; 12 had been commissioned into the regulars 
after serving as officers in the U.S. Volunteers during the Philippine Insurrection; 17 were 
commissioned into the regulars directly from civilian colleges, and two were officers who were 
commissioned into the regulars after dropping out of West Point.62  Both the growing number of 
college graduates and the preference for West Point graduates reflected the existence of deeply 
held and intertwined class and education-based prejudices and assumptions which would later 
guide the army’s initial approach to selecting officers for the World War. 
 Although many army officers viewed a college education as a virtual precondition for 
commissioning, they did not deem that this education alone was all that was required of the 
practitioners of the art of war.  In a prize-winning 1889 article in the Journal of the Military 
Service Institution, Lieutenant William Burnham argued, “For infantry or cavalry an officer 
should possess a good average brain, an eye for localities, a mind that takes in a situation at a 
glance, and, most important and essential of all, good common sense.  A line officer devoid of 
                                                                                                                                                             
the number of cadets at West Point in the years leading up to World War I, the increases added only a handful more 
of USMA graduates into the junior officer ranks prior to 1917. 
 62 These figures are based on the analysis of the biographies of World War I general officers drawn from, 
Henry B. Davis, Jr., Generals in Khaki (Raleigh, NC: Pentland Press, 1998).  Although Leonard Wood and 
Alexander Tuthill entered the army by way of the medical branch, both officers eventually transferred to the line 
army, and are thus captured in the officers who entered the regulars by the college route.  The four officers who 
entered the ranks of general officer by direct wartime commission were William Atterbury, Charles Dawes, Samuel 
McRoberts, and Guy Tripp.  These men all had civilian experience running rail roads or other large businesses prior 
to their military service.  
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good practical judgment would be quite as much a failure as an engineer officer devoid of a 
knowledge of mathematics.”63   
 The pre-war Regular Army expected that a budding junior officer would truly gain 
knowledge of soldiering, leadership, and “good common sense” through a hands-on 
apprenticeship conducted in his first unit.  This belief even applied to West Pointers.  Leonard 
Wood, the Army Chief of Staff from 1910 to 1914, noted, 
  West Point does not claim to turn out finished officers any more than a great 
  law school claims to turn out finished lawyers.  It does turn out, however, men 
  who have the discipline, training, and education to take up and follow the   
  profession of arms successfully.  It does teach its graduates to apply their minds 
  to any problem which may confront them.64 
 
Thus, while a college education provided the personal discipline and mental conditioning that 
trained new officers how to learn, their basic professional development and knowledge would be 
fostered and expanded through experience and the mentorship of their veteran superiors.  As 
Army Chief of Staff James Franklin Bell remarked in 1908, “A young officer needs to be taught 
his duty in the company by actual service under an experienced company commander.”65  Bell’s 
remarks were echoed by Major General David Shanks.  In 1917 Shanks observed, 
 Before our entry into the present war promotion in our army was relatively slow. 
A second lieutenant was assigned to a company, and he had the benefit of learning by 
observation and experience.  His captain was generally an officer who had received a 
certain amount of seasoning.  The green subaltern had abundant opportunity to become 
acquainted with his profession gradually.66  
 
Writing on the brink of the American entry into the Great War, another officer suggested that 
while civil and military education was important, the overall “theoretical” focus of this schooling 
                                                 
 63 1LT William Burnham, “Military Training of the Regular Army of the United States,” in Journal of the 
Military Service Institution of the United States, Vol. X (1889), 625-6.  It is not surprising that Burnham perhaps 
favored “good common sense” over education; he failed out of West Point in his first year, and received his 
commission from the ranks.  During World War I, he rose to command the 82nd Division.   
 64 Major Charles E. Kilbourne, ed. The National Service Library, Vol. 1. Universal Military Training, by  
Major General Leonard Wood (New York: F.P. Collier and Son, 1917), 142. 
 65 War Department Annual Report, 1908, Vol. 1, 363. 
66 Shanks, 20.   
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was “not conducive to the proper practical application of the principles studied.”  He 
recommended that “lieutenants should be permanently commissioned only after a satisfactory 
demonstration of their abilities covering a probationary period of sufficient length to determine 
not only [their] previous education but [also their] general efficiency and particular fitness 
requisite for the qualities of an officer.”67    
 Unfortunately, these concepts of apprenticeship were increasingly at odds with the 
emerging professional ethos that materialized in the army in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century.  This tension between “book learning” and “muddy boot” experience was 
never reconciled prior to the American entry into World War I and led to confusion over the best 
means of training the war’s junior officers.  It also assumed that there would be a sufficient 
number of experienced officers and NCOs to mentor and develop the army’s “seed corn,” as well 
as having the time available for young officers to complete their apprenticeship in the art of 
military leadership.    
Along with trying to increase the education level and the quality of the “on the job 
training” of its junior officers, the army also worked to improve and codify its professional 
standards.  To answer Congressional concerns that the Army’s seniority system promoted 
officers regardless of individual physical ability and professional competency, the Army 
instituted a requirement in 1890 that all lieutenants and captains eligible for promotion first had 
to pass a rigorous series of physical and professional examinations.   
The examination boards for infantry and cavalry officers consisted of five members: two 
medical officers and three line officers of superior rank to the officer being examined.  In the 
February 1903 General Order 17, the board was instructed that “examinations will be conducted 
                                                 
 67 1LT Dale McDonald, “Training and Promotion of Second Lieutenants” in Journal of the Military Service 
Institution of the United States, Vol. LIX (1916), 208. 
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in a sufficiently exhaustive manner to determine not only that the subject is thoroughly 
comprehended but the degree of proficiency of the officer being examined, and until the board is 
positively satisfied as to his ability to impart instruction in the various subjects.”68  This 
highlighted the importance that the army placed on its officers being able to not only gain and 
retain professional knowledge, but also, to use that knowledge to train those under him.  This 
skill was of vital importance in an army that expected its captains and majors to aid junior 
officers in completing their apprenticeship within their units.   
The professional examinations tested the officer’s tactical and technical competency 
through both a written exam and their “hands-on” ability to maneuver or employ a company of 
soldiers.69  Each branch or specialty of service required different examinations.  For example, 
the examinations for engineer and artillery officers were heavy on mathematics, ballistics, and 
topography. The examination boards for company-grade infantry and cavalry officers focused on 
the officer’s knowledge of administration and Army Regulations, drill and Field Service 
Regulations, fire discipline, basic military field engineering, military law, minor tactics, and 
basic topography.70   It was not unusual for the officers being examined to write over 100 pages 
in answering the questions posed by the board.71   
The examination board also certified that the officer being tested was morally and 
physically fit for the promotion.  The main moral failing that the boards seemed to have most 
watched for was the officer’s drinking habits.  Also, the memory of the morbidly obese William 
Shafter’s flailing attempts to command the Cuban expedition in 1898, and the logjam of old and 
                                                 
 68 General Order 17, 20 February 1903. 
 69 See General Order 116, 1890 and General Order 57, 1892. 
 70 General Order 17, 20 February 1903.  Every year the General Orders specified the parameters of the 
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71 Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 281.  
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infirm officers slowing promotions in the seniority-ridden military, had forced the War 
Department to be increasingly rigid in its physical examinations in the years prior to the Great 
War.  This trend was accelerated by pressure from the president.   In 1907 President Theodore 
Roosevelt wrote to Secretary of War William Taft, 
 As I have personally observed some field officers who were physically 
 unable to ride even a few miles at an increased gait, and I deem it 
 essential that field grade officers of the line of the Army should be at all times 
 physically fit and able to perform the duties pertaining to their positions,  
 especially in the field, and as I believe that such physical fitness can only  
 be demonstrated by actual physical tests.  I desire that you give necessary 
 directions to have the physical condition of all officers of the line who 
 come up for examination for the promotion to the grade of field officer 
 actually tested for skill and endurance in riding, this in addition to the 
 physical examination now required by law.72  
 
This focus on moral and physical fitness later influenced the AEF’s perceptions and expectations 
of the characteristics of an effective and proper officer.  John J. Pershing was a stickler for the 
physical fitness of his senior officers, and his attitudes eventually permeated his whole 
command. 
 The institutional process for ensuring the leadership abilities and professional 
competency of the officer corps was also furthered by Secretary of War’s 1891 order that all 
officers below the rank of colonel be given efficiency reports by their superiors.  The combined 
effects of these moves allowed the officer corps to establish the oversight and internal self-
regulating process that was beginning to guide all emerging professions during the era. The 
efficiency reports consisted of two parts.  In the first, the officer himself enumerated his 
professional reading, publications, and the special skills he brought to the profession.  In the 
second, his commanders offered their evaluations of the officer’s “professional zeal and abilities 
                                                 
 72 General Order 111, 21 May 1907. 
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[and]…capacity for command” and the morale, welfare, and training of the soldiers under his 
command.73   
 The efficiency report system was codified into Army Regulations at the turn of the 
century.  The Army Regulations of 1913 (those in effect throughout World War I) required that 
all officers (generals and colonels included) be given a yearly evaluation by their immediate 
superior to establish a “true estimate of standing, ability, and special fitness for any military 
duty.”74  The regulation continued the requirement for the rated officer to submit a personal 
report of their professional attainments. The examinations and efficiency reports did much to 
standardize the Army’s unwritten norms for leadership and professionalism.  Pershing later 
attempted to keep this system of professional oversight working in the AEF.  The pace of 
mobilization and operations prevented the AEF from continuing promotion exams, but a 
modified efficiency report system continued during the war.  The 11 March 1918 AEF General 
Order 39 required efficiency reports for all AEF majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels, and 
the maintenance by all lieutenants and captains of an “officer’s record book” that recorded their 
superior’s estimation of their physical abilities, intelligence, leadership, personal qualities, and 
general value to the Army.75   
 As with other professions in the progressive era, the army also tried to systematize its 
institutional process for ensuring competency and mastery of specialty knowledge through a 
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structure of post-graduate education.  Beginning in the 1880s, the army began to improve 
professionalism in the service through a system of post, branch, and advanced tactical schools.   
In 1881, William T. Sherman established the Infantry and Cavalry School of Application at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas.  Sherman envisioned that the school would enhance the existing system 
of officer apprenticeship by providing a course that would serve as the army’s primary means of 
instilling its junior officers with a common tactical doctrine and professional ethos.  
 The officers chiefly targeted for the course were those non-West Point lieutenants with 
little background in military art and science. Despite Sherman’s support, the School of 
Application had a long and painful birth.  As historian Timothy Nenninger noted, the poor 
selection of students, lack of qualified instructors, and the elementary nature of the course 
materials prevented the school from achieving Sherman’s vision.76  Although it took time for the 
School of Application to work through its teething problems, for the most part the educational 
reforms were welcomed by the officer corps.  The officer corps’ growing belief that the army 
was on the brink of great change and faced irrelevancy provided an added impetus for reform.  
As Hugh Scott noted of his thoughts in the late 1880s, 
  Formerly most all my studies had gone toward warfare with the Indian, 
  which I used to think, at one time, would last during my lifetime, but 
  conditions on the Plains were rapidly changing.  Instead of protecting 
  the white man from the Indian, it was now the soldiers that protected 
  the Indian from the white man, and my military ideas had been  
  changed by the maneuvers at Chilocco in 1889.  I began to study 
  civilized warfare intensively, perceiving that the day of the Indian on 
  the Plains was over.  While I was too busy with something important 
  to go to school at Fort Leavenworth, I studied its textbooks and began to 
  fit myself for war with a foreign country, although no sign of such a 
  war could yet be seen.77 
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Scott’s comments are intriguing.  They reflect not only the belief that the army was facing a 
challenge to its primary and historic raison d’ être, but also the initial ambiguous place of the 
Leavenworth school and professional education within the army’s culture.   
 In the 1890s the army attempted to expand the pool of officers and NCOs receiving 
professional education by mandating that all posts establish lyceums for officers and schools for 
NCOs and privates.  The officer lyceums were basically an extension of the “on the job” 
apprenticeship for junior officers and were to serve as a cheap and easily enacted stop-gap 
measure to further professionalism while the army established a coherent educational system.  
Captain Eben Swift, one of the early proponents of professionalization, argued of the lyceums, 
  Its aim is to make each battery, troop and company a school, and each garrison 
  a university for the study of the duties of our profession…One of the results 
  of such a course would be to improve the curricula of our schools of application 
  and enable them to be turned into veritable war colleges and staff schools… 
  The Germans have utterly dispelled the fallacy that “War alone teaches war.”  
  Under a careful system of peacetime training, they have been able to develop safe 
  leaders for great armies in the field.78 
 
While the army codified the establishment of lyceums in General Order 125 in September 1900, 
Swift’s glowing hopes for the schools fell far short of his vision.79  When it came to teaching 
junior officer 1LT William Birkhimer noted of his seniors, “With a modesty that for once is not 
worthy of all praise, the veterans shrank to the back ground, leaving to their juniors, the mere 
youngsters of yesterday, and today” to educate themselves.80   
 Upon becoming Secretary of War, Root acknowledged, “The great body of officers were 
confined to the advantages offered by post schools called ‘lyceums,’ which were, in general, 
unsatisfactory and futile.  There was no effective method by which the individual excellence 
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demonstrated could be recognized, or the result attained be utilized.”81  With the support of 
uniformed reformers such as Swift, William Harding Carter, Arthur L. Wagner, and Franklin 
Bell, Root instituted a coherent and hierarchical professional education system designed to 
progressively instruct officers over the course of their careers.  In November 1901, Root issued 
General Order 155 to implement a system of schools that would educate and professionalize an 
officer from his pre-commissioning training to his ascension to senior field-grade rank.   
 Root recast the Infantry and Cavalry School of Application (which became the School of 
the Line in 1904) as a tactical “finishing school” for company-grade officers and required all 
second and first lieutenants and captains with less than ten years of service (excepting those who 
had previously graduated from the School of Application) to attend post schools that would 
focus on minor tactics and company administration.  To give the post schools uniformity and 
importance, Root held post commanders directly responsible for the instruction and made 
Department Commanders responsible to the overall administration and conduct of the schools.  
Root also required the Department Commanders to comment on the post schools in their annual 
reports to the War Department.   
 To emphasize the new-found importance that the army held education, General Order 
155 warned junior officers that the failing of the post course would require them to retake the 
course, and that “in the event of a second failure special report will be made by the commanding 
officer with a view to its consideration by the board which may be thereafter designated to 
examine the officer as to his fitness for promotion.”82  While the order was stated in the silted 
and turgid prose that only government bureaucracies can produce, the message to young officers 
was clear: study your profession or suffer the consequences.   
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 The urgency with which Root approached educational reform reflected both the army’s 
lackluster performance in administration and mobilization during the Spanish American War and 
his concern over the changing complexion of the officer corps.  In his annual report to Congress 
in 1902, he noted, 
  Of the 2,900 officers of the line army, 1,818 have been appointed since the war 
  with Spain.  Of these 1,818 but 276 were supplied by the West Point Academy: 
  the remaining 1,542 have come- 414 from the ranks, 512 from civil life, and 
  616 from the volunteers from the war with Spain and in the Philippines.  The 
  volunteers and enlisted men have of course acquired useful experience, and 
  were all selected on the ground of their military conduct and intelligence.  Yet 
  it is generally true of the whole 1,542, constituting more than one-half of all 
  the officers of the line, that they have had no systematic military education. 
  They constitute nearly the entire body of first and second lieutenants.  After 
  some years, when their seniors have passed off the stage, they will have to 
  supply our generals and colonels and chief staff officers charged with the 
  instruction, discipline, and command of our forces.  Unless the theory of 
  military education under which we have maintained the Academy at West 
  Point for a century is a mistake, it is very important to give this class of 
  young officers, now that they are in the Army, some degree of the educational 
  advantages which the West Point men get before they are commissioned.83 
 
Root’s agenda was to launch a war on two fronts: first reform education, and then purge the 
army of the unqualified and inept officers that had flocked to the force since 1898. 
 Unfortunately, Root found that instituting his agenda was far more difficult than he had 
anticipated. For one, operational requirements, shortages of good instructors, and the reality of 
life on small and scattered posts continued to undercut his, and his successor’s, attempts to 
reform professional education at the local level.  Despite Root’s best efforts to make the 
education system uniform and progressive, its administration at the local level remained hap-
hazard and idiosyncratic.  In 1907 the commander of the Southwestern Division, Brigadier 
General Albert Meyer, remarked of the practical work conducted in his post schools, “in some 
instances the report of post commanders show that considerable interest was taken, while in 
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others but little time was devoted to that part of the course.”84  Three years later the commander 
of the Department of Colorado argued that the education of officers was “giving undue weight to 
theory as opposed to applied instruction” and was undermining “the esprit of the Army and the 
spirit of subordination of the commanded to the commander.”85  Another general lamented, 
“officers of the old army of a quarter of a century ago had much hard filed service, but in 
garrison theirs was a life of idleness and ease compared to the incessant rounds of garrison 
schools, target practice, maneuvers, etc, of the present day.”86  One officer went so far as to 
grumble that the high education standards that the reformers strived for, “might in the past have 
excluded some of our greatest generals, who have been so eminent in strategy and the masterly 
handling of armies in the field.”87   
 The reform-minded officers were well aware of the effect that these shellback officers 
had on their efforts to professionalize the army.  Hugh Scott observed, “older officers train the 
younger in their ways as they come on, generation after generation, and it is very difficult to 
change the habit of a regiment.”88  Addressing the issue of both post and other army schools, the 
commandant of the Leavenworth schools observed, “Too often a young lieutenant, returning to 
his regiment…and wishing to do things as he had been taught, has been suppressed and 
discouraged by his superior officers who had little knowledge of or sympathy with these 
schools.”89  Although their efforts were largely successful in professionalizing the military, the 
Secretaries of War and their uniformed reformers never truly resolved the tension between the 
desire for uniformity in education and training, and the prerogatives and idiosyncratic desires of 
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local commanders.  This legacy of conflict would continue to plague the army’s efforts to 
standardize officer and NCO training during the First World War.    
 Although Root, his successors, and their military reformers faced an uphill battle to 
change the army’s institutional culture, by 1910 they had succeeded in both creating a 
progressive military education system and in producing a generation of young officers dedicated 
to the professional ethos that they propounded.  This change is reflected in the increasing 
number of company-grade infantry officers attending army schools between 1897 and 1915 
(Tables 2-7, 2-8, and 2-9).90 
Table 2-7: Military Education of Regular Army Infantry Captains 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2-8: Military Education of Regular Army Infantry First Lieutenants 
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Table 2-9: Military Education of Regular Army Infantry Second Lieutenants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As was the case with the earlier examination of the level of civil education, the decline in the 
number of first lieutenants and the dramatic increase in the number of captains who graduated 
from the School of Application or the School of the Line reflected the rapid promotion of regular 
officers during the Spanish American War.   
 It is interesting to note that non-West Point officers were over-represented in these 
schools.  This was perhaps a legacy of the belief that West Point offered a superior foundation in 
the art and science of war that was simply lacking in other sources of commission.  Thus, these 
courses remained tactical “finishing schools” up to the Great War.  The fact that few second 
lieutenants had attended the schools by 1915 also points to the continuing legacy of the 
apprenticeship system.  These officers needed practical seasoning before sending them off for 
more theoretical training and education.  Despite these issues, the statistics still show a steady 
and marked increase in the professional education of junior officers.    
 Although their educational reforms never overcame the systemic problems associated 
with instruction at post schools, nor reached as many officers as they had hoped, the civilian and 
military reformers were able to instill a deep and abiding professional ethos within the army’s 
culture.  It is little surprise that this “cult of professionalism” arose.  By embracing the 
educational foundations and exclusivity that came with professionalization, the Regular Army 
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hoped to end over a century of political bickering over respective virtues of citizen and regular 
soldiers.  Professionalization would cement the regulars’ position as the nation’s preeminent 
source of military leadership and “know how.” The emphasis on education and professionalism 
would also give officers what Darryl Henderson termed “expert power” when it came to leading 
the nation’s professional and citizen soldiers.    
 This emphasis on professional “know how” was bolstered the rapid changes in weapons 
and tactics that was occurring during the period.  As early as 1889, one officer argued that, “It is 
now impossible for the ordinary man in civil life to give this matter sufficient attention, and it 
therefore becomes doubly necessary that the officers of the Regular Army should devote their 
entire time to their profession, that they may be ‘equal to the occasion’ at all times and in all 
places.”91  Fourteen years later, Major William Black noted,  
  In civil life those professions which deal with life and death, such as medicine, 
  surgery and pharmacy, are safeguarded by law from practice by the untrained… 
  When it is a question, not of the life of one man, but of hundreds, not of the 
  well-being of a community, but of a nation, how much greater is the necessity 
  for legal protection against ignorant practice, no matter how patriotic or well 
  meaning the individual…But the tradition remains…that a commission, a  
  uniform, and plenty of good will, with or without some knowledge of drill 
  regulations, are all that are required to fit a man to be a soldier in any grade. 
  The lessons of a war seem necessary to teach the American people the direful 
  distinction between an amateur and a professional soldier.  It seems absurd to 
  state such a truism, and in no other of the great nations of the world would an 
  argument be required to establish the belief that arms is a profession demanding 
  for its higher ranks the long training of the mind and body, the special aptitude, 
  and the experience which are conceded necessary for the professions of civil 
  life.92 
         
In the same vein, another acolyte of the “cult of professionalism” remarked, “An officer can no 
more cease to study than can a lawyer or doctor.  The art of war is being constantly elaborated 
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and improved and the best officers, like the best doctors, are those that who are first thoroughly 
grounded and then keep abreast of the times.”93   
 As was the case in other professions in the progressive era, the new military professional 
ethos produced both a drive for “efficiency” and intolerance for any internal or external 
opposition.  One indication of the seriousness with which the army viewed education and 
professionalism was the fact that officers were liable for courts martial if they neglected their 
studies.  In May 1903, for example, First Lieutenant Leonard Baker was charged with a violation 
of the 62nd Article of War (neglect of duty to the prejudice of good order and military discipline) 
for a “lack of proper diligence and application” and failure “to prepare himself in a suitable 
manner” for the recitations and examinations required by his attendance at the General Service 
Staff College at Fort Leavenworth.94   
 The reformers were intent upon overcoming all obstacles in the path of 
professionalization.  This is evidenced in a 1913 article in the Infantry Journal by Captain W. B. 
Burtt, 
  Our officers in the main are not fond of hard and intensive study, and in 
  general, the outer and more visible signs of the profession of arms appeal 
  to the average man more than the inner mental development…[To older  
  officers] the Service Schools are in their eyes kindergartens and thorough 
  and exhaustive study is something for cadets or college professors… Their 
  commanders had been taught in the greatest school-War, and as a consequence, 
  younger officers were made to feel that the only military education and the 
  only valuable knowledge was to be obtained in that one seminary.  We find 
  these officers a hindrance rather than help for any system [of professional  
  development] adopted, because they are unfitted by a lack of education, 
  training and experience for the position of instructor which they 
  should occupy.95 
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In the “cult of professionalism” specialist knowledge, attained through education and honed 
during an apprenticeship overseen by other expert practitioners, was the true and only path to 
professional enlightenment and salvation.   
 As the Great War waged in Europe, the missionaries of professionalism grew even more 
strident and scolding in their message.   In Leadership and Military Training, Lincoln Andrews 
warned the young officers, “Do not assume that in putting on your uniform you have clothed 
yourself with any particular omniscience.”  As Andrews pointed out, “To attain the confidence 
and respect of your men, the first requisite is superior knowledge.  That will give you self-
confidence to appear as a leader, and will justify your men in following you.”96  He also warned 
would-be leaders in 1916, “You are a sorry object pretending to lead when there are men in [the] 
ranks who know your part better than you do.”97 
 The zeal and intolerance of the uniformed reformers were also reflected in their attempts 
to purge the ranks of the officer corps of those officers that did not live up to their high 
expectations.  In his farewell address as the Commandant of the Leavenworth schools before 
proceeding to Washington to assume the position of Army Chief of Staff in 1906, the arch-
reformer James Franklin Bell maintained, “With the passing away of unreasoning automatons 
and the feudal social system of servile submission has also passed the possibility of success 
along the old lines. Large business enterprises learned this long ago, and subordinates not gifted 
with intelligence, interest, and enterprise are promptly gotten rid of.”98  One of Bell’s successors 
as Chief of Staff, Leonard Wood commented of the existing seniority promotion system, “Under 
the present conditions our officers are too old when they reach field rank.  They are retained too 
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long in the subordinate grades, and too many of them reach command rank at a time of life when 
they have lost all initiative, and, only too often, the physical ability to take up the work.”99  In 
1909 the commander of the Department of the East recommended, “If a procedure could be 
established under which officers who have failed to bring their troops up to a high standard of 
efficiency could be suspended from promotion for a year, and on a second failure be gotten rid 
of, we should have made a really substantial advance toward securing and maintaining a high 
degree of efficiency.”100   In the same spirit an infantry major wrote in 1910, “we should ask [for 
the] power to weed out the inefficient…Let us set the standard of infantry officers so high that 
none but the physically active and mentally alert will stay in the corps.”101   
 As previously noted, Root, Taft, and military reformers such as Bell and Wood, had been 
concerned by what they had seen as the dilution of the officer corps by those “outsiders” 
commissioned during the Spanish American War and Philippine Insurrection.  While serving as 
the commander of the Philippines Division in 1906, Leonard Wood remarked, 
  In the line and staff there is a considerable number of officers who have 
  entered the service as a result of the war with Spain and subsequent  
  disturbances in these islands who, now that a condition of peace is 
  established, are found to be of a type which is not desirable to  
  continue in the regular service…The class of officer referred to is made up  
  of men who find the hard and serious work of an officer’s career different 
  from what they expected.  This, combined with the lack of excitement, has 
  rendered them indifferent to improvement and in some instances to the discharge 
  of duty…With our small Army, there is no excuse for carrying a heavy load of 
  inferior personnel in any class…it is for this reason, and for the further reason 
  that our little army should retain only the best material, that some searching 
  system of elimination is necessary to get rid of those who are indifferent or 
  worthless, either through lack of aptitude, physical or mental infirmity or  
  weakness…102 
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In his annual report to Congress in 1908, Taft echoed Wood’s sentiments and stated, 
  There is another and very necessary way of increasing the efficiency of the 
  army in respect to its officered personnel, without increasing the number, 
  and that is by the process of elimination of officers who are not the best. 
  There are a number of officers in the army who do not take an interest in 
  the service that is demanded, and while they keep to the letter of the law  
  and regulations it is impossible to get rid of them and fill their places with 
  more efficient officers…Since 1890 we have had on our statute books a 
  law contemplating this elimination in the case of officers below the rank 
  of major who fail to pass satisfactorily examinations prescribed for promotion… 
  This law while calculated by its terms to produce the desired effect of 
  weeding out incompetent and unworthy officers, has utterly failed to 
  accomplish this result except in the case of physical disability…in the case of 
  incompetence or unfitness for other causes only an insignificant number have 
  been gotten rid of under this law…On an average only one officer a year 
  has been retired under this law for any reason other than physical disability.103    
  
While various civil and military leaders attempted to improve the general standards of the officer 
corps, they found the task to be an uphill battle.   
 Root failed twice during his term as Secretary of War to have Congress pass a bill that 
would provide for the quick elimination of unfit and incompetent officers.  Taft also met with 
little success.  Upon becoming president, Taft had his Secretary of War, Jacob Dickinson again 
propose an elimination bill.  Dickinson argued, “after more than 20 years’ trial of the present 
system of elimination for unfitness, there is much deadwood in the Army and many backwards 
tendencies evident.”  He went on to note, “I am also hopeful that proper correction of our 
administrative system and of our larger military policies will so change life and work of the 
Army that such deadwood will not accumulate and that the progressive, ambitious officers will 
be so worked and trained that they will keep up their high standards.”104  Although the War 
Department’s civil and military leaders failed to significantly change the army’s ability to 
remove incompetent officers, it fueled the “cult of professionalism” and made regular officers 
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ready, willing, and able to remove the World War I volunteer and National Guard officers who 
did not appear to live up to the regulars’ exacting standards of competency and deportment. 
 One of the main reasons the War Department failed to sway Congress to pass a more 
stringent elimination bill was because at the same time the army was seeking to purge its ranks, 
it was also begging for a dramatic increase in the officer corps.  The army had gored itself on the 
horns of a dilemma.  Those reforms that the army had long sought, such as creation of the 
general staff, expansion of the professional education system, and its ability to regulate the 
National Guard and the military education at Land Grant colleges, were requiring more officers 
than the service could afford to give.  From 1904 through 1916 every Secretary of War and 
Army Chief of Staff maintained a steady drum beat in their annual reports to Congress lamenting 
the shortage of officers due to the explosion of detached service requirements the army had to 
fill yearly.  To gage the depth the problem of detailed officers, Table 2-10 shows the number and 
percentage of infantry officers not with their units from 1908 through 1916. 
Table 2-10: Infantry Officers Absent from their Commands105 
Year 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 
Number 
Detailed 
And % 
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 In the decade prior to the American entry into World War I, one-fifth of the infantry 
officers were absent from their commands due to details, staff assignments, and attendance at 
army schools.  During the same time period, up to one-quarter of cavalry and field artillery 
officers were absent from their commands for similar reasons.  In all of the years between 1908 
and 1916, the vast majority of those officers on detached service were company-grade officers.  
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In 1910, for example, 85.4% of detached officers were captains or lieutenants.106  The dramatic 
decline in detailed officers in 1913 and 1914 was due to provisions in the Army Appropriations 
Bill of 1912 that severely curtailed “the detachment of officers below the rank of major from 
duties with their companies, troops or batteries, unless they shall have been present for duty with 
such organizations for at least two out of the proceeding six years.”107   
 Although the so-called “Manchu Law” temporarily shook up army assignments, the 
Congress failed to reduce the number of requirements for officers that it itself had imposed on 
the army.  In 1911, for example, the Congress finally responded to the army’s call for an 
increase in its number of company-grade officers by funding an additional 200 officers.  The 
same year, the Congress mandated that the army provide at least one regular officer to serve with 
each National Guard infantry, cavalry, and artillery battalion or squadron as trainers and 
advisors.  Ironically, this act forced the army to detail an additional 200 officers for this new 
duty.108   
 Senior army leaders rightly feared the effects of the officer shortage on the efficiency and 
readiness of their units.  As early as 1904, the commander of the Department of the Gulf argued 
“The demands on the time of officers for their own instruction at post and service schools is so 
great that the organization is apt to suffer accordingly.”109  Four years later, the Army Chief of 
Staff warned, “A young officer needs to be taught his duty in the company by actual service 
under an experienced company commander.  Yet today many companies are commanded by 
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young, inexperienced officers from civil life who have had no time to learn their company duty 
before they are placed in command.”110   
 This situation did not improve prior to World War I and the Inspector General reports of 
maneuver and field training in 1912 highlighted the doleful influence of the lack of officers on 
the field army.  Colonel George Chase, the Inspector General for the Department of the East, 
stated, “I believe that standards of efficiency in instruction and discipline and the general field 
efficiency [of units] could be raised if officers of all organizations were required to be with their 
organizations during periods of instruction, especially in target practice and field training.”  He 
found particularly alarming the rapid turnover of company commanders and the break down of 
the system for mentoring junior officers.  He noted,  
  Many organizations (companies and troops) are commanded by young, 
  inexperienced officers who are continually changing…Many of the 
  best officers of the service are detached from their commands, leaving 
  the instruction of the line in the hands of officers who lack experience 
  in controlling men.  I am convinced that the general efficiency of all   
   troops…may be improved by placing officers in command of troops, 
  batteries, and companies who will retain command for a considerable 
  period of time.111  
 
 These deficiencies were not limited to the Department of the East.  The inspector of field  
training in the Department of Dakota also noted, “The exercises were as satisfactory as could be 
expected under present conditions in the infantry and cavalry of the regular service, where units 
are always suffering from shortages of officers, especially in the grade of captain.”112  The 
Inspector General of the Philippine Division simply termed the absence of officers from their 
units the “professional disease in the line of the Army.”113   In 1905 the Army Inspector General 
chided “the young cavalry officer who is willing to abandon and thus subject his troops to the 
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resulting injury that such organization invariably receives by shifting control from one lieutenant 
to another” to take a non-troop assignment.  He suggested that an officer “who will seek 
details…should give way to one who is willing to take charge of the high office vacated by him 
and who will esteem it an honor and a pleasure to have such an important command.”114  
The situation was so grave that Brigadier General Earl Thomas feared that the opening of 
opportunities to attend schools or to fill non-troop assignments was undercutting the army’s 
leadership ethos.  He argued, “service with troops does not impress one as being honored and 
respected as it formerly was” and that the army could not “accomplish the best results when any 
form of service is viewed as more important or more creditable than the training and the leading 
of the troops.”115  
  Despite these concerns, the reformers were not going to backslide on their commitments 
to establish coherent education and staff systems.  Secretary of War William Taft rebuked those 
in the army who grumbled over the number of officers on detailed service.  In 1905 he noted, 
“The remark is sometimes heard in the Army that an officer’s time now is completely taken up 
in going to school.  With due allowance for exaggeration in this statement, it is well for the 
Army and for the country if it be true.”116  While senior officers continued to lament the overall 
shortage of officers due to service away from troops, the tapering off of criticism of the 
educational and staff systems between 1908 and 1916 reflected the army’s general acceptance of 
the “cult of professionalism.” Even as events of the Mexican border exacerbated the shortage of 
officers in 1916, the editor of the Infantry Journal maintained that the army should not let “the 
present situation to divert our energies entirely to one phase of the military development of the 
country.”  After noting how Germany “found it to her profit to continue her military schools in 
                                                 
 114 Annual Reports of the War Department for 1905, Vol. I, 446. 
 115 Annual Reports of the War Department for 1910, Vol. III, 129. 
 116 Annual Reports of the War Department for 1905, Vol. I, 17. 
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operation while engaged in the greatest war in history,” he pointed out that while there “might 
possibly be some advantage to the immediate training to the troops now on the border…it is 
fairly certain that such a course [the closing the army’s schools] would be an eventual loss.”117  
 Thus, as the U. S. Army entered World War I, its institutional culture had been overtaken 
by the “cult of professionalism.”  This culture accepted the fact that professional education was 
the key to attaining tactical excellence and overcoming inexperience.  It also accepted the 
premise that it was tolerable for junior leaders to be gone from their units for long periods of 
time to achieve this required education and that the frequent rotation of officers from positions 
of command was an unfortunate, but necessary, effect of this policy.  This belief would later 
have a baleful influence on combat leadership in the AEF.                     
 In conclusion, when the Regular Army entered World War I, its unwritten and off times 
contradictory expectations of the proper characteristics and deportment of junior officers guided 
its approach to the selection and training of wartime junior officers.  The regulars expected the 
expanding officer corps to exhibit the same sense of gentility, paternalism, noblesse oblige, and 
professionalism that defined its approach to leadership in the two decades prior to the war.  The 
regulars’ preference for West Point graduates and college education, their attitudes toward the 
larger American society, and a sense of professional superiority over citizen soldiers, negatively 
colored its attitudes and perceptions of the soldiers and officers who joined the ranks of the army 
                                                 
 117 Editorial Staff, “Shortages of Officers on the Border” in Infantry Journal, Vol. XIII, No. 2 (September-
October 1916), 231-3.  On 10 May 1916, the Chief of Staff of the Army, MG Hugh Scott, ordered the Staff College 
of Fort Leavenworth be closed in order to send the college’s students and faculty back to their regiments in order to 
support the Army’s punitive expedition in Mexico.  Despite the editor’s concerns, the school did not reopen until 
after World War I.  However, the editor’s concerns were later validated.  It is clear that their experiences in France 
convinced Pershing and many of the Army’s other senior leaders that the wartime closing of the Leavenworth 
schools had been a grave mistake.  As Col. Leroy Eltinge, the Assistant Commandant of the General Service 
Schools, argued after the reopening of the Leavenworth Staff College in 1919, “The policy of closing these Schools, 
adopted by the War Department in all national emergencies, is believed to be wrong…It seems improper to close it 
at just the time when it could perform the greatest service”  (Annual Report of the Commandant  of the Army Service 
School, 1920 at http://www- gsc.army.mil/carl/download/reports/rep1920.pdf ). 
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in 1917 and 1918.  The Regular Army officer corps’ “cult of professionalism” not only made it 
intolerant of what it saw as incompetence and a lack of professional zeal, ability, and efficiency, 
but also inculcated a reverence for professional schools that would later hinder its wartime 
efforts to build cohesive and effective small units.  Ultimately, during World War I the Regular 
Army sometimes created its own systemic problems within its attempts to instruct its wartime 
officers in the “dark art and mystery of managing men.”       
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Chapter 3 
“Sergeant John McCafferty and Corp’ral Donahue”: 
NCO Leadership in the Regular Army 1900-1917 
 
 One of the enduring songs of the “Old Army” was The Regular Army ‘O (sometimes 
called Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay).  In the song the soldiers both praised and lamented 
the leadership of… 
  Sergeant John McCafferty and Corp’ral Donahue, 
  Who made us march and toe the mark, 
  In gallant Company Q,1 
 
As with officers, to understand the AEF’s approach to the leadership of its corporals and 
sergeants, we must first appreciate the pre-war Regular Army’s expectations for its NCOs; those 
roles, characteristics, skills and abilities that the army expected of “Sergeant John McCafferty 
and Corp’ral Donahues.”  Unfortunately, the Regular Army paid much less attention to the 
education, selection, training, and development of its NCOs as it had lavished on its pre-war 
officers.  Thus, while James Moss would state “the noncommissioned officers are the backbone 
of an army,” and declare that “experience has shown that the efficiency, discipline, and 
reputation of a command depend to a great extent on its noncommissioned officers,” those 
truisms were based more on tradition and serendipity rather than a concerted effort to 
professionalize the Regular Army’s NCO corps from 1900 to 1917.2         
 As an institution, the Regular Army had long understood the correlation between having 
a strong cadre of NCOs and the smooth running of its units.  It expected the NCO corps to train 
new recruits, administer the routine details of army life, oversee the “good order and discipline” 
of its soldiers, and assist its officers in the command and direction of its soldiers in combat.  As 
                                                 
 1 The song was written in 1879 by Edward Harrigan and Tony Hart for vaudeville.  Despite, or perhaps 
because of, its ridicule of the numerous Irish soldiers that filled the ranks of the Regular Army, it was a popular 
soldier tune from the 1880s through the first decade of the twentieth century.  
2 James Moss, Noncommissioned Officers’ Manual (Menasha, George Banta Publishing Co., 1917), 17. 
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with the officer corps, these expectations reached back to the very founding of the Republic.  In 
his “Blue Book,” von Steuben noted of company first sergeants, 
  The soldier having acquired that degree of confidence of his officers as to be  
  appointed first sergeant of the company should consider the importance of his  
  office; that the discipline of the company, the conduct of the men, their  
  exactness in obeying orders, and the regularity of their manners, will in a great  
  measure depend on his vigilance.  He should be intimately acquainted with the  
  character of every soldier of the company, and should take great pains to impress  
  upon their minds the indispensable necessity of their strictest obedience, as a  
  foundation of order and regularity.3 
   
For other sergeants and corporals, the Prussian drill master required, 
  
  It being on the non-commissioned officers that the discipline and order of 
  the company in a great measure depend, they cannot be too circumspect in  
  their behavior towards the men, by treating them with mildness, and at the  
  same time obliging every one to do his duty.  By avoiding too great familiarity  
  with the men, they will not only gain their love and confidence, but be treated  
  with a proper respect; whereas by a contrary conduct they forfeit all regard,  
  and their authority becomes despised.  Each sergeant and corporal will be in a  
  particular manner answerable for the squad committed to their care.4  
 
To a great extent, von Steuben expected NCOs to mirror the paternalistic leadership of their 
officers.  In fact, since corporals and sergeants lived among their soldiers and were ultimately 
responsible for their day-to-day supervision, the army viewed NCOs as the first link in the 
army’s paternalistic system of leadership.   
 Company and regimental commanders generally expected their NCOs to identify and 
solve most of their soldier’s everyday problems or lapses in discipline before they were even 
aware that such issues existed.  In 1916 one officer lectured an audience of NCOs that, “non-
commissioned officers are valuable in their capacity as instructors, as disseminators of technical 
information, but they are doubly valuable as leaders, to whom the men look for moral, social, 
and intellectual inspiration.” He further noted, “No non-commissioned officer can hope to 
                                                 
 3 Ibid., 141-2.  
 4 Frederick William Baron von Steuben, Baron von Steuben’s Revolutionary War Drill Manual (New York: 
Dover Publications, 1985), 144-5.  
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measure up fully to the requirements of his office who is not something of a leader, and who has 
not learned how to gain the confidence and respect, and the regard of the men under him.”5  The 
way to gaining this confidence, respect, and regard was to look after the soldiers’ needs and to be 
firm, but fair, in their leadership. Given this outlook, it is not surprising that enlisted men in this 
period had to gain the permission of their first sergeants before even speaking to their company 
commanders.6   
 Against this backdrop of traditional paternalism there also existed emerging concepts of 
NCO leadership which drew on the management ideas of the contemporary industrial society.  In 
1907, the War Department published The Army as a Life Occupation for Enlisted Men, a report 
on enlisted life in the Regular Army that was intended to bolster the army’s efforts to gain pay 
raises for its NCOs.  Breaking with the traditional paternalistic view that NCOs served as the 
“mothers” of their company families, one officer noted in the report, “The noncommissioned 
officers are men who in civil life would be skilled workmen, foremen, chief clerks, and 
subordinate officials.”  He went on to argue that, 
  These [NCOs] are as important to the Army as foreman to factories; as  
  section bosses to railroads; as skilled workmen and subordinate officials 
  are to every commercial enterprise; or as petty and warrant officers are 
  to the Navy.  The same knowledge of their trade, the same abilities, the 
  same qualities of mind, and the same force of character are as essential 
  in one case as in the others.  Qualified leaders, successful drivers of men 
  are everywhere in demand.  Men who can make other men work have 
  a recognized value above their fellows in the industrial world.7  
 
Even James Moss, a leading proponent of the patriarchal ethos noted that in small units, “the 
Captain is the proprietor of the company and the First Sergeant is the foreman.”8  The leading 
                                                 
 5 CPT Frank Tebbetts, “Leadership,” Journal of the U.S. Cavalry Association, Vol. XXVII, No. 111 (July 
1916), 19. 
 6 Don Rickey, Forty Miles and Day on Beans and Hay (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), 58. 
 7 Department of War, Annual Reports of the War Department for 1907, Vol. 1, 82-3.  Secretary of War 
Howard Taft believed that The Army as a Life Occupation for Enlisted Men was so important that he included it 
verbatim into his annual report to Congress.   
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military reformer, General J. Franklin Bell, went so far as to inform one audience of junior 
officers, 
  Large business enterprises…learned long ago [that] subordinates not gifted 
  with intelligence, interest, and enterprise are promptly gotten rid of… 
  Though differing in many important respects, there is a certain parallelism 
  between the management of armies and the management of large business 
  enterprises.  The management of an army, and each of its units, should, as 
  far as practicable, resemble that of any large, highly organized business 
  undertaking.  We need to study common sense business methods, which 
  have demonstrated their soundness beyond cavil.9 
 
Although the traditional view of the NCO as a paternalistic leader continued to dominate the 
Regular Army’s expectations of its sergeants, it is interesting to note how deep the larger 
industrial society’s notions of management had begun to creep into the military’s culture of 
leadership.   
   Whether the NCO was a paternalistic leader or an industrial foreman and “driver of 
men,” the army’s officers still expected them to assist the commander in the operation of the 
company.  For example, by the turn of the twentieth century, the practice of allowing company 
NCOs to oversee the routine operation of the unit while in garrison was well established.  
Historian Don Rickey went as far as to note that in the late nineteenth century, “The first 
sergeant actually ran the company, and was expected to do so by the company officers.  Many 
privates had little contact with their officers, beyond formal exchanges of military courtesies.”10  
This reality was also satirized in the song “The Regular Army ‘O.  In one verse, the soldier 
observes, 
  The best of all the officers is Second Lieutenant McDuff; 
  Of smoking cigarettes and sleep he never gets enough. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 8 Moss, Noncommissioned Officer’s Manual, 40.  
 9 Bell, “Reflections and Suggestions,” 5-6. 
 10 Rickey, 58-9.  In the Officer’s Manual, Moss states that this practice was not universal, but that it tended 
to be customary in most companies.  James A. Moss, Officer’s Manual (Menasha: George Banta Publishing Co, 
1917), 189.  
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  Says the Captain, “All we want of you is to go to Reveille, 
  And we’ll let the first sergeant run the company.” 
 
Without a doubt, the company first sergeant was the lynchpin that tied together a company’s 
officers and enlisted men.   
 It is interesting to note that the Regular Army’s expectations of the “top sergeant” had 
changed very little from those expressed by von Steuben in 1778.  For example, in Captain M. B. 
Stewart’s 1903 Handbook for Noncommissioned Officers, he notes that the first sergeant was 
“selected by the company commander for his excellence of character, capacity to command the 
respect and obedience of the enlisted men, intelligence, efficiency, and military bearing.”  He 
maintained that the first sergeant’s main role was to “assist the company commander and 
commissioned officers of the company in the discipline, instruction, and administration of the 
company.”11  In his Noncommissioned Officer’s Manual, James Moss informed burgeoning 
NCOs that, 
  His position is, indeed, one of importance and responsibility.  Through his  
  speech, manners and action he must leave no doubt in the minds of each and  
  every member of the company, noncommissioned officers and privates, that  
  next to the commissioned officers he is the head of the company and that 
  during the absence of all officers he is the company commander’s personal  
  representative in the company and must be obeyed and respected accordingly.12 
 
 Due to their importance within their companies, first sergeants tended to be long service 
NCOs with sound records of performance and discipline, and generally had enough education to 
handle the paperwork and other administrative requirements of their units.  By and large, the first 
sergeants rose to their positions through time and merit.  Private Sam Woodfill, who later gained 
both a commission and a Medal of Honor in the Great War, described his first sergeant as a 
“rattlin’ good soldier.”  He went on to note, “The top kick was one of the gang of old-timers in 
                                                 
 11 CPT E. M. Stewart, Handbook for Noncommissioned Officers of Infantry (Kansas City, Mo: Franklin 
Hudson Publishing Company, 1903), 65. 
 12 Moss, Noncommissioned Officer’s Manual, 40.  
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our company.  What those fellows didn’t know about soldiering, neither did nobody else.”13  
Unfortunately, as with much of the regular’s approach to its NCOs, the selection and 
development of pre-World War I first sergeants was based around a peacetime system that could 
not be replicated during any major expansion of the army.         
 Despite the recognized importance of NCOs to the “good order and discipline” of its 
companies, from 1865 through 1916 the Regular Army had no formalized method for selecting 
NCOs for its infantry and cavalry units.  As historian Earnest Fisher noted, all NCOs within the 
company were “commander’s men” who were selected by, and served at the pleasure of, their 
company commanders.14  This system of the company commander “owning” their NCOs was 
enshrined in Article XXX of Army Regulations.  The article stated, “Company 
noncommissioned officers are appointed by the regimental commander, or temporally appointed 
by battalion commanders…on the recommendation of their company commanders.” 15  The goal 
of these regulations was to build harmonious units where company commanders selected NCOs 
who would best complement the captains’ leadership style and agenda.  As Captain William 
Carpenter noted, “Naturally the personality of the captain enters largely into the selection [of 
NCOs], and some give greater weight to one qualification than do others. Generally the 
characteristics of the company commander are reflected very truly by his noncommissioned 
officers, and his own peculiarities and efficiency are indicated by the quality of these men.”16  
 Although NCOs were given their warrants from the regimental commanders, their 
company commanders still managed to exercise a great deal of control over their NCOs by their 
                                                 
 13 Lowell Thomas, Woodfill of the Regulars (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1929), 38. 
 14 Ernest Fisher, Jr., Guardians of the Republic: A History of the Non Commissioned Officer Corps of the 
U.S. Army (New York: Ballantine Books, 1994), 178. 
 15 The Regulations for the United States Army 1913, Corrected to April 15, 1917, 71. 
 16 MAJ Charles E. Kilbourne, ed. The Collier National Service Library, Vol. 4, Rudiments of Drill- Mobile 
Army Troops, by CPT William T. Carpenter (New York: P. F. Collier and Son, 1917), 20. 
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power to demote those corporals and sergeants that failed to live up to their expectations.  Article 
XXX directed that “A noncommissioned officer may be reduced to the ranks by sentence of 
courts martial, or, on the recommendation of the company commander, by the order of the 
commander having final authority to appoint such noncommissioned officer.”17  In other words, 
those who the company commander promoted, he could just as quickly demote.  C. C. Lyon, a 
journalist who went through basic training in 1916 to write a story on army life for his 
newspaper, noted the “here today gone tomorrow” reality of being a “commander’s man” after 
one old soldier remarked, “I’ve been a sergeant several times and a first sergeant once, but I 
didn’t behave myself and here I am back with the privates.”18   
 Some officers recognized the drawbacks to this system.  In 1908 the Commander of the 
Department of the Columbia remarked in his report to the Secretary of War, 
  There now exists no system of governing these promotions.  There are  
  restrictions, of course, such as a private cannot be made a first sergeant, etc., 
  but, strange to note, a private can be made a sergeant-major by the stroke 
  of a pen.  There is no carefully thought out system of promotion for 
  noncommissioned officers.  In one regiment it is done one way, in the next 
  another, and even in the same regiment there may be a dozen ways of 
  appointing and promoting noncommissioned officers, depending on the 
  ideas of individual company commanders.  In the interest of fairness and 
  discipline, and to increase the efficiency of the army, a uniform system of 
  promotion should be clearly defined by the War Department.19  
 
Notwithstanding these identified problems, this ad hoc and company commander centric, system 
continued to govern the selection and promotion of NCOs during World War I. 
 Despite their official oversight of NCO promotion, few regimental commanders seemed 
willing to encroach on what the regulars had come to view as a traditional prerogative of their 
                                                 
 17 Ibid., 72. 
 18 C.C. Lyon, Experience of a Recruit in the United States Army (Washington D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1916), 15.  Lyons was a writer for the Columbus, Ohio newspaper the Columbus Citizen.  He attended basic 
training at Columbus Barracks in March and April 1916.  The War Department was so impressed with the up-beat 
tone of his articles that it decided to print them as a recruiting pamphlet. 
 19 Department of War, Annual Reports of the War Department for 1908, Vol. III, 178. 
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company commanders.  Although Army Regulations warned that “Noncommissioned officers 
will be carefully selected and instructed, and always supported by company commanders in the 
proper performance of their duties,” there were no further guidelines for company-grade officers 
to use in determining who among their soldiers would make the best corporals and sergeants.20   
In the pre-Spanish American War regulars, this lack of formal guidance in selecting NCOs was 
not a great hindrance.  Company commanders were usually mature veterans with a large degree 
of experience and command time within their units.  This allowed the long-service captains to 
gain a deeper appreciation for the abilities of their soldiers and to develop a discerning eye for 
nascent leadership talent in their pool of potential NCOs.   
 It should also be noted that in selecting his cadre of sergeants and corporals, the company 
commanders of this period could also draw upon the advice of his existing body of long-service 
NCOs.  C. C. Lyon quoted an officer as remarking, “If a young fellow hasn’t the stuff in him to 
justify us in promoting him to the noncommissioned ranks, he’d better quit the Army after his 
first enlistment.”  Lyon observed, 
  It doesn’t take the commanders long to spot the “comers.” Out of the 
  60 who enlisted the day I myself went into the Army, I thought I could 
  pick at least 10 who would be corporals before their enlistments expired. 
  They were the chaps who showed the most aptitude in drill, appeared the 
  neatest and trimmest in uniform, and put “punch” into everything they 
  did, whether in the barracks, on the drill grounds, or at play.21  
 
 Army Regulations also aided commanders in selecting NCOs by allowing them to “test 
the capacity of privates for the duties of noncommissioned officers” by appointing select enlisted 
men to the position of “lance corporal.”  While holding this position, the private-turned-lance 
corporal would be “obeyed and respected as corporals” and be evaluated by his officers and 
                                                 
 20 The Regulations for the United States Army 1913, Corrected to April 15, 1917., 71. 
 21 Lyon, 15. 
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sergeants in their ability to lead soldiers.22  James Moss admitted that this system deliberately set 
out to throw the newly-minted NCO “into deep water” to find out if they would “sink 
or…swim,” but believed that it was still the best way to determine if the soldier would “make 
good” as an enlisted leader.23    
 This view seems to have been quite common among officers.  In a 1913 article in the 
Cavalry Journal, First Lieutenant William Edwards noted, “There is no military training so good 
as personal responsibility.  The test of a non-commissioned officer should be to place him in 
command of a squad.  If he cannot command a squad, he is unfit to wear chevrons.”24  Edwards 
went on to declare, 
  Very often a man is entirely underestimated until he is tested by putting 
  him in authority.  Opportunities of this sort tend to bring out what there 
  is in a non-commissioned officer, especially his ability to command men.   
  No squad can possibly be made proficient unless the head of it first 
  sets the example by being himself proficient, and therefore every non- 
  commissioned officer should be chosen with the idea constantly in mind 
  of his fitness for filling that office.  If he shows himself unfit, a  
  recommendation to have him relieved should not be delayed.25 
  
 Not all officers were content with this “trial by doing” model of identifying potential 
NCOs.   In 1908 Major William Burnham recommended that the army establish a three-year 
course of instruction for all NCOs and that “appointment to the grade of corporal be made after a 
written competitive examination by a board of officers composed of the battalion commander, 
the company commander, and one other officer.”26  Burnham also suggested the same procedure 
govern the promotions of corporals to sergeants.  Unfortunately, despite the support of the 
                                                 
 22 Kilbourne, ed. The Collier National Service Library, Vol. 4, Rudiments of Drill- Mobile Army Troops, 
71.  
 23 Moss, Noncommissioned Officer’s Manual, 18.  
 24 1LT William Edwards, “The Squad Leader and His Squad,” Journal of the United States Cavalry 
Association, Vol. XXIII, No. 4 (January 1913), 776. 
 25 Ibid., 778. 
 26 Department of War, Annual Reports of the War Department for 1909, Vol. III, 143. 
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commander of the Department of the Columbia, the War Department failed to implement 
Burnham’s recommendations prior to World War I.  In a peacetime army with the time and 
command experience to conduct the leadership experiment of “trial by doing,” the system 
seemed to have identified and promoted the right privates to the ranks of NCOs.  However, as 
will later be seen, it was not a system that was well suited to wartime conditions requiring a rapid 
expansion of the army and its NCO corps.   
 As there was no set system of promotion boards, examinations, or NCO academies for 
identifying and developing promising privates for promotion to NCO, the pre-World War I 
regulars fell back on unofficial “rules of thumb” for selecting its sergeants.  Captain William 
Carpenter warned new officers, “One of the most important duties of a company commander is 
the selection of his noncommissioned officers.”  He went on to note, “In selecting privates for 
promotion many things must be considered, such as character, past service and conduct, training, 
ability, probable efficiency, age, personality, ect.”  After giving these rather nebulous criteria, 
Carpenter sheepishly admitted that when it came to selecting NCOs, “there is no fixed standard, 
and indeed a man would have to be a perfect soldier to meet all the desirable qualifications.”27  
 Carpenter was not alone in giving officers sweeping and general advice for selecting 
privates for promotion.  The perennial manual writer James Moss counseled officers that when 
selecting NCOs they should pick, “men possessing such soldierly qualities as a high sense of 
duty, cheerful obedience to orders, force of character, honesty, sobriety, and steadiness, together 
with an intelligent knowledge of drills, regulations, and orders.”28  In his Handbook for 
Noncommissioned Officers of Infantry, Captain Stewart stated, “The noncommissioned officer is 
selected from the enlisted men of the company for his character, intelligence, efficiency, and 
                                                 
 27 Carpenter, Rudiments of Drill- Mobile Army Troops, 20. 
 28 Moss, Officer’s Manual, 190. 
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soldierly bearing to assist the commissioned officers in the instruction, discipline, and care of the 
other enlisted men.”29  Carpenter, Moss, and Stewart’s standards of behavior and expertise for 
potential NCOs were certainly not off the mark, but again, they all presuppose that the company 
commander would have the time, experience, and advice from senior officers and NCOs to aid 
him in settling this weighty matter. 
 Moss and other military writers were somewhat more effective in describing the army’s 
expectations of its NCOs once they attained the august rank of corporal and sergeant.  As was the 
case with so many leadership subjects between 1890 and 1916, these authors filled a void that 
the War Department itself had failed to address or codify.  For example, the Field Service 
Regulation (Hereafter FSR), the army’s only definitive prewar doctrinal source, only mentions 
the duty of NCOs three times within its pages: in preventing straggling during marches, their 
commanding of combat trains when no officers are available, and when serving as the senior 
member of a train car during rail movement.30   
 In his Noncommissioned Officer’s Manual, Moss maintained that the role of the company 
NCO was to correct errors, prevent the commission of offenses, enforce quiet and order in 
quarters, suppress disorderly conduct, ensure the respect and obedience of his soldiers to officers 
and fellow NCOs, and to “assist company commanders in carrying out orders.”31  He noted that 
in order to “make good” on these expectations, a young NCO must “make himself useful to his 
superiors and he must command the respect and inspire the confidence of his comrades.”32  To 
accomplish this Moss argued that the NCO must exhibit efficiency, initiative, promptness, 
obedience, loyalty, punctuality, and perseverance.  He defined efficiency as the NCO’s ability to 
                                                 
 29 Stewart, 7. 
 30 Field Service Regulations, with Corrections to May 21, 1913 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1913), 99, 151, and 156. 
 31 Moss, Noncommissioned Officer’s Manual, 34-5. 
 32 Ibid., 18. 
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lead due to his recognized superior tactical and technical skills and abilities.  Moss viewed this as 
the cornerstone of all NCO leadership, and noted that “no man… who is ignorant (to) what he is 
supposed to know, can command respect or inspire confidence.  In any walk of life such a man is 
not taken seriously.  He is either looked upon with pity, ridicule or contempt.  People call him a 
‘boob,’ a ‘mutt’ (‘mutton head’)”33  To place this within Darryl Henderson’s leadership model, 
Moss expected his NCOs to exert “expert power” where the sergeant maintained their position in 
the unit based on “having superior knowledge and ability important to the soldier and his unit” 
that would thus improve the group’s effectiveness or survival in combat.34   
 An examination of Moss’ definitions of initiative and obedience reveals the Regular 
Army’s somewhat ambiguous expectations of its NCOs.  Moss defined initiative as doing things 
without being told to, and obedience as obeying “promptly and fully all orders and instructions 
received from superiors.”35  In these definitions, Moss seems to wrestle with the acceptable 
limits of NCO leadership.  To Moss, initiative rested upon the NCO understanding the wishes of 
his superiors and acting within those limits without constant supervision.  In explaining 
obedience, Moss warned, “Whether or not you like the order is neither here nor there.  Your 
business as a soldier…is to obey all orders, and to do so willingly, faithfully and promptly, 
without excuses or explanations (original emphasis).”36  He went on to scold, “Remember that 
nine times out of ten the superior giving the order knows more about the matter than you do and 
is probably in possession of information that you know nothing about.  If a superior makes a 
mistake in giving an order, it is his lookout, not yours.”37  Moss makes clear that while the NCO 
                                                 
 33 Ibid., 19. 
 34 William D. Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat (Washington DC: National Defense 
University Press, 1985), 114. 
 35 Moss, Noncommissioned Officer’s Manual, 20. 
 36 Ibid. 
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was a critical member of the unit, his officers expected him to be a “doer” rather than a 
“thinker.” This attitude certainly rankled some NCOs.  Color Sergeant R. W. Lewis, for example, 
despondently noted, “The thought that the enlisted man has no need of ambition, energy, and 
initiative is sad to say, a very prevalent one, though none the less erroneous.  Indeed, it is so 
prevalent that the mere fact alone has almost convinced the average enlisted man that these 
qualities are undesirable in a soldier.”38   
 If Lewis was correct, and Moss’ views of the duties and expectations of NCOs were 
reflective of the attitudes of his peers, then the regular officers of the period believed that all 
NCO actions were to be strictly proscribed and delineated.  Although the officer corps certainly 
understood the importance of having a strong and reliable cadre of NCOs, their attitudes and 
actions were thus often at odds with achieving this goal.  As will be seen in the next chapter, the 
officer corps efforts to set strict parameters on the NCOs’ scope of action was increasingly at 
odds with the tactical realities emerging on the modern battlefield.          
 The ambivalent attitude of officers toward the NCO corps was also reflected in their 
lukewarm support of efforts to improve the professional education and development of their 
corporals and sergeants.  While there was a great proliferation of officer schools between 1885 
and 1910, with the exception of the signal corps, artillery, coast artillery, and other of the more 
technically oriented branches, the “cult of professionalism” never truly reached the bulk of the 
army’s NCOs serving in the infantry and cavalry.  This lapse in professional education did not 
result from a failure to recognize the problem.  In September 1888, Major General George 
Crook, the commander of the Department of the Missouri, wrote to the Secretary of War, “While 
                                                 
 38 Color SGT R. W. Lewis, “The Soldier Verses Energy, Ambition, and Initiative,” Journal of the United 
States Cavalry Association, Vol. XXV, No. 4 (October 1914), 254.  Unfortunately, SGT Lewis was one of the very 
few NCOs who tried to take part in the professional discourse of the era by writing essays for publication in 
professional military journals.   
  102
we have many good non-commissioned officers in the service, it is incontestable that the average 
intelligence and efficiency is very far below what it should be.”  Crook remarked,  
  Non-commissioned officers, properly to perform the duties of their positions,  
  require, and should receive, a special education…I recommend that a school  
  for non-commissioned officers of infantry and cavalry be established at Fort 
  Leavenworth, on a plan similar to that now in operation at Fort Monroe for  
  the benefit of the artillery.39  
       
 Despite Crook’s exhortations, and the constant drumbeat for reform that echoed in the 
pages of professional military journals and the War Department Annual Reports, the Regular 
Army took only small and halting steps toward educating the corporals and sergeants of its 
combat units.  In fact, in 1910, 22 years after Crook’s recommendations, another Commander of 
the Department of the Missouri wrote, “In order to produce greater uniformity [in training and 
doctrine], it is believed that it would be in the interest of the service for the War Department to 
inaugurate a prescribed course of instruction for noncommissioned officers similar to that now 
prescribed for officers.”40   
 As tensions rose between the United States and Germany the editors of the Infantry 
Journal made one last plea for the establishment of a system for education NCOs. They noted 
presciently that “Noncommissioned officers cannot be called into existence by legislation alone,” 
and that in time of war, “Noncommissioned officers will be called for in large numbers to fill 
positions imposing considerable responsibility and independence of action.” The officer argued 
that a central NCO school would not only allow the army to meet this challenge, but also would, 
“raise the level of respect which the noncommissioned officer enjoy in the eyes of the privates 
under his direction, much as is now the case in the German army in which in time of peace 
                                                 
 39 Department of War, Annual Reports of the War Department for 1888, Vol. 1, 142-3. 
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noncommissioned officers are required to receive a course of instruction in a special school 
preliminary to appointment.”41 
  Following the Philippine Insurrection, the army had good reasons for increasing their 
focus on the education and development of its NCO corps.  As with its officers, the expansion of 
the army between 1898 and 1903 had forced the Regular Army to greatly enlarge its cadre of 
NCOs.  Few of these “jumped-up” noncoms had any experience in either soldiering or 
leadership.  In the 1907 War Department study, The Army as a Life Occupation for Enlisted 
Men, Captain Shelton noted that “Previous to 1898…All the higher noncommissioned officers 
and many of the lower were men of long service.  The character of the personnel of the Army 
was perhaps the highest ever reached.”  He lamented that “with the passing of the old 
noncommissioned officer,” and his replacement by “men in their first enlistment,” the army was 
sliding toward the “last stage of demoralization.”42   
 Since the NCOs had served as the primary trainers of new soldiers and were largely 
responsible for the routine running of the army’s small units, the expansion of the NCO corps by 
the rapid promotion of relatively green privates exacerbated other systemic problems within the 
institutional army.  As Shelton pointed out, “Today the average noncommissioned officer of line 
organizations is as ignorant of his duties as the recruit from which he is drawn, and lacks both 
the force of character necessary for discipline and the abilities essential for efficiency.”43  Just at 
the time that the army’s companies were being buffeted by a general shortage of officers, the 
junior and inexperienced officers that remained were being forced to perform many of the duties 
and responsibilities that had previously been done by experienced NCOs.  As Captain S. E. 
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Kilbourne observed that units now “require constant supervision [by] its officers” and such close 
management “was not [a] marked characteristic of the army officer in the old days.”44  Kilbourne 
and Shelton were only two of many officer voices that longed for the stability of “the old army,” 
and their critique of the post-Philippine War NCO corps was perhaps the source of some of the 
officers’ ambivalence toward their sergeants and corporals.  As officers assumed some of the 
duties of their NCOs, it also set a trend of micromanagement and officer-centered leadership that 
would later haunt the AEF.     
 The concern of the regular officers of the perceived deterioration of the NCO corps was 
reflected in the heated debate within their ranks over a 1911 Congressional bill that would raise 
the enlistment term from three to five years.  Much of this internal debate revolved around the 
effects that the legislation would have on the army’s ability to repair its battered NCO corps.  For 
example, Captains Kirby Walker and William Littebrandt argued that the longer term of 
enlistment would strengthen the NCO corps by giving potential sergeants more practical 
experience before pinning on their chevrons.  They maintained that the five year enlistment 
would build up the NCO corps by allowing commanders more time to assess and develop 
promising privates prior to their promotion.  To Littebrandt, the need for change was vital to the 
overall health of the institution.  He noted, 
  While in the Eleventh Cavalry in Cuba there was not a man available and 
  suitable for a first sergeant, and the same condition occurred in my present 
  troop.  I offered to make any man who would be recommended to me by 
  his Captain from any organization in the post my first sergeant- [but] none in the  
  troop [were] suitable.  The period of enlistment is too short to instruct or develop  
  men for the positions of noncommissioned officers.  It has been several years  
  since a condition existed where it was necessary for a man of any parts at all to  
  serve longer than one year to be a sergeant.45 
 
                                                 
 44 Department of War, Three Year Enlistment for the Army (Washington D. C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1912), 14.  
 45 Ibid., 39-40.  
  105
In a backhand swipe at the existing NCO corps, one supporter of the three year enlistment, Major 
Carl Reichmann, argued, “Three years will not make a man a professional soldier, so 
disassociated from and disqualified for civil life as to make his reincorporation hard for himself 
and for the civil body.”  The officer went on to remark, “At time of enlistment most men are in 
that period when the main foundations of their life’s career is laid.  Five years will make a man a 
professional soldier; he becomes set in military thought and habit, in the vices and tendencies of 
the professional soldier.”46   
 Littebrandt and Reichmann’s statements are revealing.  They reflected both the 
ambiguous perceptions that officers had of their NCOs, and also the dire problems that the army 
faced in selecting and retaining quality enlisted leaders in the aftermath of its expansion.  
Unfortunately, these tensions were not resolved prior to 1917.  Even as the nation entered World 
War I, James Moss still bemoaned the fact that in the post-Philippine War regulars, “The average 
noncommissioned officer does not full realize the importance and responsibility of his 
position.”47   
 It is interesting to examine why, in the face of such glaring need for the education of it 
enlisted leaders, the army failed to develop a systematic method for professionally developing 
the NCO corps.  Ironically, the War Department had taken a number of steps to increase the 
professional education of its NCOs in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  As early 
as September 1866, the War Department had compelled local commanders to establish post 
schools to provide all soldiers with an opportunity to receive a basic grade school education in 
reading, writing, and mathematics.48   
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 The General Order 125 of 1900 demanded that “Careful attention will be given to the 
instruction and practical training of noncommissioned officers.”49   Four years later, General 
Order 155 codified the existing guidance for NCO education by requiring division commanders 
to establish, “schools for noncommissioned officers in each battalion” where the unit’s officers 
were to instruct the NCOs in the school of the battalion, estimation of distance and intervals, 
basic tactics, sketching, and reconnaissance.50  The NCOs were even supposed to be given 
“certificates of proficiency” from their company commanders to document their educational 
progress.51 Despite these official mandates, local commanders frequently violated both the letter 
and the spirit of the orders.   
 One of the greatest reasons for these lapses was the defused and localized nature of 
command during the period. The General Orders made clear that the, “Responsibility for the 
military instruction of company noncommissioned officers rests with the company commanders, 
battalion and higher commanders such supervision as may be necessary.”52  Thus, part of the 
problem was the War Department’s failure to delineate clearly the command responsibility for 
NCO education.  How could the War Department demand that regiments establish central 
battalion-level NCO schools while also holding the company commanders ultimately responsible 
for their overall “military instruction?”  
 As was the case in NCO selection and promotion, senior leaders often abrogated their 
oversight of NCO training and allowed their company commanders to educate their NCOs as 
they saw fit.  In 1902, the commander of the Department of the Missouri went so far as to “wash 
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his hands” of the whole process of enlisted education by discounting the utility of the post 
schools.  In his report to the Secretary of War he argued, “I recommend their discontinuance and 
the substitution of more thorough theoretical military education of the soldier under the 
immediate supervision of his company commander.”53  As could be expected, this abrogation of 
their responsibility to supervise the military education of enlisted subordinates by senior leaders 
had a negative effect on the professional development of the army’s NCO corps.  Although he 
favored leaving the instruction of NCOs in the hands of their company commanders, in 1906 the 
Inspector General reported that, 
  The inspections indicated that the present orders covering the schools for 
  noncommissioned officers are far from satisfactory.  Hardly any two posts 
  were found to have the same system or course of instruction, and scarcely 
  any two company commanders at the same post entirely agreed to the limits 
  of the instruction to be given.  At one post inspected the instruction covered 
  three subjects, while at another it covered eleven.  At nearly every station 
  theoretical and practical work were mixed to such an extent that it is evident 
  that more definite orders should be issued, so that the course of instruction 
  may be defined and limited…It is believed that such provisions would 
   stimulate in the noncommissioned officers an interest similar to that now 
  figuring so favorably among the student officers and do away with the 
  present more or less chaotic and hopeless condition.54 
       
Despite these recommendations, the War Department did little to truly improve the scope or 
quality of NCO education.  
  Time and time again from 1904 to 1916 the army’s division and department commanders 
provided a steady string of excuses for the lackluster results of their NCO schools.  For example, 
in 1904 the commander of the Department of the Gulf reported that “the duties of the men 
interfere too much with their regular attendance” at school, but where “the post schools have 
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been vigorously prosecuted the results have been very satisfactory.”55  Others pointed to the lack 
of competent teachers, the shortage of company officers, the small size of garrisons, and the 
frequent movement of units as the reasons for the failure of their NCO development programs.56  
Some commanders even objected to holding post schools for the general education of their 
enlisted soldiers.  The commander of the Department of Texas argued, 
  No man should be enlisted who cannot read and write understandingly. 
  Instruction should be of a military character and not of schoolboy methods. 
  These schools do not justify the time and expense so applied.  Compulsory 
  attendance is a source of discontent, and in some cases, full duty soldiers 
  may feel their military duties of fatigue, etc. are increased so others may 
  attend school.57   
 
Another general pointed out, “These schools instruct less than 5 percent of the enlisted men and 
are practically of no advantage except to a few men desiring mental advancement.  The results 
obtained are disproportionately small to the time and labor involved.”58 
 In the face of such high ranking foot-dragging and log-rolling, it is no surprise that the 
army’s NCO schools languished.  Even when commanders held the NCO schools the results 
were far from promising.  Since junior officers were generally saddled with the responsibility to 
teach the NCOs within their companies or in post schools, the problems of the officer corps 
reverberated down through the ranks.    
 As was noted in Chapter II, the shortage of experienced company-grade officers in 
infantry and cavalry companies and troops often meant that the instruction of their NCOs was 
rather lackluster and basic.  A number of officers recognized this problem.  For example, 
Lieutenant William Parker chided his fellow officers, 
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  We have all seen non-commissioned officers catechized week in and week 
  out in one or two drill books or manuals, covering over and over again 
  the most elementary matters with which they are, or should be quite 
  familiar before being warranted.  This does more harm than good for 
  it gives them the impression that the instruction is only a matter of form  
  to fill in the report on drills and instruction; it fails to excite their interest, 
  which should be done by every possible means.59    
 
In 1916 another officer wrote in a similar vein, “Their instruction is very frequently rather 
desultory in character and tends to run into the rut of catechismal rote.”60  The commander of the 
Northern Division deplored what he viewed as “a tendency to over-education by books” in his 
post schools and recommended that the instruction should be changed to “stimulate the practical 
education of the Army by suitable practice marches, exercises, tactical problems, etc.”61 Thus, 
even the halting steps that the Regular Army took towards educating its NCOs between 1900 and 
1916 were all too often undercut by systemic problems within the institution, by the idiosyncratic 
nature of its command structures, and by the ambivalent attitudes of its officers toward the NCO 
corps. 
 It is somewhat ironic that the commander of the Northern Division criticized the 
“overeducation by books” of his NCOs.  The War Department issued no guides or manuals to aid 
in the education or professional development of its NCOs. The closest that the War Department 
came to publishing a work to be used to instruct any of its enlisted soldiers was the Soldier’s 
Handbook.  Unfortunately from the time of their first issue in 1900 through World War I, the 
content of the Soldier’s Handbooks was focused merely on training the raw recruit in the 
fundamentals of service.  The 1913 edition of the Soldier’s Handbook, for example, covered only 
extracts from army regulations and the articles of war, guard duty, the care of arms, clothing, and 
                                                 
 59 LT William Parker, “The Company Officer and His Work,” Infantry Journal, Vol. IX, No. 1 (July-
August 1912), 73. 
 60 “A School for Noncommissioned Officers,” 955. 
 61 Annual Reports of the War Department for 1907, Vol. III, 66. 
  110
equipment, and the basics of hygiene, first aid, and the Morse code.62  Nowhere in any of these 
manuals did the army address the official duties, expectations, or the technical skills required of 
an NCO.  Although manual writers such as Moss and Stewart attempted to fill this void in texts 
suitable for the education of NCOs, the lack of official publications further hindered the smooth 
operation of post NCO schools while also adding to the idiosyncratic nature of the unit-level 
instruction of corporals and sergeants. 
 Although the Regular Army compiled a rather poor record for training and educating its 
NCOs, some army reformers did try to increase the professionalism and quality of the NCO 
corps by pushing Congress to increase the pay and status of its sergeants.  As early as 1889 
William Burnham wrote in the Journal of the Military Service Institution that “in our service one 
of the main causes which is detrimental to the early discipline of the men is the fact that the line 
between the private and non-commissioned officer is not sufficiently marked.”63  As Burnham 
was well aware, in pay, mess arrangement, billeting, and the conditions of service, there were 
few tangible differences between the lower enlisted men and their NCOs.   
 This lack of differentiation between the ranks undermined the NCOs authority and gave 
truth to the old army adage that “familiarity breeds contempt.”  This problem was further 
exacerbated by the army’s expansion.  In 1905 the commander of the Department of Mindanao 
reported to Secretary of War Taft that, 
  There should be a very marked distinction between the pay of noncommissioned 
  officers …than that of the private, and even the corporal, as an incentive 
  for the later to strive for promotion.  At present there is not sufficient difference 
  in pay of the higher noncommissioned officer and the other enlisted men to 
  emphasize the importance of the position of these noncommissioned officers, and 
  the salary paid noncommissioned officers of this grade is in no way 
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  commensurate with the duties which they are called upon to perform and the 
  responsibilities which they must thereby assume.64   
 
As this officer realized, the only way for the regulars to rebuild a corps of experienced and 
reliable NCOs was to invest in those things, such as pay and separate billeting, that would induce 
talented and reliable men to make service as an NCO a promising career opportunity. 
 In 1907 the Regular Army began to press the Congress for a substantial increase in the 
pay of sergeants and corporals.  In the War Department report, The Army as a Life Occupation 
for Enlisted Men, the General Staff pointed out that the army had not been given a substantial 
pay raise since 1870.  In fact, a private in the first two years of his enlistment actually made three 
dollars less per month than that of a private during the last two years of the Civil War.65   
 While seeking an across the board pay raise, the army particularly targeted NCOs for a 
greater financial reward.  Captain Shelton argued that while love of the service and a desire for 
adventure motivated some soldiers to reenlist, the primary inducement was self-interest and “a 
desire to improve [their] condition.”66  He went on to note that the lack of a meaningful increase 
in pay when the private was raised to sergeant was a disincentive to promotion.  For example, a 
private with six to ten years in service was paid $19 a month, while a corporal and sergeant with 
the same years of service made only $21 and $24 dollars respectively.  During the same period, a 
first sergeant or battalion sergeant major (there was no differentiation in pay between the two 
positions) made only $32 a month with 16 to 20 years of service, and only a dollar more a month 
upon reaching 21 through 25 years of service.67  Ultimately, Shelton maintained, 
  It is plain that this reward is not sufficient to tempt men to remain in the  
  service, else vacancies could not so frequently occur.  The capable man 
  is not willing to assume the additional responsibilities incident to 
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  noncommissioned rank for the insignificant increases in pay.  There is 
  nothing beyond pay.  He has neither greater dignity nor more privileges. 
  He is still a common soldier, no different from the men from whom he 
  is chosen, and commanding no more respect…It is this self-respect and 
  this pride that are now so sadly lacking; and that make the noncommissioned 
  grade one whose responsibilities many men are glad to avoid.68     
 
In making his argument, Shelton examined the pay and conditions of service in both the U.S. 
Navy and in the armies of Britain and Germany.  In all cases, he found that the respect, 
privileges and pay associated with promotion to NCO were markedly better than those of the 
U.S. Army.69   
 Although Congress bowed to the army’s desires by increasing enlisted pay in 1908 and 
1916, the army itself did little to improve the overall status and privileges of the NCO corps.  
Junior NCOs continued to live and work largely under the same conditions as their privates; thus 
undermining the degree of detachment required of leadership.  Since the army had failed to give 
its infantry and cavalry NCOs the professional education and training that would give them the 
expert knowledge needed to buttress their standing among their subordinates, NCOs could only 
lead by the force of their personalities or will.   
 It is interesting to note that the post NCO schools that did operate, were to instruct both 
NCOs and “select privates.”  In 1910 one general begged the Army Chief of Staff again that “a 
greater distinction be made between noncommissioned officers and privates generally throughout 
the service.”  He maintained that, “This will undoubtedly aid discipline and render warrants [of 
promotion] more desirable.  This may be effected by providing separate messing and more 
privacy in quarters.  Future construction of barracks should have this object in view.”70  Despite 
the general’s exhortations, the Regular Army took no further steps, other than advocating pay 
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increases, to bolster the status of its NCOs prior to World War I.  This failure would later 
increase the army’s difficulty in raising and sustaining an effective wartime NCO corps. 
 One of the greatest ironies of the pre-Great War Regular Army, was that while it had 
somewhat lost confidence in the efficiency and professionalism of its NCO corps, many officers 
viewed it as a potential source for commissioning during a national emergency.  One of the 
reasons that some officers pushed for a three year over a five year enlistment was the view that 
the service would be able to draw upon the larger pool of qualified men who wanted to “test the 
waters” of military service without the long term loss of personal freedom and time.  The best 
soldiers in this pool could be promoted to sergeant and then be earmarked for commissioning as 
reserve officers.  Thus, as Lieutenant Robert Danford pointed out,  
  Noncommissioned officers, being selected from relatively a larger number  
  and a better class of men, would possess far greater ability and intelligence  
  than do our present-day sergeants and corporals.  The provisions for their 
  reenlistment and the training they would then receive would or should fit 
  them in most cases to hold commission in event of war.71 
 
The regulars assumed that in a time of war the army would undergo a great and rapid expansion, 
and that the number of regular, National Guard, and reserve officers would be insufficient to lead 
the enlarged force.  In 1914, the military reformer Major General William H. Carter argued, 
“What we need badly for such emergencies as arose during the Civil War and the war with Spain 
is a well adjusted plan for determining the relative merits and qualifications of the young 
noncommissioned officers of the regular army in order that they may be promoted as additional 
second lieutenants for war (original emphasis).”72   
 The view that the army would commission a number of regular NCOs in time of war was 
even pervasive in the sergeant ranks.  In 1916, one sergeant told journalist C. C. Lyons “I’m 
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certain to be made a captain if war is ever declared.”73  The sergeant’s remarks were closer to 
reality than perhaps he knew.  Upon the federal government’s mobilization of the National 
Guard for service on the Mexican border, a number of state governors requested that the War 
Department discharge the Regular Army NCOs detailed as instructors to their guard units so that 
the regulars could then accept commissions in the National Guard. On 18 June 1916, President 
Woodrow Wilson bowed to the request and discharged 51 of the 203 regular NCOs on duty with 
state guard regiments.74  
 Nowhere does it seem that the pre-war regular officers and NCOs considered the second 
order effects of commissioning enlisted men for service in wartime.  All thoughts, it seems, were 
on the expansion of the officer corps, and thus the army conducted no planning on how it would 
grow and sustain a wartime NCO corps.  The Regular Army’s general assumption that it was 
proper and fitting to commission enlisted men at the expense of maintaining a qualified cadre of 
NCOs within its small units strongly influenced its approach to the selection and training of 
officers and NCOs in World War I.  
 As the Regular Army entered the Great War, it brought with it certain assumptions and 
perceptions of NCO leadership that tainted its expectations of the proper duties and status of its 
sergeants and corporals.  Although regular officers viewed NCOs as “the backbone of the army,” 
and believed that strong NCOs were essential to the smooth operation of their units, the turn-of-
the-century expansion of the army had so diluted the cadre of long-service NCOs, that the same 
officers also questioned the overall professionalism and efficiency of their sergeants and 
corporals.  One of the greatest failings of the pre-war Regular Army, was its failure to create a 
sound and effective educational system to improve the lapses in NCO skills and leadership that 
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were so evident to its officers.  By falling back on the “hard knock” school of having NCOs 
“learn by doing,” and the tendency to plan only for expanding the officer corps in wartime, the 
regulars helped to create a number of systemic problems in enlisted leadership that would cause 
the AEF great trouble in the Great War.           
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Chapter 4 
Combat Leadership in the “New Warfare” 
 
 In 1884, Army Commanding General Phil Sheridan observed, “If improvements in guns 
of every caliber continue to be as rapid as during the past fifteen or twenty years…battles will 
become so destructive to human life that neither side in war will be able to stand up before the 
other.”  He went on to predict, “Armies will then resort to the spade, the pick, and the shovel; 
both sides will cover themselves by intrenchments (sic), and any troops daring to make exposed 
attacks will be annihilated.”1  Sheridan was well positioned to witness the birth of this “New 
Warfare:” a grinding and bloody form of mass industrial conflict that promised to exponentially 
expand the scope, duration, and lethality of war.  This form of warfare combined the effects of 
the previous French, Industrial, and Managerial Revolutions.  The nationalism unleashed by the 
French Revolution allowed states to harness the political passions of their citizens to swell the 
ranks of their wartime armies.  The Industrial Revolution allowed nations to sustain these legions 
and equip them with a host of novel and ever more lethal weapons.  The Managerial Revolution 
sparked the rise of the military staffs and governmental bureaucracies needed to mobilize, 
command, and control both the new legions and the national resources required to wage mass 
industrial warfare.   
 Sheridan could look to his own life to understand this “train wreck of revolutions.”  
When he was born in 1831 the U. S. Army was still a tiny constabulary force armed largely with 
smoothbore muskets and other battlefield technology that had changed only slightly since the 
late 1600s.  By the time he became a major general in 1864, the Union army had ballooned to a 
force of over a million men, and it was a force directed by telegraph, moved by railroads, and 
increasingly entrenched to survive a battlefield dominated by the fire of rifled muskets or breech-
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loading rifles.  When Sheridan died in 1888, the world’s armies were scrambling to field small 
bore, smokeless powder magazine rifles, machine guns, and breach-loading artillery pieces able 
to use indirect fire to hurl high explosive shells at ranges calculated in miles rather than yards. 
 As the expanse and deadliness of the modern battlefield grew, the “new warfare” began 
to change the demands that armies placed on their junior combat leaders.  The need to disperse 
combat formations to survive the firepower of new weapons exacerbated existing problems with 
battlefield command and control.  This change increasingly demanded captains, lieutenants, and 
NCOs able to exercise initiative and a mounting level of independent action.  This chapter will 
examine how the U. S. Army understood and internalized the realities of the “new warfare” and 
its effect on junior combat leaders prior to the United States’ entry into World War I.  It will 
address the following questions: How did the Regular officers’ perceptions of modern war 
change their views of tactics, training, and junior leader development?; How were the Regular 
Army’s expectations of junior leaders altered by the “men against fire” debate?; Between August 
1914 and April 1917, how well did Regular officers understand the tactical realities of the 
Western Front, and how did the war in Europe influence their perceptions of combat leadership?  
 In the wake of the American Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War, and the Russo-Turkish 
War, the armies of the United States and Europe all struggled to understand the effects of a vast 
array of new weapons upon their doctrine, tactics, and training.  As Michael Howard and Antulio 
Echevarria have noted, all the major powers were consumed by the central issue of how armies 
could achieve the decisiveness of the offensive without suffering prohibitive casualties.2  The 
central dilemma of this “men against fire” debate centered on the issues of mass and command 
and control.  In the age of muzzle-loading weapons, the basic tactical unit was the regiment.  The 
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by Michael Howard (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 510-526. and Antulio J. Echevarria, After 
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close order regimental formations used from 1700 through the mid-1800s could be controlled 
with relative ease by the voice and drum commands of it field-grade officers.  Junior officers and 
NCOs merely assisted the field-grade officers in maintaining the cohesion, discipline, and 
momentum of the unit in battle.  Company-level leaders seldom had the chance or need to 
exercise independent command. 
 As demonstrated at Cold Harbor, Gravelotte-St Privat, Plevna, and other battles of the 
late 1800s, the withering firepower of the defenders had made short work of massed regimental 
formations.  This reality prompted French, German, British, and American armies to experiment 
with thinning and spreading out their attack formations and to use tactics that moved their attacks 
forward in brief bounds using the terrain as cover against the enemy’s fire.3  The idea was to 
present the smallest possible target to the defender until the attacker’s last rush would overwhelm 
the defenses.  The seemingly easy solution to the attacker’s quandary was unfortunately wrecked 
on the rock of command and control.  As the attacker thinned and spread his formations, he 
quickly found it nearly impossible to direct the fire and maneuver of his subordinates.  The 
attacker also discovered that the loose formations also made it nearly impossible for him to mass 
either the firepower needed to suppress the defender or the numerical superiority at the spear 
point of his attack to overpower the defender during the final assault.4     
 One of the enduring popular myths of the Great War was that the harsh realities of the 
“new warfare” came as a sad surprise to the era’s military professionals.  Although the war’s 
officers were stunned by the intensity and level of destruction of 1914, it is inaccurate to argue 
that they failed to understand that “the next great war” would be sharp and bloody.  As with their 
European compatriots, American officers had long debated the implications of mass industrial 
                                                 
 3 Echevarria, 13-51. 
 4 Ibid. 
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warfare.  In fact, in 1882 the Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States 
offered a prize for the best essay on the “Important improvements in the art of war during the 
past twenty years and their probable effect on future military operations.”  The winner of the 
prize, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Lazelle dissected the probable effects of new weapons with 
clinical precision and detachment.  He noted that “Maneuvering under fire has now become very 
hazardous if not impossible,” and that “A front attack by infantry alone upon a defensive line has 
little chance of success; obstacles and defensive strength should first be crushed by artillery.”  He 
concluded that only close coordination between the arms and attack plans that fixed the 
defending enemy’s attention to the front while the main attack fell on his flanks or rear offered 
any hope of success.5   
 The second place essay by Captain Francis Greene essentially agreed with Lazelle’s 
assessments, and likewise stressed the argument that the defense had eclipsed the power of the 
attack.  As Greene maintained, “As it is not unlikely that any great battle will be fought hereafter 
without the use of entrenchments, it may be affirmed with certainty that the breechloader has 
enormously increased the relative power of the defense.”6  
 It is interesting to note that both Lazelle and Greene assumed that the next great war 
would be typified by the large scale use of defensive trenches.  Both officers drew their evidence 
for this assertion from the campaigns waged in the last twelve months of the American Civil 
War.  This belief in the unavoidability of trench warfare seems to have influenced American 
tactical thought well into the twentieth century.  However, neither man was willing to argue that 
                                                 
 5 LTC Henry Lazelle,  “Important improvements in the art of war during the past twenty years and their 
probable effect on future military operations” in Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, Vol. 
III,  No. XI (1882), 355-360. 
 6 CPT Francis Greene,  “Important improvements in the art of war during the past twenty years and their 
probable effect on future military operations” in Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, Vol. 
IV,  No. XIII (1883), 14. 
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trenches and defensive firepower had completely negated the attack.  Like their European peers, 
the Americans believed that victory could only be achieved by the offense, and went to pains 
(and sometimes great leaps of logic) to prove their point.  For example, although Greene noted 
the heavy losses that the attacker suffered against entrenched defenders at Fredericksburg, Cold 
Harbor, Kennesaw, and Petersburg, he still pointed to the battles of Chattanooga and Nashville 
as evidence that with “proper tactical dispositions of the troops based upon thorough study of the 
strong and weak positions of the enemy’s lines” no trench lines were impregnable.7 
 Building upon the arguments of Emory Upton, Greene argued that with modern weapons 
the Napoleonic “shock tactics” had been supplanted by “fire tactics,” and the attacker would now 
have to maneuver “against the flanks of these [defensive] positions as to compel the defenders to 
come out and fight in the open, or by advancing against them in successive waves of thin lines of 
attack.”  He noted that under the conditions of modern war, “skirmishers have now become the 
real body of the attack.”8  To a large extent, one can see the genesis of John Pershing’s concept 
of “open warfare” in these early solutions for crossing the “fire-swept ground” against an 
entrenched enemy.  
 Although some members of the officer corps were certainly aware of the changes in 
warfare that had occurred in the forty years since the Civil War, it is also clear that the United 
States Army, as an institution, entered the twentieth century with no consensus on how to 
maintain the attack without suffering prohibitive casualties.  Due to its constabulary duties and 
the nation’s rather secure strategic position, the U. S. Army lagged behind those of Europe in 
debating and testing ways to overcome the growing power of the defense.  In fact, the army’s 
first true tactical manual, Infantry Drill Regulations, was not published until 1891.  In the 
                                                 
 7 Ibid., 17-18. 
 8 Ibid., 5.   
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manual, the army codified the use of “closed” and “extended order” in the attack.  The “closed 
order” of four-man columns was to be used only to maneuver troops to the battle area just 
outside the range of the enemy’s small arms.  All formations within the battle area itself would 
be in “extended order:” formations based on single squad-sized lines of skirmishers moving 
forward by bounds while making the best use of available cover.9  Despite the army’s efforts to 
solve the problem of attacking in the face of modern armaments, the manual fell far short of 
resolving the questions of how to best suppress the firepower of the defender or the intrinsic 
dilemma of battlefield command and control.  In fact, historian Perry Jamieson noted that the 
Infantry Drill Regulations was not well received within the army and many commanders simply 
ignored the manual altogether.10    
 In the wake of the Spanish American War, the “men against fire” debate within the U. S. 
Army intensified.  While the debates that raged in the halls of Fort Leavenworth and in the pages 
of the service’s professional journals demonstrated that increasing numbers of officers 
understood the challenges of the “new warfare,” few of these debaters offered viable solutions to 
these problems or even agreed on the realities that they would face on the battlefields of the 
future.  While they were a decided minority, some officers argued that war had in fact become 
less lethal as formations on the battlefield became more diffuse and officers became more adept 
at using cover and concealment on the battlefield.  As late as 1913, Major James Chester 
maintained, “The mortality in modern battles is much less than when hostile armies fought 
within less than two hundred yards of each other with muzzle-loading guns.  Then the dying and 
the dead lay under the feet of the fighting men until the action was over, and more men would 
                                                 
 9 Perry D. Jamieson, Crossing the Deadly Ground: United States Army Tactics 1865-1899 (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 1994), 92-112.  
 10 Ibid, 113-119 and 123-5.  
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fall in five minutes than in the whole day’s work under modern conditions.”11 
 Few officers agreed with Chester’s conclusions.  In a lecture he delivered at the General 
Staff and Service College in September 1902, Captain James Dickman (who would later 
command the 3rd Division, IV Corps, and 3rd Army in the AEF) painted a very bleak view of 
what his students would face in the next war.  Dickman argued that with the advent of smokeless 
powder and the use of well sited and concealed trenches the attacker would be drawn into a 
deadly battlefield where a nearly invisible defender would quickly scythe down attacking 
infantry and cavalry.  He noted that, “For the attack, there will be no mantle of smoke to hide the 
horrors of the battle field or to afford cover for the movement of bodies of troops.  The moral 
effect of suffering severe loss without knowing whence it comes, and consequent inability to 
reply to the enemy’s fire, is also very great.”12  Unfortunately, Dickman offered few solutions to 
the grim tactical picture he painted.  The differences in Chester’s and Dickman’s arguments do 
highlight the overall lack of clarity and certainty among American military professionals as they 
grappled with the difficult subject of doctrinal and technological change. 
          Although American officers may have lacked consensus on their visions of the emerging 
realities of combat, the subject sparked a steady flow of professional writing on the subject 
between 1900 and 1917.  Like Chester and Dickman, other officers also tried to craft a coherent 
vision of future war by attempting to draw together “lessons learned” from recent conflicts and 
extrapolating, as best they could, the shape and parameters of the modern battlefield.  As part of 
this process, the officers also attempted to determine the new leadership skills and attributes that 
                                                 
 11 MAJ James Chester, “Comment and Criticism on Moral Preparation of the Soldier,” in 
Journal of the United Service Institution of the United States, Vol. XXXII (1913) 112. For another example of the 
tendency to see modern war as somehow less deadly as previously, also see, CPT Dana Merrill, “Infantry Training” 
in Infantry Journal, Vol. IX, No. 1 (July-August 1912), 59. 
 12 CPT J. C. Dickman, “General Service and Staff College Lectures Number Ten: Modern Improvements in 
Fire Arms and Their Tactical Effects” (Fort Leavenworth: General Service and Staff College Press, 26 September 
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would be required of junior leaders to fight and survive in combat.  In crafting this vision, 
officers drew upon the nation’s own experience in the Civil War and the War with Spain, as well 
as the more recent trends in warfare demonstrated by the Boer and the Russo-Japanese War.   
 Of all these conflicts, the Russo-Japanese War was the one that drew the most 
professional interest and study among the American officer corps prior to World War I.  Even 
when attempting to extract the ephemeral lessons from these conflicts, some officers clearly 
understood the need to place the wars within their proper context and of avoiding the risk of 
drawing too many hasty conclusions.  For example, in 1904, First Lieutenant R. H. Peck went so 
far as to note, “Our War with Spain was of too short duration to really test modern improvements 
[in warfare], while the conditions in South Africa were so exceptional in many respects, that 
there is a danger of drawing erroneous conclusions from them.”  Peck hoped that the then 
ongoing war between Russia and Japan would be a useful guide to war in the future for he 
believed it truly “tested all the improvements in modern warfare.”13  
 The War Department was just as eager as Peck to squeeze as much information on the 
“new warfare” as possible from the Russo-Japanese War.  In 1904, the Secretary of War sent a 
delegation of ten officers to Manchuria to observe both armies and to report back on the conduct 
of the war and its implications for future conflicts.  Four of these officers, William Judson, 
Joseph Kuhn, John F. Morrison, and Peyton March, went on to serve as generals during World 
War I, with March rising to the position of Army Chief of Staff.14  All of the American observers 
were long service Regulars with solid professional credentials.   
 Although there were some differing interpretations among the officers of what they 
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witnessed on the battlefield, the officers generally agreed that their observations validated the 
contemporary American tactical doctrine and, or, presaged no great change in warfare.  Major 
Joseph Kuhn went as far as to note,  
  Considering the magnitude and duration of the war and the fact that it 
  is the first great war between nations having modern arms and training 
  since 1877, one might reasonably expect some startling and original 
  methods.  If there is one fact more than any other which has impressed 
  itself on my mind it is that, in its general features at least, the war was 
  conducted by both sides along strictly orthodox lines…So far as I was 
  able to judge, the recognized rules and principles for conducting warfare 
  underwent no serious modifications in their application.15  
   
After following the Japanese army, Captain John Morrison concluded “The Japanese and their 
army have shown us little that is not in the books, little that can be truly called original.”16  
As with Kuhn, the other observers tended to interpret what they saw as a confirmation of their 
beliefs and their faith in existing U.S. Army practices.  In his final report Captain Karl Reichman 
confidently maintained, “I believe that our drill books supplemented by field regulations fully 
meets the requirements of infantry work on campaign.”17  The reports generally praised the 
morale and offensive spirit of the Japanese, emphasized the continued predominance of the 
offensive, downplayed the effects of artillery, and stressed the importance of the bayonet and the 
rifle.     
 While none of the observers minimized the heavy casualties that both sides endured, their 
underlying argument was that a vigorous offensive remained the key to victory and, despite the 
effects of modern weapons, the attack could still prevail.  This faith in the offense was later 
codified in the army’s tactical doctrine.  The Infantry Drill Regulations of 1911 (hereafter IDR) 
                                                 
 15 War Department, Reports of Military Observers Attached to the Armies in Manchuria During the Russo-
Japanese War, Part III Report of Major Joseph Kuhn, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906), 227.  
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reaffirmed the army’s predilection for the attack by stating “The infantry must take the offensive 
to gain decisive results.”18  Captain John Morrison even argued that, “This campaign [in 
Manchuria] proved that frontal attack against an intrenched (sic) position can be successfully 
made.”  However, he went on to warn, “But it seems equally proven that the attack must be made 
by not only brave but thoroughly trained soldiers.  I do not believe half-trained soldiers can do it, 
except at a cost that is practically prohibitive.”19  It was, of course, in the Regular Army’s 
interest to proclaim the need for a deep reservoir of “thoroughly trained soldiers,” but the reports 
also highlighted the officer corps’ underlying assumptions about tactics, leadership, and the 
attributes that soldiers needed to operate on the modern battlefield.   
 The American officers tended to see in the Japanese the spirit, morale, and discipline that 
they feared was lacking in the American people.  Lieutenant Colonel Edward McClernand 
observed, 
  The discipline of the Japanese army is excellent.  The habit of obedience 
  to superiors is bred in the bone, and has been traditionary among the people 
  for centuries.  When the Japanese soldier has to perform a certain task, he does 
  it as a matter of course, and not only executes it, but executes it to the best 
  of his ability.  The seriousness with which he viewed his mission in the 
  war left a deep impression on the writer.  The heart of the nation was in the 
  struggle, and every soldier carried himself as it was his sacred duty to 
  perform his work with faithfulness and zeal.20      
 
He viewed the Japanese as worthy of emulation, and noted, “If our countrymen would have their 
Army at its best, they must give it their affection, and always encourage a pride among its 
soldiers in the faithful discharge of duty.”21  In a veiled critique of American society Major Kuhn 
remarked, “Just how soon the spirit of commercialism will destroy the military spirit of Japan, 
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time alone can tell, but the later was a living force during the Russo-Japanese war [which] was 
apparent to the most casual observer.”22 
 If the Japanese were the model soldiers, it was the Russians that the American officers 
feared more closely mirrored American realities.  Captain Carl Reichman pointed out,  
  Among the chief causes that led to the defeat of the Russian army, are lack 
  of preparedness, lack of mobility, initiative, and offensive spirit…The 
  superior intelligence, discipline, mobility, and aggressive spirit of the 
  Japanese army stand out so sharply that no one can overlook them who is 
  in search of the qualities that helps to win victories… The physical exertions  
and the mental strain of the ten days’ battle are apt to break down the entire  
human system- even the stolid nature of Russian officers and soldiers  
succumbed under the stress of battle and numbers of them became insane at 
Liaoyang- and neither patriotism nor enthusiasm will be able to hold up men; 
it is discipline alone that will triumph over human nature.23 
 
The message was clear; morale and discipline could overcome the deadly material realities of the 
battlefield.  In his lecture “Infantry in Attack” at the Infantry and Cavalry School, First 
Lieutenant R. H. Peck echoed the sentiments of a British officer who noted, “the Japanese have 
demonstrated that the defensive is not so all powerful as was supposed.  They have shown what 
all modern military theorists have failed to realize, that the human element is still the most potent 
factor in deciding the fate of battles.”24  Thus, unquestioned obedience, superior fighting spirit, 
and iron discipline would allow the attacker to gain moral ascendancy over the enemy and allow 
him to successfully cross the deadly ground.  These “lessons” from the Russo-Japanese War, 
would be the touchstones of the Regular’s approach to tactics and leadership in the Great War.  
 This focus on the ability of superior morale and discipline to overcome the soul-less 
firepower dominance of the defense was demonstrated by the observers’ constant praise for the 
Japanese use of the bayonet.  In his report to the Chief of Staff, Captain Peyton March 
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maintained, 
  One of the striking lessons of the Japanese war is the return to the use of  
  the bayonet and sword upon the battlefield.  This is greatly increased by 
  the constant use of night attacks by both sides…While the exact figures 
  will never be available as to the number of casualties due to the bayonet 
  …it is a noticeable fact that the bayonet is not an obsolete weapon by 
  any means in modern warfare, in spite of the increased effectiveness 
  of the modern rapid-fire field gun and magazine rifle.  This is also 
  true of the sword.25 
 
Not to be outdone in this praise of the armes blanch, infantry Captain Reichman rejoiced that, 
  As regards to the infantry the war has shown that the days of the bayonet 
  are not yet numbered.  In view of the great range and rapidity of fire of the 
  present infantry weapon it was thought at one time that hand to hand conflict 
  between dismounted men had become impracticable, and this opinion 
  was strengthen by the killing power of shrapnel.  The war in the Far East 
  has shown that such hand to hand conflicts may often take place…When the 
  details of this war are sufficiently known it will be probably discovered  
  that boldness and resolution, coupled with some degree of skill, will in the 
  future, as in the past, led to hand to hand fighting and victory.26 
 
Reichman also argued that as firepower forced the attacker to wage his battles under the cover of 
night, close quarters fighting would become more prevalent and the bayonet would only increase 
in its importance on the battlefield.   
Ironically, the praise that the American observers heaped on the bayonet was not matched 
by any real evidence of its increased effectiveness.  The two medical observers of the war, 
Colonels Valery Harvard and John Hoff, both argued that the actual number of casualties caused 
by bayonets was far from being remarkable.  By their estimates, bayonets accounted for less than 
one percent of all wounds. Colonel Harvard concluded that the bayonet’s “effect…is chiefly 
moral, for the number of wounds it inflicts is practically negligible.”27   
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Why the combat arms officers continued to tout the power of the bayonet despite the 
evidence to the contrary is puzzling.  Perhaps Reichman and March’s praise of the bayonet was 
little more than grasping at straws, a “whistling past the graveyard,” as they groped toward 
solving the “men against fire” conundrum. When faced with the intractable problem of how to 
achieve an offensive victory in the face of growing defensive firepower, American officers had 
few tangible solutions.  It was easier, and more comforting, for Reichman and March to extol the 
power of moral factors in war, as symbolized by the bayonet charge, than to confront the ugly 
and maddening physical factors in war as symbolized by the magazine rifle and machine gun.          
 While most of the Americans hyped the importance of the bayonet, they also tended to 
downplay the importance of modern rapid fire artillery on the new battlefield.  For example, 
Colonel McClernand stated,  
  Although infantry acting on the offense may meet with considerable losses  
  from artillery fire, the attacking lines should not ordinarily be driven back 
  by this fire alone or even permanently checked by it. The target offered is too  
  temporary and frequently during the rushes too uncertain for the artillery to  
  gain a decided advantage.28 
 
In a similar vein, Captain Judson reported, “So far as can be seen the big guns on neither side 
produced any marked effect…big shells, falling among the scattered fieldworks, produced no 
damage worthy of the name.  The men actually laughed at them.”29  While McClernand and 
Judson did not completely discount the effect of artillery, they argued that its major battlefield 
contribution was more psychological than physical.  McClernand concluded that “In the attack 
the moral support given by the artillery to the assaulting infantry is great and often the 
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determining factor of success.”30  Although Captain Morrison disagreed with McClernand on   
the psychological impact of shelling, he echoed the sentiment that the Russo-Japanese War 
indicated little change in the importance of artillery.  He maintained, “The moral effect [of 
artillery] on good troops is, I believe, overstated.  From what I saw and was told by Japanese 
officers of the effect of Russian artillery, I do not believe that the improvements of filed artillery 
will have much, if any, effect on changing [our] present infantry tactics.”31  
 Not all of the observers were as quick to dismiss the emerging lethality of artillery.  
While he admitted that the nature of some wounds made it impossible to determine the true 
source of the injury, the medical observer, Colonel Harvard, warned, “The losses to artillery fire 
have been decidedly greater than in any previous war.”32  However, Joseph Kuhn was quick to 
undermine Harvard’s conclusions.  In his analysis of the medical statistics, Kuhn maintained that 
the increased artillery casualties were only due to the fact that many of the wounds were received 
during the siege of Port Arthur, a situation that optimized the use of artillery.  He noted that 
when examining the open terrain battle at Liaoyang, only 7.99 percent of wounds were due to 
artillery, a number “not differing materially from the results obtained in the Franco-Prussian 
war.”33   
Of the combat arms observers only the infantryman Carl Reichmann voiced concern over 
what he saw as the increased power and looming importance of artillery.  He warned that, “The 
rapidity of fire which the modern field gun is capable makes possible an intensity of fire never 
witnessed in any previous war.”34  Reichmann predicted that future conflicts would spark a rapid 
expansion of the artillery arm and a dramatic increase in the weight and volume of shellfire on 
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the battlefield.35  Unfortunately, within the U. S. Army, his Reichmann’s troubling beliefs were 
overshadowed by the more conventional and comforting views of artillery presented by 
Morrison, McClernand, and Judson. 
This debate over the relative importance of artillery was significant because in influenced 
the army’s tactical doctrine up to World War I.  Although the observers acknowledged that a 
combined approach to tactics was important, in the final analysis, they tended to relegate artillery 
to a mere supporting role for the infantry.  Artillery “prepared the way” for the attacker by 
“beating down” the enemy guns, suppressing the defender’s infantry firepower, and providing a 
morale boost to the assault troops while simultaneously undermining that of the defender.  
Despite indicators from the war in Manchuria that pointed to the growing importance of artillery 
in modern warfare, the observer reports reinforced the infantry-centric focus of the American 
doctrine.    
 The observers’ reports from Manchuria also upheld this infantry bias by noting the 
continued primacy of infantry small arms fire as the decisive material element in modern war.  In 
this area, the officers merely reinforced the army’s long-standing partiality for the rifle.  
Historians Perry Jamieson and Russell Gilmore have noted that in the last three decades of the 
nineteen century, the army enthusiastically embraced individual rifle marksmanship as the 
cornerstone of its tactical doctrine.  This “rifle craze” rested upon the faith that an army of 
marksman could create such hail of rapid, accurate, and lethal fire as to make it invincible on the 
battlefield, regardless of whether the force was attacking or defending.36  This approach 
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seemingly offered a ready solution to the attacker’s “men against fire” dilemma.  The key to the 
attack was simply to steadily build up the volume of accurate fire until the defender was 
physically and psychologically wrecked and thus unable to resist the attacker’s final assault.   
 The American observers were predisposed to see in the Russo-Japanese war those things 
that seemed to confirm contemporary practices of the American army.  Based on his study of the 
Japanese, for example, Morrison concluded, “The value of quick accurate shooting was most 
apparent.”  He went on to note that, “In the advance by file the target is small and exposed for a 
short time only.  If there are no good, quick shots firing at him he will probably go forward 
unhurt.”37  Likewise, one of Major Kuhn’s greatest critiques of the Japanese was, 
  Although much attention is paid to instruction in target practice, the shooting 
  did not impress me as being very good, considering the intense volume of 
  fire delivered by the firing line.  Volley fire was but rarely used by the 
  Japanese, who generally refrained from opening fire until mid-ranges were 
  reached, when they invariably resorted to file firing, each man firing 
  rapidly, too rapidly, in fact, for good results.  While this method produced 
  an enormous hail of bullets…accuracy of shooting suffered…and the 
  expenditure of ammunition impressed me as being out of all proportion 
  to the casualties inflicted on the Russians.38  
 
Kuhn’s examination of the medical statistics of the Japanese 3rd Army seemed to him to confirm 
the primacy of infantry fire in war and to validate the American fixation with the rifle.  He noted 
that even though the siege of Port Arthur increased the proportion of casualties due to artillery, 
over 59 percent of Japanese wounds still came from rifle fire.39   
The Americans’ prejudices and beliefs were also apparent in their discussion of machine 
guns.  Although most of the observers commented on the relative effectiveness of this weapon, 
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few of them argued that it materially changed battlefield realities.  The observers continued to 
view the machine gun as it was presented in American doctrine; a weapon of opportunity whose 
role was similar to the artillery and whose effectiveness was strictly proscribed.40  With a slightly 
veiled smugness the message from the observers was clear; the American doctrine was clearly 
valid and any lingering doubts or questions remaining from the Russo-Japanese War could be 
dismissed as the failure of the combatants to more closely adhere to “correct practices.” 
 In the final analysis, the “lessons” of the Russo-Japanese War were problematic.  
Depending on the reader’s predilections, the war offered enough evidence to support most all 
points of view on the subject of weapons, tactics, and the future direction of warfare. What is 
clear, however, was that the assurance and comfort that the army drew from the observers’ 
reports continued to influence American doctrine up to the nation’s entry into World War I.  
John Morrison, for example, used his position as an instructor at the Leavenworth Staff College 
to create a cadre of disciples committed to the faith of the all-conquering rifleman.41   From 1904 
through 1914, lectures at the Army Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth and articles in 
professional military journals continued to stress the primacy of moral strength and rifle power 
over the “physical” power of artillery and machine guns.  Despite the proven lethality of the later 
on the Western Front between 1914 and 1916, American military thought continued to be 
grounded in the comfortable assumptions of 1900 when the nation entered the war in 1917.  
These obsolete assumptions would hobble the army’s efforts to train junior leaders capable of 
operating on the battlefields of World War I.           
                                                 
 40 Kuhn did note that machine guns were most effective in the defense and in sieges and admitted that the 
Russian guns “were used with telling effect against the Japanese in the numerous bloody assaults.” 197. The 
evolution of the machine gun in American service is best covered in David Armstrong, Bullets and Bureaucrats: 
The Machine Gun and the United States Army (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982). Given Armstrong’s superior 
coverage of this issue, there is no need to belabor his points in this paper.  
 41 Timothy Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1978), 88-89.  George Marshall would later state that Morrison, “taught me all that I have ever known of tactics.” 
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 As the American army entered the second decade of the twentieth century, its officers 
were confident that its tactical doctrine rested upon a solid foundation of proven practices and a 
firm theoretical understanding of the future direction of warfare.  Like their European 
compatriots, American officers believed that the offense, carried through to a decisive conclusion 
by an infantry assault, was the key to victory in war.  This belief was enshrined in both the 
army’s pre-war and wartime doctrine.  The Infantry Drill Regulation of 1911 (hereafter IDR) and 
the updated regulation of 1917, for example, both stated, “The passive defense should be 
assumed only when circumstances force it.  Only the offensive wins.”42  This focus on the 
offense meant that the army stressed the need for an aggressive spirit in both leaders and men, 
the ability to use infantry firepower to set the right conditions for the assault, and the skill and 
willingness to force the decision by use of the bayonet.  In describing the sequence of the attack 
the IDR stated, 
    Fire superiority beats down the enemy’s fire, destroys his resistance and morale, 
  and enables the attacking troops to close on him, but the actual or threatened 
  occupation of his positions is needed to drive him out and defeat him…The  
  defenders, if subjugated by the fire attack, will frequently leave before the  
  attack begins.  On the other hand, it may be necessary to carry the fire attack 
  close to the position and follow it up with a short dash and a bayonet combat… 
  Confidence in their ability to use the bayonet gives the assaulting troops the 
  promise of success.43  
 
 This point was driven home in the army’s officer schools.  In a 1907 lecture to students at 
the Infantry and Cavalry School, Captain Charles Crawford unequivocally stated “To obtain 
[the] necessary demoralization of the enemy the attacker’s bullets must hit a number of their 
men, but the soldier on the offensive must keep in mind that his first and most important object is 
                                                 
 42 IDR corrected to December 31,1917, 122.  
 43 Ibid., 116-7.  Similar statements are also found in the Field Service Regulations of 1913, but this 
publication tends to be more cautious in its approach to pushing the attack in the face of modern weapons.  U.S. 
Department of War, Field Service Regulations of the United States Army, With Corrections to May 21, 1913 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1913),158-9. 
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to advance close enough to deliver a bayonet attack and that his fire is but a means to attain this 
end.”44  Crawford was quick to downplay the alleged increase of defensive firepower and even 
argued that the changes in weaponry actually favored the attacker.  He argued that, “The thinning 
of the defender [’s] line, due to the development of great firepower, has made this line more 
vulnerable to bayonet assaults by groups of determined men than it was in the old double rank, 
elbow touching elbow days.”45  This experienced infantry officer even went as far as to 
speculate, “The reduction in caliber [of small arms] has reduced the power of the bullet so that 
probably many of the wounds, where the bones are not hit, would not stop a man whose blood 
was up in a bayonet charge.”46  Surly this was the best of both worlds.  If Crawford was correct 
about the irresistible power of the attacker’s combination of fire and shock, then victory was 
assured, and if he were wrong about the weakness of the defender’s firepower, then the 
assaulting soldiers could take heart in the fact that being hit would generally not hurt that much.  
 The army viewed the sequence of the attack as described by Crawford and the IDR as the 
ideal melding of physical and psychological effects on the enemy by the perfect mating of 
firepower and the shock of the bayonet.  However, this American solution to the “men against 
fire” dilemma rested upon several assumptions.  The primary assumption was that the attacker 
could gain such a superior volume of accurate fire as to attrite the defender (who the doctrine 
writers also assumed would be protected by some form of trench works), shatter their morale, 
and suppress the enemy’s own fire to the point that they would be unable to resist the attacker’s 
final charge.   
                                                 
 44 Captain Charles Crawford, Weapons and Munitions of War, Part I, Infantry Weapons (Fort Leavenworth: 
Staff College Press, 1907), 11. from the CARL archives, Fort Leavenworth, KS.  
 45 Ibid., 50. 
 46 Ibid.  See also, 2LT L. H. Drennan, “Psychology of the Bayonet,” in Infantry Journal, Vol. XI, No. 2 
(September-October 1914), 169-171.  Drennan argued, “The main point was to get the firing line within bayonet 
range, for that is the raison d’être of the fire attack.”  
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 Backed by what they saw as the “lessons” of the Spanish American, Boer, and Russo-
Japanese Wars, the Regular officer corps generally embraced this offensive doctrine and its 
underlying assumption of superior American marksmanship.  Although he viewed the bayonet as 
the weapon of the tactical coup de grace, Charles Crawford confidently proclaimed, “The end of 
all warfare is attained by breaking up and destroying the enemy’s forces in battle, and the chief 
instrument used is the small arm rifle.”  As evidence for this assertion he drew upon statistics 
from the American Civil War, the Wars of German Unification, and Morrison’s report on the 
Russo-Japanese War.  He noted that “The casualties inflicted by small arms are from five to 
fifteen times those inflicted by any other weapon.”47  In a lecture at the Army War College, 
Lieutenant Colonel R. K. Evans amplified this argument by noting, “Fire action is the controlling 
factor in deciding battles,” and declared, “Over 80 per cent of the men that fall in battle go down 
under infantry fire.”48   
 Crawford’s fellow Leavenworth instructor, Captain Henry Eames, also imparted to his 
students an unshakable faith in the moral imperative of gaining and maintaining fire superiority 
in modern war.  Eames noted, “Victory in battle almost entirely depends upon a locally obtained 
fire superiority…having once obtained the supremacy and given the skill and moral strength to 
maintain it, victory is assured.”49  His formula for obtaining this fire superiority was relatively 
simple, “firstly by bringing to the firing line more rifles than the enemy, and secondly, by better 
shooting and fire discipline and by taking every advantage of cover.”50   
Eames’ fixation with fire superiority was mirrored in army doctrine.  The IDR itself 
stated, “In a decisive battle success depends on gaining and maintaining fire superiority.  Every 
                                                 
 47 Ibid., 8.  
 48 LTC R. K. Evans, “Infantry Fire in Battle,” in Infantry Journal, Vol. V, No. 6 (May 1909), 819. 
 49 Captain Henry E. Eames, The Rifle in War (Fort Leavenworth: Staff College Press, 1908), 53. from the 
CARL archives, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 
 50 Ibid., 80. 
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effort must be made to gain it early and then to keep it.”  The manual also optimistically noted, 
“Over open ground attack is possible only when the attacking force has a decided fire 
superiority.  With such a superiority the attack is not only possible, but success is probable 
without ruinous losses” (emphasis added).51  It is interesting to note that despite the fact that the 
Great War was entering its forth year, and many of the manual’s assertions had been proven false 
in combat, this passage remained in the December 1917 edition of the IDR. 
 In principle the writers and disseminators of the army’s doctrine were correct.  The “new 
warfare” demanded that the attacker gain and maintain a clear firepower advantage over the 
defender to allow them to destroy the enemy or gain ground.  The key problem lay in their 
unquestioned belief that the infantry rifle would be the key source of both offensive and 
defensive fire superiority.   
 Given the American fetish for infantry firepower it is ironic that the army continued to 
undervalue the machine gun.  In official doctrine and professional journals, officers continued to 
argue that the weapon remained one of mere fleeting opportunity of little value in the offense.   
In a 1912 Infantry Journal article, Captain A. W. Bjornstad observed of machine guns, 
 They cannot move on an enemy and dislodge him or repel an assailant who has 
 approached within a very short distance with the aid of good cover…They are purely 
 axillaries, having very important and yet very limited uses and they are always  
 dependent on infantry for protection.  A machine gun cannot supplant 30 riflemen.   
It can merely equal the fire of 30 infantrymen at certain ranges, and at certain critical 
times and places.52 
 
 It is interesting to note that as late as 1917, the IDR continued to relegate its discussion of the 
                                                 
 51 IDR corrected to December 31, 1917, 104.  Again, the FSR was more conservative than the IDR.  
Although the FSR agrees that the only way that the attacker could overcome the defender was to establish fire 
superiority, this would not be secured unless, “the number of rifles put into action by the assailants is either greater 
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defender, or the later are surprised or have been demoralized by previous defeat and the assailants have an 
unquestioned moral ascendancy over them.”  It also warns, “Frontal assaults are not impossible, but in order to be 
successful the assailants must gain a superiority of fire and be willing to pay the price of victory” (original 
emphasis), FSR corrected to May 21, 1913, 158. 
 52 Captain A. W. Bjornstad, “Infantry Combat” in Infantry Journal, Vol. VIII, No. 6 (May-June 1912), 838. 
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weapon to its “Miscellaneous” chapter, and declared, “Machine guns must be considered as a 
weapon of emergency. Their effectiveness…renders them of great value at critical, though 
infrequent, periods of an engagement.”53   
 In fairness, there were some good reasons for the army’s skepticism over the machine 
gun.  The major weapons in its pre-war inventory, the M1904 Maxim Gun, M1909 Benet-Mercie 
Machine Rifle, and the M1914 Colt Machine Gun, all had inherent characteristics or flaws that 
limited their operational usage.  Weight proved to be the biggest draw-back to both the water-
cooled M1904 Maxim Gun and the air-cooled M1914 Colt.  With its tripod and a full water 
jacket the Maxim weighed a cumbersome 152 pounds while the Colt with tripod tipped the 
scales at 91 pounds.  The ponderousness of these weapons limited their mobility and thus made 
them difficult to employ offensively.  Although the Benet-Mercie was a veritable lightweight at 
30 pounds, its complicated machinery and propensity to break firing pins and extractors made it 
very unreliable under battlefield conditions.54  It should also be noted that, with the exception of 
the Germans, the major European armies had similar reservations about the utility of the machine 
gun and also attached caveats to its usage in their pre-war doctrines.55        
 While the army’s skepticism over the machine gun was perhaps understandable, other of 
its assumptions were less justifiable.  As with the American observers of the Russo-Japanese 
War, army tacticians continued to consistently overestimate the power of small arms fire while 
simultaneously undervaluing the power of artillery.  The IDR, for example, maintained that 
“Except when the enemy’s artillery is able to effect an unusual concentration of fire, its fire upon 
deployed infantry causes losses which are unimportant when compared with those inflicted by 
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 54 Bruce Canfield, U. S. Infantry Weapons of the First World War (Lincoln, RI: Andrew Mowbray 
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 55 Echevarria, 158-166. 
  138
his infantry.”56   
 The certainly of this conviction was mirrored in the army’s schools and unofficial 
publications.  In his 1914 book, Infantry Training, Colonel John Morrison noted, “The artillery 
will often sweep with fire an area being crossed by infantry” and that “Infantry encountering this 
kind of fire should, as it approaches, lie down and get whatever cover is available and, after the 
storm has passed, move on.”57  He argued that shrapnel projectiles, “will not penetrate the 
infantry soldier’s pack at any range, so that when lying on the ground his pack affords complete 
protection to his spine and considerable protection to all vital parts except his head, and 
confidently predicted that, “the chance then of a man getting wounded…would only be about 1 
in 80 if in the open and very much less with partial cover.”58  Ironically, even as Morrison was 
publishing this work, events in northeastern France were beginning to call into question his 
assertions.      
 Student officers in the schools at Fort Leavenworth were constantly bombarded with the 
assumption-laden tenets of the army’s doctrine.  Although he admitted that artillery support was 
invaluable for preparing the way for the attacker by suppressing the defender, and argued for 
combining the effects of both infantry and artillery, Leavenworth instructor Henry Eames taught 
his students that, “In the ultimate, the fire of infantry and of artillery will be found to be so 
similar as to be practically identical at [hitting] animate targets, the radius of potential efficacy 
being the chief difference…”59  He also maintained that an infantry regiment “firing at 1000 
yards can produce as many hits per minute as will 12 [artillery] batteries firing at 3000 yards at 
                                                 
 56 IDR., 84. 
 57 John F. Morrison, Infantry Training (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Cavalry Association, 1914), 66. 
 58 Ibid., 59. 
 59 Eames, 76-7. 
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the same target.”60  Likewise, Captain Crawford lamented that,  
 Some observers of the Russo-Japanese conflict were much impressed with the  
 power of modern artillery, and were inclined to believe that the relative importance  
 of artillery had  greatly increased in late years.  None of these officers gave 
 statements showing the actual casualties made by the differing arms, their reports 
 apparently reflecting their impressions only.61    
    
Reflecting these sentiments, one American officer concluded that the “infantry is the chief arm, 
to which the other two (artillery and cavalry) are subordinate.”62  Given the missionary fervor 
and faith that these officers exhibited in their lectures, it is no surprise that their students later 
became the disciples of the AEF’s “open warfare” doctrine.   
The ultimate problem with the branch parochialism exhibited by Eames and Crawford 
was that it blinded the army to the reality of combat as it emerged on the Western Front, 
hindered efforts to forge a realistic combined arms approach to warfare, and, as will be seen, had 
a negative influence on the training of America’s wartime corps of junior leaders.  For example, 
while army schools and journals touted the need for combined arms training, seldom were these 
sentiments actually put into practice.  In October 1914 Major General William Harding Carter 
noted, “Many years of experience…have made plain to me that one of the serious needs of the 
service…is a knowledge of modern field artillery, its fighting capacity, and its relations to the 
infantry and cavalry in campaign and battle.”  He went on to lament, “A knowledge of modern 
field artillery, its methods and effectiveness of fire, is almost a sealed book to our infantry.”63  At 
the precise time that Carter wrote these passages, the major European combatants were 
discovering the ugly realities of the “new warfare.”  Unfortunately, over the next three years, the 
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American army continued to labor under a set of tactical and doctrinal assumptions that should 
have been steadily eroded by the experiences of the armies on the Western Front.    
It is clear that the U. S. Army closely followed the military developments of the Great 
War between 1914 and 1917.  The U.S. Army received a constant flow of reports from its 
military attaches in Europe, and its professional journals published a steady stream of accounts 
of the conflict from American observers and European participants.  Despite this flow of 
information about the war and its larger tactical, organizational, and technological implications, 
there is little indication that these reports led to any substantive changes to the U. S. Army’s 
doctrine or patterns of military thought prior to 1918.  Although fiscal, operational, and political 
constraints prevented the army from fielding new weapons or experimenting with new 
organizational models during this period, there were no tangible restraints on the officer corps’ 
ability to grapple intellectually with the doctrinal challenges being evidenced on the Western 
Front.  The saddest indictment of the pre-war officer corps was that it continued to cling to the 
tactical assumptions that underpinned its doctrine long after the evidence from Europe had 
proven them false. 
From the very outbreak of the war American military attachés reported the military 
situation and doctrinal developments and innovations emerging on the European battlefields.  
Major Spencer Cosby, the military attaché in Paris, was one of the more keen American 
observers of the combat on the Western Front.  One of the major trends that he uncovered and 
reported back the American General Staff was the vast rise of casualties caused by artillery and 
machine gun fire.  In November 1914 he reported that a French officer had estimated that 75 
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percent of soldiers killed on the Western Front were due to artillery fire.64  Nine months later, 
Cosby reported to Washington the staggering casualties that the French had suffered in the  
fighting around Arras in May and June 1915.  A French General Staff officer told Cosby that a 
division in the 6th French corps was down to a strength of only 12,000 men and had suffered over 
32,000 casualties to date.  Although he placed French casualties at around 60,000 to 85,000 for 
the campaign, he admitted that some of the figures ranged to as high as 200,000 men.  In one 
division which had suffered 800 men wounded in the fighting north of Arras, he ominously noted 
that “Only two were wounded by rifle bullets, all the others by shell and grenades.”65  Given the 
fact that the American Regular Army’s strength in 1914 was a mere 92,482 men and its doctrine 
was so small arms-centric, Cosby’s reports should have carried more portent.66   
As an engineer officer, Cosby was also well-fitted to report on the realities of trench 
warfare.  In two separate reports on 25 March and 5 October 1915, Cosby presented detailed 
descriptions of the trench systems on the Western Front and the challenges they presented to 
offensive operations.  He also was able to visit French trenches on an active part of the front and 
gave a pointed account of the devastation left in the wake of the firepower of the “new warfare.”  
The village of Betheny, he noted, was “nothing but a mass of ruins, not a single house having 
escaped the rain of German shells, of which at least 40 are dropped on it every day, and often 
several hundred.”  He also agreed with one French staff officer’s assertion that, “The present war 
has registered the decline in importance of the cavalry arm and a corresponding rise of the 
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artillery and Engineers…The infantry for the moment are acting chiefly as supports for the other 
two arms.”67 
Despite Cosby’s unique point of observation, not all, and perhaps few, American officers 
agreed with his assessments.  A cavalry officer claiming to have interviewed Allied veterans, 
quickly dismissed reports of the touted power of artillery.  He noted,   
 I often asked as to the comparative losses from artillery and rifle fire.  None of  
 those questioned gave me a figure for artillery fire of less than fifty percent of the 
 total losses, and one estimate ran as high as seventy-five percent.  These figures are 
 undoubtedly absurd but it goes to show how our minds are impressed by what may  
 be called primitive reason (emphasis added). 68   
 
The same officer equally discounted arguments that modern firepower had effectively removed 
cavalry from the battlefield.  He also arrogantly maintained, “I firmly believe that two of our 
normal cavalry brigades with its proper proportion of artillery, available to the Allis’ left about 
September 6th [1914], would have meant disaster for von Kluck.”69 As the British Expeditionary 
Forces’ cavalry division was unable to check the advance of Kluck’s army in August 1914, the 
unnamed American “Officer Abroad” was doing little more than idle speculation and 
unprofessional boasting.  However, his remarks do illustrate the dangerous American tendency to 
believe that its weapons, organizations, and doctrine were inherently superior to those of Europe.  
Unfortunately this propensity would later manifest itself in the AEF’s efforts to craft its own 
unique doctrine during the war.    
 In addition to reports of their own experiences at the front, and of discussions with Allied 
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officers, the military attaches also sent back to the American General Staff translated doctrinal 
manuals and circulars that detailed the evolution of tactics on the Western Front.  On 11 
November 1915, Captain J. W. Barker submitted a report containing a copy of a provocative 
French circular entitled, “Study of the Attack in the Present Period of the War.”  Although 
Barker did not include the name of the author of the study, it was written by Captain Andre 
Laffargue, a veteran combat company commander.  Laffargue’s study offered a detailed 
discussion of the challenges of attacks against fortified positions as well as some suggestions of 
how to overcome them.  This penetrating analysis offered a number of gems on minor tactics, 
combined arms coordination, small unit training, and combat leadership that were valuable to all 
company and battalion level leaders attempting to understand the realities of the “new warfare.”  
Although the study was published in its entirety in the Infantry Journal in September 1916, there 
is no evidence in American doctrinal publications or in the army’s training plans of 1917 that 
indicated that the work had any real influence on American military thought.70  Although 
Laffargue’s study was certainly not the “be all end all” of World War I minor tactics, it at least 
offered the Americans a model or foundation from which they could have built a tactical 
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doctrine that was more realistic and less assumption-laden than that which they began the war 
with in 1917. 
 Another French manual, Instructions on the Offensive Conduct of Small Units, would 
ultimately receive a more official acceptance within the American army.  The French originally 
published the manual in January 1916 and the American attaché forwarded a translation to 
Washington on 22 March 1916.71  The manual drew upon Laffargue’s earlier manual as well as 
the front line wisdom of other French officers.  Unfortunately, the work languished in the War 
College Division until after the United States entered the war.  The War Department hastily 
published and issued the work in May 1917, but since the tactics within the manual revolved 
around synchronized attacks using artillery, light and heavy machine guns, hand and rifle 
grenades, one pound guns, and other implements of modern warfare that the U. S. Army lacked, 
the publication’s utility was limited.  
 Based on the reports of American observers and European participants, some officers 
within the General Staff began to subtly question existing Army organizational structures and 
tactical assumptions.  In November 1915 the Army War College began publishing a series of 
studies intended to support Secretary of War Lindley Garrison’s “Continental Army” reform and 
reorganization plan.72  One of these monographs in particular, Study on the Development of 
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Large-Caliber Mobile Artillery and Machine Guns in the Present European War, highlighted 
realities on the European battlefields that were at direct odds with the army’s infantry and rifle-
centric doctrine.  The study noted that the war had driven all of the major combatants to increase 
the number and shell-weights of their heavy artillery.  It also pointed out the tactical limitations 
of field guns such as the French 75mm, the war’s exponential increase in the duration and 
intensity of barrages, and the deadly effect of high explosive-firing heavy artillery on infantry 
and fortifications.  The author went so far as to credit the German army’s victories on the 
Western and Eastern fronts to “the use of these enormous fieldpieces,” and asserted that such 
guns “must hereafter be considered as essential to success in war.”73  The study likewise warned 
that the war had forced the combatants to increase their number of machine guns while also 
issuing and employing them at lower echelons than had been called for in their pre-war 
doctrines.74  Based on what was being taught in the army’s schools and printed in its professional 
journals, there is no indication that this monograph had any influence on American thoughts and 
practices prior to 1917. 
 Despite the warnings and recommendations of their military attaches and general staff, as 
was the case in the Russo-Japanese War, American officers exhibited an inclination to seek 
evidence in the reports from the war that seemed to validate existing American practices.  In 
some cases this was accomplished by picking through the reports from the various combatants 
until they found accounts or editorials that matched American military sensibilities.  For 
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example, in July 1915 the Cavalry Journal reprinted a report from a German officer stating, 
“The cavalry has not only not become an antiquated arm, but it is meeting all conditions of war 
in such an apt way dovetailed into the frame of this newest of all wars.  Its raison d’être is more 
than only proved.”75  Likewise, the Infantry Journal printed an article from a French general, 
who praised the “calm and cool rifle shot…who can bring down ten men with ten bullets,” but 
also argued, “The complete weapon of the infantryman is a rifle with a bayonet…the only one 
which combines in the highest degree the two eternal methods of action, fire and shock.  But the 
bayonet is only added to the rifle as the shock follows fire, the later preparing for the former.”76  
 In December 1915, the editorial staff of the Infantry Journal examined the course of the 
war on the Western Front and noted that warfare seemed to have separated into two distinct 
branches: the stationary and attritional “trench warfare,” and the maneuver-focused and decisive 
“open warfare.”  From this analysis, they asked the vital question, “In our preparation for war, 
which of these two classes of warfare should first occupy our attention?”77  The writers 
accurately described the ugly realities of trench warfare and that bravery was simply not enough 
to overcome the physical supremacy of defensive firepower. They noted, “Trench warfare 
demands a special class of weapons and material.  To break through a thoroughly entrenched line 
requires a vast number of heavy guns …and an enormous supply of heavy shells, as these are the 
only means of destroying wire entanglements and casemates.”78  Despite the challenges of trench 
warfare, and the looming possibility that American soldiers would have to face it in the future, 
the infantrymen ultimately maintained, 
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 All the advantages possessed by either side were won in open warfare.  Rather  
 than conclude that continuous trench warfare is an inevitable phase of any future  
 war, should we not in our preparation make every effort to forestall the possibility  
 of its occurrence…To devote a large part of our energies to the development of the 
 enormous amount of materiel required of trench warfare…is equivalent to an  
 acceptance to defeat in that period of the war (open warfare) which is most decisive  
 of the final result.79  
 
Here again, the debates that swirled in the pages of the professional military journals over the 
“true” lessons and meaning of the Great War for the American army foreshadowed the doctrinal 
prejudices and assumptions that would later influence the AEF’s tactics and its expectations of 
its junior leaders.  
 Army officers, if they chose to, could also gain an appreciation of the ugly realities of the 
war in Europe from the popular press.  The war was big news, and American reporters were 
drawn to the conflict like a moth toward the flame.  The famous “writer of fortune” Richard 
Harding Davis witnessed the fighting in France and Belgium in the fall of 1914 and published his 
account of the war’s early battles in With the Allies.  Although the work was mainly a shrill 
denunciation of German actions in Belgium, Davis did portray the destructiveness and deadliness 
of modern war.80  After viewing a Germany artillery battery in action around Ypres, reporter 
Arnold Bennett informed his American audience that, “Around the guns were educated men who 
had spent years- indeed, most of their lives- in the scientific study of destruction...They had, 
indeed, been explicitly told on the highest earthly authority that, if an order came to destroy their 
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fathers and their brothers, they must destroy their father and their brothers.”81  Despite their 
obvious pro-Allies sentiments and Yellow Journalism sensibilities, these commentators still 
managed to convey to a mass American audience the changing face of modern war.  
 One of the keenest observers of the war, and the drastic changes to combat that it had 
heralded, was Henry J. Reilly, a West Point graduate and veteran of both the Regular Army and 
Illinois National Guard.  When the war broke out Reilly offered his services to the volunteer 
American Ambulance Corps and served with the Allies from October 1914 through February 
1915.  He then toured both Western and Eastern Fronts as a reporter for the Chicago Tribune.  
While he shared Davis and Bennett’s pro-Allied views, he was still able to present an honest and 
accurate portrayal of the European fighting.  For example, in September 1915 he reported, 
  The average person, if asked what he believes to be the most prominent feature 
  of the fighting on land in the present war, generally answers, airplanes or 
  trench warfare.  He is wrong…The average soldier or officer, if asked what 
  he believes to be the most prominent feature in the present war, will promptly 
  reply, the artillery…It has been the artillery which, by the intensity of its 
  fire, has surprised even the other branches of the service.82      
 
He precisely dissected the challenges that artillery and machine gun fires presented to the 
infantry and provided a detailed discussion of the development of observer-controlled indirect 
artillery fire.83  The clinical exactness with which he described the power and lethality of 
artillery and machine guns far exceeded almost all the analysis and commentary of the war that 
was written by American officers in their War College reports, professional articles, and 
Leavenworth lectures from 1914 through 1916. 
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 One of the important questions to ponder is why did the army continue to cling to 
outdated concepts of war in the face of mounting evidence from Europe that warfare was 
changing?  Why did the army continue to advocate the primacy of the infantry attack when the 
power of artillery and the defense were so manifest?  Unfortunately, there are no easy 
explanations for this phenomenon.  Part of this problem stemmed from the army’s place within 
American society.  The traditional belief that large standing armies were threats to liberty and a 
drain on the wealth of the nation continued to influence American political thought and actions 
well into the twentieth century.  Thus, even as the European combatants were feverishly working 
to expand their overall number and ratio of artillery pieces, machine guns, aircraft, and the other 
implements of modern war, the Congress made scant effort to appropriate any funding for these 
types of weapons prior to the nation’s entry into the war.  In fact, with the exception of the 
Philippine War era expansion of the army (this was an expansion and not a modernization), the 
army was perpetually cash-strapped from the end of the Civil War to 1917.  It is interesting to 
note that the American private of 1916 was actually paid one dollar less per month than the Civil 
War Union private of 1864 and 1865.   
 This penury created a culture within the army where officers were expected to make-do 
with whatever means that they had at hand.  Thus, rather than pine for artillery and machine guns 
that they would never get, was it not better to build a doctrine based on the “proven,” reliable, 
and, most importantly, relatively cheap firepower of the rifleman?  It is a fascinating 
commentary on the mentality of the pre-war U. S. Army that its last new fully fielded weapon 
system prior to 1917 was the M1913 “Patton” Saber.84  Like the rifle, the new saber promised a 
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low tech and inexpensive solution to the “men against fire” dilemma.    
 The army’s small budget also exacerbated internal tensions among its various branches as 
they battled for their piece of scarce defense dollars.  The irrational fear of a Spanish attack on 
American costal cities in 1898 had led to a steady flow of money to costal fortifications, coast 
artillery, and the navy in the years prior to World War I.  This prioritization left little money for 
the other branches, or much funding for emerging technologies such as the air plane.85  This 
internal wrangling promoted branch parochialism and merely reinforced the “make-do” military 
culture. 
 Other factors that perhaps hindered any plans that the army may have considered for pre-
war modernization were prevailing political realities and public attitudes related to the war.      
On 19 August 1914 Woodrow Wilson asked the American people to support the United States' 
neutrality in the World War and "be impartial in thought as well as in action."86  Four months 
later in his annual address to Congress, he declared that the conflict in Europe was "a war with 
which we have nothing to do, whose causes cannot touch us,” and assured Americans that “…we 
shall not turn America into a military camp.  We will not ask our young men to spend the best 
years of their lives making soldiers of themselves.”87 
 In 1914, Wilson’s position generally reflected the attitudes of the American people.   
Though mass opinion polls had yet to appear by the First World War, the results of a late 1914 
Literary Digest poll of 367 American newspaper editors revealed something of the general 
American feelings of ambivalence toward the European conflict.  When asked which of the 
European belligerents most held their personal sympathies, 20 of the newspapermen supported 
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the Germans, 105 voiced sympathy with the Allies and the remaining 242 responded that they 
held no particular preference or sympathy for either side.  The results of the poll led its authors to 
conclude that "...the sympathy on either side is that of a distant observer.  No belligerency is 
evident anywhere."88  While it is perhaps overly simplistic to use the editors' responses as a 
specific gauge of popular American opinion in 1914, the poll does point to the divisions and 
uncertainties of American attitudes on the war and its combatants.  The United States of 1914 
and 1915 was a nation with substantial ethnic populations that opposed one side or the other or 
“militarism” in general.  It was a population beset by racial, sectional, economic, and social 
tensions that made it difficult to gain any political consensus, either for or against, military 
expansion or modernization.89 
 As war engulfed Europe in August 1914, many Americans viewed the event as a 
distasteful and self-destructive blunder of the decadent Old World.  Wrapped in the Victorian 
faith in progress and science, Americans watched with dismay and regret as the "finest flower of 
Western Civilization" consumed itself in an orgy of destruction and brutality.90  With the 
security of vast oceans, was it not easy for Americans to agree with Wilson’s contention that the 
conflict was simply "a war with which we have nothing to do.”  When the threat to the nation 
was so distant, what was the point of building a modern army when so much money had been 
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spent on a modern navy designed to keep the foe away? 91  The ambivalence of building a large 
army even continued after the United States entered the war.  In fact, in April 1917 Thomas 
Martin, the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, stated, “Congress will not permit 
American soldiers to be sent to Europe.”92      
 Even after the sinking of the Lusitania and other German “atrocities” (real or purported) 
tended to sway American opinion toward the pro-Allied camp, the nation remained deeply 
divided about the war until 1917.93  Although powerful voices, such as Theodore Roosevelt, 
pushed for preparedness, equally powerful voices, such as Eugene Debs and Oswald Garrison 
Villard, equated preparedness with militarism and political repression.  Debs, for example, 
viewed the preparedness movement as a plot to “transform the American nation into the most 
powerful and odious military despotism in the world.”94  Not surprisingly, the League for the 
Limitations of Armaments scolded those politicians “stampeded by the hysterical craze for 
additional armaments.”95  Thus, the politically charged preparedness debate so muddied the 
water over the future direction of the army that any meaningful modernization was basically 
stillborn prior to the nation’s entry into the war.      
 Wilson, a Southerner with an ingrained distaste for “big government” and all things 
military, also stymied any meaningful efforts to prepare the army to wage a modern war until 
1916.   The president’s desire to maintain American neutrality (and perhaps to avoid a political 
landmine prior to the elections of 1916), led to the quashing of any serious contingency planning 
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for a possible war against Germany. In August 1915 after hearing a report that the General Staff 
had been working on plans for a war with Germany, Wilson threatened that every officer 
involved would be relieved of duty and ordered out of Washington.96  His anger with military 
men such as Leonard Wood who appeared to undercut his policy of neutrality by their vocal 
support for preparedness led him to direct the War Department to muzzle the public 
pronouncements by serving officers.  On 23 February 1915 General Order 10 directed that, 
“Officers of the Army will refrain, until further orders, from giving out for publication any 
interview, statement, discussion, or article on the military situation in the United States or 
abroad, as any expression of their views on this subject at present is prejudicial to the best 
interest of the service.”97  Robert Alexander, the wartime commander of the 77th Division, later 
recalled that the president’s directives created an atmosphere where, “Any officer, however 
distinguished, who displayed ordinary foresight by the advocacy of any preparatory measure did 
so at the jeopardy of his career.”98  Whatever their beliefs on the need to modernize the army, 
few officers seemed willing to follow Leonard Wood’s open criticism of the Wilson 
administration.   
 Lastly, army officers themselves seemed unwilling to accept the problems of their 
doctrinal thinking.  Much of this stemmed from a deeply ingrained, if hubristic, faith in 
American exceptionalism. There was a willingness to accept the idea that “American methods” 
and an inherent abundance of “American know-how” would always present the nation viable 
solutions to problems that bedeviled “lesser” mortals such as the Europeans.  In other words, the 
American solution to the “men against fire” debate would succeed if for no other reasons than it 
came from the same soil from which had sprung George Washington, Thomas Edison, and the 
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Wright Brothers.   
 This attitude caught army officers in a great dilemma.  If in fact the American citizen 
made a superior soldier, West Point made a superior officer, and Leavenworth and the War 
College made superior doctrine, why then worry about preparedness?  This quandary led to a 
great degree of cognitive dissonance within the army’s thinking.  On one hand there was the faith 
in American military practices as touted by officers such as Morrison and McClernand, on the 
other, was the belief that recent societal changes had sapped the vigor and vitality of the 
American male and thus made citizen soldiers unreliable under the stress of modern war.  Some 
officers clearly saw the perils of this self-delusion.  As one noted in the Infantry Journal, 
  It is a national illusion that we are natural soldiers; that we are natural 
  marksman; that we are Americans and therefore exceptions to the human   
  race…the marksmanship of the past has been exaggerated by enthusiastic  
  writers.  One recognized authority upon American history relates of a body of  
  Virginians who joined Washington that every man could hit a squirrel in the  
  eyes at three hundred yards while moving at the double quick himself.  There  
  was never a rifle made whose accuracy would permit such a feat, nor was there  
  ever a man made who could see a squirrel’s eye three hundred yards away.   
  Experience has shown that you must first rid the recruit of the idea that he is a  
  natural shot, and then teach him how to shoot.99  
 
The solution to the predicament was to make the army itself the vessel of American 
exceptionalism.  Only the American army could properly teach the citizen “how to shoot” and 
only the American army using American methods could find the solution to the tactical problems 
that bedeviled the European combatants.  These attitudes later colored how Pershing and other 
American officers interacted with the Allied trainers and advisors working with the army in both 
the United States and France.      
 The “answer” to the question of why the army refused to change its doctrine in the face 
of mounting evidence from Europe of course lies in the hazy shades of gray where all the above 
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listed factors intersected.  Ultimately, what is clear was that a host of internal beliefs and external 
realities left the U. S. Army with little desire to alter it doctrine or even the ability to obtain the 
quality and quantity of weapons that were proving so important in Europe.  However, while 
budget constraints hindered weapons procurement, no such tangible obstacles prevented the 
officer corps from embarking on an intellectual investigation of how the Great War was 
changing warfare.  Despite substantial indications of deep shifts in the conduct of war, the 
American officer corps as a whole retained an ostrich-like indifference to these emerging 
realities and thus continued to see war as they wanted it to be rather than intellectually engaging 
the war as it was.   
 Having discussed the army’s attempts, or failures, to come to grips with the realities of 
modern industrial warfare, it is now important to examine how the army believed that these new 
realities would influence the way that it would have to select, train, and utilize its junior leaders.  
Although American officers may have placed a great faith in the exceptionalism of the nation 
and its army, few questioned the fact that modern firepower had made novel demands on combat 
leadership. The questions of doctrine and leadership in the “new warfare” were inextricably 
linked from the very beginning of the “men against fire” debate.  As early as 1882, Greene and 
Lazelle both agreed that the “new warfare” would place a much heavier demand upon junior 
leaders.  Greene acknowledged that the open order infantry formation that he recommended 
“throws great responsibility upon the senior captains” and that “all recent experience shows that 
the result of battle, under the fire of breechloaders, depends…upon the skill of the commanders 
of small units.”100  In a similar vein, Lieutenant Colonel Lazelle argued, 
  The difficulties of command are greater with breechloaders.  Fighting is  
  more individualized, from the lowest to the highest unit of command. 
  More is left to the judgment of the commanding officer of each, from the   
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  company to the corps commander, and more is required of each.  The  
  fate of battles depends more on the courage and capacity of the individuals; 
  and the difficulty is greater of holding men in hand, and maintaining close 
  directing fire.  The General may order the attack, but the careful disposition 
  of the troops to the ground, and their forcible use to a common purpose 
  must be left to company, to field, and to subordinate general officers.101 
   
Thus, 35 years before the United States sent troops to fight in France, some within the army had 
already come to the conclusion that the “new warfare” portended drastic changes within the 
ranks of the army’s company-level officers and NCOs. 
    As American and European officers came to realize that the battlefield was becoming 
more lethal, and thus more disperse, they also began to see that their armies now demanded 
junior leaders able to operate without the direct oversight and direction of their superiors.  Rather 
than being file-closers operating within the ear and eye shot of their regimental commanders as 
they had been during the Civil War, the emerging “new warfare” battlefield placed a premium on 
captains, lieutenants, and NCOs who were able to use their initiative and judgment to carry out 
their missions.  In 1909, Captain George Balzel observed, “it is self evident, that in order to have 
an efficient whole, the minutest part must be made as perfect as available means of training will 
permit.”102  To this end, he observed, “the display of judgment among the minor leaders…is one 
of the demands of modern warfare”103 
 Some turn of the century American officers also came to believe that the changes in 
warfare required not only more independent leaders also more self-reliant and self-disciplined 
soldiers.  As formations spread and the use of battlefield cover and concealment became more 
important, the individual soldier gained vastly more control over their fire, movement, and their 
other actions in combat.  One junior officer warned, 
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  The tendency in modern warfare to fight battles in extended order and in  
  small detachments, and to throw more responsibility upon the individual  
  soldier, has brought a new influence to bear upon the profession of arms.   
  And in view of the fact that the world has so long looked upon the soldier 
  as an unthinking automaton, there still room for development along newer  
  and more scientific channels.  It is probably safe to say that there is no longer  
  a place in modern tactics for the soldier who cannot, under battle conditions,  
  take care of himself if occasion arises.104 
 
 This change in the army’s expectations of the individual soldier carried important 
ramifications for junior leaders.  The close formations of the muzzle-loading era provided a 
built-in cohesion and unifying direction to soldiers within a unit in combat.  Knowingly or not, 
these formations utilized the natural tendency for soldiers in combat to huddle together for the 
reassuring elbow-to-elbow touch of one’s comrades.  As formations thinned and spread, soldiers 
were thrown upon their own to deal with the fear, uncertainty, and confusion of battle.  When a 
line of dispersed soldiers “went to ground” as a result of enemy fire, or to establish their own 
base of fire against an enemy, inertia accumulated and leaders found (and find) it difficult to get 
them up and moving again.  Without close and direct supervision it was all too easy for the 
soldier to either stay in a sheltered position while his unit moved forward, or to conduct his own 
fire and maneuver without any direction from above.  To a very great extent, the realities of the 
modern battlefield gave rise to the military adage that “each infantryman is his own general.”   
 Unfortunately, the conditions on the new battlefield placed junior leaders in a position 
where they were being pulled in two directions.  They themselves had to develop the skills and 
abilities to achieve their missions without the direct supervision of their superiors while 
simultaneously being required to train their subordinates to act in a similar manner.  Thus, the 
junior leader was faced with the dilemma of training his subordinates to act semi-independently 
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while also needing to retain the command, control, and cohesion needed to achieve the mission.  
This often pitted the needs of the leader against the fears and instincts of the soldier. 
 It is interesting to note that a number of officers turned to the relatively new science of 
psychology to help them to understand and explain the leadership attributes now needed to direct 
the newly empowered soldier.  The reformer J. Franklin Bell went so far as to lecture a group of 
Leavenworth students that, “The military commander who contemptuously disregards the 
psychological equation of his soldiers will never succeed on earth.”105  Likewise, the noted 
National Guard officer, Major General John F. O’Ryan argued that, due to the stress that modern 
warfare had on the individual, an understanding of psychology was now a key leadership skill.  
Following the Leavenworth model that required officers to conduct a tactical estimation of the 
situation prior to issuing orders, O’Ryan maintained that officers should also go through a 
“psychological estimate of the situation” before combat.  This was of critical importance 
because, “Great fear is a psychological cholera. Like cholera it thrives among the ignorant…In 
no profession is it so important to contend with the human emotion of fear as in the profession of 
arms.”106  
 Some officers went so far as to cite psychological theorists as evidence for their 
assertions on leadership and the modern soldier.  Major Frank McCoy, who would rise to 
command the 42nd Division’s 63rd Infantry Brigade in the war, noted, “A Frenchman, Le Bon, 
gave new food for thought in his psychology of the crowd, and the practical soldiers are applying 
his principles in full intent…”107  In a similar vein, Lincoln Andrews noted, 
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  The psychology of control of men on the battlefield is a big subject of vital  
  importance to leaders…Man, an individual, is largely controlled by his  
  emotions- they color his judgment in the calmest moments, in excitement he 
   is likely to become their creature.  Men in a crowd are always swayed by   
  impulses often so unreasonable as to seem absurd and impossible to any one of  
  them standing alone…The strongest instinct in man, handed down from primal  
  times, is self-preservation.  When he feels that life is threatened, fear   
  obtrudes…In a command of soldiers on the battlefield, you have a crowd   
  subjected to the strongest emotional emotions, the ideal conditions for developing  
  a mob.108 
 
That American officers would have been drawn to LeBon is not surprising.  The Frenchman’s 
elitist suspicion of the creation of an irrational “mass man” echoed the regulars’ own wariness of 
the relentless modernity of the evolving industrial society.  The officers perceived that the values 
of the industrial men were at odds with the traditional military virtues of self-sacrifice, 
obedience, austerity and discipline.    
Although these resorts to psychology may have seemed progressive, in fact, most of the 
officers, like McCoy and Andrews, merely put a modern sheen on traditional patriarchal 
practices.  It is safe to say that the psychology used by the average Regular officer had more of a 
decidedly Social Darwinist bent than anything intended by Sigmund Freud or Gustave LeBon.  
While officers like J. Franklin Bell accurately argued that leaders had to appeal to soldiers more 
through reason than through coercion and the fear of punishment, he admitted that he was up 
against a tradition of unquestioned obedience and deference that would be hard to transform.    
 As junior leaders tried to come to grips with the issue of soldier motivation and mentalité, 
they also had to contend with the more tangible problems of command and control.  While 
weapons technologies had undergone massive changes, the technologies for combat 
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communications, especially those used for the attack, had not significantly changed since the 
musket era.  Although the use of wire-linked field phones had been perfected by the turn of the 
century, the wires were easily damaged by shellfire or incautious soldiers.  Furthermore, laying 
wire while moving forward during an attack made the linesman obvious and easy targets for the 
enemy.  Although the army placed emphasis on the use of flag signals, the signal men were 
likewise vulnerable targets for enemy marksmen.  Junior leaders were thus generally left with no 
other recourse for command and control than using messengers or voice and hand and arm 
signals.  These also had their drawbacks.  Messengers could be killed, get lost, or fall victim to 
fear-inspired inertia.  One prescient infantry officer described a battlefield where,  
   The air is filled with hostile bullets, with the snap and drone of shrapnel,  
  while a single man standing erect draws down a sudden and accurate shower  
  of bullets.  You are flattened to the ground, intently watching the enemy,  
  keeping an eye to the companies on either of your flanks, and on the musician  
  crouched by your side, who watches the rear for signals.  Your voice will not  
  carry a dozen feet, while your whistle sounds but feebly.  The tense faces of  
  the men as they glance around either for direction of the platoon commander or  
  guide, or covertly to the ditch a hundred yards in the rear, show the strains they  
  are under…how else will you communicate your will except by signals?  The  
  ordinary means of expression fail, even if you do attempt to rush about on the  
  firing line yelling madly in this or that man’s ear, or harshly grasping a quaking  
  shoulder.  You fail to command; you only increase the tension of battle, or get  
  killed.109 
 
  Although the army was well aware of the problems with battlefield communications prior 
to 1914, wartime reports from Europe continued to stress their continued baleful influence.  In 
1916, one American observer reported, 
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  Communication under normal conditions is maintained by telephone and  
  buzzer, and it almost always happens that telephone lines are cut by artillery  
  fire, and then it is necessary to fall back on visual signaling and communication  
  by messenger…Control during action has been found most difficult to obtain.   
  The noise is terrific and once an attack is launched, communication is next to  
  impossible and results in throwing control largely on the shoulders of subordinate  
  commanders, such as section and platoon leaders.  The platoon leaders led  
  their platoons during the attack; the company commander follows with the last  
  of the company reserves; the battalion commander would probably remain in the  
  battle headquarters until the attack has made considerable advance…The battalion 
  once launched in the attack is very little influenced by it commander until the  
  enemy’s trench is consolidated.110  
 
Unfortunately, there were no ready solutions to these problems of command and control.  The 
only hope, as the observer had noted above, was to build an army of self-disciplined soldiers and 
leaders able to operate within the fear and chaos of battle and achieve their missions with little 
direct oversight from field and general officers.  As the European armies had discovered, this 
was easier said than done. 
 As previously noted, in the years prior to the Great War, some army officers had called 
for leaders trained to exercise initiative on the battlefield.  They hoped that this focus would 
somewhat offset the challenges of battlefield communications.  The IDR attempted to codify this 
point by stating, “When circumstances render it impracticable to consult the authority issuing an 
order, officers should not hesitate to vary from such order when it is clearly based upon an 
incorrect view of the situation, is impossible of execution, or has been rendered impracticable on 
account of changes which have occurred since its promulgation.”  However, the IDR  offered 
senior commanders the ability to have the “best of both world” by also declaring, “In the 
application of this rule the responsibility for mistakes rests upon the subordinate, but 
unwillingness to assume responsibility on proper occasions is indicative of weakness.”111  Thus, 
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the army sought to balance its desire for self-reliant leaders with its equally strong desire for 
subordination and control.   
 The inherent conflict between subordinate’s initiative and superior’s control meant that 
the army consistently sent its junior leaders mixed messages on its institutional expectations of 
combat leadership.  On one hand, J. Franklin Bell decried officers “trained in the old tradition of 
prompt and unquestioning obedience, without even a desire to understand,” and hoped for the 
day when the notion that a soldier’s only duty was to obey “will forever be left to repose upon 
the scrap-heap of other discarded military notions.”112  On the other hand, Ellis and Garey 
lectured officer candidates at Plattsburg, 
  Never forget that you lose your identity as an individual when you step  
  into ranks; you then become merely a unit of mass.  As soon as you obey   
  properly, promptly, and, at times, unconsciously, the commands of your  
  officers, as soon as you cheerfully give up the pleasures and personal  
  privileges that conflict with the new order of life to which you have  
  submitted, you will then have become a disciplined man.113 
 
In truth effective combat units had to be able to meld the two together.  Soldiers and leaders had 
to be disciplined to stand the stress and strain of combat, they had to obey orders to accomplish 
their assigned missions, and they had to be willing and able to make snap decisions based on 
changing battlefield realities.  Unfortunately, the army did a poor job of reconciling these 
competing demands within both its doctrine and its leadership training. 
 It is clear from the era’s professional writings that a number of officers recognized this 
flaw in doctrine and training.  In 1909 Captain George Baltzell complained, “If a company 
commander were allowed the proper degree of freedom, he would find little difficulty in 
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arranging his system of instruction in consonance with his own ideas.  But under the present 
system, the orders of the department commander and likewise the views of an inspector may not 
be in harmony with the methods a commander would like to pursue.”114  Three years later, 
another infantry officer argued,   
  …the essential point needed in our infantry to-day is more independence  
  for organization commanders and a direct holding of them responsible for 
  results attained.  To do this they must be given the freedom of method  
  and not have every moment of the day mapped out by superior authority.  
  This not only kills all initiative so essential to war, but also takes away  
  any direct responsibility for the training of their organizations.115 
 
In 1916 a major with the Mexican Punitive Expedition bewailed, “Experience has led me to 
believe that the with-holding of initiative from subordinates is one of the very worst faults to be 
attributed to the field officers of our service.”  He went on to note, “And my experience as a 
captain showed me that the majors may be quite as much at fault.  Many an officer was has been 
an excellent troop commander, makes an indifferent major, because he interferes too much with 
the initiative of his subordinates.”116  Time and time again, the junior officers’ freedom to use the 
initiative and exercise a degree of autonomy was sacrificed to their superior’s desire for control 
and proper subordination. 
 Although junior officers chaffed under the smothering control of their superior officers, 
they seem to have been just as guilty of this offense when it came to their NCOs and soldiers.  
Some officers undoubtedly believed that the changes in warfare would demand as much of 
NCOs as it did of junior officers.  For example, Lincoln Andrews maintained that, “The 
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exigencies of campaign and battle will continually place noncommissioned officers in 
unexpected command, and if their peace[time] training is to be reasonable, it must prepare them 
to meet these responsibilities.”117  Major Frank McCoy recommended that as soon as a company 
commander promoted a man to corporal, the first thing he should do would be to give the new 
NCO an independent mission that tested his ability to “think, decide, and act.”118   
 Regrettably, McCoy’s advice was not followed by many of his fellow officers.  In 1916 
the editor of the Infantry Journal lamented, “It cannot be denied that our noncommissioned 
officers are given too little scope for the development of their initiative as group leaders in the 
average company of the regular service.”119  Major James Chester chastised company 
commanders who “spend too much of their time with their companies” and thus set the condition 
that within their units, “They are everything and their non-commissioned officers are 
nothing.”120 
Along the same lines, another officer observed, “The tendency of many troop commanders 
seems to be to regard the troop as either a unit, or an aggregation of individual members.  The 
existence of the squad leader is more or less ignored and the inevitable result must be that his 
interest lapses and his energy lags.”121  Company-level leaders of all ranks were hobbled by their 
superiors and the inability of the army to reconcile the needs of initiative and the demand for 
control.  Ultimately this hindered the army’s ability to adequately prepare its junior leaders for 
facing the uncertainties of the battlefield.  This would also influence the way that the army 
trained its mass of new officers and NCOs once the United States entered the war. 
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 The army’s fixation with infantry firepower superiority was one of the greatest sources of 
its ongoing tensions between control and initiative.  The weight that the army doctrine placed on 
gaining and maintaining a massing of small arms fire, in both the offense and the defense, 
dictated very strict direction by field officers of the targeting and orchestration of the firefight.  It 
is only a slight exaggeration to argue that in the American infantry doctrine the chief role of 
maneuver was merely to move units to a place that allowed them to gain a firepower advantage 
(and of course to set the conditions for the final charge).122  The dictates of fire superiority 
tended to push officers at all levels toward micromanaging their subordinates in an effort to 
maintain strict control of the combat action.   
 This obsession with controlling fires was deeply embedded in the IDR and strongly 
echoed in the professional writings of Regular officers.  The IDR delineated the roles and 
responsibilities for leaders at each echelon and provided detailed instructions on the conduct of 
the firefight.  They established a distinction between fire direction, fire control and fire 
discipline.  The battalion or company commander was responsible for fire direction.  He selected 
the target, allotted parts of the target area to his subordinate leaders, determined the range, 
announced the sight settings of the soldiers, indicated the type of fire to be used (volley, fire at 
will, or clip fire), and gave the order or time to commence firing.123  The platoon leader was 
responsible for fire control.  He insured that the soldiers had the correct sight setting and target, 
observed, regulated, and as needed corrected the firing of their soldiers.  He was responsible for 
giving “such additional commands or directions as are necessary to exact compliance with the 
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captains will.”124  Fire discipline was the responsibility of each soldier.  It entailed, “care in 
setting the sight and delivery of fire; constant attention to the orders of the leader, and careful 
observation of the enemy; an increase of fire when the target is favorable, and a cessation of fire 
when the enemy disappears; [and] economy of ammunition.”125   Although all leaders were 
responsible for ensuring fire discipline, this oversight was usually the purview on the unit’s 
NCOs. 
 The IDR made clear the paramount importance of making the fire of the individual 
soldier an extension of the will of the commander.  It unequivocally stated, “The best troops are 
those that submit longest to fire control.  Loss of control is an evil which robs success of its 
greatest results.  To avoid or delay such loss should be the constant aim of all.”126  Instructors at 
army schools and writers in the army’s professional journals constantly harped on this theme.  
Captain Henry Eames warned his students at Fort Leavenworth, “Fire Discipline is different 
from any other kind of discipline and it is vastly more important, and much more difficult to 
instill into the soldier.”  Its goal was to get the soldiers to perform “without any conscious mental 
activity” so the “very muscles may instinctively obey the word of command.”127  Although all 
military training (then as now) was to instill a reflexive response that allowed soldiers to 
overcome fear and to act rapidly and instinctively to battlefield events, the turn of the century 
army took this Pavlovian concept to an extreme. 
 For all the talk by some officers of the need for leaders to understand the psychology of 
their soldiers, to appeal to their men’s reason in giving orders, and to admit that the modern 
battlefield prevented the direct supervision of individuals, the army’s compulsive obsession with 
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control actually seemed to be a throwback to the Kadavergehorsam- the corpse discipline- of the 
era of Frederick the Great.  This reality encouraged leaders to attempt to micromanage their 
subordinates.  In 1909 Captain George Baltzell wrote that in the firefight, the main duty of 
lieutenants and NCOs was “not a mere perfunctory repetition of commands, but a close 
supervision of their execution” and that this close control should be taken “even to the point of 
examining the sight adjustments [of his individual soldiers].”128  Despite the dispersion of the 
modern battlefield and subsequent increase in the individual infantryman’s freedom of action, 
the army still expected its junior leaders to closely adhere to the will of their superiors and, in the 
process, exercise a strict and close control of their subordinates.  
 The desire for control was also reflected in the army’s mania for ammunition 
conservation.  The fear among American leaders that repeating firearms would only encourage 
soldiers to waste ammunition goes back at least to the Civil War.  Though the Civil War had 
demonstrated the effectiveness of repeating firearms such as the Spencer and Henry rifles, in 
1866 the army adopted the single shot “trapdoor” Springfield rifle.  While this decision was 
partially made out of a desire to have a more powerful cartridge than those used in the Civil War 
era repeaters, but the selection of the single shot “trapdoor” was also a means for controlling the 
individual soldier’s rate of fire.   
 It is interesting to note that both the Krag-Jørgensen and the M1903 Springfield magazine 
rifles that replaced the “trapdoor” both had magazine “cut-off” devices.  The magazine “cut-off” 
physically prevented the weapon from loading the five rounds within the magazine, thus forcing 
the soldier to load and fire one shot at a time until his officers ordered him to disengage the “cut 
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off.”129  Lieutenant Colonel R. K. Evans went so far as to state that the main duties of squad 
leaders was to ensure, “that the men do not fire without his orders or those of higher 
authority;[and] that they do not waste their ammunition.”  He advised young NCOs that, “in 
battle every cartridge should be treated as if it were a hundred dollar bill, for which full value 
must be demanded.”130  This issue was considered to be so important by the army that in 
September 1903, Captain John H. Parker presented a lecture at the General Services and Staff 
School that was related exclusively to the need for ammunition conservation in combat.  This 
subject was considered to be so critical by the faculty that the school included the lecture in 
Captain J. C. Dickman’s textbook, Modern Improvements in Fire Arms and Their Tactical 
Effects.131   
 While ammunition conservation and the linked problem of combat resupply were 
important concerns for junior leaders, the army’s anxiety with these matters were far too 
influenced by its frontier experiences and reflected a lack of understanding of the realities of 
firepower-intensive modern battlefield.  This concern again highlighted some of the 
inconsistencies in army doctrine.  Although the doctrine placed great emphasis on gaining fire 
superiority by producing an overwhelming mass of rifle fire, it never articulated the point at 
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which that massive fire strayed into the realm of wasting ammunition.  Veteran officers and 
NCOs could gain this understanding by experience, but this would be a difficult concept to 
master with green leaders and soldiers.     
 To produce the control of action that the army expected, it placed much emphasis on 
close order drill.  Close order drill has long been a tried and true method for training new recruits 
in automatic response to orders and to act as part of a unit collective.  The turn-of-the century 
army, however, continued to stress close order drill of its units above and beyond the dictates of 
recruit training.  In his 1914 semi-official manual, Fundamentals of Military Service, 
Lincoln Andrews stated that the purpose of continual and constant close order drill was for   
 
 …training your minds and bodies into HABITS of precise unhesitating obedience  
 to the will of your leader…Then when the stress of battle comes, and men’s faculties  
 are paralyzed by the unwonted roar and loss of life and straining fear, they may still  
 be controlled because HABIT has made obedience automatic and the easiest line of 
 action. (original emphasis)132 
 
George Baltzell also justified the close order drill focus on the control over the individual soldier  
 
by noting,  
  …in the heat of battle, the average man fires on in an almost cataleptic state, 
  his mind incapable of ordinary obedience.  Obedience under such conditions  
  must, therefore, be instinctive and the result of long continued habit.  This  
  habit can only be learned by strict close order drill on the parade ground… 
  Any carelessness allowed on the parade ground will bear ugly fruit on the   
  battlefield where we require that under whatsoever stress of circumstances,  
  danger and death, when the soldier hears the word of command his muscles  
  if not his mind shall instinctively obey.133 
 
This belief that close control by leaders and the conditioned response of soldiers could somehow 
overcome, or at least mitigate, the fog and friction of combat was a touchstone of army training 
practices prior to the Great War.  Soon after the United States entered the war, Frank McCoy 
admitted that, “The Great War has been terribly hard on the textbooks.  About the only military 
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china that has not been smashed are the primary functions of discipline and its drill, drill, 
DRILL. (original emphasis).134  This approach to training as “drill, drill, DRILL,” (especially 
close order drill) carried grave consequences for the leaders and soldiers of the AEF.   
 The U. S. Army on the eve of the Great War was beset by uncertainty and internal 
contradictions.  For over thirty years its officers had striven to understand the dynamic changes 
in warfare that had been wrought by a host of new, and collectively, more lethal weapons.  In 
trying to understand the parameters of this “new warfare,” the officer corps was hobbled by its 
own biases and a tendency to see in military actions in Manchuria and the Western Front of 
1914-1916 those things that seemed to confirm its prejudices and validate its doctrine.  The 
officer corps’ realization that modern weapons forced units to thin and spread out to survive on 
the battlefield led many to believe that the “new warfare” required junior leaders able to exercise 
initiative and semi-independent command outside of the traditional direct supervision of their 
superiors.  Simultaneously, the failure of changes in battlefield communications to keep pace 
with weapons innovations exponentially increased the difficulty for leaders at all levels to 
effectively command and control their units.  However, these developments were in constant 
conflict with doctrinal trends and command traditions that sought to retain as much centralized 
control of small units as possible in the hands of superior officers.  The tension between the 
initiative of junior leaders and the control by their superiors was never resolved prior to the Great 
War, but the American tendency, reinforced by its doctrine and training methods, leaned more 
heavily upon the side of centralized control.  All of these factors ultimately meant that the U. S. 
Army entered World War I without a clear understanding of modern war, or a cogent vision of 
what the “new warfare” demanded of combat leaders in small units.      
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Chapter 5 
“Where are we to get them?”- The Quest for Reserves of Leaders 1905-1916 
 
 In his 1913 Annual Report, Chief of Staff of the Army Leonard Wood warned, 
  I . . .invite attention to the necessity for building up, with as little 
  delay as practicable, a reserve of officers qualified to serve as 
  company officers for reserves or volunteers.  If we were called 
  on to mobilize to meet a first-class power, we should require  
  immediately several thousand officers; where are we to get them? 
  This is a matter of vital importance, and one which should be  
  attended to at once and not left to the rush, hurry, and confusion 
proceeding a war.1 
 
Within four years of this statement, the United States was at war with a first-class power, and the 
nation had done little to mitigate the “rush, hurry, and confusion” of mobilization.  Woodrow 
Wilson’s decision to mobilize a mass draftee-based army for use in France presented the 
immediate problem of providing officers for the nascent force.  In theory Wood’s question of 
“where are we to get them?” should have been answered largely by the federalization of 
National Guard officers and the recruitment of military-trained students from the nation’s Land-
Grant colleges.  Unfortunately, neither of these sources delivered the quality or quantity of 
trained officers and officer candidates that the army needed.  Nor did any of the army’s 
mobilization plans address the need to build a trained and reliable wartime NCO corps.  As has 
been shown in the preceding chapters, the army had clear ideas of its expectations of officers and 
NCOs and a clear, albeit flawed, conception of modern war.  This chapter will examine the 
army’s pre-war plans for creating a reserve of officers and NCOs and the challenges of attaining 
wartime officers and NCOs from the National Guard, Land Grant colleges, and the Plattsburg 
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camps.  The chapter will also explore how the failure of the various mobilization plans 
contributed to the “rush, hurry, and confusion” in 1917 that Wood had so feared.   
 The idea that the army would need to expand its officer corps in wartime was not unique 
to the World War One era.  In the midst of the Civil War, Congressman Justin Morrill proposed 
a bill offering federal land grants to colleges and universities “where the leading object shall be... 
scientific and classical studies, and including military tactics, to teach. . .agriculture and the 
mechanical arts.”2  Morrill envisioned the Land-Grant colleges as a more democratic, cost 
effective, and reliable source of wartime officers than the “treason tainted” Military Academy.  
 The 1862 Morrill Land-Grant Act unfortunately left many questions and issues of 
military training in the colleges unanswered.  The legislation was open to interpretation as to 
whether or not the instruction was compulsory for the students and about which governmental 
organization would hold ultimate oversight for the program’s implementation.  While the War 
Department was responsible for providing instructors and equipment to support military training, 
the Interior Department was responsible for overseeing land grant funding and the overall 
administration of the program.  Faced with these ambiguities, and the realities of low post-Civil 
War budgets, the War Department did little to standardize or support military training in the 
Land-Grant colleges or the other educational institutions that taught military science between 
1865 and 1912.3 
 Army officers had long been aware of the shortcomings of the Morrill Act.  The noted 
nineteenth century reformer, Emory Upton, advocated recasting the Regular Army as a skeleton 
force that would serve as the strong “expansible” superstructure for a large reserve-based 
wartime army.  Upton viewed the Land Grant Colleges as the best potential source of reserve 
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officers to lead the units that would be filled upon mobilization.  He noted that these colleges 
could, “supply us with a class of officers such as we have never seen in our army during any past 
war,” but realized that the system of military training in these institutions was in need of reform 
before they could achieve his vision.  Upton recommended that the first steps for making the 
Land Grants a reliable source of officers were to impose “a uniform programme of theoretical 
and practical instruction” in all colleges.  Upton also argued that for his system to work, it was 
vital for the army to keep track of the graduates of the Land Grant military programs.  He 
recommended that a roster of these graduates could easily be maintained by using the existing 
Army Register.4  
 Although Upton accurately gauged some of the key shortcomings of the Land Grant 
military training system, it was not until the army’s dismal performance in the Spanish American 
War that army reformers gained enough momentum to try to overturn decades of bureaucratic 
inertia.  The war with Spain, and the nation’s subsequent need to protect and police its overseas 
possessions, led Secretary of War Elihu Root and military reformers like Leonard Wood to re-
examine the Land-Grant colleges as a source for officers. The Spanish American War and 
Philippine Insurrection had demonstrated how unprepared the nation was to expand the existing 
officer corps.  As previously noted, to gain enough officers to lead the Volunteer Regiments 
raised to fight in the Philippines, the army ultimately had to resort to the direct commissioning of 
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Regular NCOs and civilians. Of the 2,000 line officers in service in 1902, 414 were former 
enlisted men and 512 were commissioned directly from civilian life with no previous military 
education.5  To prevent a reoccurrence of this ad hoc method of obtaining officers, Root and 
Wood were determined to transform the Land Grant Colleges into a viable source for officers.  
 Between 1909 and 1914 the army took steps to standardize training in the colleges and to 
define its expectations of the military program.  In all educational institutions offering military 
instruction, the War Department gave professors of Military Science and Tactics the mission to 
“qualify students who enter the military departments of such institutions to be company officers 
of infantry volunteers, or militia.”6  To accomplish this mission, the War Department mandated 
that all able-bodied college students would have to take 84 one-hour blocks of instruction over 
the course of two years.  The instruction was to be mostly lecture-based and focused on the 
Infantry Drill, Field Service, and Small Arms Firing Regulations.7  
 Unfortunately, the War Department’s reform efforts had little effect on the actual 
military education of students in the Land-Grant colleges prior to World War I.  The ambiguities 
of the original Morrill Act continued to hamper the army’s efforts to define student eligibility 
and requirements for military instruction.  As Leonard Wood noted in 1913, “Under the present 
law there is no specified standard of military instruction required, and no penalty attached to 
                                                 
5 Graham Cosmas, An Army for Empire (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane, 1994), 93, 126-128, 143-146; and 
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6 Ira L. Reeves, Military Education in the United States (Burlington: Free Press, 1914), 68.  Reeves was a 
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insufficient or improper military instruction that endangers the receipt of the annual funds 
appropriated.”8   
 Many officers argued that the inefficiency of the military programs at civilian colleges 
stemmed from a “clash of cultures” between the army officers assigned to teach at the 
institutions and the civilian faculty.  One Professor of Military Science and Tactics noted that 
most academics placed little importance on military education and supported tactical instruction 
only to the degree required to “get by the law” of the Land Grant Act.  He also pointed out, 
  College professors as a general thing are men of peace.  Few of 
  them have had any military training, and with the exception of those  
  in the departments of history but few have made any special study 
  of the question of national defense.  They are inclined to look upon 
  the military as a needless expenditure of energy and resources, and 
  upon military men as consumers contributing nothing to the world.9 
These sentiments were echoed by a number of other officer-professors.  In 1911, Lieutenant 
Smith, an officer assigned to the University of Idaho, noted of the civilian faculty, “To many of 
them it (military training) is something to be endured and not fostered and while the chief 
administrative officer may not be openly antagonistic he may not display any great enthusiasm 
for things military.”10  That same year, the officer assigned to the Kentucky Military Institute 
admitted that he was discouraged after being assigned to the college because “The military was 
regarded as a necessary evil, by both teachers and cadets.”11  These tensions contributed to the 
failure of prewar efforts to achieve any degree of standardization in military education. 
                                                 
8 War Department Annual Report, 1913, 188. and Reeves, 79. 
9 Reeves, 102-3.   Reeves’ assessment of the attitudes of college professors may be far too harsh.  The 
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 10 Draft manuscript “Notes on College Duty,” dated 2 March 1911, RG 165 Correspondence of the War 
College Division, 1903-1919, Microfilm finding guide M1024, File 6410, Roll 78. 
 11 Ibid. 
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 Even when military instruction was conducted in educational institutions, it seldom 
seems to have focused on subjects that would prepare the students to become company-grade 
officers.  Far too much of the instruction was centered on basic recruit training that had little 
relevance to modern warfare or to the leadership requirements of being an officer.  The War 
Department’s Annual Report of 1913 noted, “At the last annual inspection it was generally found 
that sufficient progress had not been made in practical instruction; that too much time was spent 
in close order (drill) and ceremonies at the expense of good theoretical instruction and practical 
fieldwork.12  This problem even extended to military schools and colleges.  In 1914 Captain 
Richard Stackton, the Assistant Commandant of the Bordentown Military Institute, argued, 
  While some schools are excellent in the instruction given, in the majority  
  of cases the cadet has little or no real military information or interest.  The  
  average ex-military-school student is not…suited for a commission in the  
  National Guard or Volunteers. . .in most institutions, mere drill is given, and 
  the youth graduates with the impression that a faultless parade and the ability 
  to form a line of skirmishers and fire a few blanks…are the sole requirements  
  of a complete military education.13 
 
Thus, with a focus on close order drill and firing “a few blanks” the true value of the little  
 
military instruction performed in most of the nation’s colleges was negligible.  
 
 To correct some of these faults, in 1911 the Chief of Staff directed the War College to 
prepare a guide for army officers assigned to colleges and universities.  This guide, “Notes on 
College Duty,” was intended to both aid in standardizing military instruction as well as providing 
helpful hints for officer-professors for avoiding the pitfalls of working with college faculty and 
students.  In dealing with the civilian professors, the guide recommended that, “The officer 
                                                 
12 War Department Annual Report, 1913, 189.  Similar comments appeared in the Annual Report of the 
following year.  For a sketch of military education at the micro level see Richard S. Faulkner “Our Patriotic Duty at 
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13 Captain Richard Stockton, Jr., “Military Schools and the Nation,” Infantry Journal, Vol XI, no. 1 (July-
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should go to the institution with the idea of becoming one of the faculty in all that the term 
implies, that is, he should make up his mind to enter fully and heartily into their social affairs, 
accepting their hospitality and being scrupulous in returning it.”14  It also advocated that the 
officers should make themselves useful to the college by assisting the coaching of sports teams 
and by assisting in non-military college administration and instruction. 
 The guide also reminded officers that their attitudes and interactions with their students 
greatly influenced the latter’s perceptions and opinions of military service. It warned, “an officer 
who has been serving with troops almost invariably adopts a manner with the cadets such as he 
has been accustomed to use with enlisted men,” and that “this manner is invariably resented by 
the cadets.”15   “Notes on College Duty” also urged that officers realize, 
  The prime object of military instruction in college is to fit the young men  
  for duty as officers of volunteers in time of war.  This is done by drill and   
  discipline directed as to give the students an intelligent appreciation for the  
  various rules and duties that are placed upon them, and by inculcating a love  
  of country and a fondness for and interest in military service…therefore,  
  don’t give them a dislike of things military by exaggerating the severity of  
  discipline so that they will fail to respond to the call and utilize the lessons you  
  have imparted.16 
 
In many ways these instructions reveal the grave challenges that the army officers faced.  On one 
hand the instructor had to prepare the students to serve as wartime officers; a task requiring a 
great and arduous degree of physical and mental preparation, while on the other hand, the 
instructor could not attain this degree of realism without perhaps prejudicing the students against 
military service.  Unfortunately, the available evidence suggests that the tendency of instructors 
was to sacrifice the former for the later. 
                                                 
 14 Draft manuscript “Notes on College Duty,” dated 2 March 1911, RG 165 Correspondence of the War 
College Division, 1903-1919, Microfilm finding guide M1024, File 6410, Roll 78. 4. 
 15 Ibid., 67. 
 16 Ibid., 5. 
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 Despite the army’s good intentions, little changed in either the ability of officers to work 
with college students and faculty or to provided the students a meaningful degree of military 
training.  For example in the army’s 1912 annual inspections of college military programs, the 
inspector went as far as to recommend that the army withdraw all regular officers assigned to the 
North Georgia Agricultural College because, “The discipline of the military department … has 
become intolerable, due to lack of proper support of the officer on duty by the college 
president.”17  The inspections also revealed that, “The relation of the military department of the 
University of Idaho to the college authorities has not been satisfactory during the past year” and 
that “the situation at this particular college required the exercise of more tact than the officer 
[assigned] possesses.” The inspector believed that the source of the tensions was that, “The 
president of the institution has a strong personal dislike” for the officer at the college.18 
 Although the officers at civilian colleges tended to blame the civilian students and faculty 
for their problems, Wood and other officers realized that the army was also responsible for some 
of the failings of its military instruction of college students.  In an address to the Engineering 
Association of Land Grant Colleges, General Wood admitted that the War Department’s own 
“inertness” and that a lack of officers suitable to teach college students were ultimately to blame 
for much of the poor results in military education.  Wood’s assertions were shared by some of 
the officers who had served at colleges.  Captain Ira Reeves, for example, believed that the 
shortcomings of college training stemmed from unimaginative officers who attempted to train 
students as if they were recruits.19   
                                                 
 17 College Inspection Board, Memorandum dated 12 June 1912, RG 165 Correspondence of the War 
College Division, 1903-1919, Microfilm finding guide M1024, File 7066, Roll 117, 12. 
 18 Ibid. 
19 Reeves, 99-100, 102, 105., and Clifford, 12-13.   
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 A great part of the failure of military education in the Land Grant colleges was that the 
army had no set standard for the officers it selected to post at educational institutions.  While the 
instructors were generally officers of good standing (for example, John Pershing taught at the 
University of Nebraska from 1891 to 1895), they had no special qualifications or training to 
teach at the college level.  In most cases, the army saw instructor duty as a well-deserved break 
for its officers from the grind and isolation of frontier service.20  In 1914, Lieutenant Colonel 
Henry Hale went as far as to argue that a more rigorous selection process for the regular officers 
assigned to teach Military Science at civilian colleges would not only improve military 
instruction, but would also “reverse the antagonistic attitude concerning the military department 
sometimes encountered” between the officers and the college administration and faculty.21 
 Another obstacle to the army’s ability to raise a ready reserve of college trained officers 
had more to do with administrative problems than with lapses in instruction or a “clash of 
cultures” between military and civilian instructors.  Simply put, until 1915, the army made no 
effort to even maintain a list of those students who had graduated from college military 
programs.  In 1912 Secretary of War Henry Stimson lamented that the lack of a rational system 
for building a cadre of reserve officers was “one of the greatest defects in our military system.”  
He pointed out that the greatest cause of this defect was that the War Department had no system 
for tracking those students who had graduated from the military programs and thus, “the young 
men who graduate at such institutions pass out into civil life without any definite place for them 
in our military establishment.”22  He also noted that since there was also no system of annual 
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training to keep those graduates current on tactics and military matters, within five years the 
former cadets quickly forgot the little training that they had received at college.  
 A 1916 War College study confirmed Stimson’s fears. The War College noted that 
between 1905 and 1915, 287,952 students had received some degree of military training from 
Regular Army officers at American college and universities.  The army only considered 44,592 
of these students to have graduated from its college military programs.  However, the War 
College admitted that “only a small percentage” of the 44,592 “will be considered ‘trained 
officers,’ as the words are understood to-day, but all will have pursued a course, both practical 
and theoretical, insuring a working knowledge of rudiments.”23  The report went on to note that 
of the 15,323 gradates of the college military programs between 1912 and 1915 only 1100 were 
even recommended by their Regular Army instructors for regular or volunteer commissions.  The 
War College staff maintained that of those who graduated from military courses prior to 1912, 
“nearly all have, no doubt, lost touch with things military, and have consequently forgotten what 
little they learned before their graduation.”24    
 Whatever the reason, it is clear that the military education in Land-Grant colleges and 
other educational institutions did little to prepare their students for commissioning. Although 
many of these former students would eventually become officers in World War One, the army 
realized the uneven nature of their previous military education and required most of them to 
attend an Officer Training Camp prior to being commissioned.  
 In theory, the question of having a ready and reliable cadre of reserve officers and NCOs 
should have been moot.  Since its founding in 1879, the National Guard Association, and various 
state adjutant generals, had waged a long and bitter battle to establish the guard as the nation’s 
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24 Ibid., 5. 
  181
primary wartime reserve.25  While legislation between 1903 and 1910 granted the National 
Guard this long-sought status, the Guard continued to suffer from a host of problems that 
ultimately prevented it from being either a source of trained leaders or a reliable wartime 
reserve.26    
 As with the Regular Army, the Spanish American War and the Philippine Insurrection 
highlighted the glaring tactical, administrative, and logistical problems of the Guard.  Due to 
problems with training and shortages of manpower, only two National Guard regiments, the 71st 
New York and the 4th Massachusetts (and detachments from the 33rd and 34th Michigan), 
participated in the Cuban Campaign.  Although seventy-five percent of the American forces in 
the Philippines in 1898 and 1899 were guardsmen, their clamoring to return home after the peace 
treaty with Spain, and problems with their equipment and training, limited their utility as a 
steadfast adjunct to the Regulars.27 
 The post-Spanish American War effort to reform the Regulars also touched the National 
Guard.  As historian Jerry Cooper has noted, a number of National Guard officers had long 
advocated a strenuous reform of the Guard that sought to transform it from a state force for 
maintaining internal social order and the suppression of civil unrest (usually in the form of labor 
strikes) to one that would enable it to serve as the nation’s military reserve in time of war.28   In 
the wake of the war with Spain, these reformers made common cause with Secretary of War 
Elihu Root to modernize and rationalize the National Guard.   
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 The first step in the process of transforming the National Guard into a viable wartime 
reserve was the Act to Promote the Efficiency of the Militia, generally known as the Dick Act for 
its main political supporter, Ohio Congressman Charles W. Dick.  Dick, a general in the Ohio 
National Guard and chairman of the House Militia Affairs committee, worked with Root to craft 
the first major legislative effort to change the purpose and composition of state military forces 
since the Militia Act of 1792.  The Dick Act of 1903 aligned the National Guard’s organization 
and equipment with the Regular Army’s, provided federal funding and Regular Army personnel 
to assist in the training of state forces, allowed the War department to hold joint National Guard 
and Regular Army maneuvers, and stipulated the minimal training standards that the federal 
governments expected from the states.29  The act also sought to improve the professionalism of 
National Guard Officers by allowing them to attend Regular Army schools.  Additional 
legislation in 1908, 1912, and 1916 continued the trend toward transforming the Guard into a 
reliable national reserve which would be more responsive to the federal government.30  In 
January 1908, for instance, the War Department established the Division of Militia Affairs (later 
renamed the National Guard Bureau) to oversee the training, equipping, and inspection of state 
units. 
With the support of the National Guard Association, some guardsmen-reformers, such as 
New York’s John F. O’Ryan, began pressuring state governors and legislators to place their 
units, officers, and NCOs on a more sound professional footing.  One of the reforms that came 
from this pressure was the establishment of annual schools for officers and NCOs.  In the 
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summer of 1910, for example, 26 states held 27 officer training camps (Indiana held two camps). 
These camps trained a total of 2,566 guard officers and lasted for an average of 5.8 days.  
Twenty-two of the camps had training cadres drawn from the Regular Army. The largest of these 
camps trained 393 Pennsylvania officers, while the smallest consisted of only three South Dakota 
guardsmen.31    
As was the case with the Regular Army, some states saw value in these camps and made 
professional education a cornerstone of their professionalization reforms.  As one guardsman 
wrote, 
  The benefit a militia officer receives from attending these schools, is  
  just the benefit an amateur derives in watching a professional in his 
  own line of work at his trade.  A college baseball team may play a 
  great game of ball.  The Harvard or Yale team, for instance, may know 
  the history and theory of the game as well as the professional, but put 
  them together and the college team will profit by the experience.32 
 
This desire to educate their way to professionalism was typified by the experiences of New York 
and Connecticut. Building on their earlier successes with officer and NCO courses, in 1913 New 
York expanded its offering by holding separate schools of application for its infantry, artillery, 
cavalry, medical, engineer, and signal officers and NCOs.  These schools were of variable length 
with the infantry and artillery schools both running 20 days, the cavalry eight days, and the 
medical, signal, and engineer schools each running for six days.33   
The Connecticut National Guard followed a similar path to professionalization as New 
York and mandated set courses of instruction for the state’s officers and NCOs.  The state also 
held summer “Camps of Instruction” where these leaders could demonstrate their ability to 
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execute the drills that they had studied. The Connecticut Adjutant General also directed that 
regimental commanders establish unit schools for their captains, lieutenants, and NCOs. The 
state directed that the officer course for company grade infantry officers would be held over four 
years.  The first year of instruction would focus on the IDR, FSR, Small Arms Firing Manual, 
and the Manual of Guard Duty.  The second year continued the study of the FSR and IDR and 
introduced topics on administration and military topography.  The third year instruction was to 
expand the officer’s study of administration and military topography and introduce map 
problems, maneuvers, and military law.  The final year of the course completed the officer’s 
study of map problems, maneuvers, and military law and introduced military field engineering 
and military hygiene.  The officers were examined by a regimental board at the completion of 
each yearly sub-block of instruction.34   
Connecticut, New York, and Massachusetts also led the nation in providing for the 
education of their NCOs.  As with the Regulars, the education of NCOs in these states was given 
much less emphasis that than of the officers.  However, as their school systems matured, the 
guardsmen managed to narrow these educational gaps.  The case of the Connecticut National 
Guard is illustrative of how the more progressive state guards approached this issue.  In 1906, for 
example, the state Adjutant General provided less guidance on the curriculum and goals for these 
courses than it did for the officer schools.  In 1906 the Connecticut Adjutant General merely 
decreed that while regimental commanders appointed NCOs based on nominations from their 
company commanders, the captain could only nominate soldiers who had passed an examination 
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testing his knowledge of “the school of the soldier, the school of the company, and the extended 
order.”35  The state expanded this guidance in 1911 by mandating that company commanders 
hold noncommissioned officers schools concentrating on guard duty, the Small Arms Firing 
Manual, and the minor tactics as covered in the Field Service Regulations.  The following year, 
the state Adjutant General issued revised guidance for NCO and Officer schools in General 
Order 42 (20 September 1912).  This order gave more explicit directives on the textbook or 
paragraphs from army doctrinal manuals to be covered in each sub-block of the annual courses.  
The NCO school curriculum focused on basic rifle care and marksmanship, tactical signaling, 
map reading, minor tactics, tent pitching, and basic field engineering.  The goal of the course was 
“to make expert instructors of the non-commissioned officers in these subjects.”36 
 Despite the reform efforts, a wholesale change in the professionalism of National Guard 
officers and NCOs proved elusive in the years prior to World War I.  Much of the positive 
changes tended to be very localized, with the most progress being made in the Northeast and the 
least in the South and Midwest.  That reforms proved weaker in the South and Midwest reflected 
general historic trends of entrenched localism and a strict parsimony of state budgets in those 
regions.  In Military Education in the United States, the Regular Army reformer Ira L. Reeves 
praised Pennsylvania, New York, Massachusetts, Ohio, Oregon, and Vermont for actively 
working to improve the efficiency of their National Guard units.37 In testimony before the House 
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Committee on Military Affairs in January 1916, Chief of Staff Hugh Scott went so far as to warn 
the congressmen, “You must not form your ideas of the National Guard of the States like New 
York and Pennsylvania…Some of the State guards do not measure up to them.”38  Unfortunately, 
due to the lack of effective federal oversight of the professional education among the states, a 
shortage of qualified Regular Army instructors, and the limitations of the time that guard units 
could devote to officer and NCO training, the trend toward increased professionalization touched 
only a limited number of guard officers from 1905 through 1916.39   
As shown by the officer camps of instruction held in 1910, the time states allocated to 
“hands-on” leadership training was far too short in duration to impart the essential tactical and 
technical knowledge that the guardsmen needed to survive in a modern war.  Some senior 
National Guard officers readily admitted that the state schools were “not up to the standard of the 
[Regular] Army.”40  Even among those few officers and NCOs exposed to the trends of 
professionalism, much of the training they did receive (as was also the case with their Regular 
Army brethren) was not based on a realistic appreciation of modern warfare.  Since the National 
Guard drew their tactical concepts from Regular Army sources, any doctrinal defect in the 
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regular’s plans for joint maneuvers, courses, and manuals served to further hobble the 
guardsmen’s quest to be a battle ready force.       
 Despite their best intentions, the Dick Act and other pre-Great War legislation fell far 
short of truly transforming the National Guard into a ready reserve.  The blame for this 
shortcoming was shared equally between the regulars and the guardsmen.  The Regular Army 
had long disparaged state forces as “tin soldiers” corrupted by political considerations and 
machinations who were only fit for Forth of July parades.   
 To a very great extent, the turn-of-the-century Regular Army reformers were disciples of 
Emory Upton and, based on their comments in professional journals and reports, generally 
seemed to have agreed with his criticism of the militia system.41  In his influential work, The 
Military Policy of the United States, Upton attributed the source of the United States’ military 
weakness to its historical reliance upon undisciplined militia troops commanded by officers 
“utterly ignorant of the military art.”42 He also blasted what he saw as the intrusion of the states 
into national military matters and blamed guardsmen for hindering the establishment of a viable 
reserve system controlled by the federal government and administered by the Regular Army. To 
counter criticism of the militiamen and driven by a desire to dethrone the National Guard as the 
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nation’s military reserve and replace it with a system of “National Volunteers,” Upton chided 
that “they should not hold me responsible for the facts of history.”43  
 Based on this Uptonian legacy, it is difficult to discern from the reports and observation 
on the National Guard by the period’s regular officers whether the guardsmen were truly inept or 
merely the victims of Regular Army prejudices and arrogance.  What is clear, however, was that 
from 1903 through 1916, regular officers kept up a steady drumbeat of denunciation of the 
guard’s training, professionalism, and readiness.  The regulars acted upon their perceptions of the 
guard.  For instance, one regular officer noted in a 1909 edition of the Infantry Journal, “In a few 
[states] the national guard is a political machine and the commissioned officers petty political 
bosses.” He went on to decry the fact that “military education of the State forces has progressed 
little beyond the company drill-ground stage.”44  The writer patronizingly, if accurately 
predicted, “the vast majority of those who would now fight our battles are peaceful farmers, 
mechanics, and clerks, whose acquaintance with deadly weapons is confined largely to the farm 
mule and the office lead pencil.”45   
 Unfortunately, the author of the Infantry Journal article was far from being alone in his 
biting critique of the state forces.  There is enough uniformity in the comments of the annual 
reports of the various Regular Army officers assigned to National Guard units and the Chief of 
the Division of Militia Affairs to suggest that, despite their prejudices, there were some grounds 
for their harsh assessment of the guardsmen.  These evaluations highlight that the reforms of the 
National Guard intended by the Dick Act and its subsequent revisions fell far short of making the 
guard a reliable wartime reserve.  The Chief of the Militia Bureau, Major General Albert L. 
Mills, admitted as much during a hearing before the House Committee on Military Affairs in 
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January 1916.  In Mill’s estimation the guard had failed to meet the goals of the Dick Act “by a 
considerable measure.”46 
 It is interesting to note that prejudicial attitudes were not limited to the regulars.  Based 
on their long experience of being the butt of the regulars’ patronizing attitudes, some guardsmen 
developed outlooks that likewise colored their interaction with Regular Army inspectors and 
instructors.  Before embarking on their annual summer encampment in July 1914, the 
commander of the 1st Missouri Infantry Regiment, Colonel A. B. Donnelly, cautioned his 
officers, 
 We will have three regular army officers detailed to the regiment during this camp.  
 Remember my previous admonition about keeping your mouth shut.  Remember  
 that we have no troubles in the regiment, we have no troubles in the state, we have no 
 criticism whatever to make of the government, or of the division of militia affairs 
 regulations.  We are in harmony with everything that has been done or is being done.  
 The personal shortcomings of officers must not be discussed by other officers.  Do 
 not tell the troubles of your company to the regular officers.  This is strictly a family 
 matter…It will do no good to talk of them publicly and it will only acquaint our critics 
 with whatever shortcomings we may have.  In other words, keep your mouths shut, and 
 keep it shut tight, except where it is open to commendation.  Do not, under any 
 circumstances, allow an argument…arise between officers in the presence of 
 outsiders…Do not make light on another officer’s ignorance on any particular subject, 
 especially in the presence of outsiders.47  
 
It is difficult to discern whether Donnelly’s statement was indicative of the attitudes of other 
guardsmen.  Two years earlier, after participating in joint maneuvers with the regulars, New 
Jersey guardsman Captain Harry Kramer reported that, “the regular officers were splendid in 
their treatment of the National Guard,” and that “everyone seemed eager at all times to impart 
the information, and there was a genial spirit which speaks well for the growing friendliness of 
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the two branches of service.”48  However, if Donnelly did represent the outlook of even a 
handful of guard officers, such feelings could only have hindered the goals set out by the Dick 
Act.   
 While they often echoed the reservations of their compatriots, some regular officers 
realized that many of the National Guard’s faults stemmed from problems with state laws and 
regulations that were beyond the control of the guard officers themselves.  In 1906, for example, 
Major John Dapray noted that Florida limited the commissions of their National Guard officers 
to a four year term.  He believed that the term was arbitrary and led to the subordination of good 
officership to “mere political considerations which now not infrequently hamper or interfere with 
the enforcement of proper military discipline.”49   The same year, Major Charles Vernou, a 
Regular Army inspector of the Michigan National Guard, noted that the state gave its officers 
little power to discipline their soldiers and thus,  “If a man becomes dissatisfied or has been 
disciplined, he absents himself from his duties, [and] does not attend drill.” He lamented that, 
“The captain’s one means of punishment is to recommend the man’s dishonorable discharge, 
which many of the men do not consider in the light of a punishment.”50 
 Some regular officers went so far as to beg their peers to understand the burdens that their 
state comrades faced and to thus temper their denunciations and be more helpful in assisting the 
guardsmen.  In 1909 Major William Johnson, a Regular Army inspector assigned to the Missouri 
National Guard, noted that guard company commanders were “martyrs to duty” who received 
very little remuneration for their services and had to divert time from their civilian occupations 
to fulfill their guard duties.  He also pointed out that most guard officers were encumbered by a 
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host of concerns ranging from drill hall maintenance and rental to the procuring of recruits that 
were largely alien to their regular peers.  He also argued that the cost of attending commissioning 
examinations and the purchase of uniforms “deters many worthy noncommissioned officers from 
accepting office” and contributed to the commissioning of officers with deep pockets but very 
little military experience.51  This argument was also made the New York National Guard John F. 
O’Ryan.  He noted that while the National Guard was looking to commission officers from 
among the ranks of college graduates interested in military service, 
  …when they find that it generally involves the expenditure of $300 or $400 
  for uniforms, equipment, and side arms their enthusiasm wanes.  We often  
  find that by far the largest percentage of the young men in that class have 
  been maintained at college by much sacrifice on the part of their families, and 
  when they have graduated they are without funds for such expenditure, and 
  while they have the time and inclination to enter the service of the National 
  Guard they are not always available due to that fact.52 
 
Thus, while the regulars were quick to decry the guard’s leadership shortfalls, few understood 
the cost in time and money that their citizen soldier comrades endured for the dubious honor of 
serving in the guard.  
  Some regular officers also criticized their fellows for uncovering the guard’s flaws while 
doing little to correct them.  In 1911, the future AEF corps commander, Robert Bullard, chided 
his fellow regular officers for not doing more to aid the guard.  He noted that far too many 
regulars were “apt to look upon knowledge of their profession as the sole merit of the soldier and 
stubbornly refuse to take the means, by keeping themselves in touch with their countrymen, of 
                                                 
 51 War Department, Report of the Chief, Division of Militia Affairs (Washington D. C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1909), 243-4. 
 52 Congressional Committee on Military Affairs, To Increase the Efficiency of the Military Establishment of 
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giving themselves an opportunity and making their knowledge count for something to their 
country in time of war.”53   
Unfortunately, the available evidence seems to show that the attitudes expressed by 
Daprey, Vernou, Johnson, and Bullard, were not representative of the regulars’ outlook toward 
the guard.  The one item that met with near universal condemnation by regular officers was the 
continued practice by a number of states of allowing soldiers to elect their leaders.  Although 
some guard officer-reformers, such as John F. O’Ryan, had fought to place the state forces on a 
more professional footing, the practice of electing officers remained entrenched throughout the 
decade prior the nation’s entry into World War I.  In O’Ryan’s own state of New York, there was 
no set policy for selecting officers as late as 1913.  Although the governor, working through the 
State Adjutant General, appointed most officers, approximately a third of all the state’s guard 
units (to include the famous “Fighting 69th” New York Infantry) continued to allow the soldiers 
to elect their officers.54   
State policies for commissioning National Guard officers ran the gamut of possibilities.   
In Connecticut any male United States citizen and resident of the state over the age of 18 holding 
a certificate of qualification from the state Adjutant General and not under “sentence of disability 
to hold office” could be commissioned second lieutenant.  Although field officers were to be 
elected by the company and field-grade officers of their regiments, and company officers were to 
be elected by the officers and soldiers of the company, “Every person to be appointed to an 
office in which a knowledge of military tactics is required, must pass an examination before an 
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54 New York Adjutant General, Annual report of the Adjutant General of the State of New York for the 
Year 1913 (Albany: J. B. Lyon Company, 1914), 7-11. 
  193
examining board, prior to being appointed.”55  The Georgia and California National Guards 
followed the same requirements for election as did Connecticut, but mandated that the candidate 
had to pass an examination immediately following their election or face removal from 
command.56 
Kansas was much less strict on the professional qualifications it required for commissioning.       
Its militia laws merely required that “The field officers of each regiment shall be elected by the 
commissioned officers of the companies of each respective regiment; the company officers, by 
the members of each respective company.”57   
 Despite the trend toward increased professional education, many states chose to follow 
more of the Kansas “path of least resistance” example than the one followed by Connecticut and 
Massachusetts.  In 1916 General Albert L. Mills reported to Congress that of the 48 state or 
territorial guards (including the District of Columbia and Hawaii), 35 used election by the 
members of the company as their methods for commissioning second lieutenants, and 31 used 
the same method for commissioning their first lieutenants and captains. The remaining states 
used a variety of different methods, ranging from appointment by the governor to competitive 
examination to commission their company grade officers.58  Given the rapid changes occurring 
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during the period in technology, tactics, and doctrine, this lack of uniformity in commissioning 
or following the paths of least resistance would prove deadly indeed.   
 The Regular Army officers objected to the system of electing officers because they 
believed that it undermined training and discipline within guard units while also sublimating 
professional competency to mere politics and popularity.  As Captain A. J. Macnab noted of the 
Illinois National Guard in 1906, “The system of electing officers gives the enlisted men of the 
company an opportunity to express approval or disapproval of their officers’ actions and causes 
the almost constant working of petty politics within the companies.”  He argued that the “officers 
must keep the good will of the enlisted men in order to retain their positions, and good will and 
discipline in command of this kind do not always go together.”59  Macnab’s point had some 
merit.   In 1908 the Adjutant General of the Texas National Guard admitted that he was having 
trouble reenlisting soldiers because they were dissatisfied with the physical hardships that they 
had endured during the drills and maneuvers of the previous year.   To quiet the discontentment 
and lure soldiers back into the ranks, he ordered that the summer encampment for 1908 would be 
“tempered to what the troops could comfortably stand, instead of trying their powers of 
endurance,” and that officers were to make the camp “as instructive and pleasant as possible.”60  
Given the physical and mental demands that war makes upon leaders and soldiers, in the long 
run, the compromises made by the Texans were perhaps shortsighted.    
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 Six years after the passing of the Dick Act, the issue of the election of National Guard 
officers was still being denounced by the regulars as well as some guardsmen.  Walter Pratt 
scolded his fellow guard soldiers, 
  …how long would a department store be able to compete with its  
  competitors if the managers of its departments were chosen by the 
  popular vote of the employees?  And what kind of managers would  
  be elected?  Would the most efficient, best posted, and strictest man 
  be elected? No! it would be the easy-going, good fellow who would  
get the job every time.  In the National Guard to-day there are many 
officers who, sad to say, are much too lenient and familiar with their 
men simply because they are afraid of becoming unpopular and fear 
being turned down when elections come.  This matter is a serious 
handicap to the Organized Militia and should be given attention for 
the good of the service.61 
 
Pratt was far from being alone in this sentiment.  In 1909 Captain M. A. Eliot, a regular assigned 
to the Illinois National Guard decried, “The curse of the guard is politics, both company and 
municipal” and lamented that, “few officers have the moral courage to forget that they are 
holding office to which they have been elected and do their duty fearlessly.”  He noted that when 
politics influenced the commander (a situation that he encountered frequently), “I have generally 
found a poor company.”62   In a similar vein, after working with the Ohio National Guard, 
Captain J. B. Schoeffel declared, “I am of the opinion that a great mistake is made in the election 
of officers.” He maintained the fact that the officers were “indebted to the men of the company 
for their position detracts a great deal from efficiency and discipline.”  Schoeffel recommended 
that all guard officers be appointed by the governor on recommendation from the regimental 
commander and be forced to demonstrate their professional knowledge on examinations.63   
Even though the Regular Army observers may have been predisposed to take a jaundiced 
view of the National Guard, one should not be too quick to discount their opinions.  The 
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instructor-inspectors assigned to guard units and the other regulars who assisted in the 
administration of National Guard summer encampments had the close vantage point and enough 
professional expertise to judge the failings of the elective system.  For all the shortcomings of the 
selection and development of the Regular Army officers, they paled in comparison to an elective 
system that allowed the commissioning of guard officers with little or no military experience or 
knowledge.     
It was not until the National Defense Act of 1916 that the federal government finally 
stipulated that all National Guard officers appointed after the act had to have “successfully 
passed such tests as to his physical, moral, and professional fitness as the president shall 
proscribe.”  Upon passage of the legislation, the Chief of the Militia Bureau, Major General 
Albert L. Mills, believed that the new requirement sounded the death knell of the old elected 
officer system, or, at least “eliminates most of the more objectionable features of that system by 
providing a remedy against the election of unqualified officers.”64  Regrettably, this change came 
too late to deal effectively with the issue of professional competency in the National Guard’s 
officer corps before the U.S. entered World War I.  Faced with the need to fill the shortages in its 
officer ranks in the early months of the war, a number of National Guard units tacitly overlooked 
the strictures of the National Defense Act and pushed through the commissioning of candidates 
that seemed to at least have the education or background to be an officer (more of this will be 
covered in Chapter Six).     
 In addition to their condemnation of the elective system, Regular Army officers often 
offered a withering appraisal of the leadership and professional abilities of their National Guard 
peers.  After inspecting the Alabama units in 1909, Captain George Moore wrote, “I found, in 
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general, a deplorable lack of instruction in elementary matters, without the redeeming feature of 
active interest.”65  Another officer observing that state’s units found them so wanting that he 
recommended that “no troops be ordered to maneuver camps until they have perfected 
themselves at home in the simple company movements in close and extended order.”  He blamed 
the lapse on “A lack of enthusiasm [that] was noticed on the part of most of the field officers.”66  
The same year, Lieutenant L. L. Gregg noted of the Illinois National Guard that “In connection 
with the knowledge of the duties of the officers and noncommissioned officers, I find that, as a 
rule, they are not sufficiently well instructed.”67 Echoing these sentiments, Captain O. S. 
Eskridge observed of the Wyoming guard,  
 One of the greatest difficulties to be met with is the matter of procuring good  
 men for company officers.  It does not seem to be a matter of much difficulty to get 
 hold of good men for the rank and file…The trouble seems to be in getting officers  
 who can get these men together, and who will study, work, and fit themselves to 
 command these men.  With a few exceptions, the officers do not know nearly as much 
 about their business as we require our sergeants and corporals to know, consequently it 
 resolves itself into a case of the blind leading the blind.68  
 
While it is clear that ingrained attitudes and prejudices colored these regular officers’ attitudes 
toward the National Guard, there was enough “smoke” in their comments to indicate the  
existence of “fire” in their assertions about the level of readiness of guard leaders. 
 Lest one argue that perhaps 1909 was simply a “bad year” for the National Guard, it is 
revealing to note that as late as 1916 the report of the Chief of the Militia Bureau noted that 
many of the earlier negative observations on the training and readiness of the guard’s officers 
remained unchanged.  Despite a decade of joint active and National Guard summer maneuvers, 
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the attendance of guardsmen at Regular Army schools, and the use of regular officers and NCOs 
to train guard units, the ability of guard officers to fight a modern war and effectively lead 
soldiers in combat remained highly dubious.   
In his 1916 annual report, Mills maintained that the training of the National Guard, at all 
ranks and levels, was problematic.  In 1915, only 43 percent of guardsmen on the militia rolls 
had “attended at least 24 drills of one hour and a half each during the year,” and only 58 percent 
of soldiers equipped with rifles had conducted an annual range fire.69  He attributed much of the 
guard’s problems to the failure of their officer corps.  Mills argued that in training guard officers 
tended to avoid the more difficult and hands-on subjects that would be useful to improving their 
soldiers’ combat effectiveness in favor of those subjects such as close order drill “which an ill-
prepared officer may continue and repeat without exposing their ignorance.”70  Mills concluded 
that while, “there has been much commendable effort made to advance the theoretical instruction 
of Infantry,” a closer examination revealed, “in many cases such instruction suffers materially 
through the lack of trained officers and noncommissioned officers.”71 He also reported that “the 
instruction of National Guard officers has not progressed as satisfactorily as that of the enlisted 
men, and the number who qualified for certificates of proficiency has been disappointing.”72  As 
tensions were growing between the United States and Germany, there seem to have been good 
reasons for the Regular Army to be skeptical of the ability of the guard’s officers and NCOs to 
provide adequate combat leadership in wartime.     
Another indicator of this problem was the dearth of National Guard officers attending 
Regular Army schools.  Although the Dick Act had opened these schools to qualified National 
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Guard officers, between 1906 and 1916 very few guardsmen actually attended and graduated 
from them.  From 1906 until 1912, when most of the schools were disbanded, the most popular 
Regular Army course for guard officers was the garrison schools held at various posts across the 
nation.  In these six years, 223 guard officers attended these schools with 180 (81%) finishing the 
course.73  As previously noted in Chapter 2, the quality of instruction in these garrison schools 
varied wildly and it is questionable how much they truly contributed to the professional 
knowledge of the guardsmen.  Once one removes the garrison schools, National Guard officer 
attendance at other Regular Army schools during the period dropped precipitously. In the decade 
prior to the U.S. entry into World War I only four of the six guardsmen attending the Infantry 
and Cavalry School, or its successor the School of the Line, graduated the course.  During the 
same period, only one guardsman, Captain Wyatt Selkirk of the Texas guard, graduated from the 
Leavenworth Staff College, and only New York’s Major General John O’Ryan graduated from 
the Army War College.  
Although there is some evidence that this lack of National Guard participation in army 
schools was attributed to Regular Army obstructionism, much of this problem stemmed from the 
personal burden that the schools placed upon the individual guardsmen.74  Clearly, a number of 
regulars welcome the guard’s participation in professional education. In 1912, for instance, the 
Acting Commandant of the Army Service Schools, John F. Morrison, recommended to the Army 
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Chief of Staff that Leavenworth establish a special class for field officers of the National Guard.  
Morrison argued that such a course would further the drive to establish a uniform system of 
training for both regular and guard forces and would build teamwork and cooperation by 
allowing guard officers to better “understand the regulars and their methods.”75  Morrison’s 
recommendation made little headway, and prior to the Great War, only seven guard officers had 
attended the Special Class for Field Officers course.  A major part of the problem of guard 
officers attending army schools was the fact that attendance required the citizen soldiers to place 
their civilian occupations on hiatus for at least a year.76   
The lack of guard officers graduating from Regular Army schools also reflected the 
academic rigor that the courses entailed.  In 1914 the Service School Commandant, Lieutenant 
Colonel W. P. Burnham, reported that the two guard officers attending the course had been 
“handicapped on account of a lack of due preparation.”77  Consequently, the ability of the army 
school system to influence the professionalism of the National Guard officer corps was limited 
prior to the Great War.      
 The commencement of the Great War sparked an intensification of the search for an 
effective means of raising a wartime reserve of leaders.  Unfortunately, this issue also became 
inextricably linked to the contentious debate over the state of the nation’s preparedness to fight a 
major war.  Ultimately, while the partisan political debate publicized the glaring need for a 
system for building a cadre of leaders, it also so polarized the political process that the army was 
able to do little to truly ameliorate the problems.   
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 As shown in the last chapter, when the war in Europe began the public was generally in 
agreement with Wilson’s declaration of neutrality.  This consensus, however, did not last.  As 
early as 14 October 1914, Massachusetts Congressman Augustus P. Gardiner called for an 
investigation of the war readiness of the American military after asserting that the nation was 
“unprepared for war, defensively or offensively, against a real power.”78 After the Germans 
began unrestricted submarine warfare, and the subsequent sinking of the American merchant 
ship Gulflight and the passenger liner Lusitiania, criticism of Wilson’s policies began to grow 
among the nation’s anglophile-leaning upper and middle classes.   
 While the political wrangling over preparedness began to grow, American public opinion 
was also being shaped by a relentless barrage of anti-German propaganda emanating from 
Britain and France and being disseminated in the United States with the collusion of pro-Allied 
American elites.  At the outbreak of the war, the British cable ship Telconia scored a decisive 
victory for the Allies by cutting the telegraph cables that linked the United States to continental 
Europe.  From that point on, all the direct communications between America and Europe had to 
channel through British lines.  This gave the Allies the ability to quickly shape and package war 
news while Germany was forced to rely on time consuming neutral intermediaries to tell its side 
of the story.   
 While bungling German propaganda operations alienated the American public, the 
British and French waged a subtle and brilliant campaign to win the hearts and minds of the 
United States.  To hide direct British governmental involvement in the propaganda campaign, the 
British worked through sympathetic third parties in Canada and the United States to disseminate 
pro-Allied books, articles and films.  Sir Gilbert Parker, the chief of British propaganda activities 
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for the United States, gleaned Who’s Who for the names of influential and potentially pro-Allied 
Americans and then had his third party agents “win” them over to the Allied side through 
correspondence and the use of well prepared propaganda writings.  This careful and covert 
cultivation of American elites resulted in an ever widening web of pro-Allied sympathy as 
Parker’s proselytes used their local influence to bring the Allied message to the unconverted 
masses.79  These pro-Allied elites would serve as the foot soldiers of the preparedness 
movement.     
 The “preparedness movement” brought together a range of Americans whose fears and 
motivations for joining the movement reflected the range of white middle and upper class 
anxieties of the Progressive Era.  In her aptly titled book, Standing at Armageddon, Nell Painter 
characterized the first two decades of the 20th century as a period of severe and endless conflict 
between the nation’s class, ethnic, and racial groups.  Economic centralization, a massive influx 
of immigrants, and breakneck urbanization forced greater numbers of Americans to compete for 
social status and financial security in the midst of bewildering societal change. 80  Nowhere was 
the loss of security and order more feared in American society between 1900 and 1916 than in 
the middle-class.  Middle-class Americans feared both the social radicalism of labor and the new 
immigrants, and the growing economic power of the hyper-capitalists.  Robert Wiebe argued in 
The Search for Order that an optimistic and progressive “new middle class” arose in the 1890s 
whose main focus was to use their new found professionalism to provide direction and social 
order to a chaotic industrial America.81   
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 Although Wiebe was correct to note that the Progressives sought to restore order to 
American society, he overstated both their optimism and their faith that ultimately the “new 
middle class” would direct the nation.  As Richard Hofstadter had more accurately noted, the 
dramatic increase in the cost-of living at the turn of the 19th century, coupled with the demands 
by both capital and labor for greater shares of profits, made the middle-class believe that they 
were “losing ground” in American society.82  In the face of this “status revolution,” the 
“progressive” middle and “gentile” upper classes channeled their fears into widespread and 
comprehensive attempts to reform society in an effort to stave off what they saw as their 
impending doom.  As Painter argued, “Plain, stark fear lay at the core of much clamor for reform 
on the part of the middle and upper classes.”83  The preparedness movement was a child of the 
progressive impulse and its overall purpose was a continuation of the progressive goal of 
redirecting the assumed violent and revolutionary tendencies of the lower classes and immigrants 
while also rejuvenating American society. 
 The preparedness movement drew on supporters with a constellation of varying agendas 
united only by their belief that the nation needed some form of broad military service and 
military reform to meet both the nation’s national security and societal needs.  Some supporters, 
such as Theodore Roosevelt and Leonard Wood, believed that the United States had to 
strengthen its military might to retain its great power status and viewed Wilson’s neutrality 
policy as the height of physical and moral cowardice.84  In a December 1914 speech that would 
earn him the lasting enmity of Woodrow Wilson, Wood stated, “A government is the murderer 
of its people who sends them to the field uninformed and untaught…these words are absolutely 
true and these fake humanitarians who recommend that we should turn the youth of this nation 
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into the battlefield unprepared are the unconscious slayers of their people to an extent far greater 
than the ordinary demands of war would render necessary.”85  To Wood, the preparedness battle 
was a struggle to educate the public of the looming threats to American interests and to push 
forward the radical and unprecedented agenda of building a large peacetime army.      
 Wood and Roosevelt were also willing to make a common cause with elite educators 
such as Lehigh University president Henry S. Drinker and Princeton president John G. Hibben to 
advance the cause of preparedness.  These educators viewed military training less as a means of 
building national strength than as a tool for building character and moral strength in the 
individual.86  Military training would be the cure for the decadence, materialism, and unchecked 
individualism that beset the modern age.  University of California president Benjamin Wheeler 
went as far as to note, “the atmosphere of the drill ground is a fine corrective upon the usual 
laissez-faire of the college yard.”87  The academic leaders also saw universal military service as a 
means for ameliorating the nation’s ethnic and class tensions by throwing together the sons of 
the rich with those of the poor and to unite the native and the immigrant into a common crucible 
from which would be cast a new collective nationalism.  
 One of the most influential and active civilian supporters of the preparedness movement 
was Harvard graduate and blueblood lawyer, Grenville Clark.  Following the sinking of the 
Lusitiania, Clark became a vocal supporter of preparedness and an energetic organizer of 
summer camps to train civilians in the rudiments of military service.  His efforts ultimately led to 
the formalization of the famous “Plattsburg Movement” by the establishment of the Military 
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Training Camp Association (MTCA) in February 1916.  Clark’s beliefs on preparedness fused 
the military realism of Wood with the social reform agendas of Drinker and Hibben.88 
 Not all of the support for preparedness was based on such high-minded ideas of civil 
obligation or moral uplift.  Some Republican politicos viewed the preparedness issue as a club 
with which to rain blows upon the Wilson administration and its Democratic supporters.89  
Theodore Roosevelt helped to heal the rift between his Progressive Party and the Republicans by 
becoming the Grand Old Party’s most visible critic of Wilson’s neutrality policies.  In a            
23 September 1914 article in Outlook Magazine, the old Rough Rider attacked the timidity of the 
Democrats who he believed were willing to maintain peace for America at any price.  He chided 
that “peace is worthless unless it serves the cause of righteousness.”  In a backhand swipe at the 
Democrat’s foreign policy, Roosevelt thundered, “Above all, let us avoid the policy of peace 
with insult, the policy of unpreparedness to defend our rights, with the inability to restrain our 
representatives from doing wrong to or publicly speaking ill of others.  The worst policy for the 
United States is to combine the unbridled tongue with the unready hand.”90  The Roosevelt-led 
Republican assault meant that the preparedness movement, and efforts to build a cadre of 
combat-ready leaders, became a political football that never quite made it into the end zone of 
either camp. 
 Ironically, the national political schism over preparedness was even reflected within the 
Wilson administration.  This conflict pitted Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan and 
Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels against Wilson’s own Secretary of War Lindley 
Garrison.  Bryan, a long time foe of militarism and high defense spending argued that the 
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preparedness advocates were merely using the issue for political theater.  In December 1914 he 
confidently stated, “The president knows that if this country needed a million men, and needed 
them in a day, the call would go out at sunrise and the sun would go down on a million men in 
arms.”91  Garrison’s thinking was much more in line with that of Army Chief of Staff Huge Scott 
and Major General Albert L. Mills, and as such, held a more pessimistic view of the army’s 
readiness. 
 With tensions growing with Mexico and Germany, in March 1915 Garrison directed 
Scott to have the General Staff and the War College draft a plan for “a military system capable of 
developing fighting power sufficient to meet any given national emergency, at the proper time, 
supported by all the resources, technical and economic, of the country….”92  Garrison directed 
that the plan be based on the army being prepared to repulse an invasion of the United States.  
The only planning to be done for an expeditionary force would be to relieve or recapture 
American possessions overseas.  The secretary’s planning guidance was for the War College to 
craft a force which, “At the outbreak of war the Regular Army at home should be strong enough, 
with the addition of organized and trained citizen soldiers, to form the first line of defense in 
order to give sufficient time to permit the mobilization and concentration of our greater war 
army.”93 
 Scott presented the War College’s preliminary plan, termed the Statement of A Proper 
Military Policy for the United States, to Garrison in August 1915.  It proposed to build a million 
man “mobile” or “continental” army.  This army would be raised by increasing the size of the 
Regular Army and creating a European style reserve force that together would comprise 500,000 
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soldiers ready for immediate employment.  The reservists would serve two years with the 
Regulars before being released for reserve duty. The plan also called for the creation of a 
500,000 man volunteer force consisting of civilians who had received some degree of military 
training at annual camps.  The reserve force would be controlled by the federal government and 
completely separate from the National Guard.94   
 Given the state of the nation’s land forces, the Army staff realized that the military faced 
a number of challenges to meet Garrison’s intent.  The War College, for example, estimated that 
the reservists would require nine to twelve months of instruction to make them into effective 
soldiers.  The army planners recommended that this training be done by the reservists attending a 
series of three-month long summer camps, followed by an additional three months of training 
upon the outbreak of war.  This would ultimately, “enable them to meet a trained enemy.”  
Despite these challenges, the planners still believed that building this “proper” and “logical” land 
force for national defense was achievable.  When complete, the General Staff expected the 
Continental Army to field 15 infantry divisions, three cavalry divisions, nine regiments of heavy 
artillery and three regiment of mountain artillery.95  
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 The planners understood that the greatly expanded “Continental Army” would also 
require a major increase in officers and NCOs.  To some of the staff officers this was the greatest 
challenge the army faced in any effort to enlarge the force.  In the report, Study on Educational 
Institutions Giving Military Training as a Source for a Supply of Officers for a National Army, 
one officer maintained, 
   With the evident defects in our system [of rising officers], brought before us  
  through bitter experience, we should not fail to organize our resources of   
  dependable personnel and insure a continuous flow of an ample supply of trained  
  officers, from well-known and established reservoirs.  In no other way can we  
  provide enough officers for the Regular Army, the Regular Army Reserves, and  
  the Volunteers on mobilization, or later replace the wastage incident to war.96  
 
Identifying the problem was simple; the solution, however, was another matter.  It is clear from 
the various staff studies and reports that accompanied the Statement of A Proper Military Policy 
for the United States, that the War College staff had put much thought into solving this problem, 
but their recommendations were far from being uniform. 
 In his annual report to Congress in 1915, Garrison noted that many officers had discussed 
the possibility of creating cadet companies within existing regular units whose job it would be to 
train would-be officers.  This plan had been suggested by some officers in the War College 
studies as being the most effective and rapid means of training and acculturating a large influx of 
young leaders.  As one staff officer argued, 
  The officers should be appointed at least six months before the time set for the  
  training season of troops.  During this period the best method of training them  
  would be to attach them to organizations of Regular troops, when they could  
  receive both theoretical instruction in garrison schools and practical instruction in  
  administration, garrison, and fieldwork.97 
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Although there was some merit in this concept, other War College students noted that the plan 
would so consume the efforts of the Regular Army as to prevent it from accomplishing its 
operational requirements such as guarding the boarder with Mexico and policing the nation’s 
overseas possessions.98  
 These more conservative staff officers and War College students put forth their views in 
two War College monographs that were part of the overall Continental Army study.  One of 
these monographs, Study on Educational Institutions Giving Military Training as a Source for a 
Supply of Officers for a National Army, argued that the army’s Land Grant College-based system 
for educating potential officers was fundamentally sound, and only required some fine tuning to 
make its operations more efficient.  The author recommended that the army continue to support 
military training in colleges, but to now focus more on grooming “selective young men who have 
shown special aptitude along military lines during their college course and who are 
recommended by the professor of military science and tactics.”  These selected students would 
be afforded the opportunity for further military training after their graduation from college that 
would qualify them to receive reserve commissions.99  
 The other monograph, The Recruitment of Officers in Time of Peace in the Principle 
European Armies, examined how the European powers selected and trained their officer 
candidates and likewise concluded that the existing American system would be adequate with 
some minor legislative changes.  Its author argued, “The fact that our educational institutions 
provide us with a class superior in education and training to the average citizen who enlists to 
make up the rank and file of the Army makes it possible to solve this problem in a scientific 
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manner.”100  He recommended the establishment of a college-based Reserve Officers’ Training 
Corps (ROTC) that would enable the army to install a uniform system for training potential 
officers in the nation’s colleges while also giving the Regular Army cadres greater autonomy 
when dealing with the colleges’ faculty and administration.   
 When it came to the issue of raising officers for the proposed force, Garrison took the 
more conservative path.  He advocated merging the college-based military programs with the 
Plattsburg camp idea (more on Plattsburg below).  The Secretary argued that the military 
instruction in Land Grant colleges be more strictly administered through a ROTC-like reform 
and advocated that students in those programs also attend Plattsburg-like summer camps to 
broaden their practical knowledge of military tactics and skills.  He also maintained that given its 
existing facilities he could also immediately expand the Corps of Cadets at USMA from 624 to 
770.  He believed that the number of cadets at the academy could be ultimately expanded to 
1200.101 
 Both Garrison and the Army staff understood that their plan would spark a vicious 
political debate.  The most contentious points of the plan were its provision to build a large and 
expensive peacetime army and its proposal for the use of the National Guard.  Under Garrison’s 
plan, the National Guard would merely reinforce coastal fortifications and guard key points, 
installations and lines of communications in the nation’s interior.  In the Uptonian tradition, the 
army planners continued to argue that any reserve force that was not unquestionably answerable 
to the Federal government and under the direct operational control of the Regular Army was 
doomed to failure.  One War College report maintained, “The Organized Militia is better trained, 
officered, equipped, and disciplined than in 1898, but men are about the same now as always, 
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and if they are not inclined to serve in war they will find a way to avoid service.”102  The report 
bluntly stated that the nation’s history had long demonstrated the “worthlessness of the 
militia.”103  Rather than become mired in the constitutional debate over the viability of the dual 
state and federal control of the National Guard, Scott and the War College staff maintained that it 
was easier, and more militarily efficient, to severely curtail the National Guard’s wartime roles 
and simply build a federal reserve force.  This plan, of course, still required Congressional action 
to revoke the guarantees made to the National Guard in the Dick Act and its 1908 revisions that 
made the state forces the nation’s first line reserve.104 
 Garrison made a clumsy effort to soften the blows that his Continental Army plan rained 
upon the National Guard.  His sop to the guardsmen’s pride was to announce,  
  The plan offers to the membership of the National Guard every alternative 
   which a full recognition of their position suggests.  With respect to the  
  National Guard system under the Constitution there is to be not only 
  continued but increased Federal cooperation and assistance.  With respect 
  to the personnel of the Guard opportunity is offered, either in units or 
  individually, to come into the Continental Army whenever by the actions 
  of their State they are free to do so.105 
 
The Regulars also offered a hand, albeit a condescending one, to their National Guard peers.  
One officer noted, 
There will be a number of National Guard officers who will make good officers, 
but it is impossible to form an estimate of the total number which can be obtained. 
There is no doubt, however, that they will be glad to come into the reserve units 
and thus assure themselves of the opportunity for future service at the front.106 
 
The message to the guardsmen and their political supporters was clear; the War Department’s 
commitment to “true” preparedness would create a new vision of the citizen soldier that 
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decisively broke with the hoary and flawed traditions of the state-based militia.  Unfortunately, 
both Garrison and his Regular Army staffers misjudged the tenacity of the guardsmen in 
defending their prerogatives and the public’s actual commitment to preparedness. 
 If Garrison and his army supporters were expecting a political fight, they were not to be 
disappointed.  In January 1916 the House Committee on Military Affairs held a hearing on the 
Continental Army plan.  The chairman of the committee, Virginia Democrat James Hay, had 
long shown an antipathy for both increasing the size of the Regular Army and the preparedness 
movement.107  Throughout January, a steady parade of Regular Army and National Guard 
officers and pro and anti-preparedness advocates filed through the hearing room to give their 
opinions of the Continental Army plan.  Feeling themselves besieged by the Uptonian Regulars 
and fearful for the survival of the militia, the National Guard Association launched an all out 
assault on the plan.  
 As expected, the regulars dusted off their long held criticisms of the guard to demonstrate 
the need for the creation of a new reserve force.  Anson Mills testified, 
  The existing law classes the organized Militia as first line troops.  As a  
  matter of fact the force does not come up to the standard of first line 
  troops, nor with its limited training, averaging not more than 15 days a 
  year, should it be expected that it can acquire the efficiency which will  
  justify placing the force in such a category.  The best that can be expected 
  is that the Organized Militia, as presently constituted and trained, will, at 
  the outbreak of war, represent a potential rather than an actual fighting  
  force, the development of which will require time and effort.108  
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Mills citied several reasons for the failure of the guard to be “an efficient force for Federal 
purposes,” and in doing so, let vent the regulars’ accumulated ire of the existing system for 
wartime reserves.  He noted that the National Guard was too under-strength to be a true reserve, 
that its organization was too heavy in the combat arms at the expense of logistical and support 
units, that it was inefficient in terms of administration and training, that it was far to willing to 
issue its soldiers an “excessive number of discharges for reasons other than expiration of term of 
service,” and that it was unable to attract “the best material that is available and suitable for such 
[military] service.”  The General also assailed the failure of the states to adopt a uniform military 
code, especially when it came to the selection and training of officers.  He concluded, “The 
Nation should be given every assurance that losses on campaign due to incompetent leadership 
will be reduced to a minimum.”109  
 Mills was not alone in highlighting the need for a competent reserve of officers.  This 
issue was raised by nearly every officer or official appearing before the board or by the board 
members themselves.  When asked by the committee on the first day of testimony how he would 
raise officers for his plan, Garrison replied that he would call those citizens already listed as 
reserve officers, recall Regular Army officers who had resigned, and commission qualified 
National Guard officers.  He went on to note, “eventually my notion is that the source of supply 
would have to come from military schools and colleges that would have been educating men 
under our supervision, under courses that we would lay down, and with institutions we would 
have officers present to participate in the training of those men.”110    
 In later testimony, Hugh Scott, Leonard Wood, and other Regular Army officers basically 
fell in line with Garrison’s proposal to reform the existing Land-Grant system for training 
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potential officers, but differed in the details.  Wood, for example, maintained that even after 
graduating from an improved college military program, the reserve officer would still require at 
least a year’s service in the Regular Army to make him fully qualified to command troops in 
wartime.111 
 When questioned by the committee on their estimations of how many officers would be 
required to meet “any serious war,” the regular officers did show a discrepancy in their 
estimations.  Scott, for instance, argued that the nation would require “30,000 to 40,000 officers” 
to meet any great military emergency.112  Wood, however, argued that “Fifty thousand officers 
are barely enough for an army of a million and a half men.”113  He drove home his point by 
lecturing the congressmen, “You will have no time to make an officer after the war starts.”114  It 
is unclear where these experienced officers obtained their estimates.  The army staff had only 
approached this question in a general manner.  In 1915, one of the American Military Attachés in 
France reported to the General Staff, “An officer of the [French] General Staff on duty in the 
Ministry of War told me that the French losses in officers to June 1st [1915] were cavalry 280, 
artillery 1160, infantry over 10,000.”115  A report complied by the War College to support the 
Continental Army plan also noted the high casualty rates suffered by the British from August 
1914 to October 1915.  In all operations the British had suffered 6,660 officers killed, 2,000 
missing and 12,633 wounded.  Of these officer losses, 4,401 of the killed, 1,567 of the missing, 
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and 9,169 of the wounded had occurred on the Western Front.116  Given these facts, both 
general’s estimations were far off the mark. 
 As with the case of their estimates for the number of officers that a wartime army would 
require, other aspects of the testimony demonstrated the inconsistencies and conflictions within 
the War Department’s case.  Although Garrison’s plans rested upon building a reserve of 
volunteer officers and soldiers, the issue of Universal Military Training (UMT) continued to 
confuse the issue.  Historian Jack Lane has noted that Leonard Wood’s unwavering and 
uncompromising prepotency of UMT played into the hands of those politicians looking to derail 
the Continental Army.117  The army could not even agree on the length of time it took to 
adequately train a raw recruit.   
 While Garrison and the regulars impaled themselves upon the horns of the Committee on 
Military Affairs, the National Guard attendees displayed a united front and a much greater 
degree of political savvy.  Major General Clifford Foster, the Florida State Adjutant General and 
the Chairman of the National Guard Association’s Executive Committee, cast the guard as both 
the Regular Army’s and the preparedness movement’s greatest supporters.  As he stated, “The 
National Guard does now and always has advocated better preparedness for national defense” 
and assured the committee members that the guard was ready and willing to correct any 
deficiencies that impaired its readiness to serve as the nation’s wartime reserve.118  In a similar 
vein, the New Jersey Adjutant General, Wilbur Sadler, whose comments drew the applause of 
the audience, noted that he had given his life to improving the National Guard and challenged the 
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Congress, “You give us the money and you take control of us and then you watch us 
[improve].119   
 The strongest testimony against the War Department’s plan came from John F. O’Ryan.  
He admitted that the state forces had problems, but challenged the Congress to “fix the 
standards” to be achieved by the guard.  He then evoked the spirit of George Washington to 
make his point,  
 Washington was some soldier, and he knew what had been and what could be.  So when 
 it came to discuss the subject of national defense he advocated what we are advocating 
 here now…We know from our experience that we will never develop a proper National 
 Army enthused with this spirit unless we put into it the spirit of the Regular Army, and  
 make their interests and our interests as identical as it is possible…120  
 
Who could argue with George Washington, or the guardsmen’s constant praise of the Regular 
Army?  In a few hours of testimony, the National Guard’s leaders undid months of work by the 
War College and the General Staff, and, unfortunately, left the regulars with no real plan for 
raising a cadre of wartime leaders or overcoming the other challenges of mass mobilization. 
 It is interesting to note that in all of the regular’s studies and testimonies, the issue of 
raising NCOs for an enlarged army seldom arose.  After going into excruciating details over the 
looming officer shortage, one of the few Continental Army studies that mentioned NCOs at all 
merely stated, “The indicated shortage in trained officers will exist in approximately the same 
degree in trained noncommissioned officers.”121   When pressed by a committee member about 
the army’s plan to expand the NCO corps, Leonard Wood laconically replied, “That is a problem 
we have not yet tackled.  We must approach it sometime, but I think first we should get a reserve 
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corps of officers…”122   Unfortunately, “sometime” never came prior to the nation’s entry into 
the war.  Congressman Greene more presciently noted, “The public generally has been led to be 
indifferent to the status of the noncommissioned officer, having only in mind the commissioned 
officer, and forgetting that without the organization which the noncommissioned officer 
maintains under himself the personnel would go to pieces.”123  
 In the end the Continental Army plan was a disaster, and one which the War Department 
could have avoided.  Facing a tough reelection bid in 1916, and unwilling to expend political 
capital to counter the growing opposition of the plan in Congress and from the National Guard 
Association, Wilson quashed any further discussion of a reserve-based “Continental Army.”  
This, and other disagreements with Wilson over “preparedness,” led Garrison to resign on          
10 February 1916.  Garrison and his Regular Army supporters were blind to the fact that 
Congress and the nation did not see the threat of a foreign invasion that the Continental Army 
was designed to counter as being that great and thus worth the money and changes to defense 
policy that the plan would entail.  As one historian noted, “There was about as much chance for 
the United States to create a 500,000-man field force in 1916 as there was for Congress to make 
Mohammedanism the state religion.”124   The real significance of the plan for this study was that 
it diverted the General Staff and War College’s time, resources, and brainpower from finding 
solutions to the concrete issue of how the nation could actually create a corps of junior leaders 
for a growing wartime army.   
 It is clear from the questions asked by the members of the Committee on Military Affairs 
that they were amenable to some reform of the military system and were attentive to the regulars 
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who raised problems with the Land Grant College system of military training.  Had the regulars 
spent less time tilting at the windmills of UMT, they may have gotten a ROTC-type reform of 
the old system a year prior to its establishment by the National Defense Act of 1916.  In fact, the 
only good that came of the debate over the Continental Army plan was that the General Staff was 
able to present the committee a draft recommendation for the establishment of a Reserve 
Officers’ Training Corps.125  The draft legislation was designed to correct the many faults that 
existed in the military training conducted in the nation’s colleges by instituting a two-year 
compulsory military education course for Land-Grant colleges, standardizing training for all 
institutions, and establishing a baseline competency for commissioning.  Although these reforms 
were made law in the National Defense Act of 1916, they came far too late to have any real 
effect on the training of officers for the war.   
 With the failure of the Continental Army concept, in the winter of 1916, the War 
Department’s efforts to craft a coherent mobilization plan were in tatters.  For all of its vehement 
and self-defeating criticism of the National Guard, it remained the only force that even 
approximated a military reserve.  Unfortunately, events on the Mexican border quickly and 
dramatically highlighted the fact that the Regulars may have been correct in their assessment that 
the guard was a fragile reed with major problems with the professional competency of its 
leadership.   
 The already strained relations between the United States and Mexico took a decisive turn 
on 9 March 1916 when Poncho Villa raided Columbus, New Mexico.  In response to the raid the 
Wilson Administration ordered a large-scale redeployment of the Regular Army to the borders as 
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well as the formation of a 12,000 man punitive expedition under the command of John J. 
Pershing.  Even though sixty percent of its forces were dedicated to the border guard and 
punitive expedition mission, the army’s requirements quickly overtaxed the stretched regulars.  
On 10 May 1916, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Hugh Scott, ordered the Staff College and the other 
Leavenworth schools be closed so that the college’s students and faculty could be returned to their 
regiments in order to support the Mexican operations.  Although the Army Service Schools’ 
Commandant, Brigadier General H.R. Greene, hoped that the schools would be reopened in late 1916 or 
early 1917, America’s entry into the First World War ultimately kept the college shuttered until              
01 September 1919.126 
 With the regulars overextended, on 16 June 1916 Wilson mobilized the entire National 
Guard to assist in securing the southern border.  This deployment quickly highlighted glaring 
deficiencies in the guard’s organization, manning, training, and leadership.  The greatest 
challenge the guard faced was mere numbers.  At the time of the call, many Guard units were at 
only 42% of their authorized wartime strengths.127  The Militia Bureau stated that it had 
approximately 95,000 soldiers on its rolls in May 1916, but over 47,657 of these dropped from 
their list between the call for mobilization and the transfer of the units to federal service.  This 
shortfall was mostly due to guardsmen failing to report for muster or found physically 
disqualified at the mobilization stations.128 
 One of the greatest contributing factors behind the shortage of troops was the tendency of 
the state National Guard leadership to be very lenient in granting discharges to officers and 
soldiers claiming business or personal hardship due to the deployment.  This drain did not stop 
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when the guardsmen came under federal control.  The Army Adjutant General reported that 
between May and November 1916 the army accepted the resignation of 482 National Guard 
officers.129  Not only was the guard not living up to being the Regulars’ reserve of wartime 
officers, the guard could not even fill its own leadership requirements.    
Other factors further eroded the guard’s numbers in the summer of 1916. The Dick Act 
required guardsmen to pass a physical examination prior to mustering into active service, but in 
some cases the states had not adopted the standard physical used by the Regular Army.  Overall, 
state physicals were not as rigorous as those of the Regulars, and the mobilization of the National 
Guard led to a number of discharges for physical disabilities.  Of the 35,834 guardsmen the army 
examined, 5,526 (15%) were rejected for active service due to physical reasons.  The greatest 
reasons for rejection were poor physique (31.4%), defective vision or eye disease (13.4%), heart 
or lung problems (13.1%), flat or deformed feet (7.4%), and hernia (7.1%).130  Since guard 
officers at the battalion level and below tended to be older than the regular counterparts and thus 
more prone to physical disabilities, their rate of discharge further eroded effective leadership at 
those echelons.   
In a 26 October 1916 report to the War Department, the Commander of the Western 
Department, BG William Silbert, noted, “Some confusion existed due to the fact that several 
officers in some organizations had been found physically disqualified for service and their places 
had to be filled by others with little or no military experience or knowledge of the duties required 
of them.”131  Lieutenant McIlroy, a regular assigned to training guard units caustically noted, 
“To a regular officer interested in seeing an efficient national force, the situation here has ceased 
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to be amusing- to think that the Federal Government must pay such enormous sums of money for 
so much inefficiency!”132  Although some regulars may have enjoyed a brief moment of 
Schadenfreude at the plight of their guard comrades, the “I told you so” moment quickly waned 
as both parties recognized the hard path that lay ahead.  
One of the tasks consuming the time and effort of the guard’s junior leaders was 
recruiting.  Company and battalion commanders were forced to neglect the mobilization training 
and preparation of their commands to try to get their anemic ranks up to their regulation 
strengths.  In far too many cases, this diversion of leaders garnered only lackluster results.  The 
New York National Guard, for example, attempted to bring two infantry regiments from Buffalo 
up to wartime strength, but the results were disappointing.  The recruiting efforts from  
7 February to 31 March only raised the ranks of the 74th Regiment from 649 to 678, and the 65th 
Infantry from 469 to 720; both were far short of the required wartime strength of over 1000 
soldiers.133  In a similar fashion, Massachusetts sent out over 20 four-man recruiting parties from 
28 July to 26 August 1916, yet only garnered 130 recruits.  At the same time, over 700 serving 
Bay State guardsman refused to take the required Federal oath or declined to show up for their 
unit’s muster.134  By November 1916, only 21 states were able to man their units to at least 60% 
of their required war strength.  Washington did the best, fulfilling 98.9% of its required quota, 
while Arkansas was only able to fill 31.2 % of its quota.135  
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 The last minute flight of experienced soldiers and officers and the frantic efforts to fill 
the depleted ranks of guard units all-to-often left the organizations woefully short of trained and 
experienced leaders and men.  Of the 128,517 enlisted men ultimately recruited or mobilized in 
1916, over 20,964 (16%) had less than three months of military service, 21,610 (17%) had more 
than three months but less than a year of service, and 34,976 (27%) had more than one year but 
less than three years of service.136  This presented captains, lieutenants, and NCOs with nearly 
insurmountable challenges.  In one of the guard infantry regiments that he inspected, Major H. 
A. Smith discovered that 37.3 percent of the unit’s soldiers were green recruits, and that over 50 
percent of the unit’s members had never attended a training camp or had even participated in 
field training.137  In a 21 September 1916 inspection of a different infantry regiment, Lieutenant 
Colonel I. G. Winn noted that out of 888 soldiers, 443 enlisted men were green recruits, and 
another 217 had been in the unit for less than three months (over 74% of total).  He also noted 
that 382 soldiers had never fired their rifles and that “the training has been almost entirely 
elementary, and that is far from complete.  Even in close-order drill the companies do not 
average fair.”138  Major General William Carter estimated that at least 60,000 of the mobilized 
guardsmen had no real military training at all, and 56,813 of the men had never fired a rifle.139  
 The regulars tended to blame the National Guard’s leadership for most of its failings and 
floundering on the border.  Much of this criticism was justified.  Once mobilized, the lack of 
experience and their own limited training hindered the efforts of junior officers and NCOs to 
raise the overall efficiency and readiness of their commands.  At the end of the guard’s 
deployment, the Chief of the Militia Bureau admitted that during the mobilization, “some 
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advance was made” in the guard’s readiness, but, “the lack of proper individual training and the 
limitations of the National Guard officers were serious obstacles to progress.”140  The Regular 
Army attempted to alleviate some of the National Guard’s shortcoming by assigning regular 
officers to train guard regiments.  One such officer, First Lieutenant W. G. Murchison reported 
of his guardsmen, “their lack of training is somewhat deplorable.”  He went on to note, 
  With the possible exception of the two officers commissioned from sergeants of 
  the regular service, there is not one of them fitted for the position he holds.  Some 
  of them will make good officers, but it will be a long hard pull for them, because 
  the senior officers are just as inefficient, or more so, than the juniors…Officers in 
  whom I had confidence proved themselves incapable when put to the test.  Not 
  that some of them lack native ability, but because of the fact that most of their 
  time has been taken up with making a living in civil life, and, as one officer 
  expressed it, the military part has been a sort of diversion.141 
 
Despite his efforts, Murchison seems to have made little headway with his new charges.  In  
August 1916, he reported, “I still find a great many companies with their small arms completely  
covered with rust, inside out.”142  
 Other regulars echoed Murchison’s critique of the abilities of the National Guard’s junior 
leaders.  After inspecting a guard infantry unit Major H. A. Smith stated that since “The officers 
are trained only in a small degree” and “Their ideas of discipline are crude and unformed,” the 
“regiment is loosely held together.”143  Of another regiment, Smith reported that its leaders 
lacked “serious military training,” and because of this, “the limit of officers and 
noncommissioned officers in disciplinary control, leadership, and as instructors must soon be 
reached.”144  In July 1916, another regular officer reported that in the guard unit he inspected, 
“The spirit of the officers and men is particularly good, and they all seem anxious to learn”; 
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however, he went on to warn that “The state of discipline among the officers leaves much to be 
desired.  It is believed to be better among the enlisted men, but it must exist among the officers if 
progress of any kind is to be made.”145  
 Both the regulars and the guardsmen took steps to correct the deficiencies in the National 
Guard’s junior leaders.  Regular officers held separate classes and courses for guard officers and 
NCOs.  Most guard commanders were willing to support these efforts.  For example, at their 
camp in Laredo, Texas, the commander of the First Missouri Brigade mandated that one hour be 
dedicated to the training of his junior officers and NCOs daily.146  Brigadier General James 
Parker, the commander of the regular’s First Cavalry Brigade, noted that he and his superiors 
issued “sixty-six instruction bulletins, seventeen general orders, thirty-six memoranda, and six 
letters of instruction…dealing with the instruction of the National Guard.”147  With the 
conclusion of the ten days of maneuvers that he held for the guardsmen in November 1916, 
Parker concluded that they were “fit to take the field in active campaign.”148  Few of Parker’s 
Regular Army comrades agreed with his assessment.  Although it was quite easy for  
headquarters to issue a flurry of directives and orders, it was another thing indeed for them to be 
carried out. 
 Unfortunately, the lack of regular officers and NCOs to assist in the training of the 
National Guard prevented all guard units from receiving the quality and quantity of training that 
they required to make a marked improvement in their readiness and efficiency.  After inspecting 
thirty-one National Guard units, Lieutenant Colonels Hemlick and P. A. Wolf argued that “...it 
seems hopeless to expect that any satisfactory degree of efficiency can be reached by National 
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Guard troops in a reasonable amount of time unless the commissioned personnel contains a 
sufficient number of officers of the Regular Army to act as instructors for the mass of untrained 
men comprising the regiment.”149  One regular officer was more sympathetic to the challenges 
that the guard leadership faced and noted,  
  The privates being largely ignorant of their duty a disproportionate amount of  
  work is required of the noncommissioned officers.  The same ignorance on the  
  part of the noncommissioned officers cause a disproportionate amount of work to  
  fall on the shoulders of the company officers.  The ignorance of the company  
  officers operates in the same manner with respect to their superiors, and so on up,  
  causing a great amount of effort to produce meager results, with inevitable  
  consequent disgust among all grades.  Too often their superiors are unable to  
  teach them, and this ignorance is readily found out, causing loss of respect and  
  discontent.150   
 
Although the officer correctly gauged the depth of the guard’s leadership challenges, the fact  
remained that the border mission highlighted the unreadiness of its NCOs and officers to face 
even the most basic logistical, administrative and tactical challenges of modern war. 
 Far too much of the guard’s training on the border focused on close order drill, route 
marches and the basics of guard duty.  Although this training certainly toughened the soldiers 
and gave them the basics of how to live in the field, it was still a far cry from the type of 
instruction needed to realistically prepare them for modern warfare.  The guard was too short on 
machine guns, heavy artillery, and the other implements of modern war, and the regulars were 
too short on instructors to fill in the yawing gaps in the guardsmen’s knowledge.   
 For far too many guardsmen, boredom, rather than meaningful training for war, made up 
their daily routine. In September 1916, one Maryland guardsman complained that “we have been 
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taught everything there is to teach us and are now going over it again, I cannot understand how it 
is that they are keeping us here for so long and [there are] no [military] activities at all.”151  Two 
months later he reported that his time was taken up with monotonous route marches, guarding 
two bridges, playing poker, and fishing.  Although he was doing a lot of shooting, it was with a 
.22 caliber rifle hunting game, rather with a M1903 Springfield.152  Another soldier, Maine 
guardsman Russell Adams, recalled, 
  We would check cars crossing over from Mexico around Brownsville, looking 
  for arms going in or out.  The papers down in Maine were playing it up big, 
  like we were in a war, but really it was a picnic.  My station was at a place called  
  Powder Ranch.  We had about twenty men here, just enough for two baseball  
  nines, so we played a hell of a lot of ball.  Our lieutenant was a man name of  
  Coolidge, but hell, there t’weren’t (sic) anyone but us around for miles…so you  
  could  say he was just one of the boys down there. It was great fun for awhile;  
  then we started to get bored.153 
 
Clearly, for Adams and his companions the baseball fields of Powder Ranch, Texas, were a far 
cry from the Duke of Wellington’s “playing fields of Eton” when it came to realistically 
preparing them, and more importantly, Lieutenant Coolidge, for the trauma of war. 
 Some historians have argued that the National Guard’s deployment to the Mexican border 
in 1916 was a vital stepping stone for preparing it for the challenges that it would face in World 
War I.  John Mahon, for instance noted that the experience was invaluable for not only preparing 
individual guard soldiers and officers for war, but also for giving senior guard officers the vital 
experience they needed in conducting a mass mobilization.154  Edward Coffman has asserted that 
“the three months or more service which these citizens had on border duty provided them with 
                                                 
 151 Letter from Corporal Charles D. Adams to “My Dear Mr. Lyle,” dated 27 September 1916 in Charles D. 
Adams, 5th Infantry, MD National Guard, Mexican Border file, USAMHI WWI Veteran Survey. 
 152 Letter from Corporal Charles D. Adams to “My Dear Mr. Lyle,” dated 13 November 1916 in Charles D. 
Adams, 5th Infantry, MD National Guard, Mexican Border file, USAMHI WWI Veteran Survey. 
 153 Henry Berry, Make the Kaiser Dance (New York: Doubleday, 1978), 189, 339-341. 
 154 Mahon, 152-3. 
  227
much more training and experience than they ever would have received in their annual two week 
encampments” and that the deployment had created a core of 110,000 “comparative veterans.”155  
There is much truth to these arguments, and the National Guard certainly gained a degree of 
training and experience from the mobilization that they would not have gotten without it.  
However, the quality and quantity of that training and experience is what remains in question.  
At the conclusion of the National Guard’s mobilization, Brigadier General William Silbert, the 
commander of the Western Department, remarked,  
  In general the instruction on the boarder can not be said to have been   
  satisfactory… The greatest fault was the lack of systematic instruction, which,  
  covering 8 or 10 hours a day, should commence first with the individual and  
  progress, by successive steps to the squad, platoon, company, battalion, regiment,  
  brigade, and division.  In many cases this was undertaken, yet the progress was  
  made too fast- was not based on proficiency.  Precision, uniformity, and   
  thoroughness were lacking in the successive stages, and the final result could not  
  be other than unsatisfactory.  In general at the end of five months’ service, with  
  few exceptions, the organizations as a whole were reported as still not ready and  
  fit for active field service against a well-trained enemy.156  
 
 As Silbert realized, it was going to take a lot of effort, time, and money to turn the 
National Guard into a viable wartime force, and its NCOs and junior officers into capable 
combat leaders.  Even with these efforts, the guard would not be totally successful.  The lack of 
leadership and professional competency in some guard officers led one enlisted man to later 
remark, “We had some beauts (sic) from the N.G. that should have been with the boy scouts.”157  
Ultimately, the War Department called 12,115 Guard officers to active duty in 1917.  Between    
5 August 1917 and 10 May 1918, the army had discharged 511 of these officers for physical 
disability; efficiency boards had removed 352 more, and 648 had been encouraged by the army 
to resign.  During the war, only six percent of the army’s officers were to be National 
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Guardsmen.158  In the final analysis, historian Timothy Nenninger was on the mark when he 
noted, “The National Guard of 1917 was nearly as unprepared for war as the state militias had 
been in 1898.”159   
 With their distrust of using the National Guard as a reservoir of wartime troops and 
leaders, some Regular Army officers pinned their hopes on gaining potential officers from more 
novel sources.  One of the provisions of the Dick Act allowed the War Department a means for 
raising a cadre of non-Guard reserve officers that could be mobilized in time of war to lead 
volunteer units.  The Dick Act’s Section 23 allowed the army to hold boards to identify those 
men “specially qualified to hold commissions in any volunteer force which may hereafter be 
called for and organized under the authority of Congress.”160  It also mandated that the army 
maintain a list of those selected so that they could be mobilized in time of a national emergency. 
To qualify, all candidates had to pass physical and professional examinations, be United States 
citizens, and be under 30 years old for a commission to second lieutenant, under 35 years old for 
first lieutenant, and under 40 years old for a captain. 
 Until 1914 the army took no major steps to implement the provisions of Section 23.  
From 1906 through 1914 the army issued only 77 certificates to hold reserve commissions.  This 
number also included 51 Regular Army enlisted men who wished to be commissioned upon the 
outbreak of war.161  However, in 1913 Leonard Wood seized upon the languishing provision as a 
means of building a reserve cadre of junior officers free from the “taint” of the National Guard. 
Wood proposed the creation of a pool of reserve officers who would be commissioned after 
completing at least two years of standardized military education in their colleges.  These men 
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would serve one year on active duty to complete and certify their training, and then be returned 
to civilian life as a ready officer reserve.  While Wood’s plan was never implemented, in the 
spring of 1913 he organized two five-week-long Students’ Military Instruction Camps at 
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania and Monterey, California to demonstrate its feasibility.   
 Although Wood’s stated goal of the camps was to “increase the present inadequate 
personnel of the trained military reserve of the United States by a class of men from whom, in a 
time of national emergency, a large portion of the commissioned officers will probably be 
drawn, and upon whose military judgment at such a time the lives of many other men will in a 
measure depend” the army had a deeper and, to them, a more important agenda.162  Wood 
admitted that the training in the camps was insufficient, but countered, 
  The benefit to the country (is) in the fostering of a patriotic spirit,  
without which a nation soon loses its virility and falls into decay; 
also the dissemination among the citizens of the country by the 
return of the students who attended the camp of a more thorough 
knowledge of military policy, the true military history of our country, 
and its military needs, all necessary to the complete education of a 
well-equipped citizen in order that he may himself form just and true 
opinions on military topics.163 
Although the training given to the students focused on increasing the discipline and health of the 
participants and in providing them a rudimentary introduction to military drill, tactics, and 
shooting, Wood’s intent of indoctrinating “right thinking” in the attendees remained the larger 
focus of the camps.  One of the regular officers who organized the training noted with 
satisfaction that, “The students left the camp with the fixed idea of doing missionary work at 
their colleges.”164  Thus, effective military training would be secondary to the creation of 
                                                 
 162 Major Charles Gerhardt, “Student Camps of Instruction,” Infantry Journal, Vol. X, No. 5 (March-April 
1914), 672. 
163 War Department, Annual Report, 1913, 190-1., Gerhardt, “Student’s Camps of Instruction,” 672-687., 
Lane, 180-1., and Clifford, 14-15.  
 164 Gerhardt, “Student Camps of Instruction,” 686. 
  230
“student-missionaries” trained to spread Wood and Upton’s gospel of preparedness and “a sound 
military policy.”  This underlying agenda remained a touchstone of all the subsequent citizen’s 
training camps held until the entry of the United States into the war.  
 Both Wood and Secretary of War Garrison proclaimed the 1913 camps to be a great 
success.  In his annual report to Congress, Garrison boasted that the attendees obtained, “a 
healthy, active, out-of-doors life for the summer vacation at less expense than that usually 
required when away from home and acquire habits of obedience, command, self-control, order, 
and personal hygiene.”165  The 1913 camps’ achievements encouraged the army to expand the 
number and size of the camps for the summer of 1914.  Wood used his friendship with Lehigh 
University president Henry Drinker to publicize the camps to the presidents of other educational 
institutions.  Drinker viewed the camps mainly as a means of promoting civic virtue, patriotism, 
and “muscular Christianity,” and was the earliest and one of the most enthusiastic boosters of the 
program.  In the fall of 1913 he, along with the presidents of Princeton, Harvard, Yale, and other 
prominent college leaders, formed the Advisory Board of University Presidents for the National 
Reserve Corps.  With the active encouragement and support of Wood, these leaders ensured a 
large turnout of their students for the 1914 camps.  In the end, the army trained 667 students in 
camps at Ludington, Michigan; Ashville, North Carolina; Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont, and 
Monterey, California.166       
 The success of the 1913 and 1914 camps and the outbreak of the war in Europe 
encouraged the army and civic leaders to examine ways to expand civilian military training.  
                                                 
 165 War Department, Annual Report for 1913, Vol. I, 19-20. For discussion of the moral and physical 
benefits of the camps see, Francis Frothingham, “Plattsburgh Lessons,” in Journal of the United Service Institution 
of the United States, Vol. LVIII (1916), 198-201. 
 166 Military Training Camp Association, Roster of Attendants at Federal Military Training Camps 1913-
1916 (New York: Anderson & Ruwe, 1916), V and XI., and Clifford, 18-29.  Drinker and most of his fellow college 
presidents on the Advisory Board of University Presidents for the National Reserve Corps would later serve on a 
similar advisory board for the Military Training Camp Association.   
  231
Greenville Clark, an influential and well connected New Yorker who was practicing law with 
the son of Elihu Root when the war began, became a driving force for further extending the 
number, size, and complexion of the camps in 1915 and 1916.  Like Drinker, Wood, and 
Theodore Roosevelt, Clark was a passionate advocate of preparedness and a critic of Wilson’s 
neutrality policies.  Although this mighty quartet would serve as the midwives of the famous 
“Plattsburg Movement,” their partisanship ultimately meant that the training of civilians became 
merely another political football in the contentious preparedness debate.   
 As was the case with the Continental Army plan, the purpose of the citizen’s training 
camps became lost or confused in the larger debate over universal military training, the 
responsibilities of citizenship, the need to instill civic virtue in the nation’s youth and 
immigrants, and the conflict between preparedness and neutrality.  This duality of purpose meant 
that while the army continued to tout the camps as a means for identifying and training potential 
reserve officers, they would also serve as a way to rally upper and middle class businessmen, 
students, and educators and direct them towards achieving the army’s goal of a “proper military 
policy” for the nation.  As late as November 1916, Army Chief of Staff Hugh Scott reiterated 
that the purposes of the Plattsburg camps was both to “furnish practical training to these citizens 
of good character and sufficient education to qualify for commissions in the Officer’s Reserve 
Corps” and to “spread amongst the citizens of the country some knowledge of military history, 
military policy, and military needs, all necessary to the complete education of a well equipped 
citizen in order that he may form just and true opinions on military topics.”167   
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 This dual agenda for the training was not lost on the camp attendees.  One cadet admitted 
to his Regular Army instructor, “I am here as a silent protest against our unpreparedness.”168  
While another camp attendee, John Barnes, took a more tongue-in-cheek approach to the 
training, he still light-heartedly confessed that since the “preparedness bug has nipped me” he 
had given up “active membership in the Old Guard of Club Warriors whose total labors for 
national defense have consisted of free advise and liberal contributions to the internal revenue on 
booze.”  Despite his mock heroics, he still proclaimed that by attending the Plattsburg camp in 
June 1916, “I am doing my bit to put our puny military establishment on a stable basis.”169  One 
of the businessmen attending attended the 1916 Plattsburg camp reported with approval the 
preparedness comments made by Leonard Wood during a visit to his encampment.  He related, 
“…when the General asked us, as I suppose he has asked previous regiments, to vote in favor of 
universal training, every man of us shouted Ay!”170  The citizen’s training camp attendees were 
well on their way to being the foot soldiers and acolytes of preparedness.  
 On the surface the dual nature of the camps should have furthered the army’s goal of 
increasing its readiness for war.  However, the conflation of the camps with universal military 
training served to lull some officers into a false sense of security over the ease at which it could 
raise and train a mass army.  Major M. B. Stewart noted that when he first arrived at the 
Plattsburg camp to serve as an instructor,   
  The mere thought of field service after three weeks of training conjures a vision of 
  unwieldy mobs, led about by hand, nursed, valetted, and personally conducted.   
  To many of the officers who were on duty at the camp during the past summer,  
  the idea of attempting such a performance with six or seven thousand men  
                                                 
 168 MAJ M. B. Stewart, “The Military Training Camps,” Infantry Journal, Vol. XIII, No. 3 (November-
December 1916), 250.   
 169 O. N. E. [John B. Barnes], Letters of a Plattsburg Patriot (Washington D.C.: United States Infantry 
Association, 1917), 5.  
170 Allen French, At Plattsburg (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1917), 294. 
  233
  brought a sinking of the heart.  However, that feeling disappeared with the first  
  day of the march.171   
 
With only a cadre of 16 regular officers and no regular NCOs, he marveled at the progress made 
by his nascent soldiers.  Stewart gushed, “Thirty days [of training] does not sound impressive," 
but argued that the quality and quantity of the training that the civilians endured was actually 
better than the “actual military training that the average regular soldier receives in any period of 
three months.”172  Of course the point seemed to have been lost on the major that he was 
supposed to be turning out men fitted to be officers and not Regular Army privates.  Stewart also 
bowed to the other purpose of the course by admitting that, “Whatever else [the students] may 
have gained from the experience, they were in a position to consider the military needs of the 
Country in a broad, intelligent way.” To him, the most important result of the camps was the fact 
that, “They make missionaries…In other words, each one of them goes home a self-constituted 
apostle of the Doctrine of National Preparedness.”173  
 Stewart was not alone in succumbing to the seductive allure of training camps filled with 
ideologically motivated and internally dedicated citizens.  It is interesting to note that a Regular 
Army captain had confidently asserted in 1911 that it took “thirty-two weeks, or eight months in 
all then as the total time needed for making of our foot-soldier, regular or volunteer.  And this is 
provided there is a trained officer for every 50 men, and a trained non-commissioned officer for 
every 12 men, working hard five hours daily.”174  In December 1915, other experienced officers 
maintained that based on Canada’s wartime experiences it would take “a minimum of ten 
                                                 
 171 MAJ M. B. Stewart, “The Military Training Camps,” 253-4. 
 172 Ibid., 252. 
 173 Ibid., 250-1. 
 174 CPT A. J. Dougherty, “The Making of A Soldier,” in Infantry Journal, Vol. VII, No. 5 (March 1911), 
732. 
  234
months, and preferably one year” to train inexperienced men to be soldiers.175  Yet only a month 
later Leonard Wood told a Congressional committee that the Plattsburg citizen camps 
demonstrated that given intelligent men as recruits and a cadre of “officers of marked ability as 
instructors” it was possible to “train those particular men very well in three months.”  Although 
he readily admitted that the attendees of the camps were exceptionally well educated and 
enthusiastic, and thus learned at a rate “6 to 8” times faster than the contemporary Regular Army 
recruit, “The men we should probably get as recruits under the continental army plan could be 
trained very well in six months if assembled in large training camps alongside of full-strength 
organizations of regular troops and under the instructions of carefully selected officers of the 
Regular Army.”176  Given the caveats that Wood enumerated in his response, why did he feel 
compelled to evoke the Plattsburg camps at all?  Although Wood was using the Plattsburg camps 
as a means to push forward his universal military training agenda, this continued conflation of a 
camp for training officers with the requirements for training enlisted recruits again merely 
confused the reasons for the camps and needlessly politicized the issue of building a cadre of 
reserve officers.     
 Whatever uses the Plattsburg camps were put to, there can be no doubt that they struck a 
responsive cord among certain middle and upper class elements within American society.  With 
war raging in Europe, the sinking of the Lusitania, and tensions building on the Mexican border, 
the popularity of the “Plattsburg Idea” steadily grew in 1915 and 1916. Although Greenville 
Clark tried to expand the social classes from which the pool of attendees came from by 
encouraging supporters to donate to “Plattsburg scholarships,” the camps retained a rather 
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narrow spectrum of candidates.177  There is much truth in historian Michael Pearlman’s 
characterization of the camps as “a Sparta for the rich.”178  
 Much of the exclusiveness of the camps derived from the fact that the candidates had to 
foot nearly the entire bill for their month of training.  The Congress made no appropriations to 
conduct the citizens training camps. While the army provided free instruction, billeting and 
equipment, the candidates had to pay for their meals, uniforms, and transportation to and from 
the camp.  In a letter to applicants from the headquarters of the Southern Department to those 
men wishing to attend the summer camp at Fort Sam Houston in 1916, the army warned that 
those attending would be expected to pay $15 for rations and sundry items and $12.50 for their 
uniforms.179  Additionally, the candidate had to be able to afford taking a month off from work 
to attend the camp. 
 Although Wood and other regular officers paid lip service to the “democratization” of the 
camps, it is clear that they were unwilling to stray far from the Regular Army’s long-standing 
preference for drawing its potential officers from the pool of college students and graduates.  In 
the autumn of 1915, Wood made a great show of working with the labor leader Samuel Gompers 
to demonstrate that the camps were not merely a club for rich boys.180  However, in the letter 
that the general sent to potential camp recruits on 17 January 1916, he stressed, 
  You will note, first, that applicants are desired principally from those who have 
  college, university, high school (or corresponding school) education.  Non-
  graduates are not excluded, but each case will be decided on its merits with 
  a view of maintaining a level in the progressive scheme of development.  The 
  training given at these camps is very intensive, covering in a period of four 
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  weeks as much as possible of the fundamental education of an officer.  This 
  calls for a well trained mind.  In the second place, past experience has shown 
  that this class of young men is the first to join the colors in time of war and 
  many of them regardless of their skill in military matters receive commissions.181 
    
For all of the army’s flirtation with Samuel Gompers, at no time prior to the war did it ever 
seriously consider admitting any more than a handful of non-college men into the ranks of the 
regular or reserve officer corps. 
 Given the support of the citizen training camps among ranking college presidents and 
their students, the army also saw no great need to expand the camps’ attendees outside of the 
bounds of “the right sort.”  John Hibben, the president of Princeton University, reported to both 
his students and their parents, “It is in my opinion infinitely better to devote one’s time in this 
way during two summer vacations of a college course than to the lazy life of the ordinary 
summer hotel.  The consciousness of making some sacrifice for one’s country in the midst of a 
season of pleasure is in itself of incalculable value.”182  In 1915 the collegian Lucian Howe 
assured the readers of the Journal of the United Service Institution of the United States that the 
institutions of higher knowledge could supply their needs because, “The young men who went to 
college would…be graduating at a rate of a little over sixteen thousand a year, most of them with 
good physique and training for officers.”183   
 On 17 November 1915, the presidents of 14 distinguished universities, to include 
Princeton, Harvard, Yale, Vanderbilt, and the University of Michigan, sent an open letter to their 
peers praising Plattsburg’s accomplishments and asking for their assistance in recruiting students 
for the 1916 camps.  They stated, “We believe that the training and instruction which the 
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students attending receive not only emphasize the dangers and losses of wars lightly and 
unpreparedly entered into, but we also believe that the training given is excellent, and a great 
benefit, mental and physical, to the students attending.”184   
The avid support of the educators and the seeming crush of college men willing to attend 
the camps reinforced the army’s predilection for college educated officers, but also perhaps 
blinded it to the limitations of drawing its leaders from such a shallow pool.  Only 35,372 
American males received bachelor’s, professional, master’s or doctorial degrees in 1916, and 
there were only a total of 294,711 bachelor’s degrees awarded to American males in the ten 
years prior to the nation’s entry into the war.  The 1910 census stated that there was a total of 
13.8 million white native and foreign born males between the ages of 20 and 34, the prime ages 
for junior officers.  Although the comparison of the total bachelor’s degrees from 1907-1916 and 
the 1910 census data for white males between the ages of 20 and 34 does not cover the range of 
possibilities for potential junior officers, it does give a ballpark idea of the self-imposed 
challenges that the army created by preferring college men for its officers.  This comparison 
reveals that roughly two percent of the male population fit the army’s ideal model, and this 
percentage was probably lower if the race, health, and personal desires of the college graduates 
were factored in.185  The question that remained was would these relatively small number of men 
be willing and able to meet the army’s officer manpower needs? 
 Despite the army’s inclinations for college-educated officers, the civilian leaders of the 
Plattsburg movement were still able to expand the training camps beyond college students.  The 
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preparedness debate had encouraged businessmen and other non-students to clamor for their own 
military training camps.  Since Wood and other officers viewed these people as natural allies in 
preparedness and supporters of their goal to implement a “proper military policy” for the nation, 
they supported the establishment of “Businessmen’s Camps of Instruction” to be held in the 
summer of 1915.  Since many of these businessmen were college graduates, had some college 
under their belts, or had demonstrated proven leadership in the business world, the army still 
viewed them as the “right kind” of people to serve as officers.   
 In the summer of 1915, the army held six “Businessmen’s Camps of Instruction”: two at 
Plattsburg, New York; and one each at Fort Sheridan, Illinois; Landsdowne, Pennsylvania; 
American Lake, Washington, and the Presidio of San Francisco.  These camps trained 2,666 
men. Additionally, the army held three student training camps at Plattsburg, the Presidio of San 
Francisco, and Ludington.  These camps trained 975 college and high school students.186  
 The end result of these camps was a dramatic spike in the number of applications for 
reserve commissions.  In 1915, Hugh Scott reported that he had a “list of approximately 1,400 
names of students of civil institutions of learning who have been recommended as qualified, 
subject to future physical examination, for appointment as Volunteer officers.”  He also noted 
that the army had received over 5,000 additional applications for reserve commissions that were 
pending the certification of an examination board.187   
 The camps also led to a large increase in the number of certificates of qualification to 
hold a reserve commission that the army issued.  As previously noted, the army had issued only 
77 certificates between 1906 and 1913.  At the student camp held at the Presidio of San 
Francisco, in 1915 alone, the Regular Army cadre recommended 94 attendees for volunteer 
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commissions.188  Ten months later the army commissioned another 658 reserve officers after 
holding a special board to clear the backlog of Plattsburg applicants.189   
 Buoyed by the success of the 1915 camps, and hoping strike a blow for preparedness by 
making the camps a permanent fixture of the military system, Grenville Clark, Henry Drinker 
and other training camp boosters gathered to form the Military Training Camp Association 
(MTCA) on January 1916.  The purpose of the MTCA was to assist the army in publicizing and 
coordinating camp attendance and in using its members’ political clout to advocate for the camps 
in the halls of government.  The most valuable service that the MTCA ultimately served for the 
army was its ability to compile records on past and potential camp attendees.  This meant that 
when the nation entered the war in 1917, it had rosters of potential officer candidates readily at 
hand.   
The MTCA also flexed its political muscle during the crafting of what would become the 
National Defense Act of 1916.  Its support led to Section 54 of the act which authorized funds to 
pay for the transportation and ration costs for the camp attendees.  The act also mandated the 
establishment of an officer’s reserve corps and reformed the Land Grant College system by 
imposing a uniform standard for the training and commissioning of college students under the 
provisions of the new Reserve Officers Training Corps.190  Although the reforms came too late 
to effect the training camps held in the summer of 1916, and had little impact on the training of 
college students prior to the war, it gave the president (and hence the army) the power to set the 
qualifications for the commissioning of reserve officers during World War I and also gave the 
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army the power authorization that it later needed to establish its wartime Officers Training 
Camps.    
With the vital support of the MTCA, the army further expanded the student and 
businessmen’s camps for the summer of 1916.  To gain more regional diversity and cast a 
broader net for potential officers, the army established twelve Plattsburg-type training camps 
across the nation.  Although some National Guard officers argued that the Plattsburg camps 
undercut the guard’s standing and siphoned-off potential recruits, others, like John F. O’Ryan, 
saw a long term benefit in sparking the citizen’s interest in military matters.  In a letter written in 
January 1916 to aid the MTCA in its recruitment efforts, O’Ryan hailed the fact that the camps 
had encouraged many attendees to later join the National Guard, and that it also offered men 
whose personal or business commitments precluded them from serving in the guard an avenue 
for some degree of military training.191   
With the MTCA, army, and some elements of the National Guard working together, 
attendance at the 1916 camps was greater than the three previous years of training combined.  In 
the thirty-day-long courses, over 16,000 civilians received military instruction, including 
Theodore Roosevelt’s sons, Theodore Jr. and Archie, and the popular New York City mayor, 
John Purroy Mitchel.  The only downside to the 1916 camps was that the large scale deployment 
of the Regular Army to participate in the Mexican Punitive Expedition or to guard the border led 
to some shortages in instructors and equipment.192 These shortages often meant that the 
graduates from the previous year’s camps played an active role in the training of the rookies.  
Although some of the camp’s leaders maintained that 85% of the “veterans” of the 1915 
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Plattsburg camp returned for the 1916 camp, this merely meant that in too many cases the half-
trained were instructing the untrained.193 One 1916 attendee remembered, “we taught each other 
how to stack arms; and finally from one argument we could only be rescued by appeal to the 
drill regulations.  We knelt around the little blue book, while the opponents of the two 
apparently conflicting ideas eagerly debated, until of a sudden each saw the other’s point, and 
discovered that they meant the same thing.”194  Despite the best intentions of both the attendees 
and the Regular Army cadre, the 1916 camps would exhibit much of this fumbling toward the 
light of military knowledge. 
With all of the time, treasure and toil that the Regular Army devoted to the summer 
camps between 1913 and 1914, one of the key questions remains: what did it get for its 
investment?  Since the end of the Civil War, the army had suffered from a lack of funding and 
from the general apathy or distain of the American public. The citizens’ training camps and the 
support of the preparedness movement by a number of the nation’s elites brought an increased 
awareness of the army’s plight and undoubtedly gave the service some added clout in its battles 
with the Congress.  However, when one examines the stated intent of the camps; to train a cadre 
of reserve officers, the results were less successful.195        
The camp held at Ludington, Michigan from 5 July to 8 August 1915, for example, 
trained 148 students from 61 different colleges and universities.  Two companies of Regular 
soldiers and ten Regular officers set up and administered the camp for the college students.  
During the first week of training the students learned close order drill and the school of the 
soldier.  During the second week they focused on extended order drill and basic offensive 
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tactics.  The third and forth weeks of training were devoted to basic rifle marksmanship, firing 
for record, practice marches, and sports.  In the fifth and last week of training, the cadets learned 
field entrenchments and the basics of handling a company in extended and close order drill.  
Despite this seemingly full training schedule, one of the Regular Army instructors noted that the 
students still had time to play rounds of baseball and, “a tennis tournament, some golf playing, 
and a great deal of swimming and boating.”  He also wryly noted that the students also 
“gradually acquired some idea of our military history, military policy, and the necessity of 
national defense.”196  
The camp held at the Presidio of San Francisco for 214 students from 10 July through   
15 August 1915 (under the command of future AEF general James Harbord) followed a different 
training schedule than did the Ludington camp, but also focused more on physical fitness and 
basic military skills.  The high point of the camp was a visit by Theodore Roosevelt.  The former 
president pushed for a system of universal training and “most emphatically urged national 
preparation for defense.”197  Although General Order 38 mandated that the training in both 
camps was to focus on “the instruction and demonstration of principles of tactics and field 
maneuvers,” the level of instruction was only slightly higher than that given to a Regular Army 
enlisted recruit within the first months of service.198   
This situation did not markedly improve in 1916.  The training in the camps continued to 
stress close order drill, route marching, basic marksmanship, and the bare basics of field craft 
and tactics.  A training schedule for one of the 1916 camps revealed that during the 30 day 
training period the students spent nearly as much time in administrative tasks such as in-
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processing, equipment issue, and immunizations as he did in basic tactical training.  Marching 
and field craft accounted for 25 percent of the training time while marksmanship was less than 
19 percent of the overall schedule.199   
Perhaps the greatest problem with the Plattsburg camps was the lack of leadership 
training.  Little was done in the way of training the attendees in the tactical skills required of a 
company-grade officer or in a serious evaluation of their leadership abilities.  For the vast 
majority of their time at the camps, the students and businessmen took on the role of the “high 
private of the rear rank.”  Although this role undoubtedly gave the attendees the essential 
leadership knowledge of the trials and tribulations of their future soldiers, and somewhat 
accomplished the hoary maxim “he who would lead must first learn to follow,” this was not off-
set by enough opportunities for the students themselves to serve as platoon leaders and company 
commanders.  Candidate Allen French recalled that much of the tactical training he received 
only reinforced his belief that “the private soldier knows but little of what is going on.”200    
The camps were too short and attendance was generally too high to accomplish the goal 
of giving the candidates further leadership opportunities.  Unfortunately, the failure to do so 
meant that those graduates of the camps largely remained an unknown quantity to the army. The 
army also seemed to assume that attendance at the camps also reflected a desire by the attendees 
for a commission or to serve as a military leader.  At least one candidate at the 1916 Plattsburg 
camp informed his astonished squad mates that he did not want to serve as a student NCO 
because, “I came here tired to death from a long hard worrying year in getting that factory of 
mine in good running order.  I don’t want to have anything to do, for the whole of this month, 
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with managing a stupid gang of men.”201  This man was not alone in viewing the camps a merely 
a vacation of sorts to enjoy the outdoors and the “strenuous life.”      
The training that the students did receive at the camps was problematic.  Although Hugh 
Scott defended the training in the camps by noting, “Camp life with its marches, maneuvers, and 
target practice has long been recognized as the most important part of a soldier’s instruction,” 
and that the instruction “approximates somewhat the conditions of warfare and furnishes the 
atmosphere most conducive to rapid progress in military training,” how well it approximated 
warfare was in the eye of the beholder.202  Little in the training reflected the realities of modern 
war as was being waged on the Western Front.  In fairness this oversight was perhaps somewhat 
understandable.  Few officers, pundits, or politicians in 1915 or 1916 envisioned sending an 
expeditionary force to Europe and much of the discussion of any possible war centered on 
Mexico or repelling an invasion of the United States.203  This being said, the tactical training 
within the camps still fell victim to the Regular Army’s lack of appreciation for the effectiveness 
of trenches, machine guns, and artillery, and, as such, provided the students a poor grounding in 
the challenges that they would face as junior officers against most potential foes.   
Although the army practiced a system of progressive training within the camps where the 
candidates steadily moved from the individual School of the Soldier to the regiment in the attack 
in ever larger and more complex tactical evolutions, the depth and realism of this training was 
severely constricted by time, available resources, and the inherent shortcomings within the 
army’s doctrine. Some of the maneuvers amounted to little more than flights of tactical fancy.  
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The candidate Allen French, for instance, noted the ease at which his side in his camp’s 
maneuver was able to overcome their mock foes even though their erstwhile enemies had the 
camp’s only two machine guns.204  It is interesting to note that the machine guns that his side 
supposedly captured were not even army property, but were, in fact, purchased by a group of the 
more wealthy young gentlemen attending the camp. He also described a simulated attack on a 
trench line that he was defending and how the attacker’s irresistible moral force had allowed 
them to seize the defenses.  He later wrote, 
There was nothing that I could do but peep though my loophole, and think how 
silly it was.  I heard a roar from the captain, an outburst of yells, the crash of 
bushes, and- there was the captain coming like a bull, and a long rank of men 
rising behind him and rolling on toward me like a wave. Oh, Frances dear, there is 
something awful about brute force! I felt the ground shake, the noise of shouting 
seemed to burst my ears, the faces in front of me were like those of angry 
demons…it….was too much for me, and I turned away and put my hands to my 
ears.205    
 
As he was writing those passages the Battles of the Somme and Verdun were raging in France.  
Seldom were the defenders in those battles so cowed by the rolling waves of the attackers that 
they faced.  
 It is also clear from French’s observations and experiences that his training in 1916 
mirrored the current army doctrine with its focus on direct fire artillery, use of cavalry, and 
maintaining the controlled fire and maneuver of infantry skirmishers.206  French also commented 
with approval the offensive focus of the army’s drill regulations.  As he stated, “As soon as you 
got beyond the mere parade-ground work…the [Infantry Drill Regulation] book brings you to a 
region where nothing else is considered than one thing, attack, attack, attack.”207  Another camp 
                                                 
204 French, 198-202.     
205 Ibid., 87-8.  
206 Ibid., 66, 77-8, 202-4, 214-220.      
207 Ibid., 77. 
  246
participant, with a more jaundiced eye than French, boiled his tactical training down to, “Our 
scout and patrols pay peek-a-boo with him (the enemy) awhile, and then up boys and at them! or 
words to that effect- real military terms forgotten for a moment- any way we all dash forward 
and the horrible carnage is on.”208  The experiences of both participants highlighted the 
problems with the tactical instruction in the Plattsburg camps and the inability of the army to 
provide realistic combat training for its potential officers. The shortcomings of the Plattsburg 
camps offered a preview of the challenges that the army would later face in training its wartime 
officers.       
   Given the length of the course and the training that the candidates received, it is no 
surprise that some soldiers questioned the ability of the camps to produce trained and ready 
officers.  Although an ardent supporter of the Plattsburg movement, Major M.B. Stewart 
admitted, 
  The average military man is inclined to be skeptical, to look on the 
  movement as a new kind of fad, valuable in a way because it serves 
to attract men who could not otherwise be interested in military matters, but 
nevertheless a fad that can lead to nothing practical in the way of real military 
training or preparedness…Most military men are willing to acknowledge the 
educational value of these camps, but they are likely to balk at the idea that they 
are productive of any military training of practical worth.  They are inclined to 
discount the idea that anything worth while from a military standpoint can be 
accomplished in thirty days.209 
 
The ambivalence of the army toward the citizen’s training camps resulted from the inherent 
tension between what the Regular Army officers wanted in the training of its reserve officers and 
what they could actually accomplish given the realities of manpower, resources, and the national 
mood.   
Army officers displayed this ambivalence during their testimony before the  
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Congressional Committee on Military Affairs in early 1916.  When committee members asked   
Leonard Wood if the Plattsburg Camp produced men “equipped to serve as officers of the 
United States Army in case of emergency,” he replied, “Not at all; [however] they would be 
better equipped by far than any men we have ever had as officers of volunteers at the beginning 
of a war…these men had thorough basic training as far as that went, but were prepared to take 
hold of and commence the training of men in the schools of the soldier, squad, and company.”210  
When the committee asked him if the student training camps were the best way to train officers, 
War College Division’s Major P. D. Lochridge responded, “I do not believe that you can get the 
best training for them, but I believe that by utilizing these camps and the civil education 
institutions…you could supplement West Point sufficiently to meet our needs.”211  Even though 
Wood was the father of the Plattsburg movement and Lochridge was an avid booster of the 
citizens training camps, it could not be said that they offered a ringing endorsement of the camps 
for training officers.   
 Other Regular Army and National Guard officers were much blunter in their assessment 
of the camps as a source for officers.  One War College staff officer lamented the systemic 
problems associated with the army’s training of officer candidates and noted, 
Imperfectly trained troops must pay with their lives for their own mistakes and for 
those of imperfect leadership.  The more efficient the leadership the better will be 
the training, and the better the training the fewer will be the mistakes, and the less 
will be the cost of any results sought to be obtained by the war.  Any system of 
training, however good in itself, will fail to bring the desired results unless there 
are available a sufficient number of trained instructors…The blind cannot lead the 
blind.212  
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The author also offered a bleak appraisal of the future of officer training if the nation faced a 
large scale mobilization.  He accurately noted that upon the outbreak of war, at least one-forth of 
the existing Regular officer corps would be sent for foreign service with their units, and many of 
the those remaining would be quickly promoted to fill vital command and staff positions in 
regular and volunteer formations.  He argued these postings would make it impossible for the 
Regulars to provide the degree of expert knowledge and leadership required to train any new 
contingents of officer candidates.213   
 It is interesting to note that although the army had granted nearly 8,000 Plattsburgers 
reserve commissions prior to 1917, it was so unsure of the quality of their training that it still 
required them to attend the three-month-long Officer Training Camps after the war began.  In a 
damning indictment of the quality of screening and training of the Plattsburg officers, the army 
noted that many of them were “found entirely unqualified for commissioned grades and. . .were 
reduced in grade.”214  In many cases the army demoted or removed these officers for 
incompetence or unsuitability to command. 
 One of the harshest critics of the Plattsburg camps was Captain Richard Stockton.  As a 
New Jersey National Guard officer, it was no surprise that he bristled at the implied or implicit 
criticism of the guard that was at the root of the preparedness movement and the training camp 
system.  Despite this prejudice, Stockton still presented a number of valid criticisms of the 
Plattsburg idea.  In an August 1916 article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of the 
United States, he caustically compared the different definitions of “valuable military training” 
held by the National Guard (and he implied the regulars) and the Plattsburgers by noting, 
Princeton University seems to think that it consists of some dozen or more 
disconnected lectures by officers of the army…The National Guard has assumed 
                                                 
213 Ibid., 17-18. 
214 War Department Annual Report for 1919, p. 300. 
  249
that it may be gained by a system of weekly drill supplemented by theoretical 
schools and a week or more of camp annually.  The business men find that it 
should be a month’s ‘intensive training.’  West Point decides that it takes four 
years of hard work… At present the nation is in actual danger from the well-
meant enthusiasm of the men who plan to ‘save the day.’…It is time to realize 
that military training which is stripped of its most valuable attributes is really 
worse than none at all, insofar as all military measures which lull the nation into a 
false sense of security are more harmful than such an entire absence of 
preparedness that the nation is awake to its needs.215 
 
Stockton also blasted the graduates of the camp who arrogantly believed that their training has 
fitted them for immediate commissioning.  He denounced those who presumed, “A private in the 
Business Man’s Camp at Plattsburg, after marching around as Number Three Rear Rank for a 
month or two, has decided that he might take a commission as low as captain in the National 
Guard, but he could not possibly lower his standing by taking a lesser rank.”216  The guardsman 
concluded that when it came to the student camps, “It is important that we should realize that it 
is impossible to educate a boy and turn out a finished officer at the same time” and that the army 
and the camp graduates had to admit to the yarning gaps in attendees’ military knowledge and 
leadership skills.217  Although Stockton offered valid criticism of the Plattsburg system, he failed 
to offer any better alternative other than having the would-be officer join the regulars or the 
National Guard.    
Other officers were more constructive than Stockton when it came to solving the officer 
training dilemma.  Reflecting the regular’s ambivalence toward the Plattsburg system, the editor 
of the Cavalry Journal admitted that he supported the camps if for no other reason than “the 
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troops need ‘em” but also acknowledged that the end result of their training regimen was to 
“throw the man overboard to teach him to swim”218  He bewailed the painful fact that,  
Anyone who has observed the pathetic and oftentimes pitiful efforts of the boy 
lieutenants from civil life to get to the bottom of things military during the first 
rough months with the colors, cannot but help be convinced that the system is not 
good.  It is unfair to the embryo officer, and a waste of potential energy in the 
military system.  The boy tries hard enough; he usually bends over backwards in 
his efforts to please.  But he usually works at cross purposes, he is subjected 
through his woeful ignorance and many mistakes, to a certain amount of 
humiliation in the eyes of his own soldiers, and the ideal of his company 
commander.219 
 
However, this officer did offer a solution to the problems that he raised.  The editor favored the 
establishment of three-month-long training camps where the candidates “would spend most of 
their time in learning to march and ride and the theoretical and practical work involving guard-
duty and the drill regulations of their arm, in hearing talks on various useful subjects not always 
found in books, and in such elementary problems in minor tactics as would ordinarily fall to the 
lot of a young officer who has never before commanded even a corporal’s squad.”220  While this 
solution was still far from optimal, it did offer a viable way to train potential officers and to 
evaluate their leadership potential in a more systematic and effective way.  The three-month-
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camps would combine the enthusiasm of the Plattsburg movement with the Regular Army’s 
desire for a greater degree of depth in the training of its junior officers. 
 In his annual report to Congress in 1917, Secretary of War Newton Baker maintained 
that the “Plattsburg experiment” had been the basis upon which the army’s wartime officer 
training system was based.221  This was only partially the case.  Although the Plattsburg camps 
had shown the benefit of massing together officer training at a handful of central locations, and 
had validated in the minds of regular officer the correctness of their desire for college-educated 
officers, few of them believed that such camps could turn out suitably trained officers in only 
one month.  Evidence of this can be found in the way that the regulars chose to train their own 
class of provisional Regular Army second lieutenants in the winter of 1916 and 1917.  In late 
1916 the army held examinations to select 250 provisional second lieutenants to fill the new 
officer allocations authorized by the National Defense Act of 1916.  Despite the legacy of the 
Plattsburg Camps, once selected, these provisional lieutenants had to attend a three-month-long 
officer course at Fort Leavenworth.222   
Thus in the final analysis, the legacy of the Plattsburg movement was mixed.  The 
MTCA and the Plattsburg boosters had been effective in publicizing the nation’s lack of 
preparedness to wage war and the shortage of reserve officers, but the camps were neither long 
nor rigorous enough to overcome those shortages with adequately trained personnel.  Although 
the regulars gained some experience with the mass training of officer candidates, and the 
attendees gained a degree of military training that they otherwise would have missed, the success 
of the camps camouflaged both the problem of obtaining suitable officers and the difficulty of 
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training a massive number of NCOs and soldiers.  In the end, the Plattsburg camps did little to 
truly prepare anyone for the demands of mobilization or combat leadership in modern war.   
In conclusion, the Regular Army had no coherent plan for selecting, mobilizing, and 
training a wartime corps of junior officers and NCOs prior to April 1917.  The Land Grant 
College system was plagued by tensions between the college faculty and the officers assigned to 
their institutions and a lack of standardized, realistic, and rigorous training regimen.  Although 
the regulars saw the colleges as the best potential source of officers, it was largely unsuccessful 
at systematically tapping this resource of potential reserve officers.  The reforms mandated by 
the National Defense Act of 1914 sought to correct these deficiencies, but they came far too late 
to ameliorate the training of potential officers prior to the war.    
The National Guard had also been proven to be a rather brittle reserve.  While reforms of 
the Dick Act and its 1908 and 1914 revisions undoubtedly increased the military effectiveness of 
some guard units and their officers, the improvement in the National Guard tended to be 
localized in certain regions and almost absent in others. Despite joint maneuvers with the guard 
and the Regular Army, and the assignment of regular officers to serve as instructor-inspectors 
with guard units, the limited time that guardsmen could devote to training, and the baleful 
influence of the elective system for junior officers on unit discipline and instruction, simply 
proved to be too great of an obstacle for most state soldiers to surmount.    
Even taking into account the regular officer corps’ prejudice against the National Guard, 
there seems to be much honesty in their generally harsh assessment of the guard’s readiness and 
abilities as exhibited on the Mexican border in 1916.  The advent of the citizen’s training camps 
and the Plattsburg movement between 1913 and 1916 went a long way towards highlighting the 
nation’s poor military readiness, but only a short way toward addressing the glaring lack of a 
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ready reserve of trained junior officers. Although the regulars had done a superb job of creating 
“apostles of preparedness” during the camps, most also realized that the camp’s graduates were 
woefully unprepared to lead soldiers in the maelstrom of modern war.  In short, none of the 
institutions that the army had looked to supply a reserve of wartime officers were ready, able, 
and in some cases, willing, to pick up the gauntlet.  It should also be noted that few officers, 
politicians, or boosters gave any thought to the equally pressing need for a system for identifying 
and training potential NCOs.   
 It is interesting to ponder that given the political and fiscal realities of the time, could the 
army have done better at planning for the mobilization and training of a wartime reserve of 
officers prior to April 1917?  Without the willingness of Congress to fund an expansion of 
Plattsburg-type training camps to cover at least three months or more of training and paying 
candidates to attend them, the citizen’s camps were never going to be more than a publicity stunt 
with the minor trapping of officer training.  More funding for National Guard training and the 
assignment of more regular officers to guard units may have incrementally improved the 
readiness of some guard units and officers, but still would not overcome the systemic problems 
of the era’s part time soldiering.  Prior to 1916, there was not enough political will or public 
interest to accomplish any of the above.   
 The one route that may have offered hope was in a general reform of the Land Grant 
College military training systems.  The army already had much of the cadre for the system in 
place and only required a tightening of the statutory requirement for military instruction and 
some increase in funding for training by the Congress to make the colleges a viable reservoir for 
reserve officers.  In many ways the Regular Army could only blame itself for this failure.  Had it 
focused its efforts on reforming the Land Grant system instead of playing Don Quixote to the 
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Continental Army plan’s windmill and serving as drillmasters to the Plattsburg dilettantes, it is 
possible that the army would have had a more coherent, logical, and effective plan for 
mobilizing officers than it did in the spring of 1917.  Ironically, in Leonard Wood failed to listen 
to his own 1913 warning that creating a reserve of officers should not be “left to the rush, hurry, 
and confusion proceeding a war.”223                    
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Chapter 6 
“We Find Ourselves in Need of a Vast Army of Officers” 
The Stateside Selection and Training of Officers 
 
 
 After the United States had been at war for over eight months, the editor of the Infantry 
Journal had grown tired of the constant carping in the officer corps about the training of officer 
candidates for the wartime army.  He rebuked his readers by reminding them, “We find ourselves 
in need of a vast army of officers. Two alternatives present themselves- to follow our old policy 
of selecting men for social, personal or political reasons, or of selecting on a basis of individual 
merit.”1  His remark highlighted the great break from historic practice that the army had 
engineered in its plans for selecting and training its wartime officer corps.   
 Unlike previous wars where units were largely officered by men selected by state 
governors, elected by the men of the organization, or directly commissioned by the federal 
government (all perhaps with little to no though as to the candidate’s previous military 
experience or training) the majority of the company-grade line officers for the AEF would be 
subjected to a more or less standard system of selection and training, all created and controlled 
by the Regular Army.  The Great War was to be the grand Uptonian moment: the chance for the 
regulars to prove the superiority of their methods and their “proper military policy” over that of 
the National Guard or other ad hoc methods of obtaining officers.  But in 1917 and 1918, the 
question that haunted the regulars remained: was their system working?   
 This chapter will examine how the army selected, trained, and evaluated its cadre of 
company-level line officers during 1917.  It will discuss the challenges the army faced in 
establishing the first officer training camps, and the revisions that it implemented between the 
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first and second OTCs.  The chapter will also evaluate the effectiveness of the first OTCs in 
preparing the army’s junior leaders to meet the challenges they would face on the Western Front.  
From the moment the United States entered the war in April 1917, the crush of 
time and events overseas influenced the way the nation mobilized its forces and trained its 
officers.  French Marshal Joseph Joffre and British General George Bridges arrived in 
Washington in April to inform their new allies about the state of their respective war efforts and 
to beg for fresh American soldiers.  Pershing confirmed their sobering assessments of the Allied 
situation upon his arrival in France in June. This sense of “hurry and dread” was only reinforced 
by the worsening Allied conditions in 1917.  The eight months between April and November 
witnessed the repulse of the Nivelle Offensive and subsequent French army mutinies, the bloody 
disappointment of the British offensive at Passchendaele, failure of the Kerensky government 
against the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, and the Italian disaster at Caporetto. The perception 
of Wilson and the War Department was clear: get an army to France to stabilize the Allies or risk 
losing the war.2 
 Within weeks of the United States’ declaration of war the Wilson administration made 
the decision that the nation would send an expeditionary army to fight in France.  The bulk of 
this force would be composed of draftee “National Army” units with the remainder made up of 
existing National Guard and Regular Army units brought up to strength with volunteers and 
conscripts.  Congress passed the Selective Service Act in May to fill the enlisted ranks of the 
mass army, and assumed that the measures that it had authorized in the National Defense Act of 
1916 provided the War Department with the means for raising an officer corps.  However, 
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authorizations on paper are not the same as warm bodies in uniform, and the administration’s 
order to build an expeditionary army of two to four million men brought the issue of who would 
lead the legions to a head.  As Leonard Wood had predicted in 1913, the war found the army 
short of many thousands of officers, and the “rush, hurry, and confusion” that he had feared had 
become a bewildering reality in 1917. 
 A decade after the war, Huge Scott, the Army Chief of Staff in early 1917, wrote that the 
War Department was far from being overwhelmed by the officer problem.  He noted, “The truth 
was that intense study had been given to every phase of the problem before the war broke, and 
everything was done that the law allowed, with much that it did not allow, and all the 
preliminaries were out of the way or in the process of elimination.”3  Scott stated that one of his 
few concerns when it came to mobilizing leaders was to ensure, “that the new officers must be 
commissioned only after making good physically and every other way at some of the various 
officer’s training camps.”4  In actuality, the situation was far from being as settled as Scott had 
remembered.  The only major thought that the army had given to mobilizing officers had been 
the reports that the General Staff had written to support Garrison’s Continental Army plan and 
some tentative steps towards commissioning provisional officers for the Regular Army.  From 
this beginning, the army still had to improvise a system of identifying, selecting, training, and 
evaluating officer candidates.    
 In his Annual Report to Congress for 1917, Secretary Newton Baker admitted that the 
plan that the army adopted for its training of officers was based on the system developed during 
the prewar “Plattsburg experiment.”5  Baker’s statement was a stretching of the truth.  As was 
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noted in Chapter Five, the regular officer corps fully understood the great limitations of the 
Plattsburg camps in turning out trained and ready officers.  In the end, the only similarity 
between the prewar Plattsburg camps and the wartime Officers’ Training Camps (hereafter 
OTCs) was the type of candidates that the camps drew.  The length and focus of training, as well 
as the standard for admission and graduation, were completely different. 
 Shortly before the United States had entered the war, the army had taken its first hesitant 
steps towards developing a more coherent and reasoned approach to commissioning an increased 
number of non-West Point officers.  In the fall of 1916 and the winter of 1917, the army held two 
officer training camps at Fort Leavenworth to instruct and commission provisional lieutenants 
for the Regular Army.  Like the subsequent OTCs, the course was three-months in duration and 
the General Staff intended that “The system of discipline and preliminary training adopted 
followed that of West Point as far as was practicable.”6  The first class, which ran from 
September through November 1916, commissioned 386 provisional lieutenants, and the second, 
which was held from January through April 1917, commissioned 338 more.7   Lieutenant 
Colonel James McAndrews, the camp commandant, admitted that these first two camps provided 
a means for working out some of the problems with the later OTC courses.8  Thus, these camps, 
more than the shorter Plattsburg encampments, were the major model for wartime officers’ 
training.    
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 However, few regular officers had any illusion that these first tentative steps were a 
panacea for the ills of officer training, nor a solution to the overwhelming issue of scale.  It was 
one thing to train 724 provisional lieutenants in six months, it was quite another to identify and 
train 200,000 more to fill ranks and positions ranging from lieutenant to major, and from platoon 
leaders to battalion commanders.  From the beginning, few regular officers deluded themselves 
that ninety days of training would produce a finished product.  As McAndrews warned the 
second class of provisional officers on 17 April 1917, 
  There is much hard work before you if you will obtain the results desired of the  
  course here.  The time given you is all too short for the ground that must be  
  covered.  Officers fitted to command first-class troops cannot be the product of a  
  course of three months’ training and instruction, no matter how strenuous it may  
  be.  But if you do your part, three months are long enough to give you a good start 
  in your profession, to give you something of an insight into the duties of   
  subalterns and above all to give you a safe foundation upon which to build your  
  future efficiency.9  
 
The best that could be hoped for was to give the officer aspirants a sound start and then pray that, 
as had been the custom in the Old Army, the novices would have the time to hone their 
leadership and tactical skills with their units prior to being committed to combat.  
 Although the training camps for provisional regular lieutenants had allowed the army to 
sort out some of the issues of officers’ training, the spring of 1917 was still marked by rush and 
confusion.  This was reflected in the steady stream of messages that flowed from Brigadier 
General Joseph Kuhn, the Chief of the War College Division, to Army Chief of Staff Huge Scott.  
As the War College did double duty as a school for staff officers and as a planning agency of the 
General Staff, Kuhn was responsible for developing the mobilization and training plan for 
officers.  Kuhn’s first report to Scott on the status of officers’ training offered a gloomy 
assessment.  Kuhn reported,       
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  Due to the decision of the Secretary of War to add all of the increments to the  
  Regular Army and to the National Guard, and to the scarcity of equipment and  
  available shelter for these organizations, the problem of establishing camps for the 
  training of perspective officers becomes somewhat complicated and must be  
  solved as part of the larger problem confronting the War Department…There will  
  probably not be equipment available for the training of any forces except the  
  Regular Army and National Guard before the later part of next fall.  For that  
  reason the establishment of the training camps for reserve officers can well be  
  postponed until the first of June.  This will also make it possible to use at these  
  camps officers now detailed to schools and colleges and a large number of  
  officers from the Military academy who will not be required during the summer  
  months.10 
 
The War College staff recommended that the training camps be established under the provisions 
of Section 54 of the National Defense Act of 1916, and that the period of training was to be for 
three months with the course “to be based on that given to provisional second lieutenants at Fort 
Leavenworth.”11  This was not an auspicious start to the mobilization of officers; although 
Kuhn’s assessment was accurate and logical, the ugly press of time meant that the officer camps 
would start much earlier than he had either wanted or anticipated.   
 Only four days after Kuhn’s initial report, the Adjutant General, Brigadier General Henry 
McCain, sent a warning order to the commanding generals of each geographic department 
advising them to begin work to establish 16 total OTCs at the 14 posts and camps within their 
anticipated divisional areas. The OTCs were to be located in camps whose locations could serve 
a number of regional division mobilization sights.  Each OTC was to train a maximum of 2,500 
candidates, and thus, provide enough officers for at least one division.12   
                                                 
 10 “Memorandum for the Chief of Staff from BG Joseph Kuhn, Chief of the War College Division, Subject: 
Training Camps for candidates for the Officers’ Reserve Corps, dated 13 April 1917” in RG 165 “Letters, 
Memorandum, Reports, etc. of the Citizens Training Camps, Officers’ Training Camps, Central Officers’ Training 
Schools, and Student Army Training Corps” RG 165 Correspondence of the War College Division, NARA 
Microfilm File 9226, Roll 261. (Hereafter, RG 165, “Letters,…etc Officers’ Training Camps”). 
 11 Ibid. 
 12 Telegram from Adjutant General to Commanding General, All Departments in the United States, dated 
17 April 1917., and Telegram from Adjutant General to Commanding General, All Departments in the United 
States, dated 24 April 1917, in War Department, Special Regulations No. 49: Training Camps for Reserve Officers 
  261
 On 23 April, McCain sent the commanders additional guidance on establishing the new 
camps.  It mandated that the first OTCs would open on 8 May 1917 and that the camps had to be 
ready to receive the candidates by 1 May.  This only gave the camp organizers a week to get 
their sites up and running.  The Adjutant General reiterated that the camps would each be limited 
to 2,500 men and lamented that, “The War Department would prefer a larger attendance, but the 
serious shortage of Regular Officers makes it unwise to attempt more at this time.”  McCain 
stated that the intent of the first OTCs would be to provide the required officers for the first 16 
divisions “by the time the necessary machinery can be put in motion for procuring the enlisted 
men.”13  In other words, the officer candidates were to be trained, commissioned, and posted by 
the time that the first enlisted draftees arrived at their mobilization camps.  That meant that the 
departmental commanders had only fourteen to fifteen weeks to establish, mostly from scratch, a 
system for screening applicants, receiving and in-processing those selected, building the camp 
infrastructures, training and evaluating the candidates, and commissioning and posting the 
graduates.  
 From the beginning, the War Department had to fight off those who would bypass the 
training camp system and return to the former ad-hoc methods of directly commissioning 
officers.  Huge Scott recalled, 
  Tremendous pressure was put on Secretary Baker for commissions…In all  
  previous wars, commissions were part of the political spoils…This was all  
  forestalled in this war by the secretary’s one answer to all applications: ‘Go to  
  some officers’ training camp and earn a commission if you want one’... The  
  secretary’s close adherence to the policy of making applicants for commission  
  earn them in camp, kept our corridors so free from politicians and their   
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  constituents that it was as quiet in my office as on a Sunday morning in time of  
  peace.14 
 
Not all of the departmental commanders were in full agreement with Baker’s resolve or Scott’s 
desire to retain a quiet Sunday-like office.  The officers responsible for establishing the camps 
certainly understood the monumental tasks before them, and some believed that the press of 
events demanded the army follow an easier path to officer mobilization.  The Commander of the 
Southern Department, for example, telegrammed Kuhn that he was, “overwhelmed with 
applications for commissions as lieutenants on [the] active list and for reserve officers 
commissions with active duty in view.”  He further noted that 90 graduating students from Texas 
A&M had expressed a desire to become officers and that “probably thousands from similar 
schools would respond if called upon.”  The general stated that “These would make [the] best 
officers we could get for immediate commission into regular service and would be efficient for 
any class of troops.”15  With the backing of Baker and Scott, Kuhn stuck by his recommendation 
that all such applicants for commission still be required to attend an officers’ training camp as a 
precondition for commissioning.  Whatever the lure of expediency and easy solutions, few in the 
higher echelons of the War Department were going to let the overwhelmed local commanders 
disrupt the army’s great Uptonian moment.  
 The War Department was never able to completely withhold commissions from non-OTC 
graduates.  During the early months of the war, a number of men were still able to gain 
commissions in the National Guard without any prior experience.  This process had in fact 
started even before the war began.  The large number of resignations of National Guard officers 
during the Mexican border mobilization had opened a number of slots for civilians seeking 
                                                 
 14 Scott, 564-5. 
 15 “Memorandum for the Chief of Staff from BG Joseph Kuhn, Chief of the War College Division, Subject: 
Appointment of provisional second lieutenants in the Regular Army, dated 23 April 1917” in RG 165, “Letters,… 
etc Officers’ Training Camps,” NARA Microfilm File 9226, Roll 261. 
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commissions, and as the tensions with Germany grew over the winter of 1917, promotions in the 
National Guard could come very rapidly.  H. A. Honaker, a civil engineer by profession, enlisted 
in the 1st Louisiana Infantry on 5 February 1917.  He was promoted to sergeant on 23 March, 
and was commissioned as a second lieutenant on 28 March.  Honaker had no previous military 
experience when he entered the National Guard and received no specific officer training 
afterwards.16  However, cases like Honaker’s were comparatively rare.  In raw numbers, those 
commissioned out of the OTCs accounted for 48 percent of all wartime officers, while National 
Guardsmen accounted for only six percent.  After factoring out physicians, chaplains, and those 
civilians given direct commissions on account of their technical skills, the OTC graduates made 
up 74 percent of the war’s officers, and the vast majority of the army’s company combat 
leaders.17        
 Although the War Department senior staff was unwavering in its determination to follow 
through on the training camp system, it was a bit more vague in its guidance in describing the 
attributes that local commanders should seek in the applicants to their camps. In selecting 
candidates, the Adjutant General advised,  
  These should be preferably mature men and the most experienced natural leaders  
  that the country possess… With the basic experience [of the OTCs] supplemented 
  by natural aptitude for handling men as demonstrated in business or otherwise, a  
  splendid corps of 10,000 reserve officers should be available by the middle of  
  July.  It is necessary the “THE FIRST TEN THOUSAND” should be the best that 
  the country has.  In planning our military forces we must assume that the war is  
  by no means drawing to a close and that the country must expand its military  
  forces as rapidly and effectively as the resources of the country permit. (original  
  emphasis)18     
                                                 
 16 H. A. Honaker, AEF North Russia and 142 MG BN, File WWI 2318, MHI WWI Veteran Survey,  
 17 Leonard Ayres, The War With Germany: A Statistical Summary (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1919) , 21-2.  Ayres maintains that only one out of every six officers had some form of prior 
military service when they were commissioned. 
 18 “Adjutant General Memorandum from BG H. P. McCain, Army Adjutant General, dated 23 April 1917” 
in RG 165, “Letters,… etc Officers’ Training Camps,” NARA Microfilm File 9226, Roll 261. 
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The only hard rule was that the candidates had to be American citizens between the ages of 20 
years and nine months to 44 years to attend the camps.  However, following long-standing army 
preferences, McCain did recommend that the commanders seek college students as they were 
“especially fitted” for selection to attend the camps.19 
 The Department Commanders and their divisional area sub-commanders had to shoulder 
most of the responsibility for selecting the camp attendees.  This task would have been all but 
impossible in the short amount of time that they had if it would not have been for the efforts of 
the Military Training Camp Association (MTCA).  Shortly after the declaration of war, Genville 
Clark and the other members of the MTCA’s executive committee offered the War Department 
its files of past and prospective Plattsburg candidates and its administrative assistance in 
recruiting and communicating with potential officer candidates.  As the War Department had 
been woefully negligent in even maintaining lists of those students who had received military 
training in college, Baker jumped at the MTCA’s offer.20 
 Although the actual military value of prewar Plattsburg camps was doubtful, there can be 
no argument that the Military Training Camp Association played a vital administrative role in 
advertising the War Department’s OTC plan and in assisting in the enrollment of the first class of 
candidates.  The MTCA’s branch offices across the United States sent Plattsburg graduates and 
potential officer candidates packets containing the forms, and outlining the process that they 
would need to go through, to qualify for the May OTCs.  For example, the MTCA’s Kansas and 
West Missouri Division of the Central Department based in Kansas City, Missouri, informed 
                                                 
 19 Ibid. 
 20 John G. Clifford, The Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburg Training Camp Movement, 1913-1920 
(Lexington, University of Kentucky Press, 1972), 228-234; and Adjutant General’s Office, The Personnel System of 
the United States Army, Vol. 1, History of the Personnel System (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 
1919), 318-320. 
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applicants that they had to submit the standard application form listing their age, race, and 
citizenship status, as well as a detailed description of their education, employment, and previous 
military service.  They also had to include at least three letters of recommendation attesting to 
the applicant’s character and abilities and a record of a physical examination by “one of the 
physicians appointed for the purpose,” or at least, “the best physician available.”  The MTCA’s 
representative warned the candidates that they had to “comply with every detail carefully to 
avoid having your application returned by the War Department for correction or thrown out 
entirely.”21 
 One of the applicants following the local MTCA’s guidance was Knox Alexander of 
Independence, Missouri.  Upon receiving the application packet, he rushed to complete his 
required tasks.  On 25 April he was duly examined by his local physician and had asked town 
notables for his required letters of recommendation.  One of these notables, Major E. M. Stayton, 
of the Missouri National Guard, wrote on 30 April 1917 that he was “pleased to recommend Mr. 
Knox Alexander for a commission in the Officers Reserve Corps.”  Stayton noted that the young 
man, “comes from one of the very best Missouri families, is well educated and will measure up 
to the highest standard that can be set for a gentlemen and officer.”  The Guardsman concluded 
that while he was serving as the commandant of cadets at Independence High School, that Knox, 
“was one of the very best cadets in the corps.”22   
 Despite the best efforts and good intentions of the MTCA, the inherent problem of the 
army’s “contacting” of the application process for the OTCs sometimes came to the fore.  In the 
frenzied crush of events in April of 1917, the local MTCA occasionally failed to provide the 
                                                 
 21 Circular from Jay M. Lee, Secretary, Military Training Camp Association, Central Department, Kansas 
and West Missouri, “To Applicants,” undated, circa April 1917, in Knox Alexander Papers, author’s collection.   
 22 Letter from Major E. M. Stayton to “Whom Concerned,” dated 30 April 1917, in Knox Alexander 
Papers, author’s collection .  
  266
proper paper work for the required physical to the applicants.  This glitch prevented Knox from 
meeting the deadline for attending the first series of OTCs.  Knox again applied for admission to 
the second series of OTC, only to be informed on 13 July that his application was being returned 
because his physical examination had not been recorded on “the proper army blank.”23 What is 
amazing in this case was that despite the fact that from an educational, social, and military 
standpoint Knox was an ideal candidate to attend an OTC, and that the army was desperate to 
find every qualified candidate for officers’ training, parts of the army continued to operate under 
the dead hand of peacetime bureaucracy.  In the confused spring and summer of 1917, all too 
often, the army was its own worst enemy.  
 Notwithstanding the missteps of the MTCA or its own bureaucratic officers, the army 
was able generally to attract a very high quality of officer candidates for its 1917 OTCs.  It is 
possible to gain an idea of the general education and experience level of the candidates who 
attended the first two OTCs by examining the backgrounds of a random sample of the graduates 
of the Fort Sheridan OTC.  In 1920, the Fort Sheridan Association, a mutual aid and social 
organization formed by the fort’s OTC graduates, published The History and Achievements of the 
Fort Sheridan Officers’ Training Camps.  This publication contained biographic sketches for 
most of the 267 OTC’s candidates who died while in military service between 1917 and early 
1920.  From these sketches one can gain an idea of the ages, education, professions, and previous 
military experiences of those who sought to become officers in 1917.24  
                                                 
 23 Letter from CPT Paul A. Barry, Examining Officer, Second Training Camp, Jefferson Barracks, 
Missouri, to Knox Alexander, dated 13 July 1917, in Knox Alexander Papers, author’s collection. 
 24  The randomness of this sample is based on the randomness of death in wartime.  However, when 
examining this sample, by branch and rank, the breakdown of the dead was generally in line with the statistics for 
officer deaths by branch given in Ayres, The War With Germany, 121.  All of the statistical information in the 
proceeding paragraphs is drawn from biographical sketches in, Fort Sheridan Association, The History and 
Achievements of the Fort Sheridan Officers’ Training Camps (Chicago: Hawkins & Loomis Company, 1920), 40-
172. 
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 Of the graduates of the first two series of OTCs at Fort Sheridan who died in the war, 
three were majors, 25 were captains, 103 were first lieutenants, 129 were second lieutenants, six 
were candidates who washed out of the course but later became NCOs, and one was a candidate 
that died during the training due to an accident.  The average age of the candidates that were 
promoted to major was 31 to 32 years old in 1918.  The average age of those who rose to the 
rank of captain was 29 to 30 years old, and the average age of the first and second lieutenants 
was 27 to 28.  The youngest captain was age 22 and the oldest was 43 years old.  The youngest   
lieutenant was 22 and the oldest was 42.  In most cases these ranges in ages fell within the 
optimal range for the level of maturity and personal experience that one would want for 
company-grade officers.  
 In education, two of the majors were college graduates and one was a graduate of public 
school.  Of the captains, 71.4 percent had some college education with 62.5 percent being 
college graduates.  Nearly 79 percent of the lieutenants had some college education with 57.5 
percent being college graduates.  The difference between the number of captains and lieutenants 
who had graduated from college was due to the number of younger men who had left school 
when the U.S. entered the war to attend officers’ training. Slightly over 20 percent of the 
lieutenants and eight percent of the captains listed their profession as “student” when they 
entered the OTC.   
 The selection of this high percentage of men with some degree of college education to 
attend officer training was in line with long standing Regular Army assumptions regarding the 
attributes and characteristics required of officership.  As stated in the previous chapters, the army 
assumed that education conditioned the officer’s mind to absorb and process knowledge, and 
thus gave him the faculties to continue to learn their professional skills and overcome any 
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shortcoming in their initial training.  It also assumed that college education and experience in 
professions and business had imbued candidates with the leadership skills needed to lead men.     
Ralph Perry, the Secretary of the War Department Committee on Education and Special 
Training, reflected this belief when he noted that the OTC candidates were “civilians who were 
by education, experience and natural aptitude especially qualified for leadership.”25  He also 
admitted that while “the men who were finally commissioned were not trained officers,” they 
were still, “picked men who had mastered the rudiments and knew how to profit by the 
experience and ordeal that awaited them.”26  These sentiments were not limited to army officers 
and War Department functionaries.  In his 1917 report to Congress, Secretary Baker praised the 
fact that, 
 When the first camp was opened, the colleges, military schools, and high schools  
 of the country poured out a stream of young men whose minds had been trained in the 
 classroom and whose bodies had been made supple and virile on the athletic field.   
 They came with intelligence, energy, and enthusiasm and, under a course of intensive 
 training, rapidly took on the added discipline and capacities necessary to equip them for 
 the duties of officers.  They have taken their place in the training camps and are daily 
 demonstrating the value of their education and the adaptability of the spirit of American 
 youth.  A more salutary result would be impossible to imagine.27  
 
Although few in the War Department questioned the assumption that being white, college 
educated, middle or upper class, and experienced in business or the professions somehow belied 
an innate ability to lead soldiers, no one also considered the long term effect that this assumption 
would have on the army’s ability to maintain these high standards in its officer candidates over 
                                                 
 25 Ralph B. Perry, The Plattsburg Movement (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1921), 202. 
 26 Ibid., 190. 
27 War Department, Annual Report for 1917, Vol. I, 23. Not everyone was in agreement with the army bias 
toward college educated officers.  In 1919, an engineer colonel argued, “I think in the selection of officers too much 
attention was paid to the college education and not enough to their training in the ‘University of hard knocks.’” from 
"Replies to Officers' Questionnaires" from Morale Branch of the War College and War Plans Division to the Chief 
of Staff, dated 5 November 1919, in NARA, RG165, NM84, Entry 378, Box 6 (here after cited as Morale Branch 
Officers’ Survey), 34.  I would like to thank James “Ty” Seidule for providing me a copy of this intriguing report.   
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the long term.   
 The occupations of the officers in the Fort Sheridan sample also reflect the army’s 
existing assumptions about the social class and job experiences it wanted in its reserve officers.  
Tables 6-1 and 6-2 list the occupations for the OTC’s graduates by the ranks they achieved in the 
war.  Although it is difficult to exactly pigeon hole the graduates into precise class grouping, 
after factoring out the students and those candidates whose occupations were unknown, 
approximately 84 percent of captains and  93 percent of lieutenants could be classified as having 
been employed in upper or middle-class professional or white collar jobs.28   
Table 6-1: Occupations of Graduates of the First Two Fort Sheridan OTC in the Rank of Captain 
Businessman- 4     
Engineer - 3   
Student- 2    
Farmer/ stockman- 2  
Unknown- 1     
Manufacturer- 1 
Lawyer- 1 
Sales Manager-1 
Pipeline Gauger- 1       
Salesman- 1 
Insurance- 1 
Lumberman-1 
RA enlisted - 1 
College Administrator- 1 
Real Estate- 1  
Newspaperman-1 
Advertisement- 1 
 
Table 6-2: Occupations of Graduates of the First Two Fort Sheridan OTC in the Rank of First and 
Second Lieutenant  
Student- 48 
Businessman- 24 
Lawyer- 22 
Manufacturer- 13 
Teacher- 10 
Salesman- 11 
Insurance- 9 
Clerk/Office work- 8  
Farmer/dairyman- 7   
Bank Worker- 7            
Stock Broker- 6 
Office/Sales Manager- 6 
Accountant/Auditor- 6  
Engineer – 5 
Real Estate- 5  
Chemist- 5   
Secretary- 4  
Advertising- 3 
Industrial Worker- 3  
Newspaperman- 2              
Architect- 2 
RA Enlisted – 2 
School Administrator- 2 
Lumberman-1 
Postal Worker- 1 
Police Chief-1 
Policeman- 1 
Industrial Foreman-1 
Railroad Worker- 1 
Purchasing Agent- 1 
Printer- 1 
Patent Clerk-1 
Plumber-1 
Physician- 1 
Unknown- 11 
 
One of the majors, four of the captains, and 20 of the lieutenants had served in the National 
Guard before the declaration of war (a total of 9.3 percent).  Nine other candidates had served in 
the Regular Army or Navy as enlisted men prior to the war (3.3 percent). One candidate, Neil 
                                                 
 28 The occupations that I classified as tradesman or blue collar jobs are industrial worker and foreman, 
railroad worker, postal worker, policeman, printer, pipe guager, and prewar military enlisted man.  When in doubt as 
to the classification of an occupation into blue or white collar, such as was the case of farmers and salesman, I erred 
toward the middle class or white collar designation. 
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Pavey, had been a National Guard officer during the Spanish American War but had accepted a 
commission as a captain of U.S. Volunteers in 1899.  After fighting in both the Philippine 
Insurrection and the Boxer Rebellion, Pavey resigned from the service to go into business.  Two 
other officers had served in foreign armies, and four others had attended one of the Plattsburg 
camps prior to attending OTC.  Only two men, Walter Pinger and John P. Slade, were identified 
as having enlisted in the army after the war broke out and thus entered the Fort Sheridan OTC as 
war service enlisted men.  All tolled, only 16 percent of the candidates in the sample had any 
degree of military training or experience prior to attending the OTC, and in a number of cases, 
even the military experiences of these few men had been decidedly limited.    
 All-in-all, the sample of the Fort Sheridan OTC graduates seems to indicate that those 
drawn to the first two series of training camps were the caliber of men that the army had long 
sought as its officers.  Based on antidotal evidence from candidates from other OTCs and the 
comments of later candidate school commanders, on the whole, the Fort Sheridan sample is a fair 
representation of the men who flocked to officer training in 1917.29 
  Whether attending Fort Sheridan or the other original OTCs, the available evidence also 
indicates officer candidates of 1917 were some the most enthusiastic soldiers to serve in the war.   
William M. Briggs, for instance, recalled that he and his classmates from Valparaiso University, 
like most of the candidates of the first OTCs, were driven by “an impelling desire to get in the 
service as soon as possible.”  All of his fellow law school senior classmen signed up to attend the 
OTC at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana.  He was so eager to go to the camp, and so afraid that 
                                                 
 29 For example, see, “Memorandum for the Chief of Staff from BG Lytle Brown, Chief of the War College 
Division, Subject: Enlisted Candidates for the 4th Officers’ Training Camps, dated 5 August 1918” in RG 165 
“Letters,… etc Officers’ Training Camps,” NARA Microfilm File 9226, Roll 261., Report of the Commander, 
COTS, Camp Pike, Arkansas to Chief, Training and Instruction Branch, War Plans Division, Subject: Report Ending 
August 24, 1918, dated 26 August 1918” in NARA RG 165, War Department General Staff, Army War College 
Historical Branch, G5 Schools, 7-51.3, Box 186, Entry 310, “Camp Pike, Ark, Infantry COTS.” 
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he would not make the army’s minimum weight standard that he drank two to three quarts of 
milk daily before his report date to add some bulk to his slight frame.30  In the fall of 1917, John 
E. Hull was a medical student at Miami University.  He recalled that “Everybody in college 
became interested in getting into the army one way or another,” and noted that at least 75 percent 
of his university’s football squad went to the training camps.  He later stated that, “My ambition 
was to get a commission and get into the Army.  If they’d have sent me a commission as a 
paperhanger I probably would have accepted it.”  Hull was only slightly exaggerating; he had 
been offered a commission in the Ohio National Guard, but accepted a provisional one in the 
Regular Army in hopes that in doing so he would “get to France a lot faster than you would if 
you hung around to be drafted or went into the National Guard.”31   
 The motivations and actions of men like Briggs and Hull were far from unexpected.  
Since the nation’s colleges were hotbeds of pro-Allied sentiments, Anglophilia, and the 
preparedness movement, it was no surprise that college men would flock to the training camps. 
German actions in Belgium and France, often exaggerated by Allied propaganda, and their 
sinking of the Lusitania had outraged the mostly Anglo-Saxon Protestant college population and 
encouraged a nationalistic zeal in the officer candidates.32   
                                                 
 30 1LT William McKinley Briggs, Camp Zachary Taylor, Kentucky, 159th Depot Brigade, File WWI 2655, 
USAMHI World War I Veterans’ Survey, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.  Briggs was not alone in his fear of 
passing the entrance examination.  Although all candidates had been certified as fit by their local doctor as part of 
their application, the army took no chances, and again subjected the candidates to a disorienting and rapid assault by 
army physicians and medics.  As Gus Dittmar recalled, “a medico sprang at the alarmed examinee and began 
popping instructions so fast that he felt somewhat like a puppet being operated by someone with St. Vitus dance.” 
When the battery of examinations was complete, the candidate “felt as though he had been pulled through a key hole 
crosswise.”  Gus Dittmar, They Were First (Austin: Steck-Warlick Company, 1969), 25-7.     
 31 Transcript of Interview of General John E. Hull by LTC James W. Wurman on 22 October 1973 in 
Washington D.C., in USAMHI Oral History Collection, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 
32 Carol S. Gruber, Mars and Minerva, 25-7, 52-6, 62-4., Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 15., Henry Berry, Make the Kaiser Dance (New York: Doubleday, 
1978), 114-5. 
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 The First World War was a period of hyper-patriotism in the nation, and the war struck 
many Americans as a crusade to protect civilization against barbarous “Prussianism.”  As one 
machine gun officer wrote home upon his departure for France, 
We are finally on the way to show the Huns that the Americans are 
  not too proud to fight, to make the world safe for democracy, to assure 
  supremacy of Freedom of the Seas and the rights of Smaller Nations.33 
 
The hyper-patriotic crusading fervor was especially pronounced in the middle and upper class 
men who made up the majority of the wartime officer corps. The majority of these men came of 
age during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, and visions of his charge up San Juan Hill 
shaped their perceptions of war as an exciting, manly, and glorious endeavor.  These young men 
of the Progressive Era generally shared his passion for the “strenuous life” and his belief that 
education and social standing brought with it the duty of noblesse oblige.34   
 Although these tendencies were most pronounced in the candidates of 1917, much of this 
spirit continued to motivate officer aspirants throughout the war.  Reflecting both the spirit of 
Progressivism and Theodore Roosevelt’s quest for a “strenuous life,” a student at the Camp 
Gordon Infantry COTS stated his personal goal for the camp was to, “make every hour bring 
dividends in increasing knowledge or helpful, constructive recreation,” and “to play the game 
like a man- to fight against nothing so hard as my own weakness and endeavor to grow in 
                                                 
33 Letter from Reggie Bradley to Adelaide Bowen, dated 1 June 1918, Entry 435, Box 1, Special 
Collections, Robert W. Woodruff Library, Emory University. Similar idealistic and patriotic views are common in 
the letters and diaries of the AEF’s soldiers.  Some of the best can be found in James Luby, ed., One Who Gave His 
Life: The War Letters of Quincy Sharpe Mills (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1923), 346-7, 356-7.  In a March 
1918 letter to his mother Mills admits, “The more I see of what the Germans have done over here, the more I long to 
kill some of them.” For descriptions of American hyper-patriotism see David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First 
World War and American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 42-3, 55-7, 66-9. 
34 Laurence Stallings, The Doughboys. New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 117-8., Berry, 128, 133-5, 
263n., Nathan Miller, Theodore Roosevelt: A Life (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1992), 330-2., H.W. 
Brands, TR: The Last Romantic (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 752-3, 812-5.  
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strength- a true soldier and gentleman.”35  In the end, most of the young college and middle class 
men who flocked to the OTCs during the war were generally highly motivated to serve and 
ideologically committed to the cause.  
  Whatever their backgrounds or motivations, the one thing that the majority of the 
candidates needed was a great deal of training.  On 5 May 1917, the Adjutant General finally 
published Special Regulations Number 49: the definitive guide for the establishment and conduct 
of the first training camps.  This regulation included all of the previous correspondence related to 
the OTCs that had been sent from the War Department since 17 April 1917, the final regulations 
for who could attend officer training, and the three month training plan for the May OTC class.  
The final plan was to give all candidates a one-month common core of training, followed by two 
months of focused training in the candidate’s arm or branch of service.  The total course of 
training for an infantry officer candidate was to be 625 ½ hours.  The branches of service that 
required more technical training of their candidates ultimately squeezed more training time in the 
schedule.  The first OTC for Field artillery candidates, for example, was to consist of 700 total 
hours of training.36   
All the wartime OTCs and later Central Officers’ Training Schools (COTSs) followed the 
same overarching goal.  As Special Regulations 49 specified, “The prescribed courses are 
designed to teach, as thoroughly as possible in the short time available, the duties of an officer 
as…,” 
(a) Instructor: by subjecting our future officers to the same drills and individual  
training that they in turn must give to their future commands, with the rigid 
discipline and attention to detail that they must exact when they become officers 
                                                 
 35 Francis Spears, et al, ed., Damitall: Twentieth Company, Central Officers’ Training Camp, Camp 
Gordon, Georgia (Atlanta: Privately Published, 1918), 6.   
 36 War Department, Special Regulations No. 49: Training Camps for Reserve Officers and Candidates for 
Appointment As Such, May 15- August 11, 1917, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 5 May 1917), 
32-55.  
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of an organization that is to be trained. 
 
(b) Manager:  by subjecting them to the same mode of life that will obtain with 
respect of their future commands, supplementing the same with instruction in the 
proper method of supplying, messing, administering, and disciplining 
organizations, and caring for [the] health, welfare, comfort, and sanitation [of 
their soldiers]. 
 
(c) Leader: by illustrating the tactical employment of troops and by giving each 
the opportunity for practice in tactical leadership.37  
 
By producing officers who could simultaneously serve as instructors, managers, and combat 
leaders, in theory, the graduates of the OTCs would serve as the ideal solution to the army’s 
great challenges of mobilization.  Given the scarcity of Regular Army officers, these young OTC 
graduates would be the ones who were to train, sustain, and deploy the legion of draftees that 
would descend on the army beginning in the fall of 1917.  They would also be the ones who 
would physically lead the legions into battle.  The Regular Army banked on the ability of the 
OTCs to accomplish this, and, in 1917, the army had no other choice.  
 The first series of OTCs were held from 15 May to 11 August 1917.  They consisted of 
16 camps that trained over 30,000 selected civilians and 7,957 officers who were previously 
commissioned in the Officers’ Reserve Corps after attending a prewar Plattsburg camp or having 
been recommended by a board of officers.  While civilian applicants were paid $100 per month 
and 75 cents per day for meals, the reserve officers attending the camps were allowed the full 
pay and allowances for their commissioned rank. Ultimately, the first series of OTCs 
commissioned 27,341 officers, of which only 238 were appointed to ranks above captain.  Over 
                                                 
 37 Ibid., 10.  It is clear that this intent was briefed to the candidates and remained in force throughout the 
war as a direct reference was made to it in a number of graduation books, reports, and memoirs of the war.  For 
example, see, Dittmar., Fort Devens OTC Yearbook Committee, The Pick: 3rd O.T.C., Camp Devens, Mass (Boston: 
George H. Dean, 1918), 9. 
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half of the new officers (14,484) were commissioned in the infantry.  Field artillerymen made up 
the second largest group of officers, with 4,565 men commissioned at the end of the camps.38   
 The performance of the reserve officers in the first OTCs highlighted the failure of the 
prewar Plattsburg civilian training camps to both identify those qualified to hold a commission or 
to provide any meaningful military training. Colonel Henry Cabell, the Chief of the Adjutant 
General Department’s Appointment Section, maintained that the camps revealed the prewar, 
“fallacy of appointing Reserve Officers upon the recommendation of Boards of Officers,” 
without requiring the applicant to attend a rigorous training process.39  He noted that during the 
course of the OTCs, “Many officers previously commissioned in the Officers’ Reserve Corps 
were found entirely unqualified for commissioned grade, and many were reduced.”  He went on 
to note that in far too many cases, “Men who had been commissioned in the grades of Captain 
and Major were not even appointed 2nd Lieutenants.”40  
 From the beginning, many regulars doubted the OTC’s ability to train officers in three 
months, but most also realized that the situation presented them with no other option.  Reflecting 
this “wait and see attitude,” an officer in June 1917 mused, 
  When the war was declared we were confronted with a condition and not a 
  theory; with a problem whose solution demanded immediate attention- we needed 
  officers, and we needed them at once.  Not everyone will agree that the solution 
                                                 
 38 Report from Colonel Henry C. Cabell, Chief, Appointments Section, Adjutant General’s Office, to The 
Adjutant General of the Army, Subject: Report of line officers’ training schools from the declaration of war to the 
discontinuance of schools,” dated 28 February 1919, in RG 165, Army General Staff, Army War College Historical 
Section, G5 Schools, 7-52.8-52.9, Box 201, NM-84, Entry 310. (Hereafter The Cabell Report.), 3-5.  The 16 original 
camps established in divisional areas were at Plattsburg Barracks, New York (2 camps); Madison Barracks, 
Wisconsin; Fort Niagara, New York;  Fort Myer, Virginia;  Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia; Fort McPherson, Georgia; 
Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana (2 camps); Fort Sheridan, Illinois (2 camps); Fort Logan Roots, Arkansas; Fort 
Snellings, Minnesota; Fort Riley, Kansas; and Camp Funston, Leon Springs, Texas (not to be confused with the later 
Camp Funston located at Fort Riley).  Of the 27,341 officers commissioned from the first OTCs, two were 
commissioned as colonels, one as lieutenant colonel, 235 as majors, 722 as captains, 4,452 as first lieutenants, and 
18,929 as second lieutenants.  The break down by branch was: Infantry- 14,484, Field Artillery- 4,565, 
Quartermaster Corps- 3,067, Engineers- 1,966, Cavalry- 1,660, Coast Artillery- 1,062, Ordnance- 385, and 
Statistical- 152. 
 39 Ibid., 4. 
 40 Ibid., 3. 
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  adopted was the best, and undoubtedly there are many men in the regular service 
  who have been hit hard by the methods employed, while time will show whether 
  all the officers who have come from the training camps in fact measure up to their 
  responsibilities.  But it must be remembered that those methods were adopted 
  because the Army itself had not provided for such an emergency.41 
 
A few months later, the editor of the Infantry Journal addressed the continued doubts in the 
regular officer ranks about the purpose of the camps and their final human products.  He wrote,  
  The trained soldiers finds difficulty in reconciling himself to the idea that the 
  profession in which he has spent a lifetime of work and study can be mastered by 
another in the short period of three months.  Let such remember that the object of 
the work is to not make finished soldiers, but to produce practical fighting men.  
The fundamentals of the fighting man’s art, when boiled down and stripped of all 
their niceties is simple.  They amount to the machine-like business of taking 
human life, today more than ever.  Men who have been accustomed to the 
application of business methods to other problems ought not to find it difficult to 
apply them equally as successfully to this simple task…Their training, as far as it 
goes, has been uniform and thorough.42 
 
Despite the editor’s positive, if somewhat resigned, reassurance, those regulars with doubts over 
the effectiveness of the training given the candidates at the first two series of OTCs were 
justified in their skepticism.  
 An examination of the training plan for the first two OTCs reveals a number of the 
missteps that the army made in training its candidates to lead and fight on the modern battlefield.   
The subjects, and the time the War College devoted to them, demonstrate the army’s continued 
adherence to obsolete tactical ideas as well as its overall lack of preparation to teach a large 
influx of men.  Tables 6-3 and 6-4 illustrate the subjects taught in the first two series of OTCs as 
well as the hours that the War College staff intended to be devoted to the topics.       
 
 
                                                 
41 Editorial Staff, “The Products of the Training Camps,” Infantry Journal, Vol. XIV, no. 1 (July 1917), 
468. 
 42 Editorial Staff, “Reserve Officers’ Training Camps,” Infantry Journal, Vol. XIV, No. 6 (December 
1917), 467. 
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Table 6-3: 1st Month Common Core Course for all Candidates (1st and second OTCs)  
Subject Hours of TNG  % of total TNG 
In processing 8 hours 4 % 
Conferences (lectures) 64 hours 29.2 % 
Evening study 46 hours 21 % 
Physical training 11 hours 5 % 
Practice marches 9.5 4.3 % 
School of Soldier and Squad 7.5 hours 3.4 % 
School of the Company 
(Half close, half extended order) 
17.5 hours 8 % 
School of the Battalion 2.5 hours 1.1 % 
Bayonet training 4.5 hours 2 % 
Saber training 1 hour .5 % 
Signaling 20.5 hours 9.3 % 
Musketry sighting practice  7.5 hours 3.4 % 
Gallery range practice 9 hours 4.1 % 
Interior guard duty 2.5 hours 1.1 % 
Field craft and patrolling 7.5 hours 3.4 % 
         Total training hours: 218.5 hours  
 
Table 6-4: 2nd and 3rd Months of Training for Infantry Candidates (1st and second OTCs)  
Subject Hours of TNG % of  total TNG 
Conferences (lectures) 102 hours 25 %  
Evening study 64 hours 16 % 
Physical training 10.5 hours 2.5 % 
Company Drill 21 hours 5 % 
Battalion Drill 10.5 hours 2.5 % 
Pistol Training 2.5 hours .6 % 
Tent Pitching 2 hours .5 % 
Bayonet training 5 hours 1.2 % 
Range firing practice 38 hours 9.3 % 
Field Tng Patrolling & Scouting 10.5 hours 2.5 % 
Field Tng Battalion in Attack and Defense 12 hours 3.1 % 
Field Tng Battalion overnight camping 12.5 hours 3.2 % 
Field Tng Battalion in trench Defense 5 hours 1.2 % 
Field Tng Company on outpost, advance and 
rear guard 
5 hours 1.2 % 
Field Tng Company in Attack and Defense 5 hours 1.2 % 
Machine Gun Drill 4.5 hours 1.1 % 
Platoon combat firing 4 hours 1 % 
Company combat firing 4 hours 1 % 
Battalion combat firing 2 hours .5 % 
Trench warfare (included grenades, gas and 
trench ATK and DEF) 
19 hours 4.6 % 
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Three-day maneuvers 60 hours 14.7 % 
Lectures on infantry, cavalry, and artillery 8 hours 1.9 % 
         Total training hours: 407 hours  
 
 The “hands on” training conducted during the common core phase focused mostly on 
building the physical stamina of the candidates and on the fundamental skills required of all 
soldiers: formation drilling, route marching, and basic rifle marksmanship.  The core course was 
also intended to provide the students with the theoretical basis of the tactical employment of 
units.  However, most of the theoretic instruction throughout the entire three month course was 
to be given during scheduled conferences.  These conferences were intended to be seminars 
where the instructors guided the candidates through a discussion of the tactics, skills, or concepts 
which the students would practice during the week of training.  During the first month of the 
OTCs, the conferences focused on the FSR, IDR, Manual of Interior Guard Duty, and Army 
Regulations.  For example, candidates at the first OTC at Fort Sheridan attended conferences 
consisting of  “lectures by the instructors on American methods of warfare, continuing into the 
present day methods of foreign armies” to “establish a comprehensive understanding of the 
subject in the minds of the candidates.”43  Conferences held during the last two months of 
training delved deeper into the doctrinal material related to the candidates’ branch, as well as 
studies of the law of land warfare, field sanitation, the Manual for Courts Martial, and other 
subjects related to officership and administration. 
Unfortunately, far too many of these conferences consisted merely of the instructor 
reading from the given manual or lecturing, rather than a seminar intended to elicited any 
meaningful degree of student interaction.  Despite the fact that the conferences accounted for 
nearly 30 percent of the training in the core phase, and 25 percent of instruction in the branch 
                                                 
 43 History and Achievements of the Fort Sheridan Officers’ Training Camps, 208. 
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phase of the course, their overall value was questionable.  One veteran of the first OTC at Leon 
Springs, Texas, Gus Dittmar, recollected that he and his comrades gained little from the lectures 
and conferences that occupied their evenings.  He noted, “The classes were held in the mess 
halls, which were crowded and hot,” and, “everyone was tired and full of food and little 
interested in the dry language of the manuals.”44  This reality did not truly change over the 
course of the war.  In its guidance for the upcoming fourth OTCs, in April 1918 the War College 
warned instructors that,  
 Formal set lectures should be resorted to very infrequently, as they become  
  tiresome to the student and nonproductive in results.  Better results are obtained  
  when practical work is interspersed with short informal talks or conferences.  The  
  most important prerequisite to an interesting talk is that the speaker know his  
  subject thoroughly.45   
 
Apparently, this admonition did not take, and it seemed to be rather rare for a lecturer to retain 
the attention of his students throughout the war.  A candidate attending the fourth OTC at Camp 
Dodge (15 May-1 September 1918) who was so surprised at receiving an effective conference 
session that he was moved to exclaim, “The day of miracles is not past.  For within a fortnight 
have we witnessed the phenomena of an instructor’s holding the attention for two-hour periods 
of five hundred young men, all of whom are possessed of a proclivity for drowsiness.”46     
 Another reason for the failure of the conferences to be a more effective medium for 
educating the officer aspirants was the lack of time that the students had to prepare for the 
instruction.  The evening study period was to be the candidates’ time to read the materials to be 
discussed during the conferences or to prepare for the next day’s training.  Unfortunately, the 
                                                 
 44 Dittmar, 88. 
 45 “Advance Extract Copy of Program of Training for Training Camps for Candidates for Commission in 
the Army of the United States, May 15 to August 31, 1918” in RG 165 “Letters,… etc Officers’ Training Camps,” 
NARA Microfilm File 9226, Roll 261. 
 46 Carl Wilhelm et al, Pass in Review: The Book of the Fourth Officers’ Training School, Camp Dodge, 
Iowa, 1918 (Camp Dodge: Privately Published, 1918), 27. 
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candidates spent this time preparing their boots, uniform, equipment and rifle for the next 
morning’s inspection rather than using it for any deep study of the mysteries of the military art.  
This dilemma of time management was satirized by one late-war candidate-turned-poet. 
  Police the room and sweep the floor, 
  Shine each piece and clean the bore, 
  Scrub your neck, align the cot, 
  And wash your clothes before they rot, 
  Each tiny “Fob” must wear a shine, 
  But do these things in your Spare Time. 
 
  Pace o’er the hill and down the side, 
  Then make a scale to fit your stride, 
  Make a map of all you see, 
  And learn the Field Service from A to Z. 
  Estimate distance, do not resign- 
  But do these things in your Spare Time.47 
 
Although cadre members seemed to be aware of this evident problem with their pedagogy, they 
remained unable or unwilling to do anything to eliminate the problem.  Thus, while conferences 
and evening study accounted for nearly half the training time allocated for the first two series of 
OTCs, what the students actually gained from this theoretical tactical discussion is open to 
debate. 
The type and quality of the practical “hands on” that the candidates received during the 
core phase was also problematic.  All too often the training was nearly identical to that given to 
recruits, and little time was devoted to leadership development.  One attendee noted that the 
School of the Soldier and the School of the Squad occupied most of the training in his first 
month in camp.48  In a letter home, second OTC candidate Charles Sorust provided a thumbnail 
sketch of his daily schedule that highlights the basic recruit training approach that his cadre used 
during the first month of the course.  On 20 November 1917, he wrote, 
                                                 
 47 Spears., Damitall, 9. 
 48 Dittmar, 75. 
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  We get up at a quarter to six, have physical exercise at 6:15 AM, breakfast at a 
  quarter to seven, drill at 7:30 AM, then comes bayonette (sic) exercise at 8:30 
AM,   then medical hygiene . . . .at 9:40 AM, then drill and then locker inspection at 
  11:30 AM, and dinner at 11:45, then a[t] 1 o’clock we have bomb and hand 
  grenade throwing, we only throw bricks, and at 2:40 PM we dig trenches, and at 
  3:25 PM we have French class until 4:15 and then supper at 4:45 PM. . . After 
  supper I am either washing clothes or cleaning my rifle, because at 6 PM it is 
  very dark.49 
 
Another candidate at Fort Riley described his training as merely “throwing a gun around and 
hiking out in the country, taking bayonet exercise jabbing imaginary enemies through imaginary 
bodies, waving the semaphore signals and drilling in squads.”50  
 Although candidates with no prior military experience did need to experience and 
understand the basics of soldiering, close order drill and bayonet practice were given far too 
much emphasis by the cadre. The frequency which candidates mentioned close order drill, 
bayonet practice, and “wig wag” flag signaling in their letters and memoirs suggest that they 
spent more time in these areas, and less time in field training than was specified in the War 
Department’s central training curriculum.  John Hull, for instance, admitted that while his OTC, 
“didn’t teach you everything,” it at least, “gave you a start [so] you didn’t feel like a complete 
stranger when you joined a regiment.”  Nonetheless, he still characterized much as his training at 
the camp as, “quite a bit of close order drill.”51   
 These deviations from the proscribed War College curriculum were due mainly to 
problems with instructors, equipment shortages, training area restrictions, or other issues that 
were specific to individual camps (to be discussed below).  The biggest problem with these 
variations in training was that when the candidates became officers responsible for the training 
                                                 
49 Letter from Charles Sorust to Adelaide Bowen, dated 20 Nov 1917, Entry 435, Box 1 Special 
Collections, Robert W. Woodruff Library, Emory University.  
50 Milton E. Bernet, unpublished manuscript “The World War As I Saw It” in USAMHI WWI Vet Survey, 
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of their own soldiers, they tended to fall back upon their initial training, and thus also displayed 
a great penchant for marching and bayonet practice.  The differences in the training regimen of 
the various OTCs also meant that there were often great variances in the experience levels of the 
graduates when they reported to their units.  Since the early OTCs tended to feed officers to 
specific divisions, this accounted, to some extent, for the differences in training and readiness 
from division to division.   
Some of the practical training in the core phase also highlighted problems with the 
army’s prewar doctrine and the inconsistencies within its emerging tactical thought.  One of the 
great ironies of officers’ training was that while John J. Pershing proclaimed that the tactical 
doctrine of the American army would be built upon individual rifle marksmanship, the OTC 
students’ marksmanship training was only conducted to the level that the army had considered to 
be the bare minimum for a regular army recruit in 1916.52  Since these novice officers were to be 
the primary trainers for the National Army, this did not bode well for the future.   
The signal training was also problematic.  This training consisted of the students learning 
how to send and receive messages using visual signals; mostly using “wig wag” signal flags.  
Prewar doctrine had stressed that these types of signals would be one of the primary means of 
command and control in battle at the battalion level and below.  Given its doctrinal importance, 
the students spent nearly ten percent of their time in signal training.  Unfortunately, this training 
had little to no practical value.  As one candidate later stated, “Those who got to France were 
never able to recall having seen a semaphore flag used for anything other than a scarf around the 
neck of some mademoiselle, or as a pillow top in a French farm house.”53  
                                                 
 52 War Department Annual Report, 1919, 313-314. 
53 Dittmar, 74. 
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 The practical training during the last two months of the OTC was to instruct the 
candidates in the tactical, technical, and leadership skills they would use in their respective 
branches in combat.  This phase would also introduce the candidates to the weapons and tactics 
of trench warfare.  The War College staff intended that the average infantry candidate would 
spend 25.5 percent of the training time of the second phase of the course practicing platoon, 
company and battalion tactics.  Seven percent of the remaining time would be spent on learning 
the weapons and tactics of trench warfare (to include trench construction and machine gun drill), 
and 13 percent of the time would be devoted to rifle practice and unit firing.  With over 45 
percent of the candidate’s training time committed to “hands on” tactics and skills of trench and 
maneuver warfare, on paper the War College training plan was focused and logical.  In practice, 
however, the training far well short of the War College’s goal. 
   There can be no doubt that the second phase of training was rigorous and physically 
demanding.  Dwight Eisenhower, an instructor at the Fort Oglethorpe OTC, noted, “The training 
was tough- designed as much for weeding out the weak and inept as to instruct.”54  In fact, the 
pace of instruction was so rapid, that in his first letter to his wife after being reassigned from Fort 
Leavenworth to Fort Oglethorpe in late September 1917, Eisenhower wrote,  
  First of all I’ll explain why I have not written.  I arrived Sunday (23 September),  
  and was sent immediately to the trenches, and didn’t get out until tonight.  I could  
  leave them under no circumstances.  It was wet, cold, and it rained the whole  
  time.  To complicate matters, my baggage has not yet arrived so I had nothing  
  except what I had on when I left home.55 
 
The frenetic pace of the second phase was also noted by the candidates themselves.  Gus Dittmar 
recalled, “the fact that some men, who had been barely holding on by their finger nails and their 
teeth, now had to relinquish that hold, brought regret for these unfortunates and considerable 
                                                 
 54 Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 132.  
 55 Daniel D. Holt, ed., Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 1905-1941 (Baltimore: The 
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concern for themselves, from those that were still in the running.”56  But, rigorous and physically 
demanding training does not always equate to effective training.   
 Although the tactical training at the OTC was demanding, in many areas it failed at 
adequately preparing the students for the tactical and leadership challenges that they would face 
in France.  Part of this problem was that the War Department never fully understood exactly 
what skills and training the candidate needed to be sound combat leaders.  Throughout the war, it 
wrangled with the issue of finding the right balance between training for trench warfare and 
“open warfare.”  Although Pershing constantly criticized the state-side army for failing to 
properly train France-bound officers and soldiers for “open warfare,” as we shall later see, the 
iron commander never truly defined the exact meaning of his term, nor the skills required to 
wage it.   
 In forming its training plans for the OTCs, the War College made the valid assumption 
that trench warfare would be the predominate condition that American forces would face 
throughout 1917 and 1918.     As late as April 1918, the staff officers writing the War College’s 
training plan for the fourth OTCs, maintained, 
  An increased armament and the more highly organized defenses has, to a very  
  great extent, modified the methods of combat, maneuver, or open warfare, for  
  which we have prepared so extensively in the past, [and] have given place, at least 
  temporally to a trench or positional warfare.  We must not, however, lose sight of  
  the fact that there has been no change of basic principles—merely a change in the  
  method of employing them…Nor must we allow ourselves to forget that although  
  the contestants are at present engaged in trench or positional warfare, it may later  
  develop into an open warfare or a combination of the two. To prepare for one  
  class, then, to the utter exclusion of the other, would be the height of folly.57  
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Even Pershing believed that the AEF would not be fully deployed and trained until 1919, and 
thus assumed that all of his units would spend some time in the trenches.58  Consequently, there 
was some consensus among the U. S. Army’s senior leaders that the AEF would have a period of 
time to fill in its units’ training gaps and to have them learn some of the aspects of trench warfare 
by actually serving at the front.  Despite all of Pershing’s carping, officer candidates throughout 
the war actually spent much more time training for maneuver warfare rather than trench warfare. 
 Regardless of the type of warfare the training focused on, the greatest problem with the 
tactical instruction that the candidates received was that it failed to replicate the conditions that 
they would face in actual combat.  Not surprisingly, tactical training for infantry candidates in 
the last two month of the course was based on concepts pulled directly out of the IDR. One 
student at Leon Springs noted that during his field training and maneuvers, his unit concentrated 
mostly on moving forward as skirmishers under the direction of the platoon commander’s 
whistle to build up firing lines and gain fire superiority in a manner specified in the regulations.59  
In a similar vein, the training at Fort Sheridan consisted of advance by a “forward attacking line” 
that rushed ahead and then, “flopped to the ground and opened up with rapid flashes.”  
Command was exercised by “crouching figures” who, “ran haltingly back and forth along the 
line.”  As at Leon Springs, these maneuvers were done in the manner proscribed by the IDR for 
building up a firing line in preparation for an attacker’s assault upon an entrenched defender.60  
Throughout all of this training, recalled a Fort Sheridan candidate, the instructors emphasized 
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17., Trask, The AEF and Coalition Warmaking, 78-9.  
 59 Dittmar, 112-114. 
 60 History and Achievements of the Fort Sheridan Officers’ Training Camps, 208-13. 
  286
that, “Bayonet work was an important branch of infantry specialization” and a vital part of the 
attack.61 
 The problem was these tactics and assumptions had long been proven invalid on the 
battlefields of France.  The building up of skirmish lines and attempts to gain infantry fire 
superiority before assaulting had been shown to only stall attacks short of their objectives and 
thus subject the attacker to higher casualties as their units remained for longer durations in areas 
swept by artillery, machine gun, and rifle fire.  This point was not lost on those officers who later 
commanded in combat.  Looking back on his officer training, one combat veteran noted, 
  …Our army had learned no lessons of modern warfare as developed 
  in Europe in the two years the war had been going on.  This was 
  again in evidence in the 1st Training Camp for officers… much time 
  (was) wasted in learning methods. . .which were useless in Europe.62 
 
The lack of realism at the Camp Root OTC led F. L. Miller to dismiss his training as “three 
months spent…learning wig-wag and semaphore signaling and reenacting Civil War combat 
problems through the mosquita (sic) filled swamps of Arkansas.”63   
 Even the training in trench warfare left a lot to be desired.  Much of the time devoted to 
this subject was actually spent by the candidates physically digging the trenches they would use 
in training.  Although there was some value in the future officers understanding the intricacies of 
sighting trenches and  the time and physical exertion it required to dig them, the value of this 
experience was not in line with the time and effort devoted to it.  After being set to dig trenches 
one Fort Sheridan aspirant bluntly asked, “What is the use of my learning to do this?  I could get 
a Dago to do it better than I could for a few dollars a day and it will cost me more than that to get 
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62 Morale Branch Officers’ Survey, 52.    
63 F.L. Miller, unpublished manuscript “The War to End All Wars,” Special Collections, Robert W. 
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fixed up after this mess.”64  Some of the candidates at the Leon Springs OTC in 1917 also 
wondered at the utility of physically digging trenches.  One wit offered that at least, “When you 
get discharged from this man’s army you can always get a job as a grave digger.”65  
 Once the candidates completed the trenches, the tactics they learned in attacking and 
defending them were also flawed.  The tactics used for attacking trenches were those listed in the 
IDR, and generally the same that the candidates had learned for open warfare: waves of attackers 
steadily building up a firing line to gain fire superiority over the defenders.  As Candidate 
Dittmar noted,       
  After the fundamentals of attacking a trench system had been mastered, the  
  companies staged simulated attacks on the enemy positions.  These followed to  
  the letter the latest techniques extracted from secret War Department manuals.   
  The instructors emphasized the necessity for ferocity in action, which the students 
  accepted as a release for their exuberance and possibly as a palliative for the  
  resentment they held against the rocky soil that had made trench digging so  
  unpleasant.  With wild yells, gritted teeth and much colorful language they poured 
  into the trenches, sticking, knifing, and clubbing the simulated defenders.  It was a 
  bad day for the defenders.66 
 
Although he mentioned “secret War Department manuals,” it is clear from his other descriptions 
of his training that the tactics stated in these unnamed guides must have differed little from the 
IDR or not been followed as intended.  Also, his simulated attack was not met with the shell and 
small arms fire that had tended to make more “bad days” for the attackers than for the defenders 
of the Western Front. This lack of realism was not localized at Leon Springs.  In a letter written 
shortly before his graduation from the Fort Riley OTC, Milton Bernet wrote, 
For the past week we have been studying barbed wire entanglements and trench 
warfare as it is now fought in Europe; and believe me it is some study.  We 
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charge from one trench to the next, stabbing the dummies as we go in with our 
bayonets, occupying and investing the trench and then go on to the next.67 
 
It is interesting to note that no mention was made by either candidate of any supporting fires by 
artillery, trench mortars, or machine guns to aid them in their assaults.  However, the fact that 
both wrote of wild bayonet attacks on the “enemy” speaks volumes of the focus and assumptions 
of their training.  
 The one real attempt to add some realism to the trench warfare training at Leon Springs 
actually fizzled.   In an effort to demonstrate how large mines had been used in France to destroy 
strong points, at the culmination of the trench warfare training, the cadre exploded a mine 
consisting of several hundred pounds of TNT under the trench works that the candidates had 
constructed.  Unfortunately, most of the candidates were worn out from a lack of sleep and from 
their week in the trenches, and were fast asleep in the warm Texas sun when the mine 
exploded.68  
 The War Department’s leadership was not unaware of the problems with training at the 
first OTCs.  On 1 August 1917, Brigadier General McCain warned the Chief of Staff that, “The 
men in the present Officers’ Camps have not received adequate instruction in the methods of 
modern war by officers familiar with [the] new conditions.”69  As a stop-gap measure, he 
recommended the establishment of divisional schools for musketry, grenades, trench mortars, 
trench construction, and gas protection, where at least one officer per company would be trained 
to be instructors in those subjects for their own soldiers.  One officer, Major General William 
Snow was so disgusted by the training at the OTCs that he acerbically observed, “The only 
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uniformity among them was that each was distinguished for its wholly inadequate course of 
instruction, its incompetent instructors, and its insufficient equipment.”70 
 The sad reality of this lack of realism and effectiveness in training was that this was in an 
area that the army could have easily addressed.  As was shown in the last chapter, the army had 
indications that its tactical doctrine was being called into question by events in Europe even 
before America entered the war.  Once in the conflict, there were several sources that continued 
to repudiate many of the Americans’ tactical assumptions.  In early 1917, Harvard University 
succeeded in having a French officer, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Azan, assigned to its faculty to 
aid American officers in teaching its ROTC students military science. While at Harvard, Azan 
published two books, The War of Positions (1917) and The Warfare of Today (1918).  Both of 
these works offered a stark repudiation of American doctrine and an honest appraisal of the ugly 
attritional realities of modern war.  He informed his young charges,  
   Hitherto, it was the infantry of the two opposing sides that came into collision; the 
  victory went to the one which at the last moment could avail itself of further  
  reserves to throw in against the troops already exhausted by combat.  But today,  
  the effects of artillery on the earthworks and guns of the enemy is the decisive  
  factor in success; victory goes to that army which has guns in good condition and  
  abundant munitions, as against the enemy whose supplies has given out.  The  
  flinging of innumerable infantrymen against batteries that are still intact results in  
  nothing but useless slaughter.71 
 
Azan was unequivocal in his statement that, “Infantry is powerless without the aid of artillery,” 
and that it “can make no attempt against a position unless the artillery has destroyed the 
accessory defenses, smashed the trenches and demoralized their occupants.”72  He concluded that  
for an attack to succeed, the infantry must, “advance with prudence and method, with the 
constant support of its artillery.”73    
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 Warnings also came from other foreign officers inspecting the training conducted at the 
OTCs.  The American officer accompanying a general from the Russian Military Mission passed 
on the Russian’s following observations,  
  The advance to attack by rushes, the attack both at drill and in the maneuvers  
  which he saw, could be, in his opinion, with one machine gun, properly   
  concealed, entirely wiped out in thirty seconds leaving no one except the dead and 
  wounded.  Such training is to his mind worse than a loss of time.  It inculcates  
  wrong ideas in future officers…He was quite astonished that no apparent effort  
  was ever made for invisibility, [of] either men, trenches or guns.” 
 
The Russian general further recommended that in addition to resolving these glaring problems, 
the officer training need more emphasis on methods of conducting relief in place operations, 
ensuring lateral and rearward communications, the proper employment of barb wire, and night 
patrolling.74  
 One wonders why, if these shortcomings were so apparent, the War Department did not 
do more to eliminate them?  Part of this problem was due to the Regular Army officer corps’ 
faith that their methods and doctrine were innately superior to the Europeans.  Despite obvious 
evidence to the contrary, nothing shook this fundamental belief in American exceptionalism 
throughout the war.  Nowhere was that more evident than in the words and actions of Pershing 
and his senior commanders and staff officers.  Pershing insisted that the stalemate in France was 
an aberration and that the American army's superior drive, morale and marksmanship would 
ultimately force the Germans out of their trenches.  Once free from the trenches and into "open 
warfare," the Americans' greater skill and ability at maneuver would allow them to corner and 
destroy the inferior German army.75  Furthermore, many Americans, from Pershing to the most 
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junior lieutenant, convinced themselves that years in the trenches had blunted the offensive edge 
of the Allies and had sapped their aggressiveness, initiative and will to win.  As one senior GHQ 
staff officer argued, 
 In many respects, the tactics and techniques of our allies are not suited to 
 American characteristics or the American mission in this war.  The French do not 
 like the rifle, do not know how to use it, and the infantry is consequently too 
 entirely dependent upon a powerful artillery support.  Their infantry lacks 
 aggressiveness and discipline.  The British infantry lacks initiative and 
 leadership.76 
 
Given their high casualty rates, the American could argue, with some justification, that perhaps 
the French and British tactical methods were far from proven.  However, these American 
attitudes did make it difficult to create training plans for the OTCs, and the rest of the army, that 
were grounded in the combat realities the Americans would face in France.  
 Further evidence of these American attitudes, and their baleful influence on officer 
training, can be found by examining the debates within the General Staff over the use of Allied 
instructors in the American OTCs.  Despite the abiding faith of the officer corps in the 
superiority of American methods, some senior officers admitted that perhaps it would be wise to 
have Allied officers at least conduct some degree of training on the unique aspects of trench 
warfare.  In terms that highlighted what he viewed as the “peculiarity” of the military conditions 
in France, on 16 April 1917, the Adjutant General wrote to the Chief of Staff recommending 
that, 
  These training camps should be provided with a corps of instructors competent to  
  teach our prospective officers…those military subjects of the first importance in  
  connection with the character of military operations they are most likely to engage 
  in.  This suggests the advisability of thorough and detailed instruction in the  
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  character of warfare now conducted along the west front in Europe.  Undoubtedly  
  England and France have hundreds of officers physically disabled but mentally  
  competent, and possessing valuable recent experience in the character of warfare  
  referred to.  It is believed that the British and French governments will gladly  
  authorize such officers to visit the United States and be assigned as instructors in  
  our training camps.77  
 
When McCain’s request was forwarded to Brigadier General Joseph Kuhn, the Chief of the War 
College Division, for comment, Kuhn agreed with McCain’s recommendations but wanted a 
very circumscribed roll for the foreign officers.  He noted that, “Such officers could best be 
employed in giving lectures and demonstrations to the officers and prospective officers of our 
forces” on trench weapons and other technical subjects, but noted that the American tactical 
“organization and methods of administration are so different from the European methods that 
foreign officers would be at a decided disadvantage if compelled to adapt themselves to a new 
system.”  He conclude by noting, “The War College Division has now in course of preparation a 
series of manuals or pamphlets covering the methods and devices of trench warfare, and it is 
probable that by this means we should be able in time to give the necessary instruction to our 
forces.”78 
 Not all members of the War College Division agreed with the recommendation to use 
foreign instructors in even a limited manner.  The General Staff’s Colonel William Johnston 
argued that employing French and British officers would be “a decided reflection upon the 
ability of officers of the United States Army to teach the duties of company officers to candidates 
for the Reserve Officers’ Corps.”  Johnston maintained that the candidates “will have ample 
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[material] to learn of an elementary nature, without attempting to acquire personal expertness in 
throwing bombs and other arts peculiar to warfare on the Western Front.”  He stressed, “To give 
instruction of this character would be equivalent to teaching chemistry and philosophy by lecture 
to one not yet able to read.”  Johnson concluded that “After our forces have had the year’s 
training essential, according to all previous plans, and if there is then contemplated sending an 
expedition to the Continent, the peculiar training now useful in France can be given [to] our 
forces after landing there” (original emphasis).  A vote by the 15 staff members of the War 
College Division on the proposal to use foreign instructors laid bare the passions that the subject 
evoked.  Johnston and five other officers (40%) dissented from Kuhn’s recommendation.79   
 Both Kuhn’s and Johnson’s positions offer insights into the attitudes and prejudices of 
the Regular Officer corps.  Any thought that the American doctrine was flawed or any 
admittance that foreign officers had something important to offer the U. S. Army seemed to them 
as a stain upon the professionalism that they had striven so hard to build since the late 1800s.  
The down side of these attitudes was that they continued to hobble the training of American 
leaders, both in the United States and in France, throughout the war.  As late as August 1918, the 
commander of the Infantry Central Officers’ Training School at Camp Lee, Virginia, Colonel 
Harry Eaton, wrote to the Chief of the War Plans Division’s Training and Instruction Branch 
complaining about the assignment of two veteran British officers to his unit to serve as tactics 
instructors.  Eaton reported that, “it is not practicable to use these officers to advantage in this 
kind of instruction.” He went on to state, 
  Really British officers are not desired for purposes other than bayonet and   
  physical training, gas, and scouting and patrolling.  Inasmuch as the policy is now 
  to develop our own instructors, work is progressing along that line and the one  
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  British officer on duty to supervise that instruction is sufficient.  It is   
  recommended that these two officers be relieved and sent to some place where  
  their services can be utilized to better advantage.80 
 
It is amazing that in a time when he and other commanders were hard pressed to find qualified 
American instructors for their candidate schools, Eaton was so quick to dispense with men with a 
great deal of combat and instructional experience.  However, this action goes a long way toward 
understanding why the wartime training of officer candidates was not as effective as it might 
have been. 
 Although the regular officer corps was reluctant to accept foreign instructors, they 
showed much less reticence in accepting French and British manuals and doctrinal publications. 
Ironically, this willingness to use these works contributed to the confusion and lack of focus in 
the training of American officers and units.  In the spring and summer of 1917 both the Army 
War College and the AEF embarked on a printing spree of foreign manuals.  Unfortunately, there 
seems to have been little thought given to reconciling discrepancies between the various works.  
For example, the War College’s July 1917 translation of the French Manual for Commanders of 
Infantry Platoons describes and illustrates formations and tactics that were completely different 
from the British ones they printed in Notes on Recent Operations, Number 3 just a month later.81   
Both of these differ from the tactics and formations printed in the War Department’s June 1917 
Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action and the AEF’s August 1917 
translation of the French Manual of the Chief of Platoon of Infantry.   
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 To add to the confusion, the War College’s Manual for Commanders of Infantry Platoons 
and the AEF’s Manual of the Chief of Platoon of Infantry come from the same French work.  
The discrepancies in translation lay with what the two entities chose to omit or emphasize.  The 
War College manual omitted much of the material that the French original had devoted to “the 
formation and movement” of both the platoon and company.82  The little discussion that the 
manual does include in these areas is sketchy and poorly illustrated.  All in all, the manual was 
much stronger in its discussion of the defense than in the offense.  To further muddy the waters, 
in May 1917, the War College had also translated and printed the French 1916 Instructions on 
the Offensive Conduct of Small Units.  While this work was similar to the Manual for 
Commanders of Infantry Platoons, it was poorly illustrated and different enough in the details it 
illustrated of the attack to sow confusion in any reader of both manuals.  By the time the War 
Department finally resolved this issue in the early summer of 1918 by reprinting the AEF’s latest 
edition of Instructions on the Offensive Conduct of Small Units with the supplement illustrating 
the new formations and deployments (issued by the AEF in April 1918), it was too late to be 
used in the United States by the majority of American junior officers who saw combat during the 
war.83    
 The overarching purpose of any tactical doctrine is to establish a common understanding 
in the minds of an army’s officers and men of how units are to operate in combat.  The doctrine 
tells everyone their roles in battle and provides an outline for how units react to given tactical 
situations.  In the confusion of the battlefield, as units become intermeshed and leaders become 
casualties, having everyone on “the same sheet of music” is of vital importance.  With the AEF 
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“freelancing” its own doctrine and the War College printing a host of foreign materials with no 
effort made to reconcile the discrepancies or illustrate how they meshed with American doctrinal 
thought, one wonders if it can be said that the U. S. Army never truly had a doctrine during the 
war.   
 What did these doctrinal problems mean to the officer candidate training at an OTC?  As 
discussed previously, Gus Dittmar clearly stated that his tactical training was based on the “latest 
techniques extracted from secret War Department manuals,” and yet in execution, it seemed to 
have actually mirrored the tactics of the IDR.84  The War Department itself, and the instructors in 
the camps, were the culprits responsible for this contradiction.  It was also pointless to have 
manuals describe the employment of weapons, such as the VB rifle grenade and the Chauchat 
automatic rifle, when no such arms were on hand in the OTCs. 
 In addition to all of the foreign manuals the army was printing, the War Department 
never stopped printing its own doctrinal materials.  In the spring of 1917, the War department 
published Notes on Infantry Cavalry and Field Artillery.  This publication was a compilation of 
lectures given by American officers to the second class of provisional Regular Army lieutenants 
at Fort Leavenworth.  In mid-1917 the War Department reissued the work as a “special reprint 
for Officers’ Training Camps” and sent it to the various OTCs.  When it came to infantry tactics, 
Major Harold Fiske asked the rhetorical question, “Will our drill regulations require radical 
modification to conform to the experience of the great war?”  His answer was a confident, “No,” 
because, “The formations contemplated and the principles taught in our drill regulations have 
been proven in the main correct.”85  He rather melodramatically reassured his readers that while, 
“All of the pomp and circumstances of war have gone from the battlefield of to-day, but its 
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harshness, cruelty, and brutality are more than ever in evidence,” ultimately, “So much more 
glorious…is it in the infantry that endures and conquers.”86  With this profusion of contradictory 
official sources, and with no official guidance as to their use, it is no wonder that the instructors 
at the OTC either attempted to reconcile the sources themselves, thus further fragmenting 
doctrine, or simply fell back to what they knew: the obsolete tactics of the IDR.  In the tactics 
described by Dittmar, the instructors seemed to have merely cloaked old ideas with new 
terminology.        
 While on the subject of instruction in the first two series of OTCs, it is also important to 
discuss how the problem of obtaining qualified instructors contributed to the poor training of the 
officer candidates.  From the beginning of mobilization the War Department knew that it was 
going to have a problem finding enough qualified instructors for the OTCs.  In his 23 April 1917 
memorandum to Departmental Commanders ordering them to establish the OTCs, General 
McCain noted,  
  In making provision for instructors at these training camps, the resources of the  
  War Department have been taxed to the utmost.  The number of instructors is not  
  nearly as great as it should be, but it is hoped and believed that many reserve  
  officers and candidates for appointment as such who will be in attendance at those 
  camps will have special qualifications to teach certain subjects and in this to be of 
  material assistance to the Regular Army officer.87 
 
The selection of these reserve and student instructors was left up to the company commanders of 
the OTCs, and a number of them ended up being recent Plattsburg graduates or regular army 
NCOs attending the camps as candidates.88  The looming teacher problem led General Kuhn to 
recommend to the Chief of Staff on 25 April 1917 that, “With the probable shortage in 
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instructors, and these instructors differing widely in experience and ability, the schedule must 
follow rather definitely certain prescribed text-books to obtain any sort of uniformity in 
instruction.”  Unfortunately, in the same memorandum, he noted that the army would also be 
very short of the exact manuals needed to attain his desired uniformity.89    
 In the excitement of the early days of mobilization, a number of regular officers were 
actively searching for exciting jobs and chances for advancement.  This frenzy of requests for 
transfer led one colonel to denounce the fact that, “At present there is an hysterical desire of 
many officers to teach anybody anywhere, something technical or unusual.”  He was angered by 
the fact that these officers expressed, “no anxiety to stay with our Regular regiments and 
discharge the duties for which line officers are authorized and paid.”90  The colonel’s statement 
reflects one of the great challenges that came with mobilization: where could the army best 
employ its active officers?  The Adjutant General had to juggle the competing demands of 
providing officers for existing and new regular army units, new National Army units, National 
Guard units short of their commissioned ranks, and the OTCs and other new entities created by 
the war.  There were simply not enough regular officers to go around.   
 The Adjutant General did the best he could in reconciling the various calls for regular 
officers, and the first OTCs did get a large cut from the personnel pie.  The number of regular 
officers assigned to a given OTC varied according to the number of classes held at the post, and 
the general availability of officers obtainable for reassignment.  At Leon Springs, Texas, for 
example, the OTC cadre consisted of 101 Regular, National Guard, and reserve officers.  The 
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camp administrative staff consisted of 28 officers under the camp commander, a Regular Army 
full colonel.  The other members of the staff included a camp adjutant, Quartermaster, Ordnance, 
and mess officers (generally from the regulars), each with their own assistant officers, two 
Regular Army sergeants major, three medical officers and twelve corpsmen. 
 The instructional staff consisted of 73 officers under the direction of a Regular Army 
Senior Instructor in the rank of lieutenant colonel or major of infantry or field artillery.  The 
Senior Instructor, aided by two Regular Army Assistant Senior Instructors, oversaw the training 
given by 16 infantry, five field artillery, one engineer, and two coast artillery instructors all 
drawn from the regular officer ranks.  These instructors, in turn, were supported by 32 infantry, 
five field artillery, and four coast artillery assistant instructors consisting of officers from the 
National Army or Reserves.91   
 The first OTC at Fort Sheridan was commanded by a Regular Army colonel, had a 
regular lieutenant colonel as the senior instructor, and two regular majors as the battalion 
commanders.  Each of the 28 companies of candidates was commanded by a Regular Army 
captain or first lieutenant.  The company commander was the senior instructor of his company 
and was supported by two assistant instructors drawn from the ranks of the recently created 
reserve officer corps.  Most of these reserve officers were graduates of the pre-war Plattsburg 
camps, and few had any real military experience to draw upon in their instruction.92  
 Although the regular officers took pride in their professionalism, being a good officer did 
not necessarily make for a good instructor.  This meant that even in the first two series of OTCs, 
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in camps with the largest cadres of regular officers during the war, the quality of instruction 
could vary wildly from company to company.  Some candidates spoke admiringly of their 
Regular Army cadre.  A Fort Sheridan candidate recalled that, “The men were quick to perceive 
in them qualities of real leadership and an unusual loyalty developed between the Regular Army 
officers who had showed any distinguished characteristics and the men who were to be the 
leaders of the new National Army.”93   
 Other candidates were much more critical of their Regular Army cadre members.  In May 
1917, future World War II general Lucian Truscott was a private serving in a cavalry regiment 
on the Mexican border when he decided to apply for officer’s training.  Truscott later admitted 
that, “Military education at the training camp had been austere and elementary” and “It had been 
conducted for the most part by instructors who seemed to know little more than the 
candidates.”94  William M. Briggs’ experience was similar to Truscott’s.  He recalled that while 
his training company commander and instructor was a West Point graduate and a dedicated 
officer, “he was still going by tactics learned in the Civil War.”  He noted that some of his 
regular officer instructors “were strict to the point of ridiculousness,” and that “the old West 
Pointers and regular army men were more interested in drilling, and were not aware of the newer 
means of carrying on a war as was going on in Europe.”95  Edwin Engleman thought that the 
officers conducting his training were “rather domineering at times,” but also believed that this 
tendency was worse among the reserve officers than among the regulars.  He also believed that 
many made poor instructors.  Engleman recalled that during his first attempt to fire the             
.45 caliber Colt pistol, the recoil of the weapon, “jumped up” in his hands.  As a result, his 
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instructors pulled him from the firing line and made him clean pistols, “rather than explaining 
what to do to prevent such action” in the future.96   
 Poor instruction left a lasting impression on the officers who went through the first 
OTCs.  When the War Plans Division’s Morale Branch surveyed officers returning from France 
in 1919, many remained bitter over the poor training that they had received at the OTCs.  One 
artillery first lieutenant noted that “officers acting as instructors at these camps were often poor 
judges of men and lacking in knowledge of methods and subject matter.”  Another wrote “My 
instructor in Field Artillery was a Coast Artillery Captain who knew nothing of Field Artillery.” 
An infantry captain later bluntly recalled, "I have never seen such pathetic attempts at instruction 
as I saw in the First Officers Training Camp."97   
 One candidate, Raymond Phelan, was so concerned about the training he was receiving at 
the first OTC that in July 1917 he wrote directly to Secretary of War Baker.  Phelan informed 
Baker that,  
  I share the pretty general opinion expressed in many different ways that there is  
  room for improvement in some important directions in conducting our training  
  camps.  In the first place, the system of instruction, with the very best   
  intentions…on the part of the officers, has so worked as to encourage belief in the 
  American idea that “getting by” is the proper test of right and wrong. 
 
He roundly criticized the “recitation system” used by many instructors and their lack of 
“pedagogic skill in questioning.” The candidate concluded that, “It would be better also if all 
instructors set down, or thought out their questions before coming to class,” and that  “much 
would be gained if officers and other leaders planned out action on problems before the company 
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falls in.”98   
 Although Baker was aware of the instructor problem, there was little he, or anyone else in 
the upper echelons of the War Department, could do about it.  The pace of mobilization 
prevented any meaningful effort to find or train competent instructors for the OTCs, and the War 
Department’s own personnel management system further hobbled this effort.  For example, as 
soon as the first OTC class at Fort Sheridan graduated in August 1917, the War Department 
reassigned most of the regular officers that served as the camp’s instructors and staff, leaving 
only a handful of officers to prepare for the next camp.  Shortly after the start of the second 
OTC, the army reassigned nearly all of the remaining regulars and replaced them with reserve 
officers who had only recently graduated themselves from the first OTC.99  This unfortunate 
process would be repeated throughout the war. 
 One of the few viable recommendations for coping with the instructor shortage was 
offered by Colonel Chauncey Baker in July 1917.  Baker headed a mission sent to France by the 
General Staff to observe training in the AEF.  He recommended that, “after a limited number of 
officers have been trained and have had experience of serving in the line in France, they be sent 
to the United States to assist in instructing troops.”  He also asked that the War Department send 
the AEF 208 “extra reserve officers” to aid in the establishment of the AEF’s school system and 
to serve as instructors in France.100  Not surprisingly, Pershing was unwilling to strip the AEF of 
experienced officers and the War Department had no extra reserve officers readily available to 
send to France to either establish the AEF’s school system or replace those officers who might 
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have left France to serve as instructors in the States.  Ultimately, only a small number of officers 
were ever reassigned from the AEF to teach at stateside schools during the war.    
 In addition to problems with doctrine and instructors, in the OTCs found that their 
training was hindered by shortages of equipment and the other growing pains of mass 
mobilization as all other organizations in the U. S. Army experienced.  The army entered the war 
with no mortars, tanks, grenades, or gas masks, and many of its machine guns and artillery were 
obsolete.  The OTCs had to scrape by using whatever they could borrow from local posts or 
requisition from the army’s overburdened supply system.  The shortages were particularly acute 
in machine guns and artillery.  A graduate of the Fort Sheridan OTC recalled that meaningful 
artillery training was stifled in his camp because “guns and horses were sadly lacking.”  Given 
these shortages, artillery instruction denigrated into a series of lectures where, 
  The dismounting of the gun was explained and also such weird sounding terms 
  as angle of site, mil and corrector.  The circle of eager listeners strained eyes 
  and ears in an effort to catch every word.  Queer names were scrawled in   
  notebooks.  At the end of the lecture, heads whirled like a rotating band blown 
  through a rifled tube.101 
 
All of these shortages contributed to the first OTC’s lack of realism and hindered the candidates’ 
ability to fully understand the challenges they faced leading small units in modern war.   
 In May 1917, nearly all the camps also suffered shortages of basic necessities such as 
uniforms and shelter.  One of the first things that struck Gus Dittmar when he reported to Leon 
Springs was the confused, hurried, and incomplete nature of training camp.  Workmen were still 
constructing the barracks, so the candidates’ first weeks were spent in tents.  The lack of 
uniforms meant that a number of candidates drilled in mud and mire dressed in civilian suits and 
“light low quarter shoes and silk sock” that were “about as suitable for the conditions as would 
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have been a coon skin coat in the Fiji Islands.”102  Likewise, Edward Chayes noted that upon 
arriving at his training camp, “everything seemed confused and out of control, the camp was 
recently constructed and not yet running smoothly.”103  Although these problems resolved 
themselves over time, they do serve to illustrate the unsettled state of most aspects of the army in 
1917.  
The ultimate problem with the lack of realistic training in the first OTCs was the long 
term impact that this shortfall had on the overall effectiveness of the American army.  As already 
stated, since the OTC graduates became the primary instructors of the new army, any flaws with 
their training were redoubled in the instruction of the larger force.  This will be discussed at 
length in Chapter Eight.  There was also a psychological price to be paid for failing to present an 
accurate view of the war in Europe and the harsh challenges that the officers would face as 
combat leaders in the OTC’s training.  The graduating officers of the OTCs often left with an 
overly unrealistic and romantic view of war in general and warfare on the Western Front in 
particular.  Although the Europeans entered the war with similar false visions of glory, the 
reality and the thousands of wounded returning from the front made it impossible for their 
armies to maintain their rosy illusions of combat.  Photos from the various OTCs show men 
training in immaculate trenches and making mock attacks in formations that would have made 
Frederick the Great smile.104  A graduate from the Plattsburg OTC wrote in 1917 that America's 
entry into the war would return the Western Front to "the warfare of the old days, the warfare of 
our own West and South, when sabers flashed to the beats of galloping horses, and men went 
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miles over the top instead of yards."105  In a similar vein one OTC student wrote home, “Just 
think of it!  The future may hold in store for me the chance to charge with thousands of other 
horsemen the retreating Germans being hurled back to Berlin.”106   
 These unrealistic and romantic views even appeared in the semi-official handbooks 
popular among reserve officers.  The Plattsburg Manual, which along with Moss’ Officers’ 
Manual, was one of the most popular semi-official works purchased by wartime officers.  They 
assured young officers that trenches and machine guns could be overcome by a vigorous attack 
pushed to the point of “bayonet against bayonet, man against man, and nerve against nerve.”  In 
the attack the soldier’s “clear eye and steady nerves, his soul’s blood and iron, constitute a better 
defense than steel and concrete.”107  The officers’ own self-delusions, their sketchy training at 
the OTCs, and the army’s visions of an American attaque outrance all combined to overshadow 
the need for tactical “know how.”   Unfortunately, this war would not be like the Civil War, 
where a junior officer’s leadership was judged by his personal bravery and ability to keep a 
dressed line moving forward.  It would rather be a war that required a deep understanding of how 
to combine the effects of a host of weapons, and one where the junior officers often operated in 
the loneliness and isolation of the “empty” yet deadly battlefield.  This lack of psychological 
preparation for the deadly realities of modern combat would later prove to be disheartening and 
disillusioning to many officers in France.     
 The army held the second series of OTCs at sixteen army posts from 27 August to 27 
November 1917.  As previously noted, there were very few changes to the training programs in 
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these camps, though the issue of instructors was more acute than in the first camps.  The War 
Department estimated that it received approximately 70,000 applications to attend the second 
camps, and it ultimately selected 20,000 to attend.  The second series of OTCs commissioned 
17,237 new officers, with the infantrymen again accounting for over half of the total number.  
With the exception of 59 men commissioned as majors, the rest were all company grade 
officers.108  The quality of the candidates in terms of education and prior military experience was 
close to those of the first series.  It should be noted that the War Department also established a 
“special” OTC for African American candidates that overlapped both the first and second OTCs 
for white candidates.  This OTC was opened at Fort Des Moines, Iowa, on 18 June 1917 and 
concluded on 18 October 1917.   
 For the applicants to the second OTCs, the War Department was a bit clearer in stating 
the characteristics that it was seeking in its officers.  On 4 June 1917, the Adjutant General 
issued a memorandum directing the Departmental Commanders to establish the second series of 
OTCs.  In the memorandum, the applicants were asked to list any previous military experience 
they had in the Regular Army, National Guard, college cadet corps or ROTC, civilian training 
camps, or with foreign armies.  They were also to attest to any “mental training” they had gained 
from “study in educational institutions, or systematic and extensive study at home, or from 
constant dealing with difficult, complex, or technical problems in business or professional life,” 
as well as showing past evidence of “Executive Experience and Opportunities for Leadership” 
from their business, professional, civic or other practices that indicated the “character of 
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responsibility assumed and success attained.”  The army made clear that “every effort will be 
made to select men of exceptional character and proved ability in their various occupations,” and 
that, “While it is desired to give full opportunity for all eligible citizens to apply, no man need 
make application whose record is not in all respects above reproach and who does not possess 
the fundamental characteristics necessary to inspire respect and confidence.” The only major 
difference between the first and second camps was a slight change to the ages that the War 
Department was seeking in its applicants.  Although the age limits remained 20 years and nine 
months to 44 years old, the memorandum noted, “in order to obtain the experienced class of men 
desired preference will be given to men over 30 years of age [with] other things being equal.”109   
 The issue of the ideal age for company officers that the memorandum raised sparked a 
debate that continued throughout the war.  In the planning for the third series of OTC, the Acting 
Chief of the War College Division, Colonel P. D. Lochridge disagreed with the Adjutant 
General’s earlier age preferences.  He stated that  “The peculiar requirements of the present 
warfare calls for extreme physical fitness and activity, especially on the part of officers in the 
grade of lieutenant and captain…It is believed that men under the age of 31 years will best meet 
these extreme physical requirements.”110  Five months later, Leonard Wood weighed in on the 
subject.  Wood argued that,    
 … fifteen percent of the officers be men from thirty-one to forty-five years of age, -all of  
 coarse, to be men who are physically and mentally fit.  We need a percentage of older 
 officers to give a steadying influence upon the large number of new and only partially 
 trained men who are coming in.  The troops are inexperienced and the officers are young, 
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 inexperienced and only partially trained.  A reasonable percentage of older men will have 
 a beneficial effect.111 
 
Colonel Charles Miller disagreed with both the Adjutant General and Wood.  In August 1918 he 
argued that no one over the age of 35 should be admitted to officer training due to their physical 
limitations, the difficulty that an older man had in “adjusting himself in the new life and 
surrounding,” and the fact that after 35 the individual’s, “enthusiasm and buoyancy of spirit of 
youth is on the wane.” He further groused that if the older candidate failed at officer training he 
was of little other utility to the army for he would prove “very likely to be only mediocre 
material for [a] non-commissioned officer.”112   
 All of these arguments had merit, but ultimately they were all moot.  As the war went on, 
the pool of available officer candidates became more shallow, and the army was increasingly 
forced to take whatever applicants it could get.  This eventually meant that the officer candidates 
became younger over the course of the war. 
 With two series of OTCs under their belts and 1917 drawing to a close, the army took 
few steps to change the direction of officer training as it approached its third series of camps.   
There were certain indicators that the training of the candidates was not as thorough as needed or 
intended.  Hugh Scott later explained, 
  While these camps did not by any means provide a finished military education to  
  fit an officer for war in the short time possible, they were the utmost that could be  
  provided under the circumstances.  Their establishment enabled the sorting out of  
  the unfit, and an enrollment and organization.  It gave an opportunity to place men 
  in the positions which they were best fitted to fill and gave them an inkling of  
  discipline and the life of a soldier.113   
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Although there was much truth in Scott’s admission, the army could have done a better job at 
focusing the tactical training of its candidates more adequately to prepare them for the challenges 
ahead.  Unquestionably, the pace of mobilization and the systemic problems with obtaining 
weapons and instructors were major obstacles to officer training throughout the war.  But, the 
training of combat leaders at the company level is not just about properly employing weapons; 
the most important part of their education was conditioning the mind of the leader to react 
quickly to unexpected situations occurring in a confused environment.   
 Much of the combat in small units is the execution of tactical drills designed to meet the 
common challenges presented by a general tactical situation.  In other words, in destroying a 
machine gun position there were (and are) general steps that the leader should take to accomplish 
that mission without taking undue casualties in his unit.  The key to training small unit leaders is 
thus to ensure that the officer or NCO understands how to identify the drill, or combinations of 
drills, to meet the given situation.  The leaders must also be able to “think on their feet” in such a 
manner to adapt a drill designed to meet a general situation to the specific realities that confront 
them in combat.  This means that the leader must make a rapid assessment of the situation, 
taking into consideration the terrain, the strength of the enemy, the strength of his troops, and 
what he must accomplish to achieve his overall mission, and then issue the proper orders to deal 
with the problem that confronts him. 
 It is clear that the army understood this process in World War I.  The “estimation of the 
situation” had been a basic concept of the Leavenworth schools for over a decade.  In fact, the 
schools’ 1908 Studies in Minor Tactics was written in a manner to lead the student through the 
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process of tactical problem solving.114  Although the work focused mainly on the operations of  
battalion or larger units, the thought process for the leader was to be the same at all echelons.  
Harold Fiske even went so far as to argue that once the leader understood how to properly 
estimate the situation, any given tactical problem could be solved “without the conscious use of 
reason.”115  Unfortunately, little in the OTCs encouraged the candidates to achieve this near 
intuitive level of tactical decision-making.   
 It could be said that much of this failure to adequately train the candidates in rapid 
tactical decision-making was due to a lack of time.  Both Scott and some of the candidates 
believed this to be the case. As John Madden, a lieutenant in the 89th Division’s 355th Infantry, 
admitted, “I became what we called a ninety-day wonder when I was commissioned a second 
lieutenant by an act of Congress.  Well, it could have been by an act of God, but I was still no 
great military man after only ninety days.”116  However, the problem was not so much of a lack 
of time for training as it was a problem of how the OTCs utilized the time they had.   
 Although the press of time in the spring and summer of 1917 may have curtailed the 
army’s range of options for officers’ training in the first six months of the war, there was no need 
for it to have continued pursing a path that so many within its ranks knew was strewn with 
obstacles.  At the request of the War Department, the American Military Mission in France 
studied the French method of training officer aspirants in the early summer of 1917.  In July 
1917, Captain Dawson Warrington submitted a report that detailed not only what the French 
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trained at the St Cyr Aspirants’ School, but also their philosophy of officer training and their 
expectations of the skills and attributes that their army needed in their junior commanders.   
 What impressed Warrington the most was that the French approached officer training “as 
if it were a branch of business.”  With an approval that would have warmed the heart of Henry 
Ford, Warrington enthusiastically noted, “The best training-school, now, is the one that can be 
described as the best factory.”117  He noted that the French put little stock in detailed training in 
the new weapons of war and were content to give their candidates only enough instruction with 
these tools to be “all-round competent men.”   What the French did emphasize, however, was 
training that forced the candidate to think on their feet in times of duress, and to “develop such 
steadiness and resourcefulness, such independent reasoning powers, that the most unexpected 
circumstances cannot take them by surprise.”118  The French accomplished this by constantly 
placing the aspirants in a series of tactical leadership problems that forced them to make quick 
estimates of the situation they faced, and then give their units clear orders to react to the 
dilemma.  Under the St Cyr method, 
The future aspirant must be a resourceful man, not a machine acting by rule.  
Therefore the leader of the company or of a platoon is not told, ‘Do this,’ but is 
informed, ‘You are in such and such a position,” and is asked, ‘What are you 
going to do?’  This keeps his mind constantly on the alert… Then the commander 
must go on to explain how he will utilize the ground and fight effectually.  
Afterwards, he is questioned as to the lessons to be retained for similar 
circumstances if they should reoccur…Here, then, there is a double lesson: How 
to get out of present trouble, and how to avoid trouble another time.119  
 
In other words, the French were training their candidates in a form of “estimating the situation” 
that would have been readily identifiable to any prewar Leavenworth graduate.  
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 Warrington also noted that the French cadre went to great lengths to have their maneuver 
training reproduce, as close as possible, the conditions and confusion of the battlefield that their 
charges would face in combat.  They continually updated their curriculum to take advantages of 
the new tactical, organizational, and technological changes that had developed at the front.  
However, the key for the French was not only to “manage under conditions as they may develop 
next week or month, but furthermore to face conditions as they may develop two years hence: 
because the cadet’s mind has been accustomed to reasoning and to adaptability.”120  In combat 
training, “The actual conditions of modern warfare are minutely reproduced, down to the 
explosions of shells of firing calibers, barrage fire, bombs, machine-guns, machine-rifles, rifles, 
and mines.  Even the cartridges used are not black cartridges, having cardboard bullets which can 
hurt at 20 meters.”   Under these conditions, he observed, “some of them struggle against the 
nerve-shattering effects of the smoke, the noise, the vibrations, the flying bits of earth, and I have 
seen them conquer fear as they would have to conquer it at the front if the lesson had not been 
taught them at St Cyr.”121    
 Unlike the pristine trenches that most American candidates trained in, Warrington 
observed that the terrain and trenches within the French maneuver area were pock-marked with 
shell holes and laced with barbwire and other impediments to tactical movement and weapon 
employment. The sensory inputs that the cadets were subjected to were designed to replicate 
those combat realities at the front that hindered effective small unit command and control.  As 
with the cadets’ earlier training, all along the maneuvers, the cadre grilled them on their 
understanding of the situation and their response to the crisis.  Of the cadets, the senior instructor 
“demanded a clear and simple statement of what was being done, a statement which none of the 
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men could have failed to understand, and which at the same time would have sufficed for the 
information of any officer who had just come up.”122  
 Since their officer training focused more on the mental rather than the material aspects of 
warfare, nearly all the elements of the French training were readily able to be replicated by the 
Americans.  So, why wasn’t more made of Warrington’s report?  Like Alcoholics Anonymous, 
the first step was for the army to admit that it had a problem.  However, to do so, and admit that 
perhaps the French had a more effective system for officer training, would also have been to call 
into question the professional competence of the Regular Army officer corps.  The more 
intractable problem remained one of instructors.  The French placed much more emphasis than 
the Americans on selecting, training, and assigning the best possible instructors to its officer 
schools.  With the rare exception of officers such as Dwight Eisenhower, the U. S. Army never 
displayed a willingness to take its best and brightest officers and assign them the role of 
developing its officer candidates.  
 In addition to sorting out the issue of training officer candidates, the War Department 
also had to devise a system for rating and selecting the best students for commissioning.  In June 
1917 Dr. Walter Dill Scott, of the Bureau of Salesmanship Research of the Carnegie Institution 
of Technology, approached the War Department with a method for “scientifically” rating the 
abilities of officers and candidates.  In true progressive form, the army jumped at the opportunity 
to replace its ostensible subjective methods with an equally ostensible objective method for 
sorting its aspirants.  On 11 July 1917, the Adjutant General informed the Fort Meyer OTC 
commander of the army’s desire “to work out a more careful and scientific system” for ranking 
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candidates for the second OTCs and that his post had been selected to test the new method.123  
 The ultimate result of the Fort Meyer experiment was the adoption of an Officers 
Qualification Card developed by Walter Scott in November 1917.124  With some slight 
modification, the card would be used throughout the war as both a means of selecting candidates 
for commission and for commanding officers to evaluate the performance of their subordinate 
officers.  The card listed the soldier’s age, education, military experience, and previous 
occupations.  More importantly, the card contained the senior officer’s evaluation of the soldier 
using the five categories of the “Scott Scale”: physical qualities, intelligence, leadership, 
personal qualities, and general value to the service.  Scott used the following criteria for each of 
the categories… 
  Physical Qualities: Physique, bearing, neatness, voice, energy, endurance. 
   Consider how he impresses his command in these respects.    
  
  Intelligence: Accuracy, ease in learning; ability to grasp quickly the point of view  
   of the commanding officer, to issue clear and intelligent orders, to   
   estimate a new situation, and to arrive at a sensible decision in a crisis. 
 
  Leadership: Initiative, force, self reliance, decisiveness, tact, ability to inspire  
   men and to command their obedience, loyalty, and cooperation. 
   
  Personal Qualities: Industry, dependability, loyalty; readiness to shoulder  
   responsibility for his own acts; freedom from conceit and selfishness;  
   readiness and ability to cooperate. 
 
  General Value to the Service: Professional knowledge, skill and experience;  
   success as administrator and instructor; ability to get results.125 
   
While the first four categories used a scale of 3 to 15 (the higher the better), the “General Value 
to the Service” category was more heavily weighted and used a scale of 8 to 40.  Although the 
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Scott Scale was little more objective than the ad hoc methods used by instructors in the first 
OTCs, at least it allowed the army to believe, in the best manner of the Progressive Era, that it 
had used science to achieve efficiency in its selection of officers.   
 Every OTC candidate was constantly under the observation of his commander and 
instructors.  These cadre officers were continually on the lookout for any flaws in the candidate’s 
character and abilities, as well as any violation of orders, regulations, or post policies.  If they 
discovered one of these infractions, the cadre member noted it in the candidate’s file and meted 
out punishment for these “skins.”  One candidate recalled, 
  “Skins” could be incurred for a great variety of errors, misdemeanors,   
  miscalculations, mental lapses, acts of fate, and ill luck.  Regardless of the 
  cause, when a man got “skinned” he was confined to camp for the ensuing 
  weekend; and a mark went against his name in the company commander’s 
  “little black book.”  Too many marks and he received an order to appear 
  before the Benzine Board.126  
 
Many candidates considered this system to be too harsh and arbitrary than it needed to be, and 
marveled at the pettiness that the army system could produce.  After one candidate had not been 
able to go to the firing range because he was in the post hospital, his comrades were astonished 
when, during the next inspection, the inspecting officer cited the man for having powder residue 
in his rifle even though he had never fired it.127  Often the candidates were put off by the fact that 
they were charged with a violation of rules that they did not even know existed.  Unfortunately, 
this experience also left the candidates with a skewed idea of “what right looked like” when it 
later came to enforcing discipline within their own units.  
 At some point in the candidate’s schooling he appeared before the dreaded “Benzine 
Board.”  If a candidate had demonstrated a pattern of ineptness, indiscipline, or flaws in 
                                                 
 126 Dittmar, 71. He gave examples of a man throwing a cigarette butt on the ground and being “skinned” for 
“throwing litter on the company street.”  
 127 The Pick, 62. 
  316
character during the course, these boards of officers were convened to judge his fitness to 
continue officers’ training.  Gus Dittmar recalled, “No inquisition chamber in the Dark Ages ever 
controlled the destiny of people more completely than did the Benzine Board, as it judged the 
frailties and capabilities of these aspirants for commission.”128  He did note, however, that it 
generally was not a candidate’s failure to do well in command or poor tactical knowledge that 
resulted in him being called before the Benzine Board; rather it was “repeated failure to react 
properly, physical weakness, lack of confidence, poor cooperation and slack interest, and an 
inability to adjust to the strange and often harsh environment” that caused a student to be 
boarded.129  He went on to declare that, “Looking back from the pinnacle of fifty years later, it 
does appear that the Benzine Board was eminently fair, indulgent in minor shortcomings and 
compassionate to a degree that was never suspected” at the time.”130   
 At the end of the course, all candidates also went through a “Benzine Board.”  The 
graduation board was the last check of a candidate’s suitability for commission and an 
opportunity for the cadre to test his overall military knowledge.  Like much of the OTCs, the 
quality of these boards varied widely from post to post, cadre to cadre, and OTC series to 
series.131  Candidate Fred Wheeler remembered that when he appeared before the “Benzine” 
final examination board two of the “star” questions were, “What kind of whiskey do you prefer?” 
and “How many buttons are on your coat?”  After those preliminary questions Wheeler described 
what happened next as, 
  Finally some officer thinks of some question; the answer to which he desires 
  to know, states it in some new language and the candidate must reply.  So he 
  makes an attempt, usually getting by as the officer [who gave the question] 
  chooses to conceal his ignorance.  By this time every one of the other officers 
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  have a question not in Moss’s Manual and they open “Rapid Fire” at once… 
  some officer requests a description as to how some simple movement should 
  be executed.  It is then the duty of the candidate to give, verbatim, the paragraph 
  from the 1925 paragraphs of the I. D. R.  This they meet with approval. 
  Occasionally, however, the senior officer will disagree and it is advisable to 
  concede that he is right.132 
 
The candidates make clear that the graduation “Benzine Board” was one of the most stressful 
events in their short military careers, and a percentage of those who made it through the course 
had their hopes dashed for a commission in the last days of the OTC. 
 Notwithstanding the board’s apparent arbitrariness or harshness, they served two vital 
roles: to weed out the incompetent and to encourage the students to do their best.  Given the pace 
of mobilization, the first function was all important. A wartime battalion commander hailed the 
fact the “careful selection at the training camps” had “undoubtedly served to weed out the more 
defective material which presented itself for commissions.”133  The second function of the boards 
was also important.  Candidate Largron recalled that when he was tempted to abandon his quest 
for a commission while at the Machine Gun COTS he would,  
  …lie on that iron cot and kill a couple of Fatima’s and cuss your 
  instructors because you’re a bonehead and anyway they demand to much 
  of you.  You wonder what that little blond is doing back home, and wonder 
  who the hell is taking her to the “Junior Prom” this year.  You wonder why 
  in the devil you ever made this stab for a commission and you recall those 
  happy laborless carefree days spent as a “goldbrick” back at Kelly Field. 
  In the midst of your “beefing” just after you resolved to go up to the orderly 
  room and tell ‘em to keep their commission and put you in for a transfer back to  
  your old outfit, a little voice whispers to you “Get busy, ‘boy, you got a court 
  martial exam on Wednesday…The little voice goes on to tell you that their 
  is going to be an inspection Saturday and unless you get busy and clean that 
  “gat” you’ll be sure to get “skinned” because of a “dirty bore,” and that if you  
  flunk those two exams, they’ll have you up before the “Benzine Board” and 
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  then it’ll be “good-bye shoulder straps and then what will the folks at home  
  say?134 
 
In a similar vein, Candidate Russell Frazier, of the Camp Lee COTS, half-jokingly stated that, 
 
  …we are convinced that the officers simply must be actuated by German   
  propaganda and a desire to break our manly spirit.  We are positive to-day 
  that it will be impossible to go on; we will write to our Congressman and 
  get out of it the best we can.  We are sorry, of course, but we have  
  overestimated our abilities.  It is settled and if we can ever get time to 
  write that letter we will get it off.  Two things, however, prevent the 
  carrying out of this resolution.  In the first place we never get the time to  
  write followed by the none to gently expressed opinion of the lieutenant 
  on the general subject of “Quitters.”  The psychic intuition of those 
  shavetails was positively uncanny, now wasn’t it?  The little talk on 
  quitters always came when you were sick of it all…135 
 
The army undoubtedly understood the power of ego and peer pressure.  The hash whip of pride 
and the fear of the “Benzine Boards” proved a powerful motivator for the candidates during the 
war. 
 One of the challenges of the training camps was not only to determine who would receive 
commissions, but also what rank the new officer would hold upon graduation.  This was a 
particularly difficult decision in the first two OTCs because in addition to selecting company 
grade officers, the camps also had to select those few candidates who would be commissioned as 
majors and more than likely assigned to command battalions.  Only a small handful of major, 
captain, and first lieutenant slots were available to each graduating class.  At Camp Sheridan, 
only one captain and one first lieutenant slot was allocated to each training company.  In making 
this determination, the instructors weighed, “Age, previous experience and training camp 
record.”  When it came to these qualifications, “age was considered of greatest importance” in 
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the selection of majors and captains.136 
 When the selection system was properly working, the training camps seemed to have 
done a fair job in choosing the best candidates for commission. The whole process was described 
in an August 1918 report by Major William Gunn, the commander of the Camp Sherman          
fourth OTC.  Gunn noted that his camp selected its final slate of candidates for commissioning 
after evaluating the soldier’s scores on the Yerkes psychological test, his scores on written 
examinations, the results of his personal interview with the camp’s senior instructor, and from 
the rating he received from his platoon instructor on his overall military and leadership abilities.  
The last was based on daily observations of the candidate by his chain of command using the 
“Scott Scale.”  Gunn maintained, “Each instructor carried at all times a book in which he made 
notes, from time to time, as he gained impressions of the men under his observations.”137 
 Gunn’s mentioning of the use of the Yerkes psychological test to evaluate candidates 
highlights one of the fascinating aspects of the war.  For the first time in human history, the U. S. 
Army used psychological testing on a massive scale to help classify and utilize men by their 
supposed mental capacity.  On the very day that the United States declared war on Germany, a 
group of experimental psychologists met in Cambridge, Massachusetts to discuss the possible 
role of the new science in national defense.  The driving force behind the meeting, Robert 
Yerkes, had also invited Captain S. B. Bowen, a Harvard ROTC instructor, to the meeting to 
gauge the practicality of using psychological testing as an aid in properly utilizing military 
manpower.  The success of the meeting led the American Psychological Association to petition 
                                                 
 136 History and Achievements of the Fort Sheridan Officers’ Training Camps, 235. 
 137 Memorandum from, MAJ William K. Gunn, Commanding Officer, Fourth Officers’ Training School, 
Camp Sherman, Ohio to LTC C. R. Lewis, Chief of the Training and Instruction Branch, War Plans Division, 
Subject: Summary of Instruction of Candidates, dated 17 August 1918, in NARA RG 165, War Department General 
Staff, Army War College Historical Branch, G5 Schools, 7-51.3, NM-84, Box 186, Entry 310, “Camp Sherman, 
Ohio Fourth Officers’ Training School Summary of Instruction of Candidates.” 
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the Army Surgeon General to adopt the psychological testing of men mobilized for the war by 
the War Department.  After months of debate within the military and the continued refinement of 
the examination plan, on 24 August 1917, Secretary Baker gave permission to hire or 
commission psychologists to finalize the test and to conduct experimental evaluations of officers 
and enlisted men at Camps Devens, Dix, Lee, and Taylor.  Yerkes was given a direct 
commission to major and four weeks of testing to demonstrate the viability of his plan.138  
 Despite initial skepticism, the Regular Army officers at the posts conducting the 
experiment warmly embraced the psychological tests and sent glowing reports to the War 
Department encouraging it to expand the program army wide.  In many ways it is no surprise that 
Yerkes’ psychological testing gained such an enthusiastic response in what was generally a 
conservative regular officer corps.  The new science was a reflection of the Progressive Era 
spirit.  It allowed the army to use science to help solve some of the pressing problems of society, 
in this case the mobilization of wartime manpower.  The tests promised to replace subjectivity 
with objectivity in the quest for the great “holy grail” of the Progressivism: efficiency.  With 
Yerkes, “Taylorism” came to the army.  
 During the Second World War, George C. Marshall ruefully noted that in peacetime you 
have all of the time in the world and none of the money, and in wartime you have all the money 
in the world and none of the time.  This observation was certainly borne out in the summer and 
fall of 1917.  The army was out of time and beset with the pressing need to rapidly “pigeon hole” 
its legion of new soldiers into the most efficient positions that they could fill. The mental tests 
seemed to address that need.  The commander of Camp Lee’s 80th Division, Major General 
Adelbert Cronkhite, was so smitten by the idea that the psychologists could easily and 
                                                 
 138 Robert M. Yerkes, “Psychological Examining in the United States Army,” in Memoirs of the National 
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scientifically allow him to solve complex personnel problems such as selecting NCOs and officer 
candidates, that on 26 October 1917 he informed his command that since the exams “are 
virtually conclusive,” “intelligence testing will play a great role in this division.”139 
 The army also accepted psychological testing because it seemed to confirm the 
correctness of all of the officer corps’ Social Darwinist prejudices and assumptions about race, 
character, education, and “native intelligence.”  Time and time again, officers scored much 
higher than enlisted men on the tests.  The first wide spread testing of officers was conducted at 
Camp Lee in the fall of 1917.  Of the 1,116 officers tested, 44 percent scored in the “A” or most 
intelligent category, 32 percent scored in the “B” or superior category, and only 24 percent 
scored in the “C” or average category.140  The 76 percent of officers scoring in the “A-B” range 
was much higher than those scoring in that range from the ranks of the NCOs and privates.  
 The results seemed incontrovertible; the army had done a fine job of selecting the “right 
men” to serve as its officers from the first OTCs.  If this were true, then the officer corps’ 
assumptions about the proper education, class, and character needed for leadership must also be 
valid.  As one officer noted, “The results of the psychological tests are fully borne out by actual 
observations of the abilities and capacity of various officers in the performance of duties 
assigned them.”141  
 The Regular Army officers of units mobilizing across the country were quick to grasp the 
utility of using the mental tests as a means of selecting men for officers’ training.  One went so 
far as to maintain, “It is doubtful whether applicants should be admitted to school who have not, 
according to the psychological examinations, made a score equivalent to “high average” 
                                                 
 139 Ibid., 22. 
 140 Ibid., 21-3. 
 141 Quoted in, Clarence Yoakum and Robert Yerkes, Army Mental Tests (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1920), 13. 
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intelligence (C+).”142  Another camp commander revealed that in addition to an evaluation of 
their personal bearing, military knowledge, and physical abilities, applicants for officers’ training 
in his unit were also given mental tests.  He noted that, “If they do not rate A or B in this 
examination they are rejected.”143  
 This practice of using the psychological examinations as a deciding factor in the selection 
of officer candidates was so wide-spread, that on 14 August 1918, the War Department issued 
General Order 74 encouraging commanders to use the tests only as “assisting guides” in their 
selection boards and also mandated that, “No particular psychological rating shall be declared as 
a minimum to be attained by any such candidates.”144   However, this stricture did not keep unit 
commanders from continuing to place great weight on the mental tests as a tool for weeding out 
officer candidates.  As late as the fall of 1918, the commander of Camp Lewis, Washington 
reported, 
  One of the most important services [of the exams] has been to assist in selecting  
  candidates for the officers’ training schools.  It was demonstrated that a certain 
  minimum of intelligence was essential to success in the training school, and that 
  candidates failing to reach a given psychological rating failed to receive 
  commissions.  Approximately 17 per cent of candidates of the fourth officers’ 
  training school were thus eliminated by purely objective standards with   
  considerable saving to the army.145  
 
 The psychological tests revealed some interesting data on the Army’s officer corps and 
candidates.  Engineer officers performed the best on the examinations with 67.3 percent of its 
members scoring in the “A” range, and 90.2 percent of its total numbers scoring in the “A-B” 
range.  Artillery officers came in second in highest intelligence, followed by sanitary corps 
officers and signal corps officers.  Machine gun and infantry officers rated in the mid-range of 
                                                 
 142 Ibid., 14. 
 143 Ibid., 15. 
 144 General Order 74, 14 August 1918., Yerkes, “Psychological Examining,” 115. 
 145 Quoted in Yerkes, “Psychological Examining,” 108. 
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scores for all army officers.  For example, 47.1 percent of infantry officers scored in the “A” 
range, and over 80 percent of the total infantrymen fell in the “A-B” range.  The lowest scores 
for officers were garnered by medical doctors, dentists, and veterinarians.  Over 57 percent of 
veterinarians scored in the “C” range and only 18.5 percent scored in the “A” range.  In fact, 
veterinarians scored lower than the enlisted men in field signal battalions; the branch with the 
highest intelligence rating of all enlisted personnel.146        
 The tests also followed a pattern where test scores all fell out according to rank.  In other 
words, majors scored higher than captains, who in turn scored higher than lieutenants, and so on.  
Yerkes claimed that this progressive steps in scores based on ranks had nothing to do with 
education.  To prove his point he compared officers with the equivalent of an eight grade 
education to “native born white recruits of high school and college education.”  The end result 
was that the under educated officers still did slightly better on their intelligence tests than did 
their more highly educated enlisted soldiers.  Yerkes made no real effort to explain this 
phenomenon other than to assert that, “It is evident that the examination is measuring other 
qualities, in which officers stand above recruits, to a greater extent than is measuring 
education.”147  Although this might invalidate the army’s preference for college educated 
officers, it could still use these figures as proof that it was a democratic institution where natural 
talent allowed everyone to rise to their fullest extent.    
 Psychological testing of officer candidates in the winter and spring of 1918 also showed a 
trend in regional demographics.  The testing of candidates training in the 21 camps of the third 
OTC series revealed that candidates in camps located in the northeast and the Great Lakes states 
scored higher than those in the deep South, Texas, and the Mid-West.  The highest scoring OTC 
                                                 
 146 Yerkes, “Psychological Examining,” 518 and 521., Army Mental Tests, 36-7. 
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was at Camp Devens, Massachusetts, while the lowest was in Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia.  Yerkes 
noted in passing this regional variation, but again, made no effort to explain the phenomena.  
Since the OTCs tended to draw their candidates from the immediate region, and Yerkes had 
ruled out an education-based determinism in his psychological tests, the unstated conclusion 
seemed evident; northerners were generally more intelligent than southerners or mid-
westerners.148  
 Of course the greatest problems with Yerkes’ psychological tests were that they were 
culturally biased and, contrary to his assertions, dependent on a degree of general education to 
correctly answer the questions.  The testing consisted of a battery of eight different exams each 
focusing on a different intellectual skill.  Test Two, for example asked the student to answer 
mathematic word problems such as, “A certain division contains 3,000 artillery, 15,000 infantry, 
and 1,000 cavalry.  If each branch is expanded proportionally until there are in all 20,900 men, 
how many will be added to the artillery?”  This problem would have required both an 
understanding of mathematics and of the concepts of ratios and proportionality. Test Four asked 
the examinee to establish whether two words were synonyms or antonyms.  Examples included, 
“vesper-matins,” aphorism-maxim, and “encomium-eulogy.”  Again, the student had to have a 
well developed vocabulary to score well on these questions.  The most culturally skewed of the 
tests was Test Eight.  This test assessed the examinee’s ability to recall facts.  Questions drawn 
from one version of these tests included, 
      The Wyandotte is a kind of   horse   fowl   cattle   granite 
      “Hasn’t scratched yet” is used in advertising a    duster   flour   brush   cleanser 
      Rosa Bonheur is famous as a   poet   painter   composer   sculptor  
      The bassoon is used in  music  stenography   book-binding   lithography 
      The number of a Zulu’s legs is   two   four   six   eight 
      The scimitar is a kind of   musket   cannon   pistol   sword 
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      The Knight engine is used in the   Packard   Lozier   Sterns   Pierce Arrow 
      The author of “The Raven” is   Stevenson   Kipling   Hawthorne   Poe 
      Isaac Pitman was most famous in physics   shorthand   railroading   electricity 
      The ampere is used in measuring wind power   electricity   water power   
rainfall149 
 
Given the quality of schools in the South and parts of the west, it is little wonder that some 
officer candidates and soldiers had trouble answering these questions.  Despite its inherent flaws, 
the psychological tests served a valuable purpose; knowingly or not, it rewarded white, educated, 
middle and upper class men; men who mirrored the characteristics, and perhaps the social 
outlooks of, the West Point graduate; men who the army had long stated were their ideal pool of 
officer candidates.      
 The candidates themselves seemed rather bemused by the whole process of physiological 
testing. One candidate at the Machine Gun COTS remembered the red letter day when, “The 
company easily qualifies in the nut exams, the members showing a high order of intelligence by 
answering such questions as, ‘How any legs has a Papuan?’”150  Another wrote in 1918, 
  For most of us the army psychological examination was the first and only 
  such amusement we have ever had.  We distinctly remember, at the officers’ 
  signal how we glanced at the long sheets of questions with foolish interrogations, 
  and how we romped through the examination with a sneaking feeling that we 
  were playing in the kindergarten.151 
 
Playing in the kindergarten or not, the army certainly took the tests seriously, and used them, to 
an extent, as another scientific means of classifying, typifying, and sanctifying their selection of 
officers.   
 Looking back on 1917, the War Department could claim some notable accomplishments 
in its creation of an officer cadre for its rapidly expanding divisions.  The first two series of 
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OTCs had commissioned 44,578 new officers.  Given the fact that the army began the war with 
only 17,000 Regular Army, National Guard and Reserve officers (and many of these had less 
than a year in service), the OTCs had accomplished a prodigious feat.  The army’s desire for 
college men and business leaders for its candidates meant that the overall graduates of the 
training camps were some of the best educated and motivated officers that the nation had ever 
been able to commission at the beginning of its wars.  Moreover, it can be stated that the army’s 
insistence that all new officers for the National Army have at least three months of standardized 
(in theory) instruction before commissioning meant that the new officers of 1917 were also better 
trained than the wartime volunteer officers of any previous American conflict. It is clear that the 
army endeavored to establish a rigorous system for selecting and evaluating its officer 
candidates; to the point of turning to the new science of psychology to evaluate their intelligence 
and mental capacities.   
 Despite all these accomplishments, however, in the training of these officers, the devil 
was in the details.  Due to shortages of instructors, equipment, and facilities, the training at the 
OTCs never reached the degree of standardization that the War Department expected.  The 
training itself was too mired in obsolete prewar doctrine and unrealistic views and assumptions 
about modern war to accurately and adequately prepare the candidates for the tactical trials that 
laid before them.  As these new officers were to be the primary teachers of the wartime legions, 
this fundamental flaw in their training was redoubled in the tactical instruction of their later 
units.  Given the fact that OTC graduates made up the bulk of the junior officers in the wartime 
Regular Army, National Guard, and National Army divisions, few units escaped this elemental 
problem.  Unfortunately, the officer training situation only grew worse in 1918.   
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Chapter 7 
“By Improvised and Uncoordinated Means” 
Officer Selection and Training in 1918 
 
 
 In his annual report to Congress for 1918, Chief of Staff Peyton March accurately noted 
that the army’s efforts to build a wartime cadre of officers was accomplished only “by 
improvised and uncoordinated means.”1  Creating the first OTCs had been a monumental 
undertaking, and despite their great inadequacies in training, still generally succeeded in bringing 
to the army a high quality of human material to serve as its new officers.  But why did officer 
training in 1918 continue to operate under the “improvised and uncoordinated means” that 
March so lamented?  This chapter will examine this question by discussing how any why the 
training of officer candidates, and the men selected for this training, changed between 1917 and 
1918.  As with the previous chapter, this one will continue to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
army’s training plan for preparing its junior leaders to meet the challenges they would face on 
the Western Front.  
 Although some within the Regular Army expressed concern over the training given at the 
OTCs, most of the regular officer corps seemed to have been either content with the system or 
resigned to the fact that there were no other viable options open to the War Department. With the 
army generally satisfied with, reconciled to, or perhaps blissfully ignorant of, the outcomes of 
the first OTCs, it is no surprise that the third series of OTCs (5 January- 19 April 1918) ushered 
in only a few minor changes to officer training.  Under the continued demand for more officers, 
the War Department expanded the camps from 16 to 24 schools, with 22 of them now being 
located at posts where National Army or National Guard divisions were mobilizing or training.  
The army also opened smaller schools in Hawaii, the Philippines, and the Panama Canal Zone.  
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Other changes to the camps included giving preference for selection to attend the camps to 
enlisted soldiers, and limiting all commissions granted at the camps’ conclusion to company-
grade ranks.  The only change to the camps’ training regimen was to extend the courses by two 
additional weeks to give the candidates instruction in “Army paper work and company 
administration.”2  The army made no material change to the existing OTC plan for tactical 
training.   
 The army’s desire to admit more enlisted men to OTCs ultimately led to 90 percent of the 
camps’ candidates coming from the ranks.  There were also further changes to the requirements 
and obligations of the candidates entering the camps directly from civilian life.  These men could 
be no older than 32 (rather than 40 for the enlisted candidates) and were now required to enlist in 
the army as a precondition for admission.  The later change had been pushed by Adjutant 
General McCain as a way of managing the cost of the camps.  McCain argued that while the first 
training camps were successful, they were also expensive.  In December 1917, he recommended 
forcing all candidates to first enlist in the army, because, “camps composed of enlisted men bring 
practically no expenses additional to those of the normal expenses of training enlisted men.”3  
While the candidates from the ranks continued to be paid based on the enlisted rank they held 
prior to entering the camp (i.e. a candidate who was a sergeant continued to be paid as a sergeant 
while at OTC), the candidates from civil life were now only paid as privates first class 
(approximately $33 a month) rather than the $100 a month stipend enjoyed by previous civilian 
                                                 
 2 Report from Colonel Henry C. Cabell, Chief, Appointments Section, Adjutant General’s Office, to The 
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candidates.  Also, if the civilian candidate failed to be commissioned, he was required to serve 
the rest of his term as an enlisted man.4  
 The third OTCs eventually graduated 11,659 candidates: 8,165 in the Infantry, 3,347 in 
Field Artillery, and 147 in the Cavalry.  The War Department originally intended that only a 
small number of the graduates from the third OTCs would be commissioned immediately.  The 
rest would constitute a reserve pool of trained personnel who would be commissioned as needed 
when officer slots opened due to casualties, other attrition, or the continued expansion of the 
army.  Until such time as these men were needed, they would return to their units to serve as 
NCOs.  Unfortunately, unforeseen officer losses in the spring of 1918 forced the War 
Department to commission all of the third OTCs’ graduates on 29 May 1918.  This left the army 
with no ready reserve of soldiers qualified for immediate commissioning if the need arose.5 
 As the third OTCs witnessed the first large influx of enlisted men into officer training,  
there were also some changes to the levels of education, military experience, occupation, and 
social class of these candidates from that of the first two series.  Although it is too limited of a 
source to draw too many conclusions from, the available evidence from the candidates from the 
third series OTC at Camp Devens, Massachusetts illustrates some of these changes.   The Camp 
Devens class began with 716 candidates.  This number dropped to 625 by the end of March 
1918.  Of the 91 losses, 31 had accepted commissions in the Engineer and Tank Corps, two had 
transferred to aviation and Ordnance commissioning schools, and 56 had resigned or failed out 
of the course.   
 Due to the preference given to enlisted men for the third OTCs, over 78 percent of the 
candidates at Camp Devens had prior service in wartime units, with most coming from the 76th 
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 5 Ibid. 
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Division then also training at the camp.  One should not make too much of this military 
experience.  Few of these soldiers had been in the army more than a few months, and much of 
their training had been limited to the School of the Soldier.  The remaining 21.3 percent of the 
candidates were students drawn from local New England colleges and universities.  The average 
age of the candidates was 25, at least two or more years younger than those of the Fort Sheridan 
sample.   
 Unfortunately, the education and occupations that the Camp Devens candidates listed in 
their graduation book were not nearly as detailed as those given at Fort Sheridan.  If the available 
Camp Devens’ statistics are representative of other of the third OTCs, the statistics do suggest a 
steep decline in the education levels of the candidates. Only one of the four companies in the 
graduate book listed the education levels of its members.  The first company stated that 69 (46%) 
of its 150 candidates had some level of college education; 65 (43.3%) had graduated from high 
school or preparatory school, and 16 (10.7%) had only a grade school education.  If one 
combines the number of college students, teachers, engineers, lawyers, and professionals for all 
of the OTC’s companies (see Table 7-1), it is a safe inference that at least 38 percent of the all of 
the candidates had some degree of higher education.6  Since the “business” category was so 
vague, it is impossible to make even the barest guess as to the social class of the Camp Devens 
students. 
Table 7-1: Occupations of Camp Devens Third OTC Candidates 
 
 
 
                                                 
 6 Statistical information drawn from, Fort Devens OTC Yearbook Committee, The Pick: 3rd O.T.C., Camp 
Devens, Mass (Boston: George H. Dean, 1918), 10, 12, 16, 22, 27. 
Student- 152 (21.3%)  Farmer- 28 (3.9%)                            Not given- 98 (13.6%) 
Engineer- 48 (6.7%)  Lawyer- 7 (1%) 
Teacher- 31 (4.3%)             RA Enlisted - 2 (.02%) 
Professional- 31 (4.3%) Business- not specified as to type- 319 (44.5%)   
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 The changing demographics of the OTC candidates illustrate the personnel challenges 
that the army faced during the war.  These statistics in no way suggest that the army was 
repudiating its long standing preference for college educated officers.  In fact, soon after the 
graduation of the second OTCs, Colonel P. D. Lochridge expressed his belief to the Chief of 
Staff that, “In the present crisis the best material for officers should be sought from all colleges 
and representation not limited to those colleges in which military training has been given.”7  
However, Lochridge also admitted that college graduates were a finite resource and the army 
would have to be content with the stop-gap measure of sending the best qualified enlisted men to 
the OTCs.  
 The commissioning of enlisted men proved to be a double-edged sword.  The army had to 
balance the perceived military experience of the enlisted candidate against the need to have men 
with the mental training gained from a college education that enhanced their ability to cope with 
changing circumstances and new knowledge.  The army, as an institution, also had to match 
itself to the expectations of the larger American society.  The elitism of education had to 
compete with the national expectations of equality of opportunity.   
 Throughout the war, many regular officers claimed that entry into the officer corps was 
based on merit and natural talent.  Eisenhower stated that “In our Army, it was thought that every 
private had at least a second lieutenant’s gold bars somewhere in him and he was helped and 
encouraged to earn them.”8  Lochridge’s replacement as the Chief of the War College Division, 
Brigadier General Lytle Brown, went so far as to argue in July 1918 that,  “It is true that a 
college education is an advantage, but many men have made good officers who have not had 
                                                 
 7 “Memorandum for the Chief of Staff from Colonel P. D. Lochridge Acting Chief of the War College 
Division, Subject: Admission of civilians to the third series of training camps for officers, dated 21 November 
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college education, and it is believed that in the democratic army we are building up under our 
draft system every man should at least be given the chance, whether he has been so fortunate as 
to be a college graduate, or has attended only two years of college, or obtained a fair education in 
some other way.”9  The desire for college men had to coexist with the idea that every white 
American citizen in the ranks carried a field marshal’s baton in his knapsack, or at least a pair of 
lieutenant’s bars in his pocket.   
 The belief that the wartime force was a vast democratic army was also held by some of 
the candidates themselves.  Russell Frazier, a student at the Camp Lee COTS in the fall of 1918, 
recalled, 
  …as we help that Pennsylvania coal miner with the slope scale, he forgets  his  
  labor union and his animosity for the Plute [plutocrat].  Over in the other corner  
  the son of a United States Senator and a former carpenter are stretched out on one  
  bunk telling of their future hopes and fears.  All are dressed alike, the snobbery of  
  the first days are gone and all is harmony.  We are a little puzzled as we look over 
  this peaceful scene and then the great light breaks; “Gosh!” we fairly shout, 
  “this is what is meant by Democracy, this is what we are going to fight for.”10 
 
In Frazier’s vision was the stated hope of the prewar progressive UMT advocates: that military 
service would “Americanize” the nation and bank the fires of class warfare.  It is clear that a 
democratization of the officer corps did occur to some extent during the war, but, this was due 
much more to the ever-gnawing need for junior officers than from any high minded commitment 
to equality of opportunity.  By the end of the war the army would prove itself more than willing 
to change its age standards to get men with some college education than to continue down the 
path of the democratization of the officer corps.     
                                                 
 9 “Memorandum for the Chief of Staff from BG Lytle Brown, Chief of the War College Division, Subject: 
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 Although the army wanted college educated officers, the decision to commission NCOs 
was not unexpected.  As noted in previous chapters, the army had long intended to commission a 
number of regular NCOs upon mobilization.  On 1 May 1917, the Adjutant General placed these 
plans into effect by notifying the Departmental commanders to activate the commissions of all 
enlisted men who have previously passed the examination for becoming reserve officers and to 
bring them into active service on 8 May 1917.  Adjutant General McCain reminded the 
department commanders that since the “need for expansion of military forces is urgent,” they 
must ensure that the commissioned enlisted men must, “take over legitimate duties of an 
officer.”11  The commissioning of regular NCOs quickly expanded beyond just those who had 
taken the officer examination.   
 In the spring of 1917, the regular sergeant Sam Woodfill was still serving with his unit on 
the Mexican border.  When the war broke out, Woodfill recalled that, “all of us old rookies had 
visions of being rushed to the firing line,” and that “they’d shoot us across on the next boat.” 
Woodfill and his comrades soon found out that, “they needed officers and, although we were 
typical old-time non-coms of the regulation buck private breed, they shot us over to San Antonio 
for a couple of months’ training and then gave us temporary commissions.”  He approved of the 
fact that “most of the top sergeants in our crowd blossomed forth as captains.”  He believed that 
this rapid rise was justified due to the fact that “they had been as good as captains for years, 
because during the frequent absences of their company commanders they had run the outfit.”12  It 
is interesting to note that despite Woodfill having nearly 20 years of service in the regulars, the 
army still sent him through an OTC before granting him a commission. 
                                                 
 11 Telegram from Adjutant General to Commanding General of All Departments and Staff Corps and 
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 Although Woodfill would be touted by Pershing as the AEF’s finest soldier, not all of the 
enlisted men admitted to the officer corps did as well as he.  Comments by some OTC students 
and cadre members suggest that there were some tensions between the old regulars and the other 
candidates.  Of the regular soldiers attending the Leon Springs OTC with him, Gus Dittmar 
noted that the old timers brought both experience and humor.  Unfortunately,    
  The humor that they contributed was unintentional, resulting mainly from 
  their volatile language, lack of imagination, and close conformity to the 
  “old army” thinking and habits.  They didn’t understand this upstart group 
  of civilians who expected to become officers in three months.  Their  
  background and years of experience convinced them that this was in the realm of 
  impossibility.  They took pride in being tough and rode these new type  
  soldiers as hard as the company commander would permit.  Strangely, 
  this conduct never seemed to have the effect on the ridden that the rider 
  expected.  This is because they had a much better understanding of the 
  “old regular” than he did of them.  They appreciated his knowledge of the 
  fundamentals, sympathized with his effort to gain a commissioned status and, 
  except in a few instances, looked upon him with a casual, objective affection.13 
 
In 1918 another candidate penned this ditty poking fun at the supposed superiority of the long 
service regular NCO going through officers’ training… 
The Old and the New 
 
   He’s been in the service for sixteen years, 
   And he’s spent all his days shooting blanks. 
   At blowing he really has not any peer, 
   And he’s spent all his life in the ranks. 
 
   We marched one day to the P. T. field, 
   And the C. O. called his name. 
   The shock of the thing made the old boy reel, 
   But he tottered out just the same. 
  
   He tried his best to lead that bunch, 
   But he lost his poise and grace. 
   He knew how to act in ranks and at lunch, 
   But in front he was out of place. 
 
   He warbled commands in a dizzy way, 
                                                 
 13 Gus Dittmar, They Were First (Austin: Steck- Warlick Company, 1969), 77. 
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   And shifted from foot to foot. 
   He talked a lot with nothing to say, 
   For his mind was not stay put. 
 
   “Enough of this,” bawled the O. in C., 
   “Next rookie take command!” 
   A two-months veteran jumped with glee; 
   To hear this reprimand. 
 
   He stepped out front with a vim and snap- 
   “Attention!” clear and cold. 
   And he drilled that bunch from the bell’s first tap, 
   Like a banker counting gold.14  
 
Another candidate-poet lampooned the regulars’ gruff manners, worldliness, and constant  
criticism of the new men’s greenness.  In his poem “In a Regular Outfit” the new soldier 
mimicked the old by noting, 
   Ever heard the expression, men, 
   ‘Bout the ghastly deeds o’ war? 
   “Why this school here aint nuthin’, men 
   ‘Cordin’ to things that have gone befor.” 
 
   “Have you ever been in Panama, 
   Wheer the sun is hot as ‘ell? 
   Why men ya don’t know what grief is, 
   Now, I’m right here to tell. 
 
   Why you poor dubs from civilian life 
   Aint never roughed a bit. 
   Ya don’t know grief as it really is 
   In a regular outfit. 
 
   Why some o’ you men with your pink tea ways, 
   That cross yer legs when ya sit; 
   Would last as long as a row o’ pies, 
   In a regular outfit.15 
 
Perhaps the traditional jaundiced American view of the regular enlisted soldier was simply too 
great for many of the college men to overcome.  But, if these sentiments were common, then 
                                                 
 14 Machine Gun Officers’ Training School, Four Months of Sand (Augusta, GA: Phoenix Printing 
Company, 1918), 32. 
 15 Ibid., 40. 
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Frazier’s barracks room utopia was far from a success.   
 The college men were not the only ones with patronizing views of the regular soldiers. 
Regular officers sometimes showed their own prejudices, especially when enlisted men failed to 
make it through officers’ training.  One officers’ training school commandant disapprovingly 
noted, 
Among the men from the old Regular service there was a large proportion that 
seemed to have studied but little, outside their military subjects; these men had a 
hard time with the course and at times seemed to feel they were at a disadvantage, 
and they were,- the fault was their own; they had never studied when they were 
young and when called upon for some elementary knowledge requiring figuring, 
elementary geometry, etc, [they] floundered hopelessly.16 
 
Officers’ training was perhaps less of a democratic meritocracy and more of a Darwinian jungle 
where the regular officers believed that the jumped-up enlisted men were out of their depths and, 
all-too-often, destined to fail.  This attitude can also be seen in what became of many of the 
NCOs commissioned during the war after the Armistice.  While Lucian Truscott, an officer with 
a bit of education and no overseas service, retained his commission after the war, the uneducated 
Medal of Honor winning Sam Woodfill reverted back to being an NCO so as to not lose his 
pension.    
 If the college men sometimes held condescending views of the enlisted men, the old 
regulars also seemed to hold some rather pointed views of the young civilians that filled the 
OTCs.  Dittmar noted that the gullibility of the new men was an endless source of mirth and 
disgust for the regular NCOs attending the course or assigned to the camp.  After one candidate 
repeated a rumor that the camp was oversubscribed and the determination on who would stay 
would be based on the candidate drawing a white or black bean from a hat, a grizzled first 
                                                 
 16 “Report of the Commander, COTS, Camp MacArthur, Texas to Chief, Training and Instruction Branch, 
War Plans Division, dated 15 November 1918” in RG 165 “Letters,… etc Officers’ Training Camps,” NARA 
Microfilm File 9226, Roll 261. 
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sergeant responded that if it were true, “it’ll be the first time I ever knew a quartermaster to 
waste a mess of beans.”17  After another sergeant heard a group of candidates violently debating 
the origin of the word “latrine,” and concluding that it came from the Latin lavatrina, it was 
more than the regular could take.  The NCO noted with disgust, “that building over there is a 
latrine and not a damn thing else.  What makes you young fellows wanter (sic) put lace drawers 
on everything?”  At the end of the discussion he simply concluded “This damn army is goin’ to 
plumb hell.”18  Given the qualifications and training of many of the new officers, perhaps the old 
sergeant was right.  
 Whatever the attitudes and prejudices of the various “tribes” in the OTCs, the inclusion 
of enlisted men in officers’ training presented as many problems as it solved.  In selecting 
enlisted men for officers’ training, the army had to balance the need of retaining good NCOs in 
its units with the equally pressing need for building a corps of competent junior officers.  
Throughout the war, the army chose to err on the side of producing officers over retaining good 
NCOs.  On 21 November 1917, Lochridge airily dismissed complaints from field commanders 
that the War Department’s evolving OTC attendance policies were denuding their units of good 
soldiers by noting, “The withdrawal of several of the best noncommissioned officers from the 
companies at the end of the training period will, for the time being, weaken them, but companies 
must expect to make preparation in advance for the loss of their best men.  Part of the duty of the 
company commander must be the development of officer material in the company.”19  This 
                                                 
 17 Dittmar, 21. 
 18 Ibid., 47. 
 19 “Memorandum for the Chief of Staff from Colonel P. D. Lochridge Acting Chief of the War College 
Division, Subject: Admission of civilians to the third series of training camps for officers, dated 21 November 1917” 
in RG 165 “Letters,… etc Officers’ Training Camps,” NARA Microfilm File 9226, Roll 261. 
 
 
  338
cavalier attitude toward the NCO corps would later have a major impact on the cohesion and 
effectiveness of the AEF’s small units.   
 Although the third OTCs witnessed the first large influx of enlisted men into officers’ 
training, other aspects of the camps were far less novel.  The problem of finding qualified 
instructors, for example, remained intractable.  Following a trend that had begun with the second 
OTCs, as the regular officer instructors were posted to new assignments, their billets for the third 
series of camps were being filled by newly commissioned officers with less experience.  Of the 
21 instructors (out of 22) of the Third OTC at Camp Devens who listed their commissioning 
sources, two were reserve officers who were commissioned after attending the 1916 Plattsburg 
camp, 14 were commissioned by the first OTC, three were commissioned by the second OTC, 
one was a National Guard officer, and one was a Regular NCO commissioned for war service. 
Sixteen of the instructors had some degree of college education.  Half of the instructors also had 
some level of prewar military experience.  Four of the instructors had served in the prewar 
regulars, with one, John Schweitzer, having served over 18 years in the ranks as an infantry 
NCO.  Seven more had served as enlisted men in the National Guard, but all for less than six 
years.20  Camp Devens was actually fortunate to have even this amount of military experience in 
its instructors.  The instructors in many other camps were far less seasoned.  However, the fact 
remained that none of the Camp Devens instructors had been officers for more than 15 to 18 
months when they began training the camp’s candidates. 
 In addition to continuing problems with instructors, the third OTCs also faced other 
challenges.  Shortages of equipment, especially in machine guns and the new weapons of trench 
warfare, continued to limit hands-on training.  Even the weather seemed to be against the army.  
The winter of 1917-1918 was exceptionally cold.  Even training camps in the deep South saw 
                                                 
 20 The Pick, 12,16, 21, 26, 30.   
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accumulations of snow and frigid temperatures that played havoc with the OTCs’ training 
schedules.  The harsh weather conditions at Camp Devens led one candidate to recall, 
  Although our drilling was confined for the most part to the Eighth Brigade drill  
  field, we have tasted of the ice-clad fields of the Yukon, the windswept plains 
  of Siberia, and the mud-flats of Flanders, all on the same drill field, for  
  nothing but a winter at Camp Devens could afford such varied weather. 
  Probably the most dangerous maneuver that was attempted during the entire 
  course was a sudden halt on the ice of the drill field.21 
 
In the end, weather, the continued adherence to obsolete doctrine, and the shortages of qualified 
instructors and equipment all combined to make the third OTCs as ineffective at preparing their 
graduates to face the realities of combat as had the first two series of camps. 
 Despite the thousands of new officers commissioned by the first three OTCs, the 
expanding army’s thirst for leaders was insatiable.  In April 1918, the War Department directed 
the commanders of the 24 divisions then training in the United States to each establish an OTC at 
their posts to provide officers for their units and to serve as a general reserve for all other officer 
vacancies in the army as a whole.  This fourth series of OTCs was scheduled to run from 15 May 
to 1 September 1918.  To fill the camps, the War Department required that all divisions and non-
divisional units or organizations (excluding the Coast Artillery) stationed in the United States 
provide a quota of two percent of their total enlisted strength to attend officers’ training.  The 
total enrollment at the schools was 13,114, almost all of whom came from the enlisted ranks.  As 
before, those civilians selected to attend the camps had to first enlist in the army.22 
 The War Department hoped to address some of the previous shortcoming in officers’ 
training by adding new classes or adjusting the time devoted to certain subjects in the fourth 
OTCs. For example, the training time for infantry officer candidates expanded from 625 ½ hours 
of instruction in the third OTCs to 718 hours of training in the fourth OTCs.  Unfortunately, 
                                                 
 21 Ibid., 19. 
 22 The Cabell Report, 9110.  
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much of these additional hours came from expanding the candidates’ study time and from adding 
classes on “practical administration:” paperwork, company supply and mess hall management.  
Although there was some effort to make the tactical training more focused, “hands on,” and 
realistic, the overall amount of time devoted to minor tactics remained largely unchanged from 
the previous OTCs.  The changes made to tactical training were little more than the reallocation 
of time from one subject to another. Thus, while the first two OTCs devoted 84 hours to trench 
warfare (to include 60 hours of maneuvers), by the fourth series OTCs, the candidates were 
spending 106 hours studying trench construction, weapons, and tactics.23    
 The tactical training that the fourth series OTC candidates received remained 
problematic.  Notwithstanding the War Department’s best efforts to improve instruction within 
the camps, local commanders continued to deviate from the standard training plan due to local 
conditions and shortages or their own tactical proclivities.  Ironically, the War Department had 
actually exacerbated the problem of standardization by making officers’ training the 
responsibility of the division commanders.  For better or worse, the individual division 
commander’s personal interest in his OTC often determined the training that the camp followed.  
Given the systemic problems of raising and training the larger division, many commanders 
seemed to have followed the path of least resistance in their OTCs.  This often meant that close 
order drill and bayonet practice continued to occupy far too much of the candidates’ time.  This 
is evident in a parody of the trench song, “Drunk Last Night” penned by a Camp Dodge 
candidate, 
  We drilled last week and we drilled the week before, 
  We’re going to drill next week like we never drilled before; 
  For when we drill we’re as awkward as can be, 
                                                 
 23  “Advance Extract Copy of Program of Training for Training Camps for Candidates for Commission in 
the Army of the United States, May 15 to August 31, 1918” in RG 165 “Letters,… etc Officers’ Training Camps,” 
NARA Microfilm File 9226, Roll 261. 
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  I don’t see how the hell they’ll make an officer out of me. 
  Glorious, glorious, the Depot Brigade for the four of us. 
  Glory be to God that there are some more of us, 
  So the four of us won’t be there all alone.24   
 
Another Camp Dodge student wrote, “We were trained in handling the bayonet until it seemed a 
part of us.”25   
 The War Department and some division commanders did attempt to make the training of 
the candidates more realistic and up to date by using the latest tactics used by the Allies.  A few 
of the third OTCs had also experimented with the new tactics in April 1918.  Regrettably, these 
efforts do not seem to have met with much success.  With the advent of the “new 2-line 
formations” that were to replace the old skirmish lines of the IDR, one of the candidates acidly 
observed, “If you don’t understand the new formation, ask your officers about it; they don’t 
either.”  He also noted that under the latest system, “We have two lines of skirmishers in the new 
formation. This is to prevent one-half of the platoon from finding out what the other half does 
not comprehend.”26  At Camp Dodge, another candidate recalled the confusion that resulted from 
the French instructor, Captain Pourchot, and his efforts to teach his company the French Army’s 
latest tactical formations for the platoon in the attack. 
  No responsibility, no thought of where you are supposed to go, and not bothered 
  by the dogmatic rules of the I.D.R.  When the command “Columns of half   
  platoons” is sounded, just close your eyes, hang your rifle on the nearest ear 
  of your squad mate and move until halted by some old veteran sergeant of six 
  months.  Now wait patiently at “rest” or argue furiously with the man next to 
  you in regard to the objective (neither one of you will know it, it’s always 
  a secret) until you hear someone say, “Line of combat groups,” when you take 
  a swig from your canteen, resume the action used in the first actions used   
  in the first accident, when you formed half platoons, and wade promiscuously   
  through the woods until halted…After having enjoyed a short nap, you are 
  rudely aroused by the command, “As Skirmishers March,” at which time you 
                                                 
 24 Carl Wilhelm et al, Pass in Review: The Book of the Fourth Officers’ Training School, Camp Dodge, 
Iowa, 1918 (Camp Dodge: Privately Published, 1918), 47. 
 25 Ibid., 25. 
 26 The Pick, 86.  
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  get up, take another swig from your canteen, and run to the front, any front 
  will do just so long as you are five paces from somebody…Now you are in 
  battle formation.  Not only is it battle formation, but it was also a battle to  
  get it.  You are now ready to advance on the enemy and should be able to 
  inflict fifty thousand casualties without sustaining a single one yourself.27  
 
Although these observations were made for amusement, it is clear that the instructors were 
unsuccessful at explaining the underlying concepts upon which these tactics were based, and the 
candidates merely went through the motions of the maneuvers rather than truly accepting them.  
Despite its obsolescence, the IDR remained the paramount doctrine at the OTCs if for no other 
reason than it was relatively simple in concept, execution, and in its expectations of junior 
leaders.  
 By the time that the fourth series OTCs began training, the United States had been in the 
war for a year.  Some regular officers believed that the army’s policy of filling the camps with 
enlisted men had caused a decrease in the quality of its officer candidates.  After an inspection of 
the fourth series Engineer OTC at Camp Lee, Virginia, General Lytle Brown concluded that “the 
qualifications of the students at this camp are far below the standard previously maintained at 
other Reserve Officers’ Training Camps.”  He placed the blame for the inclusion of “undesirable 
men” at the OTC at the feet of division commanders and their subordinates for failing to properly 
screen applicants for commission.28 
 An examination of the candidates of the Camp Sherman fourth series OTC provides a 
glimpse into the changes and continuities in demographics of the officer candidate population 
and a way to test the validity of Brown’s assertion.  The average age of the candidates at Camp 
Sherman in the summer of 1918 was 25, the same average age for the Camp Devens third OTC 
                                                 
 27 Pass in Review, 56. 
 28 “Memorandum for the Chief of Staff from BG Lytle Brown, Chief of the War College Division, Subject: 
Enlisted Candidates for the 4th Officers’ Training Camps, dated 5 August 1918” in RG 165 “Letters,… etc Officers’ 
Training Camps,” NARA Microfilm File 9226, Roll 261. 
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students.  Of the 362 Camp Sherman candidates that listed their educational background, 249 
(68.8%) were college graduates or had some degree of college education, 41 (11.4%) were high 
school graduates, 64 (17.6%) had some high school education, and eight (2.2%) had only 
attended grade or common school.  If these levels of education where indicative of the other 
fourth OTCs, then these camps actually witnessed an increase in education of its candidates over 
those of the third OTCs. 29   
 Other evidence also points to the possibility of a rebound in the quality of candidates 
between the 3rd and fourth OTCs.  Robert Yerkes noted that the psychological testing of over 
9,000 candidates attending the third OTC, “seemed to indicate that the student officers in the 
third series of training schools are inferior to the first and second schools in intelligence.”  This 
trend seemed to reverse itself as test scores for candidates in the fourth OTCs returned to levels 
similar to the 1917 classes.  However, scores for infantry officer candidates going through 
training in the first COTS class in the summer and fall of 1918 were over ten percentage points 
lower than the average score for infantry officers the previous year.30      
 In addition to increases in education, over three quarters of the Camp Sherman candidates 
had served at least three months as enlisted men prior to attending the OTC (with nearly all of 
these being wartime enlistments).  This was less than the percentage of enlisted men attending 
the third OTCs.  Of these enlisted men, 11 (3%) had been regimental or battalion sergeants 
major, 12 (3.2%) had been first sergeants, 106 (29.2%) had been sergeants, 33 (9%) had been 
corporals, and 120 (33%) had been privates.  The high percentage of NCOs attending the course 
                                                 
 29 Statistic drawn from, Memorandum from, MAJ William K. Gunn, Commanding Officer, Fourth 
Officers’ Training School, Camp Sherman, Ohio to LTC C. R. Lewis, Chief of the Training and Instruction Branch, 
War Plans Division, Subject: Summary of Instruction of Candidates, dated 17 August 1918, in NARA RG 165, War 
Department General Staff, Army War College Historical Branch, G5 Schools, 7-51.3, NM-84, Box 186, Entry 310, 
“Camp Sherman, Ohio Fourth Officers’ Training School Summary of Instruction of Candidates.” 
 30 Robert M. Yerkes, “Psychological Examining in the United States Army,” in Memoirs of the National 
Academy of Sciences, Vol. XV (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1921), 863-5    
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(over 44% of the total class), represented a major drain of junior leadership from the 84th 
Division and the other units that filled the Camp Sherman OTC.  It is interesting to note that 91 
of the 120 privates that attended the course were either college graduates or had spent at least a 
year in college.  The same could be said of the 82 men who were admitted to the camp without 
any prior military service.  Only 14 of these men (17%) lacked any college education.31  
 The detailed records of the Camp Sherman Fourth OTC also allows us to draw some 
tentative conclusion on the social class of those seeking commissions after a year of war.  Table 
7-2 shows the occupations that the Camp Sherman candidates listed upon entry into the course. 
Table 7-2: Occupations of Camp Sherman Fourth OTC candidates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using the standard applied to the Fort Sheridan OTC for determining social class, and factoring 
out the students and those candidates that listed no professions, 86.6 percent of the candidates 
could be classified as having been employed in upper or middle-class professional or white collar 
jobs.32  It appears that in many ways the quality of the candidates at the fourth OTCs actually 
increased or at least remained constant with that the third OTCs.  
                                                 
 31 Ibid. 
 32 Blue collar jobs are defined here as industrial foreman, industrial worker, mechanic, actor, watchmaker, 
baseball player, plumber, lineman, farm manager, and railroad worker.  Given the number of candidates who did not 
give an occupation but had some college education (59 of 89), it is a good possibility that half of the “occupation 
unknown” were also students when they entered the OTC.  
Student- 44         Industrial Worker- 8     Real Estate- 1            Editor-1 
Salesman- 33         Office/Sale Manager- 7     Contractor- 1            Plumber-1 
Clerk/Office work- 31       Banker- 5         Advertising- 1           Lineman-1 
Teacher- 28          Insurance- 3      Watchmaker-1           Buyer- 1 
Farmer/Rancher - 21        Druggist- 3      Baseball Player- 1           Unknown- 89 
Businessman- 19        Mechanic- 3       Draftsman- 1 
Accountant/Auditor- 16     Actor- 3        Farm Manager- 1 
Lawyer- 14                    Scientist- 2      Lumberman- 1  
Industrial Foreman-11       Manufacturer- 1      Architect- 1 
Engineer- 8         Stock Broker- 1       Railroad Worker- 1         
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 One of the other constants that influenced the effectiveness of the fourth OTCs was the 
continued problem of securing qualified instructors.  A year into the war, with the exception of 
most camp commandants and perhaps a handful of staff officers, the regular army officers were 
long removed from instructing at the OTCs, leaving short-service officers responsible for 
nurturing the army’s leadership seed corn.  The OTCs at Camps Dodge and Sherman illustrate 
this ongoing problem.  While Camp Dodge’s OTC at least retained a Regular Army officer as its 
camp commander, the senior instructor, Captain Harold Schaub, was a graduate of the First OTC 
at Camp Snellings, Minnesota.  Of the remaining 13 instructors and camp staff officers, nine had 
received their commissions from the First OTCs, and four had only been commissioned since 
November 1917 after graduating from the Second OTCs.  Although ten of these officers had 
college educations, including one Rhodes Scholar, Henry Gunderson, only two had had any 
military experience prior to the war.  First Lieutenant E.G. Kelsey had served three years as an 
enlisted man in the Idaho National Guard, and Captain Marion Drake had served briefly with the 
Indiana Naval Reserve.  Although it was bad enough that all of the instructors had less than a 
year of commissioned service, the military experience that they had gained since their 
commissioning was also suspect.  Of the 13 instructors, nine had only served in depot brigades or 
other OTCs prior to joining the Camp Dodge OTC.  This meant that their actual leadership 
experience and depth of military knowledge was severely circumscribed.33   
  The instructor situation of Camp Sherman was equally grim, and actually made worse by 
the War Department’s eleventh-hour personnel decisions.  After the Camp Sherman class had 
been training for only a month, the War Department abruptly reassigned all of its instructors, to 
include the OTC commanding officer.  The replacement commander, Major William Gunn, had 
been commissioned after the First OTC, and thus had less than ten months in uniform when he 
                                                 
 33 Pass in Review, 9, 11-12, 15, 17, 19. 
  346
took over the camp.  His senior instructor, Captain Jesse Marshall, was little better off.  Marshall 
had been a reserve officer who had only been commissioned since 21 April 1917.  Of the eight 
assistant instructors, one was a reserve officer commissioned in June of 1917, five were 
graduates of the first OTCs, and two were graduates of the second OTCs.  All told, this meant 
that all of the assistant instructors, those officers who were directly responsible for most of the 
training of the candidates, only had seven months to a year of military training themselves when 
they began teaching the course in June of 1918.34  Given the dearth of knowledge that the Camp 
Sherman and Dodge instructors brought to their teaching, it was truly a case of the “blind leading 
the blind” when it came to officers’ training. 
 The students themselves realized the limitations of their instructors.  Their uneasiness at 
the inability of their instructors to teach the French platoon drill has already been noted.  Other 
candidates also remarked on the continued problems with lectures and conferences as well as the 
obvious gaps in their instructors’ knowledge.  One candidate offered a series of tongue-in-cheek, 
“Word to the Wise” for future candidates, 
   Never admit former affiliation with National Guard. 
    
   When an officer says you are wrong, for heavens sake be wrong…  
    
   Catch lost sleep during lectures, especially if conducted by brother 
   aspirants.  You don’t know what he is trying to say and neither does he… 
 
   Get away from the lesson as much as possible by irrelevant questions.  If 
   the instructor has a hobby, play it systematically for sixty minutes… 
 
   Never ask for an explanation.  Wait until the last minute.  Someone is  
   bound to show his ignorance by beating you to it. 
                                                 
 34 Memorandum from, MAJ William K. Gunn, Commanding Officer, Fourth Officers’ Training School, 
Camp Sherman, Ohio to LTC C. R. Lewis, Chief of the Training and Instruction Branch, War Plans Division, 
Subject: Summary of Instruction of Candidates, dated 17 August 1918, in NARA RG 165, War Department General 
Staff, Army War College Historical Branch, G5 Schools, 7-51.3, NM-84, Box 186, Entry 310, “Camp Sherman, 
Ohio Fourth Officers’ Training School Summary of Instruction of Candidates.” 
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   Laugh at all jokes told by the instructor.  Be sure to wait for the end of the 
   joke… 
 
   If the Colonel puts in an unexpected appearance, bawl someone out… 
 
   If on a deep tactical question, do not embarrass the instructor by asking  
   him to explain [it] before the entire command.35   
 
In spite of their drollery, the candidate’s observations were also a telling indictment of his 
instructors’ overall abilities. 
 If all these woes were not enough, last minute decisions and policy changes from the War 
Department also hobbled training in the fourth OTCs.  On 15 May 1918 the army opened an 
OTC at Camp Zachary Taylor, Kentucky, to provide officers for the 84th Division, then 
organizing at that location.  After only three weeks of training, the OTC accompanied the 
division on its move to Camp Sherman, Ohio.  Due to this major disruption in training, the War 
Department granted the OTC commander permission to extend the course by one month, but 
later reneged on parts of the agreement.  In August 1918, Major William Gunn, the OTC 
commander, reported that his students’ instruction on the automatic rifle had been limited to a 
theoretical discussion of the tactical employment of those weapons because they had been 
“unable to procure the rifles” for hands-on training.  He also noted that the candidates had not 
received rifle range practice or instruction on company administration due to the move of the 
OTC from Camp Taylor to Camp Sherman and the War Department’s early closure of the 
training camp.36 
                                                 
 35 Pass in Review, 39. 
 36 Memorandum from, MAJ William K. Gunn, Commanding Officer, Fourth Officers’ Training School, 
Camp Sherman, Ohio to LTC C. R. Lewis, Chief of the Training and Instruction Branch, War Plans Division, 
Subject: Summary of Instruction of Candidates, dated 17 August 1918, in NARA RG 165, War Department General 
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 Sadly, these disruptions were far from rare. Like Camp Sherman, the fourth OTC at 
Camp Dodge was also hindered by last minute changes imposed by the War Department.  After a 
month of training at Camp Dodge, the instruction of candidates ground to a halt as the War 
Department filled the camp with a large levy of new aspirants.  The War Department took this 
step in an attempt to overcome the ongoing shortage of officers.  At the same time, the War 
Department reassigned nearly all of the instructors back to their original divisions so they could 
deploy to France.  Soon after training resumed with a new cadre of instructors in mid-June 1918, 
the War Department again disrupted the camp by sending candidates slated to be artillery and 
machine gun officers to the new Central Officers’ Training Schools at Camps Taylor and 
Hancock.37  
 With the War Department’s decision to replace the OTCs with COTSs (discussed in 
detail below), officers’ training in the fourth OTCs suffered more blows.  This is illustrated in the 
experiences of Walter Adams.  In the winter of 1918, Adams and 14 other men from his 
company applied to attend OTC.  Ultimately six of these soldiers were selected to attend the 
training camp after being interviewed by their company commanders and passing an examination 
board headed by a colonel and two other officers.  Although he began the fourth OTC at Camp 
McClellan in May 1918, his training was disrupted by the consolidation of officer training at the 
Central Officers’ Training Schools.  He admitted that even prior to the closing of his OTC, his 
training had already been slowed in anticipation of the transfer.38  These changes affected nearly 
all of the OTCs and severely disrupted the flow and depth of the camps’ training.   
                                                 
 37 Pass in Review, 22. 
 38 Letter from Walter Adams to “Mr. Lyle” dated 19 May 1918 from Camp McClellan, Alabama, in 2LT 
Walter Adams, Officers’ Training Schools, Camp McClellan, USAMHI World War I Veterans’ Survey, Carlisle 
Barracks, Pennsylvania. 
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 As with the third OTCs, the War Department originally intended to commission only a 
fraction of the candidates as officers upon their graduation from the fourth OTCs.  This was 
again an effort to build a pool of personnel trained to be officers.  The army’s original plan was 
to commission merely 50 percent of the graduates in September.  As before, however, the 
“urgent need for line officers” prevented this plan from coming to fruition, and all eligible 
candidates were commissioned at the end of their training.39   
 Although the AEF was to be the “Army of 1919,” no one had thought to consult the 
Germans on the American plan.  In March 1918, the German Army began a series of attacks 
along the Western Front designed to end the war before the Americans could bring their weight 
of numbers and resources to bear.  The German offensives forced the commitment of the AEF to 
battle much earlier than Pershing or the War Department had anticipated.  As American officer 
casualties mounted in the spring and summer of 1918, and the Allies put more pressure on the 
Americans to ship units to France, the already great shortage of junior officers reached crisis 
levels and forced major changes to officers’ training. 
 A reflection of that crisis was Adjutant General McCain’s recommendation to Chief of 
Staff March on 2 August 1918 to immediately graduate and commission those fourth OTC and 
COTS students who had received at least three and a half months of their four-month officers’ 
training course.  He argued that this would help to alleviate the shortage of infantry officers by 
filling the junior commissioned ranks of those divisions departing for France in August and 
September 1918.  The Director of the War Plans Division concurred with McCain’s 
recommendations and admitted that since the newly-formed COTSs were still short of both 
instructors and facilities, the early commissioning would gain him some time to sort out the 
                                                 
 39 The Cabell Report, 9-10. 
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growing pains of the central schools.40  During this crisis, the Adjutant General even directed 
camp commanders to immediately commission some candidates that were still far short of the 
three and a half months of training he had recommended to March.  In early August 1918, with 
more than a month of instruction left in the course, the War Department ordered Camp Dodge’s 
OTC commander to commission 68 candidates early so they could deploy with the 88th 
Division.41     
 Given that the War Department had not expected to need replacement officers in any 
number until 1919, it was still caught flat footed by the demand for junior officers in mid-1918. 
To a great extent, poor planning by the General Staff had contributed to this problem by not 
linking the attendance at the training camps to accurate projections of long-term officer needs.  
It was not until 18 May 1918, that the Adjutant General warned General March that despite the 
recent commissioning of an additional 11,657 officers from the thirds series of OTCs, the army 
was in danger of draining its pool of surplus officers to replace casualties or to fill new units.  He 
estimated that “only 2,000 Infantry and 750 Field Artillery [officers] are available to be 
absorbed.”  He further noted, 
It is believed to be a conservative estimate that the replacement needs of officers 
in the several arms will approximate not less than ten percent per month of those 
actually engaged in front line service.  Beginning with the month of August and 
assuming four army corps to be actually engaged, replacement needs alone will 
approximate 2,000 officers per month, therefore, for the remaining five months of 
the present year, provisions should be made for at least 10,000 officers, for 
replacement purposes alone.42 
 
To further muddy the waters, McCain admitted that he was uncertain of the number of surplus 
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officers with the AEF in France and that he had no information on the number of officers being 
turned out by the AEF’s Candidate School. 
 There should have been no surprise in the upper echelons of the War Department as to 
the number of replacement officers that it would have to provide the AEF.  As early as 1915, a 
American military attaché in France had reported on the unprecedented scale of officer casualties 
being absorbed on the Western Front.  On 25 August 1915, for instance, Major Spencer Cosby 
reported, “An officer of the [French] General Staff on duty in the Ministry of War told me that 
the French losses in officers to June 1st [1915] were Cavalry 280, artillery 1160, infantry over 
10,000.”43  No one, it seems, took any notice of these facts until well after the United States had 
entered the war.   
 In March 1918, the American Military Intelligence Branch tried to estimate possible 
American officer losses for May 1918 through April 1919 based on the losses that the British 
army had suffered in France in 1917.  For that year, the British lost 7,881 officers killed in 
action, 2,703 who died of wounds, and 298 who died due to disease.  They calculated that the 
British also suffered 25,789 temporary or long term losses of officers due to nonfatal wounds.  
Of the wounded officers, eight percent convalesced for two months or less, 16 percent for two to 
four months, 15 percent for four to six months, 27 percent required recovery times over six 
moths in duration, and 34 percent were so grievously wounded as to be unfit for further service.  
The study revealed that British officers on average took twice as long to recover than either 
NCOs or soldiers.  Based on these statistics, the intelligence branch estimated that beginning in 
May 1918, when they “assumed that the American forces will be actively involved in France,” 
until November 1918 the AEF could expect to lose between 4.6 to 6.4 percent of its officers per 
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month.  The study’s author projected that after officer casualties declined to 1.3 to 2.5 percent 
per month due to the slowing of operations during the winter of 1918 and 1919, April 1919 
would see a spike in officer casualties to 8.3 percent as the Americans began to shoulder more 
responsibility in fighting the war.44  Unfortunately, for the AEF’s infantry officers in 1918, these 
estimates were quite short of the mark.      
 Although the War Department waited until the crisis was upon them to act, it did take 
steps in the spring of 1918 to try and solve its glaring shortages of officers.  Shortly before the 
commencement of the fourth series of OTCs, some members of the General Staff were already 
questioning the wisdom of placing the OTCs under the control of division commanders.  On     
14 March 1918, the acting Chief of the War Plans Division, Colonel D. W. Ketcham, 
recommended to Chief of Staff Peyton March that the army replace its system of OTCs located 
in the divisional mobilization camps with four centralized camps for training officer candidates.  
Ketcham argued that the war was likely to be a long one and that “there is a possibility of 
necessity for very large officer replacements.”  In a telling indictment of the current OTC 
training, he stated that recent inspections had revealed that, “the present schools in divisions are, 
with few exceptions, failing to produce the desired results,” and that “some of the schools have 
been described as so ineffective as to be farces.”  Furthermore, “National Guard divisions are 
believed to be unable to organize and conduct efficient schools because of a lack of competent 
instructors.”  Any division commander, Ketcham declared, “cannot efficiently train his division 
and supervise the school in addition.”  When it came to officer training, Ketcham accurately 
predicted that division commanders, 
  …will not be inclined to put it under his best officers.  The school is a feature 
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  that is grafted on to his division.  It is reasonable to place this extra burden on 
  division commanders when their time should be entirely occupied in preparing 
  their divisions for war.45   
 
 Ketcham was far from being alone in his desire to reform officers’ training.  Leonard 
Wood had long been dissatisfied with the officers he was receiving from the OTCs.  He 
unequivocally stated in April 1918, “The three months’ course does not turn out sufficiently well 
trained officers and it has been necessary to give them comparatively long periods of training in 
France.”  He recommended that the OTCs be expanded from three to six months.46  McCain also 
agreed with these sentiments, and in his 18 May 1918 letter to the Chief of Staff, he pleaded that 
the army immediately establish Central Officers’ Training Schools at Camps Gordon, Lee, 
Hancock, and Pike.  He estimated that such centralized officer schools could turn out at least 
2,000 new officers per month and would overcome the problem of training replacement officers 
after divisions in training left for France and closed the OTCs.47   
 Unfortunately, change was slow in coming to the officers’ training system.  It was not 
until early June 1918 that the War Department finally issued orders closing the OTCs in the 
divisional training camps and established three Infantry Central Officers’ Training Schools 
(COTS) at Camps Gordon, Lee, and Pike; a Machine Gun COTS at Camp Hancock, Georgia; 
and a Field Artillery COTS at Camp Zachary Taylor, Kentucky.  As already noted, this late 
decision both disrupted the fourth OTCs and complicated the establishment of the new COTS.   
 Regardless of branch, all of the COTS classes were to be four months in duration.  
Although the army understood that “a fully trained officer cannot be produced in so short of a 
                                                 
 45 “Memorandum for the Chief of Staff from Colonel D. W. Ketcham Acting Chief of the War College 
Division, Subject: Future Officers’ Training Schools for Infantry, Field Artillery and Cavalry, dated 14 March 1918” 
in RG 165 “Letters,… etc Officers’ Training Camps,” NARA Microfilm File 9226, Roll 261. 
 46 “Letter to Adjutant General from MG Leonard Wood, Subject: Training camps for officers, dated 18 
April 1918,” in RG 165 “Letters,… etc Officers’ Training Camps,” NARA Microfilm File 9226, Roll 261. 
 47 “Memorandum from BG H. P. McCain, Army Adjutant General, to Chief of Staff, dated 18 May 1918” 
in RG 165 “Letters,… etc Officers’ Training Camps,” NARA Microfilm File 9226, Roll 261. 
 
  354
course,” the aim was to give the candidates a course, “comprehensive enough to cover the 
fundamentals in which an officer should be thoroughly grounded, and, in addition, to permit a 
primary schooling in the methods of modern war.”  In designing the course, the War Plans 
Division sought to continue to balance training in both trench and open warfare, and directed that 
in the interest of time, “the course of training must not be interrupted by unnecessary parades, 
reviews, practice marches,” or other distractions.48  
 During the first month of the new course for infantry officers the instruction would focus 
on the theoretical basis of the IDR, the Manual of Interior Guard Duty, field sanitation and first 
aid, and the Small Arms Firing Regulations.  Training in the second month continued to 
emphasize the IDR but put more time into the theory and practice of minor tactics, topographic 
sketching, administration, paper work, and the “interior economy of company messing and 
property.”  The third month of training continued to emphasize the IDR and topographic 
sketching, but now focused mostly on musketry training and practice (62 hours), and on minor 
tactics.  The final month of training introduced map reading, field fortifications, the Manual for 
Courts Martial, the tactical employment of machine guns (3 hours), and “Trench warfare, 
grenades, trench mortars, gas, etc” for 26 hours.  Physical training, bayonet training, and 
signaling were emphasized throughout and given the same amount of time during each month of 
training.  This meant that the candidate still spent 49 hours in dubious bayonet training over the 
course of the school.  The continued reliance on the IDR also demonstrates the persistent use of 
obsolete tactical doctrine in officers’ training.  It is amazing how little the tactical instruction of 
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officer candidates had changed over the course of the war.  In the fall of 1918, candidates were 
still being subjected to training which in no way reflected the realities of combat in France.  
These subjects were taught in the infantry COTSs, and the time devoted to them.49   
Table 7-3: Four Month Training Plan for Infantry COTS Candidates 
  
Subject Hours of TNG % of Total TNG 
In and out processing, and misc. 45 hours 4.6 % 
Evening Study 176 hours 18.3 % 
Physical training 49 hours 5.1 % 
Bayonet training 49 hours 5.1 % 
Infantry Drill Regulations  
(33 hours theoretic and 121 hours hands on) 
154 hours  
 
16 % 
Small Arms Firing Regulation and fundamental 
musketry 
42 hours 4.3 % 
Practice march 23 hours 2.3 % 
Manual of Interior Guard 23 hours 2.3 % 
First Aid, hygiene, and field sanitation 16 hours 1.6 % 
Military discipline and courtesy 8 hours .9 % 
Signaling 24 hours 2.4 % 
Field Firing 8 hours  .9 % 
Range Practice 48 hours 5 % 
Military topography and sketching 43 hours 4.4 % 
Manual for Courts Martial 13 hours 1.3 % 
Field engineering and fortification 6 hours  .7 % 
Sand table and map exercises 15 hours 1.5 % 
Company administration, paperwork, and interior 
economy 
24 hours 2.4 % 
Field Service Regulations 6 hours  .7 % 
Minor Tactics 17 hours 1.7 % 
Advance guard and outposts 14 hours 1.4 % 
Combat offensive and defensive 8 hours  .9 % 
Map Problems 12 hours 1.2 % 
Tactical walks and terrain exercises 19 hours 2 % 
Employment of machine guns and automatic rifle 6 hours  .7 % 
Trench warfare- (grenades, trench mortars, gas)  26 hours 2.7 % 
Tests and examinations 36 hours 3.7 % 
Inspections and ceremonies 42 hours 4.3 % 
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Lectures 10 hours 1 % 
                Total training hours: 961 hours  
 
 Some of the problems in the COTSs training was reflected in the questions the candidates 
were given in their written examinations.  An examination given to Camp Gordon candidates 
during their first week of training, for example, asked them to answer: “What is the present status 
of Bulgaria in this war?”; “What are the ‘Eagle Boats’ and who makes them?”; and “Who wrote 
the following: Evangeline, The Last of the Mohicans, The House of Seven Gables, Ben Hur, The 
Call of the Wild?”  On an examination in the eleventh week of training the aspirants were 
required to, “Name the eight rules that govern the carrying of the piece.”50  An examination 
given COTS students at Camp MacArthur on 21 September 1918 included some weighty 
questions drawn from materials in the IDR such as, “Why is close order drill essential,” “Explain 
the command, By the Right  Flank, March,” and “Describe the Hand Salute.”  The essay portion 
of the test asked the students, “In not more than one hundred words state the value of bayonet 
work from the following standpoints: physical benefits to be derived; need for alertness of mind 
as well as quick and decisive movements of the body; discipline; developing the individual 
fighting spirit of each man.”51  As had been the case with the previous OTCs, the problem with 
the training in the camps had more to do with what was taught rather than how much time the 
course had to teach its students. 
 The poor quality of the training was not lost on either the students or certain senior 
American officers.  On 4 September 1918, Leonard Wood expressed his concern to the Adjutant 
General that the COTSs were failing to give, “proper weight to the quality of leadership, 
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judgment, character, and initiative” of the candidates.  He went on to note,  
 There are plenty of men who can squeeze through a training camp, memorize 
 commands and make fair recitations; who are absolutely unfit to be officers…It is 
 a dangerous policy to continue turning out partially instructed men.  This war 
 demands thoroughly trained officers, and no class is more important than the 
 platoon commander, who is generally a young officer just from training school.  
 They are not coming to us at the present time, so trained as to be really competent 
 to perform this duty.52  
 
Wood’s sentiments were shared by the Camp Gordon COTS candidate Henry P. Frey.  In a July 
1918 letter to an acquaintance in the War Department, Frey wrote that “there are a lot of defects 
in the system” of officer training.  Fry was a graduate of VMI, a former commissioned officer in 
the National Guard, and a recent sergeant in the National Army.  He maintained that, “the 
theoretical instruction given in the school is exceeding weak,” and singled out instruction in 
musketry, bayonet work, topography, and minor tactics as being particularly flawed.  He also 
believed that not enough time was being devoted to subjects that a young officer needed “to 
make him think.”53  Another candidate, Robert O’Hair simply believed that his officer training at 
both the Fort Sheridan OTC and the Camp Taylor Field Artillery COTS was “brief and sketchy,” 
and that it did not entail “enough attention to detail or preparation for actual battle.”54   
 Wood and the candidates were not alone in their anxiety over the training at the COTS. 
A British officer assigned to Camp Gordon, Captain V. S. Hebbert, reported on 25 July 1918 that 
the training plan for the COTS was in disarray because there was little uniformity in training.  He 
also noted that the candidates had arrived at Camp Gordon from several defunct OTCs, each of 
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which differed in the content and methods of instruction.55  An inspector from the General 
Staff’s Training and Instruction Branch discovered similar problems upon visiting Camps 
MacArthur, Pike, and Gordon in the same month.  Major Elvid Hunt noted that the COTSs he 
visited all lacked adequate training in “leadership and drillmastership,” and overall, the schools 
suffered from a lack of quality instructors.56 
 Despite the War Department’s best efforts to “fix” officers’ training with the COTSs, 
reoccurring problems with instructors and equipment, and the AEF’s voracious demand for 
replacement officers, combined to short-circuit its goals. Ultimately, only the classes that began 
on 15 September 1918 received the full four month course, and that was only because the War 
Department allowed it to continue over two months after the Armistice.  Due to the crush of 
events, nearly all of the COTS students who were commissioned prior to the Armistice only 
received from two to three months training.57  It is amazing that in the last four months of the 
war the army was still wrestling with some of these problems.  The most intractable of which 
seems to have been finding qualified instructors.   
 The British Captain V. S. Hebbert viewed the issue of instructors as the furthermost 
obstacle to American officer training.  He noted, 
Great hindrance is also caused by the shortage of instructors.  In no subject is the 
school provided with outside instructors.  The company commanders, platoon 
commanders, and students are all employed as instructors.  In nine subjects out of 
ten it is selected students who give the instructions and such as it is, it is done 
very well, but it greatly retards the progress.  In many cases the students chosen as 
instructors are really insufficiently trained to act in that capacity, and owing to the 
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instructor being of the same category as the students subconscious slackness 
results in the students.58   
 
In many ways, the American response to Hibbert’s trenchant observations reveals why the army 
continued to face such intractable problems so late in the war.  Answering Hebbert’s criticism, 
an American General Staff officer simply retorted that it reflected nothing more than, “The 
English desire that their fixed system be used in Central Officers’ Training Schools.”  This 
officer expressed his horror that another Allied officer was going to “recommend that fewer 
hours be given to bayonet work, etc, and more to Offensive and Defensive Warfare.”  The 
American concluded that it was best to allow the American commander on the scene, “work out 
his own system, selecting from British and French criticism what is best and applicable.”59  The 
staff officer seemed oblivious to the fact that allowing local commanders to “work out his own 
system” of training was partially to blame for the Americans’ predicament. 
 Throughout the late summer and fall of 1918, the COTS commandants wrote a steady 
stream of reports to the Training and Instruction Branch bemoaning their problems with 
obtaining suitable instructors.  On 26 August, the Camp Pike commander informed the War 
Department that, “The general character of the instructor personnel which has to be employed 
leaves much to be desired in the point of efficiency.”60  A few weeks later, he stated, “The 
greatest need is that of qualified instructors in charge of the various battalions to supervise the 
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work of the company instructors, most of whom require a great deal of instruction…to qualify 
them for the work.”61  He asked for Regular Army majors, preferably West Pointers to be 
assigned to him to take on these tasks. In late September 1918, the Engineer COTS at Camp 
Humphreys, Virginia was 150 officers short of their goal of graduating 700 officers per month, 
and had been forced to decrease the length of its course from four months to only three, with 
some students only receiving five weeks of instruction.  The Camp’s commander attributed this 
decline to a serious shortage of qualified instructors.62 
 As with the earlier training camps, at times the War Department added to the 
commanders’ litany of woes by reassigning COTS instructors with little or no notice.  The 
commander of the Camp Lee COTS, Colonel Henry Eaton, sent a blistering letter to the Chief of 
the Training and Instruction Branch in September after one such occurrence.  He complained that 
just as his cadre was adequately trained to serve as trainers, the War Department reassigned his 
Senior Instructor and 20 other junior instructors.  He angrily replied “if the War Department will 
let my officers alone and give me a chance to develop them, I shall be able to turn out 
satisfactory Lieutenants.”63 
 At other times, the camp commanders themselves helped to exacerbate their instructor 
problems.  Only a month prior to launching his tirade against the War Department, Eaton himself   
had reported his dissatisfaction with having recently received 14 captains from France to serve as 
cadre at the school.  Eaton complained that since these officers were due for promotion to major, 
                                                 
 61 Report of the Commander, COTS, Camp Pike, Arkansas to Chief, Training and Instruction Branch, War 
Plans Division, Subject: Report Ending September 7, 1918, dated 9 September 1918” in NARA RG 165, War 
Department General Staff, Army War College Historical Branch, G5 Schools, 7-51.3, Box 186, Entry 310, “Camp 
Pike, Ark, Infantry COTS” 
 62 “Memorandum for Director, War Plans Division, dated 2 October 1918” in RG 165 “Letters,… etc 
Officers’ Training Camps,” NARA Microfilm File 9226, Roll 261. 
 63 Report of the Commander, COTS, Camp Lee, Virginia to Chief, Training and Instruction Branch, War 
Plans Division, Subject: Weekly Report, dated 14 September 1918” in NARA RG 165, War Department General 
Staff, Army War College Historical Branch, G5 Combat Training, 7-56.2 – 56.4, Box 207, Entry 310, “COTS Lee” 
  361
he had no use for them.  They would be too senior to serve as company commanders and he did 
not want them as senior instructors or battalion commanders because they would not be 
“thoroughly conversant with training school systems.”64  In October 1918 Colonel Edan Frey, 
the Camp Gordon COTS commander, recommended that for the sake of their morale, some of 
his instructors should be given the chance to be reassigned to combat duty in France.  While he 
admitted that “this will result in the loss of trained instructors,” such a move would help to 
overcome the “slump” he believed his officers were stuck in by holding out the carrot of a 
sought-after assignment.65  Although both commanders believed that they were doing the right 
by their camps and instructors, neither seemed to consider the downsides of these actions and the 
detrimental effects they would have on their students’ training.  
 The General Staff and the War Plans Division sympathized with the camp commanders, 
but, thanks to a host of missteps throughout the war, by late 1918 they were powerless to remedy 
the situation.  The Chief of the Training and Instruction Branch admitted to the commanders that, 
“in most cases the instructors will be officers of limited experience.” His only solution was for 
the commanders to ensure that their instructors made “careful preparation of the problems given” 
and were provided, “a logical solution of the problem which will bring out the tactical principle 
involved.”66  By this Pontius Pilate-like move, the War Department washed their hands of the 
mess and placed the burden on the schools’ Senior Instructors to prepare all of the tactical 
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problems and to ensure that their assistant instructors understood how to properly teach the class. 
 The available evidence does point to worsening problems with instructors in late 1918.  
By examining the background of instructors at Camps Lee and Hancock, it appears that the 
experience level in the cadre continued to wane as the war went on.  The company commander 
and senior instructor for the August through October 1918 class for the 8th Company, Camp Lee 
Infantry COTS, Major Gordon Hunter, was commissioned at the first OTC at Plattsburg, but had 
then only served as an instructor in other OTCs or depot brigades before arriving at Camp Lee.  
Hunter’s five assistant instructors had followed a similar path.  Two of them were graduates of 
the first OTCs, two others were graduates of the second OTCs, and one had a reserve 
commission that predated the war.  Only one of the instructors had any wartime troop experience 
outside of depot brigades or OTCs prior to his Camp Lee assignment.67   
 Of the ten instructors that taught the 6th Battalion, Camp Lee Infantry COTS from 
October 1918 to January 1919, five were commissioned out of the first OTCs, two from the 
second OTCs, one from the third OTC, and two had been students in the Camp Lee COTS class 
that had just graduated in early October 1918.  While seven of the instructors had some level of 
college education, only three had any military experience prior to April 1917.  First Lieutenant 
William Rodenberger’s military experience consisted of only one year’s service during the 
Philippine Insurrection.  First Lieutenant George Stevens had served five years as an artilleryman 
in the British Army before immigrating to the United States.   Second Lieutenant John Teter was 
a first generation Polish immigrant who had served as a coast artilleryman in the Regular Army 
from 1914 to 1917.68   
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 The assignment of officers who had just graduated from the course to the cadre was not 
limited to Camp Lee.  Of the 15 company commanders and senior instructors identified in the 
October to December class graduate book of the Camp Hancock Central Machine Gun Officers’ 
Training School, four had graduated from the 1st OTCs, five from the third OTCs, and six from 
the fourth OTCs.  Only three of the 21 assistant instructors had been commissioned for at least a 
year. The remaining officers had all been recent graduates of the Machine Gun COTS itself.  
Five of these instructors had graduated in September 1918 and 13 had graduated in early October 
1918.  This meant that when the last Machine Gun COTS class began its training in mid-October 
1918, half of its instructors had only been officers themselves for mere days and weeks.69  This 
trend of using recently graduated officers is solid evidence of a steady decline in overall 
instructor quality and a continued adherence to the unintended policy of the “blind leading the 
blind.”  
 Surprisingly, the COTSs continued to face shortages of equipment and instructional 
material to the end of the war. On 15 September 1918, the commander of the Camp MacArthur 
COTS, Colonel John Boniface, informed the War Plans Division’s Training and Instruction 
Branch that he had concerns about his instructors and the glaring shortage of textbooks.  He 
admitted that his new instructors were “eager and willing,” but hoped that their “efficiency will 
develop as time passes.”  The shortage of text books, however, was of greater import, and the 
colonel noted that until the army could provide the required texts, he would make due by 
“borrowing books from the post library and other sources.”70  Over a month later he was still 
lamenting, “The shortage of text books is terribly trying; I have again purchased them 
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locally…and I hope that this meets with your approval in this.” He noted, “We must have text 
books and I am sure you will not disapprove my buying when I cannot get them any other way.” 
(original emphasis)71  A General Staff inspection of COTS in October 1918 revealed that the 
Camp Gordon school was still short 2,000 copies of the IDR and other publications.72  The Camp 
Lee COTS commander was also bedeviled by the shortage of text books and raised the logical 
question of why he could not get them from the divisional OTCs that were closing down.73  
Unfortunately, the War Department made no reply to this valid question.   
 Texts books were not the only instructional materials in short supply at the COTS.  As 
late as November 1918, camps commanders were still reporting shortages of key equipment.   
The Camp Grant COTS commander, Colonel C. E. Reese, reported on 4 November that, “no 
rifles, bayonets and scabbards are available for issue to October and November classes.”  He 
noted that while the camp had been able to supply the September class with rifles, a great 
number of them, “are unserviceable as no spare parts are obtainable in camp.”74  The same day,  
the Chief Instructor of the Camp Gordon Infantry Replacement and Training Camp, Colonel 
Robert Getty, reported to the General Staff that he was so short on gas masks that they had to be 
shared among his different organizations, thus making the supervision and scheduling of 
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“practical gas instruction” very difficult.75  Even the students rebelled at these obvious problems. 
When presented a lecture on the obsolete Benet-Mercie machine gun, one candidate of the 
Machine Gun COTS vehemently stated that the instructor should, “Cut the stone age stuff; this is 
the World War, not the Civil.”76  The continuation of these supply problems and their baleful 
influence on officer training is a sad reflection on the haphazard nature of the American 
mobilization. 
 The greatest single complaint or concern broached by the COTS in the last four months 
of the war was not about instructors, text books, or equipment, but rather was the perceived 
decline in the quality of candidates attending their camps.  Nearly all of the camp commanders 
raised this issue in the fall of 1918.  As early as August, the Camps Lee and Pike COTS 
commanders were noting what they viewed as the precipitous decline in the standards of their 
students.  The Camp Lee commander, Colonel Eaton, lamented that the decline was not only 
evident in the enlisted men being sent to the school, but also in the attendees that he was being 
sent from the civilian sector.  He maintained that the local draft boards had “not been as strict as 
required for the infantry course and candidates sent here have had to be rejected after being here 
but a short time.”77  He later noted that a number of the enlisted men, “are being sent who are 
entirely lacking in the instincts of a gentlemen,” and “were uncouth and their language was far 
from being refined.”  He concluded that it was “quite impossible to make gentlemen out of men 
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of this type in four months.”78  The Camp Pike commander, Colonel Charles Miller, echoed 
Eaton’s unease and reported that “Many of the enlisted candidates who reported in July and 
August were lacking in educational qualifications and a considerable number were lacking in 
physical qualifications, and many had to be eliminated at once.”79 
 The situation only worsened in September and October.  On 26 September 1918 the 
Camp MacArthur COTS commander complained that the quality of candidates he was receiving 
was not what it should be.  He was angered that a recent levy of enlisted candidates had included 
two men with venereal disease and others that clearly lacked the qualities needed for 
officership.80  In October be furiously reported, 
 …We have discovered two or three men that have the most abominable records 
 and how they were ever allowed to come here is a mystery and shows that 
 company commanders still have to realize the grave error of sending men here 
 with bad records…Today I found one candidate’s record that showed something 
 like 21 company punishments and 13 courts-martial, yet he was sent here to 
 become an officer.81  
 
That same month, the problem had become so apparent that even the Assistant Secretary of War  
had to admit that the army had experienced great “difficultly in securing the proper number of 
qualified candidates for the Officers’ Training Schools, and within the greatly enlarged military 
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program this difficulty has threatened to become acute.”82  
 The camp commanders all blamed the candidates’ company commanders for sending 
unqualified men to officers’ training.  The Camp MacArthur COTS commander accurately noted 
that,   
…some of the company commanders failed to select suitable men as candidates; 
such mistakes are bound to occur where the selection is made by inexperienced 
officers back in their companies…My observations of the candidates, as a whole, 
impresses me with the fact that previous classes have drained the service and we 
must expect many poor candidates to arrive…Please urge company and 
regimental officers to appreciate the grave importance to the service of selecting 
their VERY BEST men, regardless of whether that means they must send their 
first sergeants, sergeants majors and troop clerks…” (original emphasis)83 
 
However in establishing the blame for the problem, the colonel had also stumbled on the reason 
for the decline.  Not only had many of the best soldiers already gone through the training, but the 
unit commanders had also grown tired of seeing their companies decimated by the War 
Department’s ceaseless levies of personnel.   
 The demands of officer replacements drove the War Department to both cut standards for 
candidates and increase its quotas for attendance to officers’ training in the last months of 1918.   
In August 1918 the severe shortage of infantry officers led the War Department to depart from its 
long-standing policy of having all line officers be graduates from a designated officers’ training 
course.  The Adjutant General directed that commanders of depot brigades, replacement centers 
and infantry and cavalry regiments still in the United States hold boards to “examine enlisted 
men for direct appointment as 2nd lieutenants of infantry and cavalry.”  Those enlisted men 
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already attending an officers’ training school, but not having finished the course of instruction, 
could also apply to their school commander for an appointment.  By this commissioning slight of 
hand, the army added a further 539 infantry and 309 cavalry second lieutenants.84  On               
27 September 1918 Secretary of War Baker directed that the commandants of the three Infantry 
COTSs graduate and commission the students, who entered the course in August 1918, after only 
two and a half months of training.  He did stipulate, however, that they were “authorized to retain 
for one month longer those whom you think need further instruction to make efficient 
officers.”85  This was only one of a frenzied series of changes to the qualifications of the 
applicants and reductions in their training time.   
 Although it intended the candidates from the COTS to come mainly from the army’s 
enlisted ranks, the War Department found that the supply of quality enlisted candidates was 
running dry.  This was particularly apparent in candidates for field artillery and other technical 
branches.  The field artillery, for example, had to accept over 50 percent of its candidates from 
civilian life in order to find men with the requisite mathematical skills that the branch required.  
This meant that while it was physically capable of processing over 1000 students per week, in 
October 1918 the Field Artillery COTS at Camp Taylor, Kentucky was only reaching a weekly 
intake of 500 new students.86   When it came to worthy applicants, Colonel Cabell reported, “the 
Army had already been thoroughly combed for good material and the normal draft calls did not 
supply the quality of material required.”87    
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 The War Department tried to address this problem by first expanding the quota of 
soldiers that units had to provide to the COTS.  In the fall of 1918, the Adjutant General raised 
the quota for infantry units from 2 percent to 5 percent of their total enlisted strength.  It set the 
quota for artillery and machine gun units even higher.88  The shortage of infantry officers 
became so acute that, in September and October 1918, the army even added three more Infantry 
COTS at Camp Grant, Illinois; Camp MacArthur, Texas; and Camp Fremont, California.  To 
make matters worse, the great Influenza epidemic also led to a great reduction in the number of 
applicants in both October and November.  While few of their graduates ever left the United 
States, the COTSs ultimately commissioned 20,563 officers between September 1918 and 
February 1919.89  
 In many ways it was this increase in quotas for the training camps that led to some of the 
worst abuses of the system.  All-too-often, harried company commanders used the levies as a 
means of ridding themselves of the troublemakers or the expendable elements of their units.  The 
Camp Lee commander noted that one sergeant from the 29th Infantry Regiment was sent to the 
course against his will because his company commander had a quota to fill for the school and the 
sergeant was the most expendable.  In another case, a first sergeant from a unit in Panama 
entered COTS “solely to get back to the United States with hope that he could secure a furlough 
to visit his home.”90  This also accounts for the VD and discipline cases that showed up at Camp 
MacArthur. 
                                                 
 88 Ibid., 14. 
 89 Ibid., 15.  The Camp Grant Infantry COTS commander, Colonel Charles Hagadorn, reported on               
7 October 1918 that he had to delay the start of the new class of candidates scheduled to being on 15 October 
because of “the prevalence of the influenza epidemic.” On 19 October, the Camp MacArthur commander reported 
that his camp was in the midst of the influenza epidemic, and that the sickness had already killed two candidates and 
four of the school’s cadre.  He also reported that half of his staff was sick. 
 90 Report of the Commander, COTS, Camp Lee, Virginia to Chief, Training and Instruction Branch, War 
Plans Division, Subject: Weekly Report, dated 7 September 1918” in NARA RG 165, War Department General 
Staff, Army War College Historical Branch, G5 Combat Training, 7-56.2 – 56.4, Box 207, Entry 310, “COTS Lee.” 
  370
 Nearly all the COTS commanders also reported great spikes in the number of candidates 
who reported that they had been sent to officers’ training against their will or without any 
previous consultation by their commanders.  In his report summarizing the lessons learned at the 
Camp MacArthur COTS, its commander noted… 
There were candidates stating, quite frequently, that they had been sent here to 
school without their wishes being consulted, in fact against their expressed wishes 
and that they desired to be relieved from the course....[this] impeded the work of 
the school, caused additional work of elimination boards at the schools, and the 
elimination of such men created vacancies in the candidate body at a time when 
the Government needed every officer that could be obtained from such schools.91 
 
Given the frequency with which these comments appear in the record, this seems to have been a 
rather common occurrence.  Even some enlisted men noted how rapidly and unexpectedly a 
soldier could be packed off to become an officer.  One private wrote home, “The captain just 
announced that he had selected a private named Hilmen to go to the officers’ training school in 
Atlanta, Ga. in the morning.  That’s how quick [the] U.S. does things in the Army.  Hilmen 
didn’t know a thing about it till just now.”92 
 There were a number of soldiers that wanted nothing to do with becoming an officer.  
The regular sergeant-turned-captain Sam Woodfill repeatedly tried to get his first sergeant, 
Severt  Nelson, to attend officers’ training.  Nelson would have no part of it.  The grizzled 
veteran informed Woodfill in no uncertain terms, 
  I wouldn’t know what to do with a commission if I had one.  I figure that  
  I was born to be a top sergeant.  I’ve learned the game.  And I’m goin’ to stick to  
  it.  I’d rather be a top sarge than a brigadier.93     
 
Nelson was not alone in trying to avoid the officer’s training.  Sergeant Major John Burton was a 
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college student when the war broke out, and was thus a prime candidate for selection to attend 
officers’ training.  But Burton recalled that “I did not wish to become a commissioned officer, 
preferring to remain ‘in the gang,’ with my comrades.  I had no wish to be called ‘Sir,’ 
whatever.”94  It appears that Woodfill was one of the few company commanders who took the 
time to ask their soldiers’ opinion before bundling them off to officers’ training. 
 In August 1918 the Congress and the army had begun to explore ways to better utilize the 
manpower that was being held in the nation’s colleges and universities.  This came to fruition 
with the Man Power Bill of 12 September 1918.  The bill authorized the enlistment all of the 
nation’s able-bodied college students into the Students’ Army Training Corps (SATC).  
Beginning 1 October 1918, the SATC militarized the nation’s educational institutions by 
essentially turning them into mills for the production of junior officers.95  In fact, soon after the 
establishment of the SATC units in the colleges, the Assistant Secretary of War made clear in the 
memo that the SATCs were to be “a recruiting ground for the central training schools for line 
officers” and that the army had already asked the SATC to provide 8,000 students to the COTSs 
per month.96 
 Faced with a deepening officer manpower crisis, the War Department also used the Man 
Power Bill of 12 September 1918 as a justification for raising the maximum age for admission to 
officers’ training for candidates from the ranks from 40 to 45 years old.  Two days after the 
Congress passed the Man Power Bill, Secretary Baker further authorized the commissioning of 
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SATC candidates who were at least 18 years old and had been recommended by a local board of 
officers.  By essentially lowering the minimum age for commissioning from 20 years and nine 
months to 18, the army squeezed out another 3,264 second lieutenants before the end of the 
war.97  This also meant that by mid-October, the capacity of the Infantry COTSs at Camps Pike, 
Lee, Grant, MacArthur, and Gordon was at 5,600 students each, and they were taking in 1,400 
new candidates a month and graduating around 1000 officers every four weeks.  Of these 
candidates, 60 percent were enlisted men, 20 percent were SATC students, and 20 percent were 
coming directly from civilian life.98 
 On 21 October 1918, the Adjutant General further lowered the standard for admission 
into officers’ training by allowing five percent of COTS candidates to be drawn from “limited 
service men whose physical defects [such as poor eyesight or lack of a full range of motion in the 
arms and legs] were not glaring, but were of a minor nature.”99  The idea was that upon 
graduation and commissioning, these limited service officers would be sent to fill positions in 
depot brigades and other postings not requiring field service so as to release physically qualified 
men then occupying those jobs for active service.  In the week before the Armistice, the Adjutant 
General was also successful in lowering the acceptable physical standards for officers to that of 
the minimal physical standards for draftees.  This allowed enlisted men to apply for attendance to 
COTS who had previously been disqualified due to poor eyesight, color blindness, or other 
minor defects.  Despite these steady lowering of the standards,   
Colonel Cabell still argued that had the Armistice not been signed, “it would have been difficult 
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to have gotten the November classes to the Central Schools to the authorized strength.”100  
 The lowering of the standards for entry into the COTS was also met with alterations to 
the training conducted in the camps.  On 6 November 1918, the Chief of the War Plans 
Division’s Training and Instruction Branch issued new guidance to the Infantry COTS 
commanders on the length of the course and subjects that were to be taught.  It directed that the 
COTS course be reduced from four to three months in duration, and that the course was to be 
based on a six-work-day week (Monday through Saturday) with a “minimum day of 10 hours” 
of training.  The new three month course drastically reduced training time devoted to musketry 
training and practice, minor tactics, and the new weapons of warfare.  Signal training was 
limited to the use of “wig wag” signal flags.  It is interesting to note that under the new course, 
33 hours were devoted to bayonet training and 18 hours to “wig-wag” signaling while the 
candidates only received 14 hours in small arms firing, eight hours of gas instruction, and only 
three hours of map reading.101  Even in the face of severe cutbacks to training, at the eleventh 
hour the army was still devoting an inordinate amount of precious instructional time to subjects 
of questionable importance.   
 Were the men attending the COTSs in late 1918 truly as poor as the Regular Army 
officers who trained them claimed?  A study of candidates from Camps Lee, Hancock, and 
Taylor do allow for some tentative answers to this question.  The statistics for the candidates of 
the 4th Battalion, Machine Gun Central Officers’ Training School, at Camp Hancock, Georgia, 
who began their training in August 1918, actually show a slight increase in levels of education 
over the sample taken from fourth series OTCs.  Over 70 percent of the candidates in the 
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battalion’s 21st Company had some college experience.  Of the 111 candidates of the 22nd 
Company, 75 (67.5%) had some college education; 31 (30%) had only a high school education; 
3 (2.7%) had attended vocational school, and 2 (1.8%) had less than a high school education.  
There also seemed to have been no major change in the candidates who had held professional or 
white collar jobs prior to the war.  Table 7-4 lists the occupations given by the 121 candidates of 
the 20th Company.  Using the same criteria applied to the Fort Sheridan sample, after factoring 
out the students and those candidates whose occupations were unknown, approximately 85 
percent of the candidates could be classified as been employed in upper or middle-class 
professional or white collar jobs.102  
Table 7-4: Occupations of Camp Hancock MGCOTS August 1918 
  
 
  
 
 Despite the greater academic rigor required of officers in the Field Artillery, the 
education levels for candidates at the Camp Taylor FACOTS were very similar to those of 
students at Camp Hancock.  Of the 8737 officers who graduated from the Field Artillery Central 
Officers’ Training School at Camp Zachary Taylor, Kentucky from 16 August 1918 to its closure 
in February 1919, 6207 (71%) were college graduates or had some degree of college education.  
Of the remainder, 2416 (27.6%) had graduated from high school and 120 (1.4%) had only a 
grade school education.  When examining the age of the graduates, 563 (6.4 %) were between 18 
and 20; 5634 (64.5%) were from 21 to 26; 2076 (23.8%) were from 27 to 31; 448 (5.1%) were 
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from 32 to 40, and only 16 (.2%) were over 41 years old.103   
 Statistics from two different classes at the Camp Lee Infantry COTS illustrate the shifts 
in demographics of who was attending officers’ training after the COTSs replaced the OTCs.  
They also highlight the influence of the Student Army Training Corps on who was entering the 
COTSs in the last months of the Great War.  The statistics for the candidates of the 8th Company, 
Camp Lee Infantry COTS (who went through the course from July through October 1918), 
indicate the continued shift toward selecting candidates from the enlisted ranks of the army.  Due 
to the requirement that all those seeking commissions had to first enlist in the army, every 
candidate listed his military rank at time of entry into the course.  What is interesting is that a 
broad majority of the candidates (78.7%) had been NCOs prior to attending officers’ training.  
Of the 8th Company’s 173 candidates, 38 (22%) had been corporals; 68 (39.4%) had been 
sergeants; 3 (1.7%) had been sergeants first class; 19 (11%) had been first sergeants, and eight 
(4.6%) had been regimental or battalion sergeants major.  Seven of the 37 privates in the 
company even had some degree of military service prior to entering the course.  The high 
number of NCOs attending officers’ training illustrates the army’s continued policy of “robbing 
Peter to pay Paul,” when it came to company-level leadership.  This also explains the irritation of 
many company commanders in being forced to give up their NCOs to officers’ training. The 
constant drain of solid NCOs from line units, as will be seen in the next chapter, played havoc in 
the training and cohesion building of companies, platoons, and squads.104 
 The average age of the 8th Company’s candidates was 26, and 35 (20%) had military 
service in the National Guard, Regular Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, or with a 
foreign army, prior to America entering the war.  One of these men, Arnold Kroepsch, had 
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served three months with the regulars and nearly six months with the British Army’s 14th London 
Territorials on the Western Front.   The company also contained four soldiers who had attended, 
but failed out of, previous officers’ training camps.  One of these men, William Pierson, had 
washed out of the 1st OTC at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana and the third OTC at Camp 
Sherman, Ohio.  The occupations listed by the 8th Company candidates prior to joining the army 
are in Table 7-5.  Using the same criteria applied to the Fort Sheridan sample, after factoring out 
the students and those candidates whose occupations were unknown, approximately 85 percent 
of the candidates could be classified as having been employed in upper or middle-class 
professional or white collar jobs.105  
Table 7-5: Occupations of Camp Lee 8th Company ICOTS, July 1918 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The statistics for the candidates from the 6th Battalion, Camp Lee Infantry COTS who 
went through the course from October 1918 to January 1919, illustrate the dramatic change to the 
demographics of officers’ training schools after SATC students began to flood the camps in the 
fall of 1918.  Of the 167 candidates in the 6th Battalion, nearly 71 percent of them had been born 
between 1898 and 1900, thus making them age 18 through 20.  This influx of younger candidates 
lowered the average age of the course to 21 to 22 years old.  The youngest candidate, Robert G. 
Hunt, was born on 24 June 1900, making him 18 years and four months old at the time of the 
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Armistice.106   
 The vast majority of these younger candidates were entering the schools directly from 
college and university SATC programs.  This raised the overall education level of the men in the 
course.  Of the 167 candidates, 153 (91.6%) were college graduates or had some level of college 
education.  Of the remainder, three (1.7%) had graduated from preparatory school; five (3%) had 
graduated from high school, and six (3.5%) had less than a high school education.  The influx of 
college students also witnessed a precipitous decline in those candidates with prior military 
service.  The only candidate with any real military experience was Julien Bryan, who had served 
with the French Army for seven months as an ambulance driver and had chronicled his exploits 
in the book, Ambulance 464.  Four candidates had attended the first Plattsburg OTC and had 
failed to obtain commissions, while nine others had attended military colleges. 107  
 Based on the samples from these camps, the regular officers may have been overhasty in 
their characterizations of the COTS candidates.  On the surface, with the addition of the SATC 
cadets, one could even argue that the overall education level of the candidates, and thus their 
perceived quality, actually improved at the end of the war.  This being said, it is still clear that 
the army was facing an uphill battle to fill the ranks of the training schools in late 1918 and had 
correspondingly lowered standards to fill the officer schools.  However, the number of obviously 
unqualified candidates sent by fuming company commanders to fill the War Department’s 
endless quotas, may have magnified the issue of overall candidate quality in the eyes of the 
COTS commanders. 
 At no time in the war did the Regular Army officer corps ever stray too far from their 
preference for college educated officers.  In his final report, the Camp MacArthur COTS 
                                                 
 106 Statistical information drawn from, Lieuie VI, 30-51.  
 107 Ibid.   
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commander still maintained that, “It was found that the brightest men were those from the 
universities and colleges; also that it was these men who gave the greatest enthusiasm for the 
work.”108  In the end, the SATC cadets seemed to offer a panacea for the War Department’s 
officer manpower woes by still retaining the benefit of having college educated men.  
Unfortunately, for all its allure, the SATC path came with serious consequences.  First of all, 
given the ages that these cadets were when entering the COTSs, it is obvious that they had spent 
very little time in college.  Thus, whatever intellectual broadening or conditioning that the army 
hoped to gain from selecting these men was largely moot.  More importantly, one should not 
disregard the inherent danger that the army was willing to accept in placing immature youths in 
command of combat units.  Of these callow youngsters filling his camps, one COTS commander 
warned, 
 The incoming candidates from the Students’ Training Corps look like boys; quite 
 a few of them seem to be about eighteen, underdeveloped, week, needing the 
 training I had as a boy in prep school.  I doubt if your office contemplated such 
 material being sent here to become officers after four months’ training.  Some will 
 not be nineteen when their four months are up.109 
 
It is generally difficult enough to direct young 18 and 19 year old privates; it is quite another to 
place them in command of soldiers who are dependent on their decision-making abilities and 
knowledge.  It was perhaps fortunate that the war ended before these adolescent officers made it 
to the front.   
 During the war a French officer was reputed to have told his American counterpart that 
while raising a four million man army was no great feat, the Americans’ ability to create an 
                                                 
 108 “Report of the Commander, COTS, Camp MacArthur, Texas to Chief, Training and Instruction Branch, 
War Plans Division, dated 15 November 1918” in RG 165 “Letters,…etc Officers’ Training Camps,” NARA 
Microfilm File 9226, Roll 261. 
 109 “Weekly Report of the Commander, COTS, Camp MacArthur, Texas to Chief, Training and Instruction 
Branch, War Plans Division, dated 19 October 1918,” in RG 165 “Letters,…etc Officers’ Training Camps,” NARA 
Microfilm File 9226, Roll 261. 
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officer corps from virtually nothing was quite miraculous.  In all fairness to the Great War U. S. 
Army, the sheer effort it shouldered in identifying, training, and selecting its 200,000 man strong 
officer corps was a prodigious accomplishment.  Shortly after the end of the war, Peyton March 
explained, 
  In planning for an intensive course of training for three month 
  there was no thought that trained officers could be produced 
  in that short period of time.  It was believed however that some 
  of the necessary fundamentals could be taught, and that the course 
  would permit the selection of those who showed that they were 
  capable of becoming instructors and leaders of soldiers, and that 
  belief was fully justified by the results.110 
Although March’s statement is certainly valid, one should not forget that this accomplishment 
was only achieved by cutting a number of corners.  Teaching the fundamentals is a sound 
practice as long as the fundamentals taught are applicable and are linked to the skills that an 
officer needed to command in combat.  As we have seen, this was often not the case in the 
training camps.   
 In the final analysis, the operation of the OTCs and SATC demonstrate the ad hoc and 
“stop-gap” nature of the American mobilization for the war.  Some of the “corner cutting” was 
an inevitable result of the systemic problems of mass mobilization.  Others, however, such as the 
ineffectiveness and lack of realism in the candidates’ training were self-inflicted War 
Department wounds. While the army’s makeshift officer training system generally managed to 
fill the ranks with an acceptable quality of officer (although even the quality and rank-filling was 
proving to be a chore in late 1918), the improvised character of the training produced leaders of 
wildly uneven abilities, questionable technical and tactical competencies, and unrealistic 
concepts of warfare.  This fundamental flaw would dog the U. S. Army until the end of the war. 
                                                 
110 War Department Annual Report, 1919, 300.  
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Chapter 8  
“Ninety-Day Wonders” and “Jumped-up Sergeants” 
Stateside Mobilization and the Challenges of Small Unit Leadership  
 
Until the creation of the COTSs, most of the graduates from the officers’ training camps 
went directly from school into leadership or staff positions in units in the process of mobilizing 
or training.  As these officers reported to their new units, most Regular Army officers realized 
that the OTCs were but an elementary school in the graduates’ overall military education.  
Following the traditions of the Old Army, the novice officer’s finishing school would be his “on 
the job training” within his unit.  As a battalion commander later noted of his new officers,   
  Careful selection at the training camps has undoubtedly served to weed 
  out the more defective material which presented itself for commissions. 
Three months of intensive exercise and the most superficial training in the theory 
of leadership have naturally failed to impress this human material, 
though it is of the finest quality, with the true character of officers. . .Their 
intelligence, enthusiasm, energy, and potential capacity for leadership are 
in no sense satisfactory substitutes for the knowledge and experience  
which in the main they lack.1    
 
This fact was not lost on the new officers.  Lieutenant Milton Bernet recalled, “every candidate 
realized that if he were fortunate enough to receive a commission, he would have to supplement 
his actual work with a great deal of further study.”2  Unfortunately, as Bernet and the other 
officers filling the new divisions in the fall and winter of 1917 and 1918 discovered, the pace 
and problems of mobilization left little time for completing the “graduate study” of their new 
trade or even filling in the gaps in their training left over from the OTCs. 
                                                 
 
1 LTC Jennings C. Wise, “The Soldier’s Life in Battle,” Infantry Journal, Vol. XVI, no. 11 (May 1920), 
929.  
2 Milton E. Bernet, unpublished manuscript “The World War As I Saw It” in USAMHI WWI Vet Survey, 
89 DIV, WWI 2340, 35. 
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 This chapter will examine how the army trained its small unit leaders as part of its overall 
plan for mobilizing, training, and deploying its divisions.  It will specifically explore the 
selection and training of NCOs, the continued instruction of the new wartime officer corps in 
units, and the overall effectiveness of the preparation of both groups to meet the tactical 
challenges they would face in France.  It will also investigate the following questions: what was 
the army’s expectation of its junior officers and NCOs as combat leaders?; what were the 
average soldiers’ perceptions of their leaders?; how effective was the army and its junior leaders 
at building cohesion within their small units?; how did systemic problems associated with mass 
mobilization (i.e., unit organization, the levy of soldiers, shortage of training equipment, etc.) 
exacerbate the issue of leadership training and competence? 
With the OTCs often located on the same posts as the National Army cantonments, for 
the young “90 day wonders” it was a short walk from the OTC graduation field to their lives as 
company grade officers.  The letters, diaries, and memoirs of those officers reveal that many of 
them were apprehensive and unsure about assuming their new roles.  As one young officer 
recorded, 
  “Reposing special trust and confidence in my patriotism, valor, fidelity, 
and abilities,” W(oodrow) Wilson, Esq. has this day appointed me 
1st Lieut., Field Artillery, of his army.  He’s an optimist! . . Getting 
used to being saluted. Losing the Uncle Tom feeling of “candidate.” 
Occupied with size, shape and position of shoulder bars.  Feel like 
a Knight of Pythias…Having had our spirits thoroughly broken by 
three months at Sheridan, find it hard to assume the mental attitude of 
honest-to-goodness officers.3 
Some realized that it was not going to be an easy task to instill discipline in their independent-
minded citizens-turned soldiers.  An Oklahoma National Guard officer recalled, “Men who had 
lived all their life in the open and managed their own affairs found it difficult to obey someone 
                                                 
3 Anonymous, Wine, Women and War: A Diary of Disillusionment (New York: J.H. Sears and Company, 
1926), 3, 9.  
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else in nearly everything they did, especially as it was not always explained why the thing was to 
be done.”4  Even the soothsayers of the new science of psychology gave dire warnings of the fate 
awaiting the new officers.  Noting the effects of individualism and egalitarianism on American 
society, Yale professor and army consultant William Hocking wrote, 
  Those who say it is hard for an American to take orders may not 
  realize that it is equally hard for the average American to give them. 
  . . .While the experienced commander forgets his own special  
personality, and uses quite naturally the voice and authority of the 
organization, the raw commander is conscious of his individual self, 
and consequently realizes that the words falling out of his mouth have 
hardly the weight that should make men obey them. . . He knows he 
has to face, not so much the surly criticism as the more searching  
humor of his men…He needs the manner which only experience can 
justify, the manner of confidence, authority, prestige.5 
Thus damned by science and uncertain of his own “confidence, authority, [and] prestige,” the 
young officer went forward to meet the men he would lead into battle. 
 As the officers made the fateful trip from candidate to combat leader, they carried with 
them, for better or worse, the Regular Army’s expectations of officership.  This process of 
acculturation began the moment that the soldier entered the OTCs and continued during his early 
months within his new unit.  These standards of personal conduct and models of combat 
leadership did not differ greatly from those of the prewar Regular Army.  Given the regulars’ 
long standing drive to have “a proper military policy” instituted in the United States, it is little 
surprise that they fully intended to stamp their attitudes and expectations on the new officers. 
 The beginning of the young officer’s acculturation process often began with the man’s 
reading of many of the same semi-official publications for officers that had circulated prior to the 
war.  As soon as the nation entered the war, James Moss and other prewar authors quickly 
                                                 
 4 Captain Ben Chastaine, Story of the 36th (Oklahoma City: Harlow Publishing Company, 1920), 17. 
5 William E. Hocking, Morale and its Enemies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1918), 131-2.  Hocking 
observed American soldiers training in both the U.S. and in France.  His writings were also published in Infantry 
Journal (May 1918).  
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printed new editions of the manuals for young officers.  Given the early shortages of training 
publications, these books often served as textbooks or recommended reading for the 
impressionable candidates. They also became mediums for inculcating the novices with the 
army’s values, codes of conduct, and expectations of leadership.   
 James Moss’ Officers’ Manual was perhaps the most widely used guide for young 
officers and officer candidates.  Moss reprinted the manual in May 1917, and 135,000 copies of 
the work were printed during the war.  Although the book provided a handy guide to the 
organization and workings of the army and provided a few hints or general maxims to aid young 
officers in their daily work, it was still much too concerned with the niceties of the peacetime 
army’s “customs of the service.” Neither it, nor any of the other reprints of these types of prewar 
semi-official publications, truly offered any real insights into combat leadership or any help in 
training a unit for war or preparing it to deploy overseas.  What these manuals did do, however, 
was to serve as a means to inculcate the novices with the service’s paternalistic culture and the 
belief that the officer was first and foremost a gentleman.  
 The indoctrination of officer candidates in the army’s leadership culture of gentility, 
paternalism, and noblesse oblige continued through the war years.  Within days of the United 
States entering the war, the Army Service School Press published The Customs of the Service 
also Some Suggestions and Advice, by Lieutenant Colonel Charles Miller.  Miller stressed the 
importance of the candidates understanding the army’s unwritten rules of conduct.  He noted 
that, “in our social intercourse there are many little conventionalities which, although of no 
apparent intrinsic importance, are in the eyes of the world an index to character and breeding, 
and these conventionalities no gentleman can afford to ignore.”6  He went on to describe such 
                                                 
 6 Lieutenant Colonel Charles Miller, The Customs of the Service also Some Suggestions and Advise (Fort 
Leavenworth: Army Service School Press, 1917), 7. 
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weighty matters as when a lieutenant should be addressed as “Mister” rather than his rank, the 
importance of paying due “attention to which her position entitles her” to the commanding 
officer’s wife at social functions (“especially if she be an elderly woman”), and that since the 
regiment’s Chief Musician was usually, “above the average enlisted man in education, 
refinement and artistic temperament, they are generally shown a certain amount of cordiality by 
officers.”7  One wonders that given the grave challenges that the army faced in training its 
officers, if its time and energy would have been better spent in worrying about commanding 
platoons in combat and less on the feelings of artistic bandmasters.  
 Whatever the value of refining the manners of the army’s young officers, the army’s 
expectations of gentility echoed throughout much of their training.  Lieutenant Colonel James 
McAndrews warned the second class of the provisional second lieutenants graduating from Fort 
Leavenworth to “remember at all times that you are gentlemen worthy of confidence.”8  
Throughout their time at the third OTC at Camp Devens, for example, the camp’s senior 
instructor, Lieutenant Colonel Massee, constantly reminded the candidates that, “War is a 
gentleman’s game and you will play it as gentlemen.”9  Major Christian Bach informed the new 
officers that these attributes were key to their ability to command because their moral 
ascendancy over their men came from their being morally straight, physically strong, and having 
the strength to do what is ethically right.10  As noted in the last chapter, one of the fears of some 
Regular Army officers was that the rush to fill the commissioned ranks had allowed men into the  
officer corps who were not only “lacking in the instincts of a gentleman,” but also were never 
                                                 
 7 Ibid., 10, 14, 18. 
 8 LTC J. W. McAndrews, Address to the Second Class of Provisional Second Lieutenants, April 17, 1917 
(CARL Archives, Fort Leavenworth, KS.), 7. 
 9 Fort Devens OTC Yearbook Committee, The Pick: 3rd O.T.C., Camp Devens, Mass (Boston: George H. 
Dean, 1918), 15.  
 10 Major C. A. Bach, “Leadership,” Infantry Journal, Vol. XIV, No. 8 (February 1918), 607. 
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likely to improve their social horizons.11   
 As they had before the war, the regulars also placed great emphasis on the need for the 
new officers to exhibit paternalism when dealing with their troops.  Echoing the army’s pre-war 
paternalistic creed, one colonel advised,  
One of the rules is expressed in the regulation that familiarity between yourself 
and enlisted men is inadmissible.  This seems like a harsh rule in democratic 
America, but it is one which you will find necessary to apply, but with sound 
judgment and discretion... While your dignity must be sustained and undue 
familiarity avoided, your manner toward your men should be marked by 
simplicity and kindness…So treat your men as to cause each one to think that you 
are personally interested in him and in his success as a soldier.12 
  
Another officer maintained that the officers should always provide “a watchful care for the 
comforts and welfare of those in your charge.” Since, “soldiers must be like children.  You must 
see that they have shelter, food and clothing, the best that your utmost efforts can provide.”13  
 In many ways, the U. S. Army’s focus on paternalistic gentility mirrored similar beliefs 
in the Great War’s British Army.  In Leadership in the Trenches, historian G. D. Sheffield argues 
that while the war somewhat loosened the army’s harsh discipline and the upper classes’ grip on 
the officer corps, the generally good wartime morale of the British army still rested on pre-war 
assumptions of officer paternalism and the social deference of the enlisted man.  He notes that 
despite the large influx of new officers promoted from the ranks or appointed from the civilian 
middle class, regular officers were largely able to inculcate their public school ideas of noblesse 
oblige, self-sacrifice and paternalism on the hearts and minds of their “temporary gentlemen.”14  
                                                 
 11 Report of the Commander, COTS, Camp Lee, Virginia to Chief, Training and Instruction Branch, War 
Plans Division, Subject: Weekly Report, dated 7 September 1918” in NARA RG 165, War Department General 
Staff, Army War College Historical Branch, G5 Combat Training, 7-56.2 – 56.4, Box 207, Entry 310, “COTS Lee.” 
 12 Colonel C. H. Hitchcock, “A Letter to a Training Camp Student,” Infantry Journal, Vol. XIV, No. 1 
(July 1917), 59. 
 13 Bach, “Leadership,” 608. 
 14 G.D. Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches: Officer-Man Relations, Morale, and Discipline in the British 
Army of the First World War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 4-8, 38-40, 56-60, 68-83, 111-113, 178. 
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Although the four week cadet courses that commissioned the rankers and civilians were woefully 
deficient in training critical combat leadership skills, Sheffield maintains that their focus on 
instilling the attributes and values of upper-class gentility within the candidates was perfectly 
suited to the military culture of the British army.15  Regardless of social background, officers 
who were able to provide for the physical needs of their soldiers, exhibit courage under fire, led 
from the front, and exercise of degree of tactical common sense meet the “social contract” 
demanded by their men and thus buttressed the overall morale, discipline, and combat 
effectiveness of the army as a whole. 
 Michael Ramsay has argued that while the British conception of combat leadership rested 
on paternalism and gentility, the class consciousness and social assumptions of the prewar officer 
corps largely hindered efforts by reformers inside the army to adequately deal with massive 
changes that occurred in warfare between 1870 and the Great War.  In Command and Cohesion, 
Ramsay notes that, like prewar American regular officers, the largely rural aristocratic and 
gentry-based British officer corps believed that industrialization and urbanization had sapped the 
lower classes of their courage, manliness, and patriotism and had left behind dangerous strains of 
individualism and liberalism.16  As with the Americans, much of the British debate on small unit 
tactics centered on how to balance the need for obedience and discipline in what many officers 
saw as a flawed pool of potential recruits with the increased demand for soldiers able to exercise 
individual initiative and judgment due to the changing nature of warfare.   
 To Ramsay, the downside of gentility was that it propagated a culture in the British 
officer corps that (unlike the Americans) consciously denigrated professional study and tended to 
concentrate decision-making at the highest possible level.  He also maintains that the regular 
                                                 
 15 Ibid., 54-5. 
 16 M.A. Ramsey, Command and Cohesion: The Citizen Soldier and Minor Tactics in the British Army 
1870-1918 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 56-73. 
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British officers deliberately tried to instill class consciousness within their new wartime officers 
and demanded such a great degree of separation between the ranks that officer paternalism was 
actually circumscribed.17  This last trait was also evident in the American officer corps.  As one 
colonel warned new officers, “One of the rules is expressed in the regulation that familiarity 
between yourself and enlisted men is inadmissible.  This seems like a harsh rule in democratic 
America, but it is one which you will find necessary to apply, but with sound judgment and 
discretion.”18  There were certainly limits to democracy in the wartime “democratic army.” As 
with the British, the willingness of some American officers to abuse the rule that “rank hath its 
privileges” at times undermined the morale of numerous doughboys.        
  The seriousness with which the regulars viewed the need for all officers to act as 
gentlemen was reflected in its wartime use of military law to police its commissioned ranks.  The 
records of courts martial reveal that not all the army’s officers were up to the moral expectations 
of their ranks and positions.  As the officer ranks swelled, so to did the number of officers 
brought before courts martial.  From 6 April 1917 to 30 June 1918, the army tried 642 officers,  
but, from 1 July 1918 to 30 June 1919 the number more than tripled to 1,948.  Most charges 
during this period actually occurred before, or shortly after, the Armistice. Trials of lieutenants 
accounted for over 75 percent of all officer courts martial.19   
  Nearly 37 percent of all of the trials of officers in the later half of 1918 were related to 
violations of just three Articles of War: drunkenness, absence without leave, and conduct 
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.  As the case of Captain John M. Andrews demonstrates, 
the army took its concepts of “officers and gentlemen” very seriously.  Andrews, an officer of 
the 88th Division’s 349th Infantry, went on something of a binge between 30 August and              
                                                 
 17 Ibid., 38-41 and 58-60. 
 18 Hitchcock, “A Letter to a Training Camp Student,” 51-2. 
 19 War department, Annual Report for 1918, Vol. 1, 672. 
  388
9 September 1917 in Des Moines, Iowa.  During that time, he was seen drunk in uniform on 
several days, consorted with and “occupied a bedroom with a woman not his wife,” and, “while 
in uniform, consort[ed] with prostitutes and did become drunk with them in a public place.”  To 
add insult to injury, the officer went absent without leave to conduct his debauchery, and in the 
process “incapacitated himself for the performance of military duty by excessive use of 
intoxicating liquors.”  The court found Andrews guilty of all the charges, except being AWOL, 
and recommended his discharge from the service.  In another case, Second Lieutenant Charles 
Ferguson was found guilty of both theft and conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman,  
for stealing a $50.00 overcoat from a fellow officer.  It was clear that the regulars were going to 
make damn sure that the new “emergency” officers lived by their code and expectations of 
officership.20 
 The immutability of the officer code of conduct was also displayed in the actions of 
Lieutenant Colonel Dwight Eisenhower.  While commanding the Tank Center at Camp Colt, 
Pennsylvania, Eisenhower had to deal with a new officer who had been caught cheatings at cards 
by his fellow officers.  Ike gave the officer the choice of resigning his commission or facing 
courts martial.  The officer opted to resign.  Shortly after the resignation, Eisenhower was visited 
by the cashiered officer’s Congressman and father.  They tried to convince him to tear up the 
resignation and transfer the officer to another post, and made veiled threats to harm Ike’s career 
if he did not comply with their wishes. Eisenhower refused to change his order and argued that if  
he failed to act, he would merely pass his problem on to another commander and undermine the 
foundations of the officer corps.21   
                                                 
 20 General Order 143, 14 November 1917., General Order 152, 7 December 1917., 
Annual Report for 1918, Vol. 1, 672. 
 21 Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 143-4. 
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 Beyond the desire to instill a veneer of gentility on the new officers, when it came to the 
subject of leadership Lieutenant Colonel Miller and other the regulars could offer little.  Miller 
admitted that “The management of men is a vast unbound sea upon which the young officer sets 
sail without pilot and without chart,” and that “there is no textbook nor treatise to guide him in 
this, the most important feature of his profession.”22  Like Moss, and most of the other Regular 
Army pundits, Miller could only offer broad rules of thumb and hoary chestnuts for a young 
officer to follow when it came to leading soldiers.  A good bit of their counsel sounded much 
like the advice that Polonius gave Laertes in Hamlet: live within your means, don’t drink, don’t 
gamble, don’t grumble, and don’t gossip.  As for the troops, the old paternalistic ethos held 
sway;  
  With regards to his company the captain stands in the same light as a father to a  
  large family of children.  It is his duty to provide for their comfort, sustenance and 
  pleasure; enforce strict rules of obedience, punish the refractory and reward the  
  deserving.23  
 
Unfortunately, when it came to some of the most important issues of combat leadership, dealing 
with battlefield fear and stress and motivating men to kill and risk death, Miller, Moss, and the  
other “authorities” were tellingly silent. 
 In addition to the reissued manuals and guides, the war saw an explosion of new War 
Department and semi-official privately published handbooks.  Myron Adams, the morale officer 
for the Fort Sheridan 2nd OTC worked with some of the camp’s instructors to publish The 
Officer’s Responsibility for His Men.  This small tome not only encapsulated the army’s 
paternalistic outlook on leadership, it also melded it with the crusading spirit of civilian 
                                                 
 22 Miller., 28. 
 23 Ibid., 29.  Similarly, McAndrews informed his Leavenworth candidates, “The highest efficiency possible 
must be your goal.  The price that you will pay to attain it is made up of the items of clean living, sobriety, industry, 
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progressivism.  Adams admonished his readers, “The officer entrusted with a company in the 
National Army has a responsibility in caring for his men, equal to that in commanding them.”24    
Although one of the work’s four chapters was devoted to the practical care of the soldier from 
the aspect of field sanitation, food, clothing, and shelter, the bulk of the book provided the reader 
a guide for dealing with issues of recreation, religion, “moral problems,” and the “mental 
training of the enlisted man.”   
 In true progressive fashion, the paternalistic care of the soldier also extended to moral 
uplift and social engineering.  The candidate was informed, “The leisure hours of the men can be 
made valuable or dangerous,” and warned, “An unwise use of leisure hours results in destroying 
the good spirit of the company, multiplying delinquencies and discrediting the character of the 
army among civilians.”  However, “The wholesome use of leisure hours contributes directly to 
military efficiency, to ease of training, and to general morale.”25   Thus, a good officer was the 
one who took, “social measures to diminish sexual temptations,” and worked to eliminate such 
vices as gambling and the drinking of alcohol.  As civilian progressives sought to uplift the 
uneducated immigrant street urchin, “fallen women,” or men addicted to drink, the “social 
working” officer sought to steer the child-like soldier toward cleanliness in body, mind, and soul 
for the good of the army, society, and nation.  Again, while these pleas for uplift and paternalism 
served a military purpose, they still failed to address the salient issues of combat leadership.   
 The army did not completely wash its hands of the issue of leading men in battle, but it 
consistently equated the issue with the concept of discipline throughout the war.  In other words, 
if the young officer inculcated iron discipline in his soldiers, the demands of combat leadership 
became relatively easy and manageable.  The officer simply ordered and the soldier simply 
                                                 
 24 Myron Adams, ed., The Officer’s Responsibility for His Men (Fort Sheridan: Locally Published, 1917), 
viii. 
 25 Ibid., 46. 
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obeyed.  Iron discipline was the remedy for battlefield fear, confusion and friction.  Miller 
argued that discipline had to be the focus of all training if a unit was to be successful in combat.  
He defined discipline as an “ever present respect for superiors, and an instant, cheerful 
obedience” that produced, “a spirit of loyalty to leader and organization which will result in unity 
and promptness of action, in instant response to the will of the leader.” (original emphasis)26  
Thus when it came to the tension between unquestioned obedience and initiative, both Moss and 
Miller advised the aspiring officer to follow his superior’s orders.27  
 Interestingly, when Allied officers’ vision of leadership and discipline meshed with 
American principles, the War Department even turned to them to drive home its expectations of 
combat leadership.  In March 1918, the Army War College printed the lectures that the British 
Colonel Applin had given to American officers on discipline, leadership and training, as well as 
a British officer’s “Hints to Young Officers.”  In his lectures, Applin evoked the specter of the 
Russian soldier Soviets to drive home his message that the American officers had to exhibit 
leadership that produced “instant and willing obedience to all orders.” To Applin this “instant 
obedience” entailed no questioning, no second guessing, and “no moment for thought.”28  Thus, 
in their tactical training, in their lectures, and in their personal reading the young officer and 
officer candidates were bombarded by a steady message that unquestioning obedience to orders 
and the will of their senior commanders was much more important than preparing them for 
independent thought, action, or initiative. 
                                                 
 26 Miller., 27. 
 27 James A. Moss, Officers Manual, 6th Edition (Menasha, WI: George Banta Publishing Company, May 
1917), 219-221. 
 28 Army War College, Lectures on Discipline and Training by Colonel Applin of the British General Staff 
and Hints to Young Officers by a British Officer (Washington D. C.: War College Press, February 1918), 8.  
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 Applin’s views were amplified by the advice that senior American regular officers gave 
the newly commissioned men.  McAndrews warned his new second lieutenants that when 
dealing with their superiors,    
  Do not set up your own judgment against theirs.  If they seem to you to be at 
  fault, have patience, as time will probably show you that they were right.  And 
  always remember that implicit obedience to orders and wishes of your superiors 
  is the foundation of discipline.29 
 
Colonel C. H. Hitchcock pointedly instructed young officers that, 
  
  The conduct and orders of your superiors must not be criticized, questioned, 
  or even commented upon…This rule is very contrary to our civilian customs 
and practices, but is necessary to discipline.  An order is an order and is to be 
carried out without cavil or evasion.  The only discussion admissible is to as[k] 
how it may best be obeyed.30 
 
Both McAndrews and Hitchcock made one thing perfectly clear, the young officer was as bound 
by the rules of unquestioned obedience as the NCO and private.  
 The constant emphasis placed on discipline and unquestioning obedience by regular 
officers, revealed a major source of tension within the American concept of combat leadership.  
Even before the war, it had dawned on some in the officer corps that the realities of the modern 
battlefield were making new demands on the leadership, abilities, and decision-making of junior 
leaders.  As the battlefield extended in both depth and breadth without any subsequent 
improvement in communications and control methods, it became increasingly difficult for 
commanders at the battalion level and above to exercise their traditional role as the primary 
director of combat actions.   
 Of all of the major combatants in the war, the Americans’ German adversaries were the 
most developed in dealing with this challenge.  In response to the confusion and isolation of the 
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new battlefield, the German Army had built its wartime doctrine on long-standing traditions of 
command and control that expected subordinate leaders, at all levels, to use their initiative to 
achieve the given mission directed mainly by the broad guidance and intent of their superior 
commanders.  Since no order could ever cover the myriad of eventualities that occurred in battle 
or could anticipate the opportunities that randomly opened and close in combat, the Germans 
were content to tell their subordinates what must be accomplished and then let them adapt their 
plans to the terrain, enemy, and other specific realities that they faced on their portion of the 
battlefield.  This, of course, required that leaders in the German Army, from general to corporal, 
understood the army’s doctrine, were trained to best use the resources at their disposal, and most 
importantly, were practiced at using their initiative, rapidly making decisions, and issuing orders 
with little or no reference to the higher headquarters.31  
 To some extent the IDR acknowledged this German view of combat leadership.  It stated, 
“subordinates must…be given great latitude in the execution of their tasks,” and that “a 
subordinate who is reasonably sure that his intended action is such as would be ordered by the 
commander, were the later present and in possession of the facts, has enough encouragement to 
go ahead confidently.”32  The manual also warned, however, that “independence must not 
become license,” and that there was still “one supreme will to which all must conform.” 
Ultimately, the young officer was warned that any responsibility for an exercise of initiative that 
went wrong “rests on the subordinate.”33  This was perhaps less than reassuring to neophyte 
officers already unsure of their own authority, training, and knowledge.    
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 Some American officers during the war argued for the U. S. Army to follow a path of 
command and control that was similar to that of the Germans and broader than those outlined in 
the IDR.  In July 1918, Captain W. N. Hughes argued in the Infantry Journal that given the 
deadliness of the new battlefield, junior officers and NCOs had to be trained to quickly assume 
the duties of their superiors, but to accomplish this, the young leaders had to be schooled in 
taking the initiative.   He believed that this skill had to be inculcated in leaders as soon as they 
reached their units and pleaded that their senior commanders should “carefully refrain from 
interfering with any system which is producing results, remembering that no two men will 
proceed along exactly the same line.”  Hughes also stressed that interference by superior officers, 
“not only destroy initiative, but also weaken the authority of the subordinate commander over his 
men.”34   
 In May of 1918 the journal also published a series of lectures on infantry tactics from the 
British Lieutenant Colonel J. L. J. Clarke.  In one of the articles, he accurately framed the 
problem that the U. S. Army faced in combat leadership.  He noted, “We have seen that the 
necessity for infantry of fighting exclusively in skirmish lines had increased the difficulty of 
direction of combat and the importance of the action of subordinates (chiefs of platoons and half 
platoons).”35   Later, Clarke unequivocally stated, “The platoon is the bedrock of modern 
infantry fighting.  On its fighting efficiency everything else depends.”36  Unfortunately, while 
Clarke identified one of the glaring blind spots in American (and also the British) doctrine and 
tactical thought, he offered no real solution to the problem. 
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 This tension between obedience and initiative plagued the American Army throughout 
the war.  On one hand, it was clear to many officers that the ability of field and flag rank 
commanders to exercise direct leadership in combat was waning.  On the other hand, no colonel 
or general was willing to relinquish the reins of responsibility for the conduct of battle into the 
hands of junior officers and NCOs, especially given their subordinates’ lack of experience and 
training.    
 Nowhere was this tension more clearly seen than in an editorial printed in the Infantry 
Journal in January 1918.  In one part of the article the author points out that, “In order to obtain 
maximum efficiency, officers, noncommissioned officers, and men must be taught the qualities 
of resource, independence, and self-reliance- qualities which go to make the best soldier in the 
long run.”37  Yet, a few paragraphs later, he demands,  
  …in planning training, the first and most important step before you can   
  accomplish anything is to inculcate discipline in the ranks in its most rigid  
  form…unless you begin with discipline, you will not obtain the full benefits of  
  your efforts. The individual will not be a dependable cog in what would otherwise 
  be a smooth-running machine.  Only when a man salutes properly and smartly and 
  is smartly dressed, equipment clean, etc, and when he stands at attention properly, 
  his mind and body alert, only then is he ready to follow any order with confidence 
  and precision…38 
 
Discipline is an unquestionable necessity for any military organization.  It is essential to the 
officer’s ability to command and the soldier’s ability to obey in the face of death and danger.  
But, at what point does discipline and obedience become the enemy of battlefield command, 
control and intelligent leadership? 
 The army’s inability to reconcile the demands of strict control and obedience with the 
needs of junior officer independence and initiative sparked a lively and telling debate in the 
pages of the Cavalry Journal in the winter and spring of 1918.  The journal’s editor sparked the 
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debate by recounting his experiences of sitting on an examination board for young officers.  The 
editor noted that the “results of the practical examination in Minor Tactics came as a bewildering 
disappointment.”  He recounted, 
The officers being examined showed no training in leadership; their estimates of 
the situation were insufficient and inaccurate…instead of giving orders to their 
platoon leaders when a situation required action was announced [to] them, 
assumed a far-a-way look, as if they were searching their memory for precedents, 
and answered as if they were reciting a lesson of abstract theories: “I would do so-
and-so;” “I would give such and such orders;” “I would send such and such a 
message.”39 
 
After evaluating the machine gun companies of several regiments, he was astounded by the 
officers’ unwillingness to take the initiative and act without direct orders from their superiors.  
When he asked the officers why this was the case, 
One of the officers…replied: “why, Colonel, all my service I’ve been jumped on 
so hard if anything that I attempted to do without authority went wrong, that I 
have learned the safest way is to do only what I knew beforehand will be 
approved.” And the other chimed in: “Same here!”40 
 
He found that the Regular Army had also so long labored under the same problem that it 
contained far too many officers, “whose initiative was, by their training in those regiments, 
completely destroyed.”  Over all he worried that the officer corps was largely, “untrained to 
leadership and without initiative.”41 
 The response to the editor’s indictment of junior officer leadership and initiative was not 
long in coming.  In the journal’s next issue one regular officer blamed the problems on the 
army’s own culture and the narrow mental horizons of many of its senior officers.  He 
denounced instances where “commanders have forbidden their subordinates from conducting 
tactical exercises, merely because such particular exercises were not specifically described in 
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detail in the drill books.”42  The writer laid the blame for “any observed lack of initiative and 
spirit of leadership in juniors” on, 
1. A long extant deep rooted struggle hold grip of bureaucratic administration.  
Papers must be kept straight whether the battle be won or lost. 
2. Centralization of control, command and instruction. 
3. Insufficient basic training. 
4. A failure on the part of a majority of those charged particularly with instruction 
to realize and visualize the necessities and to take advantage of such latitude as 
given them to decentralize and to force subordinates to assume responsibility and 
the initiative.43    
 
If the army was going to solve its problems with junior leaders, its senior commanders were 
going to have to divorce themselves of the desire to maintain absolute control and change the 
way they trained their young officers. 
 One of the young officers in question also offered his critique of the army’s culture of 
absolute command, control, and obedience.  The officer, writing under the name “One of them,” 
argued that the Cavalry Journal’s editor was off the mark in his disparagement of the new 
officers.  “One of Them” blamed much of the problem of junior officer initiative on the army’s 
school system.  As he pointedly observed, his instructors were too tied to teaching by “the book,” 
that it became the, “all and all of their instruction as they handed it down to the next 
generation.”  The officer recounted, 
I have been red-inked at a school solution of a Grippenkurl problem for a 
departure from the approved solution.  I was not informed that I violated any 
principle but that a second lieutenant could not improve a solution of Grippenkurl 
therefore a departure was necessarily wrong.  Thereafter, knowing what my 
instructor wanted, which was quite a game at these schools, I memorized the 
solution and gave them verbatim…Immediately I received excellent marks and 
saved myself the labor of original thought…Thus instead of mental development, 
the young officer received a training in mental gymnastics… Is it any wonder that 
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the edge of our initiative and keenness to assume responsibility are somewhat 
blunted?44 
  
As he saw it, the greatest failure in his training was that the army, through its schools and 
instructors, had beaten any desire or ability to exercise initiative out of its junior leaders.   
 Although the contentious exchange waged in the pages of the Cavalry Journal highlights 
the fact that some in the officer corps recognized the glaring issues with company-level 
leadership, it also underscored the fact that the army had done a very poor job at mitigating the 
problem.  In the spring of 1918, just as the bulk of American divisions began to deploy to 
France, it seems that the army had not reconciled the tension between obedience and control and 
the need for initiative in its junior leaders.  Since the modern battlefield operated under its own 
logic and realities, the junior leaders were going to be thrust into situations where they had to act 
on their own regardless of the desires and proclivities of their senior officers.  However, as the 
senior commanders and the army’s schools had failed to adequately prepare the company-level 
leaders for this challenge, the captains, lieutenants, and NCOs were going to have to learn these 
lessons under the unforgiving taskmaster of combat. 
Although the exchange in the Cavalry Journal revealed that some officers were aware of 
the problems with the army’s leadership training, throughout the war, regular officers tended to 
place the burden of repairing these deficiencies back on the junior officers themselves.  Time 
and time again, the young officers were browbeaten by their Regular Army superiors to take 
responsibility for completing the professional education that the army had failed so miserably to 
provide.  Colonel C. H. Hitchcock chided, 
      By law and regulations you are the superior of the men under you.  You must 
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make this a fact and not a mere theory.  This is the first thing.  You must not 
allow any of the men under you to know more of your profession than you do, 
and you must not allow them to surpass you in any of the true soldierly quality.45 
 
Major Christian Bach warned his novices that “Men will not have confidence in an officer unless 
he knows his business,” and sharply pronounced, “If you have a rotten company, it will be 
because you are a rotten captain.”46  It does seem that the majority of the new officers took this 
charge seriously and studiously applied themselves to expanding their knowledge.  Regrettably, 
those officers who tried this course of self improvement still found themselves stymied by the 
continued prevalence of obsolete doctrine and their inability to sort the best tactical practices 
from the flood of information coming from the host of official and semi-official publications. 
 The War Department attempted to resolve its monumental problem of preparing its 
tactical units for war by instituting a standardized training plan for all levels of command within 
a division.  On 27 August 1917, the War Department issued the pamphlet Infantry Training to 
serve as the mandatory guide for readying divisions to fight in France.  The pamphlet delineated 
the responsibility of commanders at all echelons for the training of their soldiers, mandated the 
establishment of 13 divisional schools for specialists, and provided a weekly training plan for the 
instruction of infantry and machine gun companies.47  The total course of instruction was to take 
16 weeks, and its intent was to be make it possible for the division’s units “to take their places on 
the line,” with a “minimum of training in France.”48   
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 From the beginning, the instruction to be given in the divisions’ training in the United 
States was at odds with the wishes of General Pershing.  On the very first page of the pamphlet, 
the War College author clearly stated that the “training for trench warfare is of paramount 
importance,” and declared, “every effort should be devoted to making all squads from the squad 
and platoon upwards proficient in this kind of training.”49  This guidance conflicted with 
Pershing’s desire to place more emphasis on “open warfare” and to leave much of the training 
for trench warfare for after the units arrived in France.  On 20 December 1917, the War 
Department extended the standard training plan from 16 to 18 weeks.  This move was partially 
made to appease Pershing by adding more emphasis on maneuver warfare.50  However, much of 
these changes were superficial and did not greatly differ from the plan issued in August 1917.  In 
instructions issued on 27 August 1918 to the commanders of the divisions being mobilized late 
in the war, the War Department stipulated that the new training plan would focus on “open 
warfare with minimum instruction in trench warfare.”51  The War Department followed these 
instructions up with Training Circular No. 12: Combined Training of a Division issued on 10 
October 1918.  The training circular again stressed the need for divisions to be well trained in 
open warfare, but failed to give any meaningful directions in how to achieve that end. Whatever 
the merit of the changes that the War Department tried to implement, they arrived too late to 
change the stateside training of American divisions in any consequential way.  
 The original 16 week training plan was to consist of 640 total hours of instruction.  Of 
this time, the soldiers were to spend 41 hours in bayonet training, 56 hours in close order drill,   
57 hours in extended order and trench warfare drills, and 27 hours in trench construction.  In 
weapons training, the soldiers were to spend 40 hours in musketry and the fundamentals of the 
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rifle, followed by 80 hours of individual, squad, and platoon firing.  All soldiers were to spend 
31 hours in hand grenade training and six hours of familiarization training on machine guns, 
automatic rifles, and the other weapons of trench warfare. Weapons specialists (automatic 
riflemen and machine gunners) were scheduled an additional 80 hours in range firing, while 
other members of the company spent that time in additional trench warfare training.  Gas warfare 
and defense accounted for only 14 hours of the training plan.52  At all times the unit’s officers 
and NCOs were supposed to continue to hone their skills through lectures, unit schools, and 
hands on practice.  Once the basic training of the companies was complete, the divisions were to 
receive an additional months of training to focus on regimental, brigade, and division operations.      
 Although the standardized training plan seemed very complete on paper, it proved to be 
very difficult to execute in reality.  The systemic problems of mass mobilization that had so 
plagued officers’ training were redoubled in the wartime training of units.  Across the country, 
the order to have the divisional cantonments ready to receive the first draftees by August 1917 
led to a frenzy of activity and quickly showed the army’s lack of preparation for such a massive 
mobilization.  On 22 May 1917, George Marshall wrote an acquaintance,   
  We are suffering from a serious lack of sufficient officers and non-commissioned  
  officers of the regular army, particularly at the larger headquarters and training  
  camps.  The commissioned officers now available are simply overwhelmed with  
  work.  Difficulty is being experienced in obtaining the necessary supplies for the  
  present camps.  Tentage is not available.  Cantonments for some 200,000 men  
  must be built in this department within two months.53   
     
The War Department had to locate suitable land for the training posts and build a complete road, 
water, and barracks infrastructure on the new sites.  Much of this work was still being done when 
National Guard and National Army units arrived in camp.   
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 One guardsman recalled that when his unit arrived at his mobilization station near New 
Orleans, they discovered that it was “at the time a cypress swamp” that the soldiers had to drain 
and clear. Despite their efforts to improve drainage, after heavy rains the floor of his tent was six 
inches deep in water.  One of his soldiers on guard duty even “killed an alligator during the night 
thinking that it was a German creeping up on him.”54  The number of accounts by World War I 
veterans that mentioned their work in pulling stumps or otherwise preparing their camps for 
military use, indicate that this was a rather common experience in the early months of the war. 
Upon arriving at Camp Dodge, Iowa after being drafted in September 1917, Walter Aamoth 
discovered that since “the camp was not ready for us” he and his comrades mostly worked to 
turn a cornfield into a parade ground.  He also noted that shortages of food and poor staff work 
meant that he existed on “black coffee and stew for weeks.”  The uniform shortages meant that 
for several weeks, the young recruits had to perform their duties in whatever shoes and clothing 
that they had brought with them from home.  This entire muddle meant that he did no regular 
drill or training until he was shipped to Camp Pike, Arkansas after being in the service for over 
two months.55  The 89th Division forming at Camp Funston also faced a host of shortages.  The 
division commander, Leonard Wood, had his supply officers buy blue denim overalls to give the 
new soldiers some semblance of uniformity when no uniforms were forthcoming from the War 
Department.56 
 As they tried to cope with the mounting problems of mobilization, commanders and staff 
officers at all levels constantly bombarded their subordinates with requests for information and 
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details of soldiers to accomplish the myriad assortment of chores required in the expanding 
posts.  Despite the War Department’s standard training, these other demands continually drained 
men from training.  One officer recalled, “In their efforts to supply details for all of these 
objectives, Company Commanders found schedules impossible.”  For 19 November 1917 alone, 
the 353rd Infantry had to provide two and a half companies to do engineer work on post: 12 
carpenters, 12 laborers, and six plumbers to build a detention camp; 11 men to do fatigue work 
for a truck company, and five men to work fatigue duty for the YMCA.  Furthermore, “when the 
guard and school details were added to this list, few were left on the drill grounds.”57  One 
exasperated company commander in the 78th Division recalled that his higher headquarters 
demanded,  
  …reports on how many men we had; how many shirts each man had; how many  
  extra shoe-laces were in our possession; how many men had W[ar]. R[isk].  
  insurance; how many were yet to be inoculated and how many times.  Twice a  
  day that I have to report for officers meetings; twice a day would the Colonel hold 
  forth on the reports the general wanted, which company commanders would  
  prepare at once, personally, and writing; then the adjutant would begin on the  
  reports the colonel wanted; the supply officer would chime in with a few more  
  that he had to have by six o’clock at the latest.  Life was a veritable nightmare of  
  typewritten figures…  Drill was carried on in the intervals of lining up for another 
  check or inspection.   
 
The young officer concluded that as a result of this frenetic and often pointless activity, “the 
men, quite naturally, looked upon the officers as a set of lunatics who didn’t know their own 
minds for 10 minutes at a time.”58  This last comment highlighted the ultimate effect of this 
muddle and confusion.  Leadership rests upon a foundation of mutual trust between the leaders 
and the led.  When the leader seems to act in a manner that indicates to his men that he has no 
idea what is going on, or seems unable to provide those articles that his soldiers need, his 
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leadership and effectiveness is called into question by the soldiers.  Although many soldiers 
understood that their leaders were being hobbled by forces beyond their control, it was still not a 
situation that encouraged trust and confidence among the men in the army or its officers. 
 One of the gravest shortages that the army faced in 1917 was of arms and equipment. The 
experience of the 82nd Division demonstrates the effects that the equipment shortages had on 
training and leadership development.  The acute shortage of weapons in the 82nd Division forced 
officers to contract with local saw mills for the production of dummy rifles.   The "Camp Gordon 
1917 Model Rifle," as the doughboys derisively called the wooden weapons, allowed units to 
conduct limited instructions in close order marching and bayonet training but had few other 
useful purposes.  Though the 82nd Division was formed in August 1917, some of the unit's 
infantry regiments were not completely armed with rifles until the first week of February 1918.59  
Rifles were but one of the shortages that hamstrung the division's training.  The division Chief of 
Staff, Colonel G. Edward Buxton, recalled, 
The training of specialists in the United States was necessarily of a theoretical 
character.  The Divisional Automatic Rifle School possessed about a dozen 
Chauchat rifles; the regiments had none.  Colt machine guns were issued to 
machine gun companies, although this weapon was never to be used in battle.  
The Stokes Mortar platoon never saw a 3-inch Stokes Mortar while in the United 
States, and the 37-mm gun platoons possessed collectively one of these weapons 
during the last two or three weeks of their stay at Camp Gordon.  A limited 
number of offensive and defensive hand grenades were obtained and thrown by 
selected officers and non-commissioned officers at the Division Grenade School.  
The men of one regiment witnessed a demonstration where four rifle grenades 
were fired.60     
 
These shortages not only hindered the training of the unit's weapons specialists, but also 
prevented the junior officers from understanding the employment and potential of the new 
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military technologies.  
Equipment problems were not limited to National Army units like the 82nd Division.  The 
National Guard’s 36th Division had to rotate its limited stock of rifles around its infantry units to 
accomplish the bare minimum of marksmanship training.  As late as 18 December 1917 most of 
the division’s machine gun battalions had not been issued weapons and had only received a 
modicum of training on the obsolete Colt and Benet-Mercie machine guns.61  The supposedly-
Regular Army 4th Division also suffered shortages of rifles and machine guns.  Its soldiers were 
dispirited when their unit’s arms and equipment were stripped to fit out the 3rd Division and other 
units who were to deploy before them.  In fact, it was not until after the 3rd Division deployed 
that the 4th Division was even able to begin its rifle marksmanship training.  Unfortunately, the 
time available for the training was so short, that the 4th Division’s 39th Infantry Regiment and a 
battalion from the 58th Infantry were not able to complete even the basic firing course before the 
division itself deployed to France.62  Although the 14 January 1918 Division Table of 
Organization stated that divisions would have 768 automatic rifles (usually Chauchats), in 
February 1918, the French Military mission stated that of the 18 divisions that they inspected, 17 
had 32 or fewer of the rifles on hand.  They found similar shortages in trench mortars, signal 
equipment, and artillery.  In fact, the only artillery found at Camp Beauregard, Louisiana was 
four Parrot Guns and three Napoleon Guns from the Civil War.63   
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In nearly all the divisions, artillery units were most affected by equipment shortages.  The 
army entered the war with only 604 field guns and 180 heavy howitzers, many of which were 
obsolete.64  Through much of 1917 most of the new artillerymen had to content themselves with 
practicing their trade on wooden guns made from “logs mounted on the running gear of escort 
wagons,” or other improvisations.65  When cannons were available, they were generally of the 
old American designs and not the French guns that they would later use on the Western Front. At 
the beginning of their training, the 77th Division’s 306th Field Artillery’s men were instructed on 
standing drill and simulated firing of obsolete cannons, but soon even these were taken away.  
One soldier recalled, “No explosives were ever handled at Upton, and the only real benefit the 
cannoneers received from their training there, was a slight inkling of how a gun crew was 
formed, how it functioned on a drill field, and the manner in which indirect fire was 
conducted.”66  Artillerymen in the 90th Division did not fire their guns until March 1918, only 
weeks before the unit departed for France.67   
The shortage of guns prevented artillery officers from adequately learning how to control 
and adjust fires and stymied efforts to conduct combined arms training in most divisions.  This 
later contributed to the AEF’s problems in mastering infantry-artillery coordination.  Regardless 
of their branches, the young officers’ and NCOs’ lack of experience with modern weapons 
limited their professional development and further hobbled their efforts to realistically prepare 
themselves and their units for combat.   
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 Adding to these problems was a shortage of training aids and publications.  The            
89th Division’s George English noted that his division’s artillery units had no drill manuals to 
assist them in their training until an officer translated the French Artillery Drill Regulations and 
provided mimeographed copies to the units.68  Lucian K. Truscott recalled that when he attended 
an ad hoc regimental machine gun school while posted at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, “There were 
no textbooks of any kind.  No manuals. And no charts.” During the class, “The instructor read 
his own notes, complied during his course at the Machine Gun School at Fort Bliss…and the 
class copied furiously in their own notebooks.”69  Reflecting back on his World War I 
experiences after a lifetime in the Regular Army, General John E. Hull recalled, “We were short 
…of all the training aids that you need to conduct training adequately.  But we didn’t realize we 
were short because we didn’t know any better.”70 
 Ironically, Major General John F. O’Ryan faced the opposite challenge.  O’Ryan  
bemoaned the fact that when he began training his 27th Division, there was no general agreement 
among army officers in which direction that the American training should take.  Despite the 
existence of a standard training plan, there continued to be a great debate over what should be 
emphasized in instructing the troops.  O’Ryan recalled that some Regular officers argued for the 
primacy of training the bayonet and rifle, others for concentrating primarily on machine guns, 
grenades, or other specialist training, and some argued that since trench warfare had so 
completely changed tactical Principles, “that time expended in maneuvers was time wasted.”71  
While he was working through these issues, he found that, 
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  The training problem at the outbreak of the war was compounded by a veritable 
  avalanche of books, booklets, pamphlets, and bulletins covering every phase 
  and aspect of the conduct of war, which were delivered at the training camps 
  almost daily.  These came from the War Department and apparently had been 
  prepared hurriedly by officers on duty in Washington.  Most of them were  
  reprints and adaptations of foreign books and pamphlets.  Some of them were 
  illuminating and valuable.  Many were repetitions of other pamphlets, while 
  a considerable percentage were obsolete.72 
 
As noted in Chapter 6, the War Department’s orgy of publishing further muddied the water as 
officers at all levels attempted to sort through the weighty questions of what should be taught to 
the flood of new recruits filling the divisions in the fall of 1917.   
 In addition to these systemic problems of mass mobilization, officers also faced other 
challenges in completing their training that were completely out of anyone’s control.  The winter 
of 1917 and 1918 was particularly inclement and played havoc with the War Department’s 
intricate training plans.  On 28 February 1918, for example, the 83rd Division’s Intelligence 
Officer reported that the “unduly severe winter” at Camp Sherman, Ohio had so retarded the 
progress of the division’s training that they were still working on the 18th week of the War 
Department’s training plan when they were supposed to be working on the program for week 23.  
He also noted that, “trench work, of necessity, has been cut down to almost nil up until the 
present time.”73   
                                                 
 72 Ibid.  The problem with the flood of material that O’Ryan described was endemic in the army.  While 
Chapter 6 discussed the issue of conflicting doctrinal publications at the platoon and company levels, these problems 
even existed for division commanders.  In addition to the August 1917 Infantry Training guidance, O’Ryan and his 
peers also had to sort through the ideas contained in Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action, a 
copy of a British Army work that the War Department issued in June 1917.  Of course, the War College made no 
effort to reconcile the differences between the two works.     
 73 Report from The Acting Intelligence Officer, 83rd Division to Chief, Military Intelligence Section, 
Subject: “General Information,” dated 28 February 1918, NARA, RG 165 Records of the General Staff, Entry 377, 
Correspondence Related to Morale at Army Installations, Box 14, Camp Sherman file. (Hereafter “Morale at Army 
Installations”) for other discussion of the effects of poor weather on stateside training see, Elmer Murphy and Robert 
Thomas, The Thirtieth Division in the World War (Lepanto, AK: Old Hickory Publishing Company, 1936), 38., 
Frederick L. Huidenkopfer, The History of the 33rd Division A.E.F. (Springfield: Illinois State Historical Library, 
1921), 15.  
  409
 The situation was even worse for the 4th Division at Camp Greene, North Carolina.  The 
rain and snow in the winter of 1918 turned the post’s red clay soil into such a viscous mess that 
“the troops simply could not work out of doors” for weeks at a time.  Between 10 December 
1917 and 4 March 1918, one officer recorded that the division’s units experienced only 16 days 
where any meaningful outdoor training was even possible.  Under the constant wet weather, the 
trench system that the division constructed for training quickly turned into a sea of unusable 
muck.  The only bright side to this natural disaster, one division staff officer quipped, was that 
they gave the soldiers an unintentionally realistic view of the conditions that they would later 
face in Flanders and the Argonne.74    
 Adding to the misery of weather-induced inactivity and further hindering training, were 
deadly outbreaks of Spanish influenza, measles, and other diseases.  Disease hindered or halted 
unit training as whole companies were quarantined for weeks at a time to prevent the spread of 
the sickness.75  In a letter home to his wife in March 1918, Benson Oakley wrote that a mutual 
friend in another company had “just got out of his two week quarantine last week when a fellow 
in his tent came down with the mumps.  He together with the others in tent were moved out into 
the woods away from everyone else for 21 days more of quarantine.”76  That meant that his 
friend lost at least five weeks of valuable training time.   
By far the deadliest disease that the doughboys encountered was influenza.  The army 
estimated that between 25 to 40 percent of its doughboys suffered from influenza at some time 
during the war.  Influenza eventually killed 45,000 American soldiers, almost as many as were 
killed in action.  The army also lost 8,743,102 days of work and training from enlisted men laid 
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low by the epidemic.77  Forced indoors by the weather or sickness, junior leaders found it 
difficult to complete their own training or that of their soldiers and units.   
 The systemic problems of mass mobilization, such as shortages of equipment, lack of 
weapons, inadequate infrastructure, and uncertainty in the subjects to be trained, along with 
weather problems and epidemics, all had the cumulative effect of hindering the instruction of 
American units and served as an obstacle to the “on the job” training of junior officers and 
NCOs.  This also meant that the War Department’s training plan for the divisions was never as 
standardized as the army had envisioned.  Thus, local conditions often determined the quantity 
and quality of unit training and produced divisions, and unit leaders, with widely varying levels 
of ability.  As will be seen below, when these systemic problems were combined with poor 
personnel decisions and sketchy, ill-focused, or incomplete unit training, the net results were 
combat leaders and units that were unprepared for the tactical challenges that awaited them in 
France. 
 Perhaps the gravest systemic problem that confronted the army and its junior leaders was 
the issue of how to select and train NCOs.  As noted in Chapter Three, the Regular Army system 
for selecting NCOs rested upon the ability of long-service officers to identify and promote 
potential NCO “talent” from within their units.  NCO training in the old army was “learning by 
doing” within the squad, platoon, and company.  Since the army had given little to no thought to 
raising a wartime cadre of NCOs, the old army method became the defacto system for the 
selection and training of the Great War’s NCOs.  The keys to the success of the old army system 
were experience and time: the experience of the officer making the selection, and the time the 
man in the ranks had to learn his trade and demonstrate the qualities the officer sought in his 
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NCOs.  Unfortunately, the two things that were sorely lacking in the wartime army were, of 
course, experience and time. 
 The regulars were well aware of the problem in raising NCOs and offered the new 
officers plenty of advice for selecting their sergeants and corporals as well as providing a small 
cadre of regular NCOs to serve as the basic noncommissioned skeletons for the newly formed 
units.  This last idea proved to be a mixed blessing.  Some of these regular NCOs did quite well. 
The 353rd Infantry received a contingent of 34 Regular Army NCOs to train the unit’s recruits 
and serve as the basis of the NCO cadre.  Captain Charles Dienst admired the fact that their men 
were “soldiers by profession and played the game in a manner worthy of the best traditions of the 
old army.”78  Unfortunately, Dienst’s experience with the regular NCOs seems to have been the 
exception rather than the rule.  
 At the outbreak of the war, the Regular Army was already shorthanded and over-
extended.  The loss of a number of NCOs to officer training resulted in the rapid promotion of a 
number of short-service privates to the noncommissioned ranks.  Lieutenant Colonel George 
English noted that the 89th Division received enough Regular Army NCOs that they “assigned 
two to each company of infantry and battery of artillery.” However, while, “many of these men 
were of inestimable value in drilling the new recruits,” far too many of them have been “recently 
promoted as a result of the great expansion of the Regular Army.” English believed that the best 
qualified regular enlisted men had already been commissioned, “leaving only the less qualified 
men available for noncommissioned officers.” He went on to state, “As a class these 
noncommissioned officers did not accommodate themselves well to the new conditions, and not 
so valuable as the better educated and more highly skilled men from civil life, of which there 
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were a number in every company or battery.”79  The 89th Division was fortunate to have regulars 
assigned that had at least been promoted to NCOs.  During its organization, Company B, 311th 
Infantry received three regular Army soldiers to serve as the nucleus of its NCOs.  
Unfortunately, all three men were buck privates when they reported.80   
 The units of the 89th Division were not alone in being somewhat disappointed in the 
quality of  NCOs sent to their organizations after having been promised that they would receive 
“the best” the regulars could provide.  When their Regular Army soldiers reported to the 77th 
Division’s 305th Field Artillery, it quickly became clear that their previous company 
commanders had used the requirement to transfer their NCOs as a means to rid themselves of 
their problem soldiers.  The men that the 305th Artillery received had long “records of battery 
punishments and courts martial.”  One of the officers sarcastically noted, “We pitied those 
distant, unknown commanders.  If these were their best we shrank from picturing their days and 
nights with the worst.”81  In due course the new officers learned this lesson themselves and in 
turn used transfer orders to shed their human deadwood over the course of the war.   
 For their part, not all of the regular NCOs were happy with their assignments to the new 
units either.  One battery of the 305th Artillery was assigned a Regular Army NCO as its first 
sergeant.  The sergeant, “with deliberate intention went A.W.O.L. to be ‘busted’ and sent back to 
his unit in the Regular Army.”82  Other regulars succumbed to the age old temptations of 
soldiering and lost their positions.  Leslie Langille, of the 42nd Division, was gladdened by the 
fact that his first sergeant was a “real soldier” who had served two hitches with the regulars.  
Unfortunately, while his unit was mobilizing at Fort Sheridan, the top sergeant met a girl and 
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went AWOL for two weeks.  After “having spent his dough on the babe and drained his ‘cup of 
joy’ to the last dime,” the sergeant returned to his battery to face the music.  The company 
commander reduced the NCO to stable sergeant and promoted a lesser man to first sergeant.  
Langille and his comrades roundly cursed the girlfriend “because of the grief she unwittingly 
brought upon our heads by luring away a good top-kick, who was replaced with a dolt.”83   
 Some of the veterans brought with them the regulars’ jaundiced view of citizen soldiers.  
James Howard recalled that some of the regular NCOs, “came with an utterly wrong notion of 
the National Army and had an idea they could do about what they liked with the reserve 
officers…A strenuous sifting process was instituted which soon got rid of the undesirables.”84  
Ultimately, Captain Kerr Rainsford, of the 77th Division’s 307th Infantry, best summed up the 
practice of assigning regular NCOs to the new units.  He recalled that the regular NCOs “did 
excellent service as drill sergeants; but on the whole the experiment was not successful, and the 
greater number returned to the regiments whence they came.”85  
 With many of the regular NCOs returning to their units and the ones that stayed being 
overwhelmed or otherwise occupied with standing up the new units, the company commanders 
were thrown on their own to do the best they could with selecting NCOs from the anonymous 
mass of recruits arriving daily in their units.  Their Regular Army superiors were quick with 
advice.  Just as the draftees were arriving at the camps, Major J. C. Wise warned the new officers 
of the fate that awaited them.    
The company officers will find within the course of a few days about 150 recruits 
committed to their charge- recruits representing all degrees of education and 
intelligence and every social caste, from professional gentleman with a college 
education to illiterate city loafer, from the intelligent mechanic to the untutored 
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laborer, from men imbued with the loftiest sentiments of patriotism to those of 
foreign birth and attachments…There will be ne’er-do-wells of the luxurious 
classes, stupid yokels, criminals, near criminals, and thugs mixed in with the good 
elements of all classes.86 
 
Wise advised that the new commander must plan his training only after considering the 
individual soldier’s “social caste” and “Character, intelligence, and experience.”  He 
recommended that junior officers should divide their soldiers into three categories: Superior, 
“business and professional men, tradesmen, [and] skilled mechanics;” Ordinary, “uneducated but 
intelligent laborers and miscellaneous recruits;” and Inferior, “recruits of the lowest order of 
intelligence and character.”   
 Wise suggested that officers select their NCOs primarily from the “superior” caste of 
their units, and that they be made “temporary acting noncommissioned officers” and be “given a 
chance to demonstrate his fitness for a chevron.”  He stressed that if the acting NCOs are 
“intelligent and ambitious they will rapidly acquire military knowledge superior to that of other 
recruits in order to measure up to their responsibilities.”87  Along the same line, Major Charles 
Tipps noted that during the war he found that, “Men who have successfully handled six to eight 
men in civil life as a boss of a group of farm hands, or as the foreman of a small department in 
some factory, will almost invariably make good corporals, and men with relatively more 
experience will, in most cases, qualify to fill relatively higher positions.”88  
  Shortly before George Williams left for officers’ training, a retired Regular Army 
sergeant advised him that when “choosing your sergeants and corporals, don’t look for the most 
cooperative men- but [for the one who] is observed to be in the center of the group in free time in 
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the barracks- look for the leaders, [for] it is better to have them on your side.”89  The retired 
sergeant’s advice, along with those of Majors Wise and Tips, were good “rules of thumb,” but 
they still required that the commander have the time and experience to identify those with the 
attributes they described.  
 Although some officers used the Yerkes mental tests as a way of identifying potential 
NCOs, most muddled through the best they could, with little help from their superiors.  On         
4 September 1917, the 89th Division’s commander, Leonard Wood, tried to cut the Gordian Knot 
by simply directing that “The training of the first five percent of the new National Army men 
will be undertaken immediately upon their arrival, with the purpose of developing among them 
noncommissioned officers and instructors for the National Army men who will arrive later.” 90 
Wood’s grandiose plan, which was followed by a other divisions, still only provided two weeks 
to train these jumped-up NCOs prior to the arrival of the second contingent of draftees.  
 Faced with the pressing need for NCOs, some officers simply opted to assign men to 
these ranks based on seniority.  In these units, NCOs owed their positions to the fact that they 
arrive days or hours prior to their comrades.  As none of the men who arrived at Camp Funston 
with Private John Nell had any previous military service, his new company commander simply 
went down the line selecting every fourth man to serve as a corporal.91  Other officers followed 
Wise’s suggestions and tried to select their NCOs based on the soldier’s previous occupation or 
leadership experience.  Given the need to maintain some semblance of order and discipline in the 
ranks, some NCOs gained their stripes solely on their ability to over-awe or bully their fellow 
recruits into line.   
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 Soon after the war, one officer lamented the lack of any uniform system in the units for 
picking NCOs.  He pointed out, 
  Candidates for the commissioned ranks as a rule pass through a rigid process of  
  selection, are then sent to appropriate schools for further observation and training, 
  and weeding out at the end of the training period.  In the case of sergeants and  
  corporals, the pillars of the army, there are no such schools.  Rough observation, 
  personal idiosyncrasies, subjective factors, all enter more or less into the selection 
  of these men.92 
 
This confusion was not lost on the privates, and some even felt pity for their officers’ plight.  
Private D. B. Gallagher wrote, “Our officers were all men who had respect for those serving 
under them, and the mistakes that were made in selecting the ‘non-coms’ were not of their 
making, but due to the utter lack of any system to be governed by placing men in positions which 
they were qualified to fill.”93  Nor were these problems lost on the “jumped up” NCOs 
themselves. As one sergeant recalled, “The confusion was unbelievable- it seemed as if nobody 
knew anything for sure.  I was a corporal within three months and knew very little about the 
army.”94 
  Regardless of their method of selection, the vast majority of the newly minted sergeants 
and corporals had no real knowledge or practical experience to merit their promotion or assure 
their authority.  Captain John Stringfellow observed that the best method for giving the NCOs 
the experience they needed was to throw them into the deep water of responsibility to see if they 
would “sink or swim.”  He maintained, 
  Through a lack of material, usually, a Corporal is chosen who has never   
  commanded before in his life, and those seven men about his age, fret under  
  restraint.  In camp, all sorts of petty requirements are devised to compel the  
  Corporal, against his will, to order the seven unwilling men to perform.  In this  
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  way he becomes accustomed to command and they to obey, without argument.   
  Then, and only then, will they fight successfully.95 
 
Although Stringfellow and his peers often had no other options readily available to them to train 
their NCOs, these unsystematic and idiosyncratic procedures did not produce the strong 
backbone of NCOs that the army needed for its combat units.   
 Sadly, while the army made efforts later in the war to provide some degree of training to 
its novice NCOs, these changes came too late to significantly change the course set in 1917.  As 
late as 31 July 1918, a War Department inspector reported of the 84th Division, 
The noncommissioned officers are as a rule not thoroughly instructed.  Many of 
them are noncommissioned officers simply because there were no others to make.  
Many corporals have only a few weeks service and many organizations have not 
made all their  noncommissioned officers for lack of trained personnel.96 
 
The lack of a strong corps of NCOs to help to train and lead the squads, platoons, and companies 
of the new divisions had immediate and profound influence on unit training and a lasting effect 
on how the American army later fought in France. 
 The most significant consequence of the weak NCO corps was that the company-level 
officers had to not only serve as the unit commanders, but also took on the training and 
administrative roles usually accomplished by first sergeants, company clerks, supply sergeants, 
and enlisted drill masters.  As one officer observed, the “Lack of experience on the part of non-
commissioned officers at the beginning of training centered full responsibility on the officers. 
Officers…[were thus] occupied with details of instruction, police and paperwork.”97  Another 
infantry officer recalled that the “training of non-commissioned officers [was] slighted almost to 
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the point of neglect. Officers, from the Company Commander down, [were] obliged to spend 
fifty percent of their time and energy in doing the work of non-commissioned officers.”98  As the 
officers became the font of all military knowledge and the leader directly responsible for the 
training, discipline, and care of the soldiers, the NCOs’ roles and prestige within the units 
declined.   
 Knowingly or not, the Regular Army senior officers and commanders encouraged this 
process.  They merely wanted certain tasks accomplished to standard in their subordinate units 
and held the officers in those units responsible for these results.  One regimental commander 
expressed no alarm in the fact that, “The junior officers really performed the duties of non-coms, 
in each company one being in charge of quarters, one with an assistant in charge of mess, one in 
charge of the company office, and so on.”99  With the spotlight on the junior officers to produce 
results, and a lack of training and readiness on the part of their nascent NCOs to aid them, the 
officers tended to simply do their jobs as well as those of their sergeants.  
 The tendency of officers to become defacto NCOs led to a culture of micromanagement 
and dependency in the small units that made it difficult for NCOs to find their authority and 
break their unit’s absolute reliance on their commissioned leaders.  Soon after the war, Major 
Thomas Swann decried the fact that, “It was often the practice in the formation of the National 
Army to have a sergeant always supervised by an officer.”  He maintained that while, the 
“officers and men had to be trained simultaneously…too much supervision [by the officers] was 
destructive of initiative in the noncommissioned officers, and rather made them dodge than 
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accept responsibility.”100  The 305th Infantry’s Captain Frank Tiebout also ruefully 
acknowledged, 
…the officers never ceased to regret the theory of the Division Commander who  
 forbade the placing of any real responsibility upon the shoulders of our non-coms.  
 Far better it would have been at camp and throughout our subsequent experience,  
 if it had not always been required that an officer be present, whether at the fairly      
simple task of filling a bedsack, or at an inconsequential gathering of any sort.101 
 
Although Tiebout was quick to denounce the micromanagement of his senior commander, the 
company-grade officers also perpetuated this officer dependency and undercut their sergeants 
and corporals.  One private observed that when NCOs began to drill their squads, inevitably, 
their lieutenant would step in and correct the NCO in front of his men, all the while lecturing him 
on the chapter and verse of the drill regulations.102  At every turn, the officer’s position was thus 
strengthened to the detriment of his sergeants and corporals.  
 The prewar Regular Army’s tradition of NCOs being “captain’s men:” selected, 
promoted, and demoted at the whim of the company commander, and the continued lack of effort 
to physically and psychologically separate the NCOs from their men by giving them greater 
privileges, further eroded the status of noncommissioned officers in the wartime army’s small 
units.  The rapidity with which a company commander could make or break a NCO cheapened 
their status among the soldiers.  One barely literate Kansas soldier wrote home from Camp 
Funston,  
  I was made a sergent (sic) 4 weeks ago and got Busted the next week 
  after wards for going absent without leave there was me and 3 Serg’ts 
  2 Corp’l and one First Serg’t in the guard House and I got Busted 
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  Ha Ha dident want it any way. to much trouble. (sic)103    
The Kansan was not alone in shunning the dubious honor of wearing chevrons.  The future 
Medal Of Honor winner John Barkley and one of his comrades wanted no part in being promoted 
to corporals and thus forced to “run around after” their squad members “like their mammies.”  
To avoid the promotion they, “decided to go absent without leave for a few days; then there’d be 
nothing to do but reduce us.”104   
 Due to his previous college educational and military experience, Claude Hopkins was 
quickly promoted by his company commander to corporal after reporting to Camp Gordon in 
July 1918.  However, despite his credentials and qualifications, it was quickly brought by to him 
by his captain how tenuous his hold was on his stripes.  During the influenza epidemic of the fall 
of 1918, many stateside posts required all soldiers to wear cotton masks to keep the infection 
from spreading.  Unfortunately, Hopkins had allowed some of his soldiers to briefly take off 
their masks while he was chatting with them when his commander walked into the room.  On the 
spot, the captain gave Hopkins the choice between being sent before a courts martial or reduced 
in ranks.  Hopkins took the reduction, but soon regained his corporal stripes and ended the war as 
a sergeant.105   
 While their superiors advised the young officers to follow the old army tradition of 
“trying out” acting NCOs before actually promoting them, some officers took this as a license to 
establish a revolving door policy for selecting their sergeants and corporals.  On 29 July 1918, 
Captain Clarence J. Minick, of the 361st Infantry, 91st Division, wrote that he had reduced 31 of 
his NCOs to privates, leaving him with only one remaining NCO in the company.  He noted that 
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“these are the ones I tried [out] on the way over,” and found they did not work out in their new 
ranks.106  Although Minick’s case was extreme, it does highlight the company commander’s 
latitude to shape the composition of his unit NCOs to his pleasure.  While battalion commanders 
were, by regulation, expected to be the approving authority for the demotion of any NCOs in 
their units, few seemed willing to second guess their captains in these matters.107   
 To add to this litany of woe, neither the new officers nor their proto-NCOs seemed to 
understand exactly what the roles and responsibilities of the sergeants and corporals were to be.  
Some officers, however, were quick to denounce the failings of their non-coms. An infantry 
battalion commander observed, “Among the so-called noncommissioned officers, who are but 
the more apt enlisted personnel with chevrons, no high sense of individual obligation to their ill-
defined and imperfectly understood responsibilities exists, and being, like those over whom they 
have been set, but novices at the game, they are lacking utterly in the confidence which is 
necessary to force them to the front.”108  This officer failed to grasp that the American NCOs 
generally received no special training and little incentive for their assignment and were often 
poorly guided and supported by their officers.  The position of NCO carried few privileges in 
terms of pay and status and even fewer responsibilities. That the new NCOs’ responsibilities 
remained “ill-defined and imperfectly understood” was the fault of the army and of officers such 
as the battalion commander himself. 
   In 1914 the War Department issued the Manual for Noncommissioned Officers and 
Privates for each branch of the service.  These manuals were updated in 1917 to serve as the 
recruit’s handbook for basic military knowledge.  As the title implied, these manuals were also to 
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instruct NCOs on their duties and responsibilities.  Unfortunately, the information in the books 
was far too broad and general to be of any practical use to the NCOs.  The books covered how to 
give close order drill, but nowhere was the new sergeant instructed on the principles of 
leadership or on his role in combat.  The manual stated that the NCOs overarching duty was to  
enforce discipline and “obey strictly and execute promptly the lawful orders of your 
superiors.”109 Beyond those admonitions, the inexperienced NCO was given no “helpful hints” 
on how to turn a group of civilians into soldiers or get those same men to move forward in an 
attack.  Also, if one followed the manual, there was little to no room for an NCO to exercise 
initiative or any independent combat action outside of very limited patrolling.   
 Throughout the war the army made little effort to distinguish NCOs from privates.  Even 
the title Manual for Noncommissioned Officers and Privates is suggestive of this attitude.  Given 
the fact that the majority of NCOs had no more experience than the privates they led, this attitude 
may be understandable.  However, this outlook seems to have sidetracked any serious efforts to 
systematically educate and develop NCOs until late in the war.  Throughout 1917 and much of 
1918, the only effort to train NCOs was at unit level schools.  For example, the commander of 
the 30th Division’s 60th Infantry Brigade mandated that company commanders devote at least one 
hour per day to a school for their NCOs.110  Unfortunately, these schools were usually taught by 
OTC graduate-officers who often lacked the knowledge and experience to adequately train their 
student NCOs.  Also, when the units began to face large transfers of soldiers in the winter and 
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spring of 1918, and new drafts of men had to undergo basic instruction, the NCO schools were 
often the first thing dropped from over-crowded training schedules. Ultimately, without a reliable 
mechanism to develop knowledgeable corporals and sergeants, their status and authority 
remained unclear to their officers and privates.   
 These missteps in raising a corps of NCOs were not lost on the Allied officers assigned to 
train the Americans.  What troubled a number of these officers was that the Americans seemed to 
overlook the emerging role of NCOs as true combat leaders who would be required to use their 
initiative and make weighty decisions on the battlefield, rather than being merely an executer of 
their officers’ explicit orders.  In a 10 January 1918 report to the American General Staff, an 
officer of the French Military Mission tried to broach this subject with the Americans.  After 
noting how the lethality of the battlefield had led to a greater dispersion of units and thus more 
responsibility devolving upon NCOs, the Frenchman observed, 
The American N.C.O’s have no authority at the present time and consequently no 
influence over their men.  Their situation is scarcely more than that of a corporal 
in the French army.  Nothing has as yet been done to change this situation.  Under 
such conditions, they can neither second the officers efficiently nor replace 
them.”111 
 
He recommended that the ad hoc company or battalion NCO schools be replaced by central 
divisional schools that could give the NCOs, “the power, confidence, and prestige which only 
instruction can bestow.”  Two months later, after inspecting training at Camp Oglethorpe, 
Georgia, the French General Claudon reported, “The [American] N.C.O. is non-existing…At 
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present time they have no authority and they have no right to punish.  They are mixed with their 
men; they fight with them to get a piece of food, etc.”112 
 The French were not alone in their concern over the weak American NCO corps.  On    
24 May 1918, the Commander of the British Military Mission, Brigadier General Trotter, warned 
the American Chief of Staff, “ In the three divisions that I visited (the 83rd, 84th, and 89th) during 
my tour the British Officers commented on the status of the N.C.O. in the U.S. Army.  The 
opinion I formed was that for both training and disciplinary purposes his status as compared to 
the British N.C.O. is not sufficiently recognized.”113  He stated that in discussions he had with 
the American division commanders he warned that if the American NCOs were to become 
effective combat leaders, the officers had to grant them more privileges, and do more to give the 
sergeants increased status and standing within their units. 
The War Department’s failure to adequately plan for training NCOs meant that most of 
the divisions that deployed to France before the fall of 1918 did so with sergeants and corporals 
who had learned their roles mostly through on the job training under the constant supervision of 
their officers.  Immediately following the war, the Morale Branch of the War College Plans 
Division submitted a questionnaire to officers leaving the army to gauge their opinions and 
attitudes toward their service.  Looking back on their service, nearly all the officers polled agreed 
that they and the army had not done enough to give their NCOs the respect, prestige, or authority 
to accomplish their tasks or to encourage their privates to follow them.114  Unfortunately, this 
hindsight wisdom came too late to do much good.      
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 It was not until the bulk of the American divisions began deploying in the spring and fall 
of 1918 that the War Department began to take seriously its responsibility for training NCOs.  As 
was the case with officers’ training at the time, the instruction of NCOs was part and parcel of 
the overarching need to provide replacements to the units of the AEF.  As the divisions departed, 
the War Department established a series of replacement training centers and depot brigades.  In 
addition to providing (in theory) basic training for new draftees, these units were also directed to 
establish schools for training NCOs.   
 However, since the War Department neglected to provide a standardized training plan for 
these schools, as they had throughout the war for officers’ training, the training regimen and the 
selection criteria for the students for these courses varied greatly from post to post.  For example, 
Brigadier General Sage, the Commander of the Camp Gordon Infantry Replacement Camp, 
issued regulations to guide all of the training schools under his command on 1 May 1918.  Sage 
directed that ten percent of the privates going through the infantry replacement course at Camp 
Gordon would be selected for “special training in the duties of non-commissioned officers.”  Due 
to shortages of instructors, Sage mandated that, “Officer-candidates will be detailed as N.C.O’s 
of the training companies.  An officer-candidate will be assigned to each squad of recruits, and 
will continue if necessary their informal instruction and discipline outside of drill hours.”115   He 
also allowed those going through the NCO training to serve as instructors in their own courses.  
The NCO school lasted for 30 days and provided the candidates with their basic infantry training 
focusing on “close and extended order drill, musketry, elements of field service, guard duty, 
[and] signaling.”116  
                                                 
 115 “Memorandum for the Chief of Staff from BG Lytle Brown, Chief of the War College Division, 
Subject: Appointment of noncommissioned officers of those students at Central Officers’ Training Schools who fail 
to receive commissions, dated 5 August 1918” in RG 165, “Letters,… etc Officers’ Training Camps.” 
 116 Tips, “Selecting and Training Military Leaders,” 543. 
  426
 On 30 July 1918, the officers at Camp Devens, Massachusetts recommended that the War 
Department establish a two-month-long NCO school.  After removing the time dedicated to 
conferences, inspections, and in and out processing, the school curriculum consisted of 262 
“hands on” training hours (see the subjects and hours listed in Table 8-1).  Over half of the 
practical instruction was devoted to close order drill, interior guard duty, and bayonet and 
physical training.117  Although these matters were important in building discipline and 
aggressiveness in the nascent NCOs, the relatively short amount of time given to subjects such as 
map reading and minor tactics, reveals the continued problems that the army faced in 
understanding the realities of modern combat and the skills that its junior leaders needed to face 
them.      
Table 8-1: Camp Devens NCO School Subjects and Hours 
Close Order Drill, 55 hours (21% of total hours) 
 Physical Training, 40 hours (15.2%) 
 Bayonet Training, 20 hours (7.6%) 
 Interior Guard Duty, 10 hours (4%) 
 Small Arms Training and Firing, 32 hours (12.2%) 
 Extended Order Drill, 15 hours (5.7%) 
 Field Fortifications, 12 hours (4.5 %) 
 Minor Tactics and Field Problems, 23 hours (8.7%) 
 Voice Culture (Giving oral commands), 6 hours (2.2%) 
 Map Reading, 5 hours (2%) 
 Practice Marches, 12 hours (4.5%) 
 Overnight Bivouac, 10 hours (4%) 
Camp and Trench Experience, 6 hours (2.2) 
Modern Weapons (machine guns, automatic rifle, one   
   pound gun, mortars, grenades, and gas),16 hours (6.1%)  
 
 
 
 NCO schools later established at Camps Lee and Grant had the same problem in focusing 
their subject matter as had Camp Devens.  The Camp Lee school, for instance, devoted             
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29 percent of its training time to close order drill and less than 15 percent of the curriculum to 
minor tactics.118  At times, had it not been for the specter of combat which hovered over the 
training, some of the material taught in the schools would have been laughable.  Despite all the 
lapses in the training of the army’s NCOs, the Camp Gordon Morale Officer gushed with pride at 
his ability to have a “special school for singing” established in the camp for selected NCOs to 
train them to serve as “song leaders in their companies.”  The officer noted that this was a coup 
for, “Singing is becoming an essential part of training.”  Two weeks later he reported that his 
new school was filled with two NCOs per company, and met four times a week for 30 minutes of 
instruction.119 
 It is interesting to note that all of the NCO schools mentioned here were of differing 
durations.  The Camp Gordon NCO course ran for 30 days, while the Camp Grant course was for 
seven weeks, and the Camp Lee course was for two months.120  This lack of standardization was 
not the only problem with the training.  Just as with the OTCs, the NCO schools faced grave 
challenges in obtaining qualified candidates in the late summer and fall of 1918.  Part of this 
resulted from the army’s own priorities.  Major Charles Tips reported that at the infantry 
replacement depot at Camp Gordon, “The best men from the noncommissioned officers’ training 
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school are selected to attend the central officers’ training school.”121  The Chief of the War Plans 
Division tried to put the best face possible on this reality by suggested that since only 65 percent 
of the COTS graduates ultimately received commissions, “the other 35 [percent] should make the 
best noncommissioned officer material possible to secure at this time, both from the view point 
of selected material and training.”  However, even he admitted that “this source alone will not 
furnish the necessary number of noncommissioned officers required.”122 
 A post-war board of officers studying the combat effectiveness of the AEF lamented that 
some of the tactical sluggishness of the U. S. Army was due to "poorly trained and rather dull 
non-commissioned officers."123  Given all of the problems the army faced with selecting and 
training its NCOs, was it any wonder that its corporals and sergeants sometimes, if not often, 
failed to live up to their ill-defined responsibilities and expectations?  As the 307th Infantry 
departed for France the best that one officer could say of the unit’s enlisted leadership was,  
  [In] every company one or two N.C.O.’s had shown that absolute reliance   
  could be placed upon them as leaders of their men; for a much larger number it  
  was confidently hoped that under war-time conditions their power to command  
  would develop; but the great mass of men still constituted an ununified,   
  unknown, and very insufficiently trained quantity, who had never learned to take  
  themselves serious as soldiers.124  
 
This rather bleak, though accurate, assessment could have been applied to most of the divisions 
at the time.  The reality of combat in France later meant that many of this “ununified, unknown, 
and very insufficiently trained quantity” of NCOs would be forced to take command of units due 
to officer casualties and/or the arbitrary dictates of the “fog and friction” of war.  While some 
                                                 
 121 Tips, “Selecting and Training Military Leaders,” 543. 
 122 “Memorandum for the Chief of Staff from BG Lytle Brown, Chief of the War College Division, 
Subject: Appointment of noncommissioned officers of those students at Central Officers’ Training Schools who fail 
to receive commissions, dated 5 August 1918” in RG 165, “Letters,… etc Officers’ Training Camps.” 
 123 General Headquarters American Expeditionary Force, Report of Officers Convened By Special Orders 
No.98, GHQ AEF 09 April 1919, 9-10. (Here after cited as the Lewis Board) in USAMHI library. 
 124 Rainsford, 16. 
 
  429
NCOs rose to these occasions and others did not, in neither case did much in their training 
adequately prepared them for the eventualities that thrust them into the center stage of combat 
leadership.     
 Given the systemic problems of mobilization and the level of leadership and knowledge 
of the new divisions’ officers and NCOs, it should be no surprise that the stateside unit training 
was problematic.  This was not for want of effort.  The vast majority of the officers and NCOs 
involved with the training poured their hearts, souls and intellect into preparing for combat.  Still, 
enthusiasm and effort is no substitute for skills and “know how.”  In a telling incident, in August 
1917, Captain Robert Gill’s commanding officer ordered him to form a trench mortar battery.  
After accepting the assignment, Gill’s only question was “May I ask, sir, what a trench mortar 
is?”  His commander’s only response was, “Damned if I know, but you will soon find out.”125   
 With their own experience and knowledge barely above the level of a pre-war private, the 
junior officers found themselves suddenly responsible for the basic instruction of their soldiers.  
This left little time for the officers to concentrate on developing their own tactical competence.   
The under-trained lieutenants and captains frantically scrambled to learn the basics that they 
were expected to impart to their subordinates.  For example, W. A. Sirmon, a lieutenant in the 
82nd Division's 325th Infantry, recalled spending many of his mornings in hurried classes so he 
could give the same lessons to his soldiers later on in the day.126  Soon after being assigned as 
the commander of the 157th Infantry’s machine gun company, Lieutenant Maury Maverick 
realized that he faced a grave problem in training his soldiers.  He recalled,  “I could, with 
great show, take a machine gun apart, but putting it back together again was another matter.  A 
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few pieces would always be left over, or I simply couldn’t get it together.”127  Lieutenant Charles 
Bolte, a graduate of an OTC and three Plattsburg summer camps, noted,  
  When it came to teaching the 45 automatic pistol, I had to sit up 
  all night long with a manual just learning how you took it apart and 
  put it together again so the next day I could sit down as if I knew  
  all about it and try to teach this company how to do this very  
  complicated task.  It was a case of the blind leading the blind.128   
The phrase "blind leading the blind” peppers the writings of the war’s veterans and was perhaps 
the best description of the tragi-comic training environment in the mobilization camps.  
 The shallowness of their officer’s knowledge and training was not lost on their soldiers.  
During a lecture he was giving to his troops, one officer was taken aback when, “one fellow 
asked an embarrassing question.”  He had the soldier report to him after class, and “told him that 
if he tried making a monkey of me again I’d put him on K.P. for life.”  After the lieutenant 
discovered that the man was a civil engineer in civilian life, he sheepishly had the soldier tutor 
him privately in the subjects the officer was not well versed in.129  The 27th Division’s William 
Clarke remembered being drilled by a new officer while he was training at Camp Wadsworth, 
South Carolina.  The officer, fresh out of OTC, “got so mixed up we were scattered all over the 
field and he was unable to get us back into platoon or company line.”  The lieutenant was 
rescued from this humiliating situation only by the timely intervention of the company’s veteran 
first sergeant.  Clarke did note, however, that “much to his credit” the novice “understood he had 
a lot to learn” and took steps to correct his shortcomings.130 
 It is an age-old military truism that leaders “can’t fool the troops” for long.  In a case of 
pure motivated self-interest, enlisted men have (and do) closely observed their leaders to 
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determine their strengths, weaknesses, and overall competence.  As their daily life and very lives 
depend upon the personalities and abilities of their officers and NCOs, the men in the ranks have 
tended to be harsh and honest judges of their leaders.   This was certainly the case with Private 
John Oechsner.  He described his officers as “90 day wonders” and, “boys just out of school.”  
During his time in training, it was clear to this private that his officers, “… didn’t know what the 
hell it was all about…it was all Greek to them.” He noted that even when it came to basic drill, 
“Our commanding officer didn’t know a damn thing.”131 It was even clear to the rookie recruit 
Benson Oakley that there were large gaps in the knowledge of his officers.  Writing home from 
Camp Hancock in April 1918, Oakley described his officers as “ignorant.” After a week of 
“quite a little drilling,” he determined that his leaders “ought to study up [on] the drill regulations 
a bit.”132  None of these faults in the officers discussed could have done much to inspire trust and 
confidence in their soldiers. 
 Many senior commanders tried to aid their new leaders by establishing after hours unit 
officer and NCO schools.  Unfortunately, the hectic conditions under which the leaders operated 
left little time for continued professional development and self-study.  Though well-intentioned, 
the unit schools often lacked qualified instructors and “hands on” application.  Lieutenant Milton 
Bernet complained, “This school was valueless and uninteresting.  Attendance…was supposed to 
be compulsory but we all tried to duck it as it was so useless.”133  As his unit was about to sail, 
Lieutenant John Castles expressed his dismay that in the hurried preparations, “the officers were 
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compelled to listen to the Lieutenant Colonel’s theory of fire superiority, etc.  It was even more 
criminal than the protracted schools in New York the month before…”134   
 Lucian Truscott experienced similar problems with continuing his professional education 
after reaching his unit.  The first thing that struck him was that “The instructional content and 
methods of training in the regiment differed little from that in the officers’ training camp.”135  
His formal leader training consisted of one of the regiment’s veteran officers gathering the new 
lieutenants under an open-air dance pavilion where, 
  …he would read from the manual the lesson assignment for the day.  There  
  were no charts, no diagrams, no photographs, no illustrations, no training aids of 
  any sort.  No practical work for the students; no questions period.  He read.  
  We listened.  Then, the day’s reading done, he would regale us with tales and 
  and anecdotes of colorful cavalry personalities and past cavalry history.136   
 
Nor were his senior officers helpful in filling in their new lieutenants’ knowledge.  Truscott’s 
regimental commander, 
  ….amazed us young officers by maintaining that the War Department had made 
  a great mistake when it had abandoned the old single-shot [Trapdoor] Springfield 
  for the Model 1903…He insisted that the repeating rifles and machine guns  
  wasted ammunition and encouraged soldiers in careless habits, while the old 
  single-shot rifle caused the soldier to exercise due care to make every shot count. 
  Considering that the machine gun was dominating the battlefields of Europe 
  at the time, Colonel Morgan’s views provided us junior officers with a great 
  amount of conversational material and did little toward increasing our confidence 
  in some of our superiors.137  
 
True to the old army tradition, his regimental commander believed that the best way to instruct 
young officers “was to assign them a task and then let them work out their own solution.”138 
Thus, to these half-trained company officers like Truscott and Bernet fell the responsibility for 
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the training and leading of the new army.   Without a strong cadre of competent NCOs to aid 
them, the junior officers were left to "sink or swim" in the training of their soldiers and units.   
 In the fall of 1918, Army Chief of Staff Peyton March reported that, “The quality of 
troops and their value as an effective force depends to a very large extent upon the character and 
sufficiency of their training, which in turn is dependent upon the officers who are designated to 
instruct them in camp and lead them in battle.”139  For the U. S. Army in the Great War, no truer 
words could be spoken.  Despite the War Department’s well laid plans for stateside pre-
deployment training, works by the war’s participants suggest that far too much of the instruction 
time in the United States often centered on subjects that the novice officers understood and could 
easily teach, such as close order and bayonet drill.140  A number of accounts from the war agreed 
with a 27th Division soldier’s observation that “bayonet instruction was a prominent factor in the 
training schedule.”141   
 As was the case in the OTCs, far too much of the training in the new divisions was also 
centered on mastering obsolete battle formations and inculcating unrealistic views of warfare.  It 
should come as no surprise that the young officers passed on to their soldiers the tactics and 
                                                 
 139 War Department Annual Report, 1919, 299. 
 140 For example, First Lieutenant Henry Thorn, of the 313th Infantry, noted the company commanders held 
schools for their NCOs every afternoon. These schools focused on those tasks which the sergeants would be training 
their soldiers on in the upcoming days. He noted that “The bayonet, one of the principal weapons of the 
infantryman, was gone into extensively.” Henry Thorn, History of 313th U. S. Infantry (New York: Wynkoop 
Hallenbeck Crawford Company, 1920),12-13.  For another example of the continued prevalence of the bayonet, see, 
Huidenkopfer, 12. 
              141 War Veteran’s Association, History of Company “E,” 107th Infantry (New York: Privately Published, 
1920), 50.  A soldier in the 165th Infantry noted that his unit’s stateside training routine consisted of “drill at 
formations and bayonet practice without dummies.” Martin Hogan, The Shamrock Battalion in the Great War 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007), 18-19.   Despite the supposed hard training that the soldiers of the 
131st Infantry received, one of their officers noted that by April 1918 “the men were getting stale from close order 
drill.”  The solution to this dilemma was a ten day practice march through southern Texas.  Captain George M. 
Malstrom, The 131st Infantry in the World War (Chicago: Privately published, 1919), 25.  For the army’s view of the 
importance of close order drill, see, John Cutchins and George Stewart, History of the 29th Division, 1917-1919 
(Philadelphia: MacCalla & Co., 1921), 50 
  434
assumptions that they had so recently learned themselves.  Looking back on the training he gave 
and received, one lieutenant confessed,  
Too much stress [was] put on form, ceremonies, close order drill and other West 
 Point relics of the Roman phalanx age. . .too much valuable time [was] spent 
 teaching "squads right" and not enough making every man able to use any type of 
 machine gun.142     
 
This point was also not lost on the 82nd Division’s W. A. Sirmon.  He recorded that as late as the 
division’s soon-to-be-deployed infantry units were still focusing on, “one hour in general 
infantry training, close order drill, bayonet work and bombing.”  He lamented, “Drill, drill, drill- 
will it never end?”143  
 Without their own base of experience to draw upon, the junior officers often found it 
difficult to instruct their men in the more complex tasks of soldiering.  Despite the time and 
effort that his unit devoted to officer-supervised marksmanship training, the 82nd Division's 
famous Alvin York remembered that his comrades remained the worst “shots that ever shut eyes 
and pulled a trigger," and that their shooting "missed everything but the sky."144  An inspection 
of the 84th Division revealed that, “Many of the old men of the command (meaning those with 
longer service) were found to have a very poor knowledge of subjects as care and preservation of 
arms and equipment…individual cooking, care of feet, first aid, or the effect of wind, heat, and 
light upon shooting.”  This was a poor start for an “open warfare” army built upon superior 
American marksmanship and maneuver.145 
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 Unfortunately, as American units prepared to deploy overseas, the experiences of the 
82nd and 84th Divisions were the rule rather than the exception.  A War Department inspection of 
division cantonments in 1917 revealed serious problems with the training conducted in the new 
units.  The inspectors noted, 
  Schedules of drills and instruction show an ample provision of time for this phase 
  of instruction.  Want of time, therefore, cannot be given as an excuse.  The defect 
  lies in a want of accurate knowledge on the part of company officers and  
  noncommissioned officers and failure on part of battalion commanders and 
  commanders of higher units properly to supervise the drills and instruction of 
  their commands…They fail to make satisfactory progress in drilling their    
  commands because they do not see the mistakes which are constantly made, and 
  do not, as a consequence, correct them.(original emphasis) 146  
 
This unfortunate situation did not improve with time.  Nearly a year after the first inspection, 
Colonel H. O. Williams noted the same problems in training within the 84th Division.  Williams 
reported, 
  The instruction of the division has not been as thorough as it should have been.   
  Officers and noncommissioned officers are not sufficiently zealous in correcting  
  mistakes made at drill…They give command and command without any   
  correction or any apparent effort to see that the movement is properly executed.147 
 
Like the previous inspector, he noted, “The greatest weakness of our system of training today is 
the lack of officers and noncommissioned officers who have a thorough knowledge of what they 
are trying to teach or who insist upon having their commands or instructions thoroughly 
complied with.  We must have more accuracy and more attention to detail.”148   Without an 
adequate knowledge of the basics or a fundamental understanding of war on the Western Front, 
the new officers and NCOs were ill-equipped to identify and correct problems in both the 
training of their soldiers and in the flawed American doctrine.   
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 The Americans did not embark into their wilderness of training alone.  Both the French 
and the British sent a number of officers and NCOs to instruct the Americans in the mysteries of 
modern war.  Every division training in the United States had a cadre of Allied officers to teach 
the Americans the technical skills needed to master the new weapons that had come to 
prominence during the war.  For example, one officer recalled that in the 89th Division, the 
training conducted by French and British officers was generally limited to machine gunnery, gas 
warfare, bayonet fighting, artillery firing, automatic rifles, bombs, liaison, and the Stokes 
Mortar.149  These courses, which due to shortages in weapons, were generally taught in 
divisional schools and were those most commonly given by the Allied officers.   
 While the junior officers seemed to have been enthusiastic and receptive students, their 
regular army senior commanders were much less impressed.150  After Huge Scott left the Chief 
of Staff office to take a division command, he observed,     
    A number of foreign officers invalided in France were sent over to teach us the  
  newest developments of trench warfare…They invariably assumed our total  
  ignorance of everything military, and started their course with the most   
  rudimentary subjects.  I had to stop this waste of time, and told them that our  
  regular officers needed only the newest developments as they came up, for they  
  were otherwise as well or better trained than the officers of Europe.  After this  
  they taught us the art of throwing bombs, the use of flares, and the operation of  
  trench mortars, but the best thing we got from them was their new bayonet drill.”  
  (emphasis added)151  
 
The fact that he found the bayonet drill to be the most important aspect of the training that the 
foreign officers gave is a telling statement on the mentality of many of the army’s officers.  It 
also shows why the training given by the Allied officers was so limited in scope and scale. 
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 The stiff-arming of French and British tactical concepts by the Americans was not lost on 
the Allied instructors themselves.  Their reports to the American General Staff and their own 
military missions bristled with anger and exasperation over their sidelining by the very people 
they were trying to aid.  After inspecting training at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, one French 
officer reported “When there is a question of drills and maneuvers in which they could readily 
assist, the American officers are careful not to consult them, preferring to work their own way.  
Our officers have no part in training except in that of specialties and do not assist at any 
drills.”152  After visiting a number of American posts, he concluded the “The word ‘specialist’ is 
being deliberately exploited [by the Americans] to limit our activity.”153   
 As the Americans “found their feet” in 1918, these obstructionist tendencies grew 
stronger.  On 18 April 1918, Colonel James Martin, the Acting Chief of French Advisory 
Mission, reported a number of problems that his trainers were having in instructing the 
Americans.  In one of the gravest situations, he found that his officers at Camp Custer were 
subject to “a certain hostility on the part of the new chief of staff.”  The Frenchman peevishly 
observed that the American “thinks that because he stayed a few days near the front that he does 
not need any help of foreign advisors for the instruction of the division.”154 
 The Allied officers were also critical of the tactical training that the Americans were 
conducting.  As most, if not all, of these officers had personally experienced the realities of 
modern war, their criticism was telling.  One Russian general was amazed that given the changes 
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in warfare that had placed increased importance on small unit combat and made well-trained 
squads “the basis of all efficiency” in higher units, that he ”saw practically no squad work in the 
entire trip.” This, he believed, was “a most grievous fault” in the Americans’ training.155  The 
Frenchman, Major De Reviers condemned the fact that he was “unable to have our infantry 
combat methods accepted or to have the progressive stages of instruction directed along the lines 
of modern warfare” because the Americans insisted that their tactical training be based on 
“American Methods.”  He found that in the U. S. Army, “False ideas of combat prevail such as 
antiquated tactical theories of before the war…”156  As the bulk of the American divisions were 
preparing to deploy in the spring of 1918, the Head of the French Military Mission, General 
Claudon, noted that the Americans’ tactical training still lacked, “a programme of exercises in 
combat in simple but well defined and progressive steps.”157  
 The Allied officers also denounced the Americans’ fixation with close order drill and 
time wasted on other topics of limited importance.  The senior French officer assigned to Camp 
Sheridan was maddened by the fact that while the Americans had finally established a much-
needed platoon leader school, six of its ten lessons were devoted to close order drill.  Another 
noted that the platoon leader school at Camp Sevier had essentially closed because senior 
officers had mandated that young officers attend morning close order drill sessions rather than 
attending the school.158   
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 Some of the Allied officers placed the blame for this squarely on the backs of the 
American regular officers responsible for planning the training.  Of his American peers, one 
Frenchman acidly remarked,  “The field officers are very inferior as they have no special schools 
and do not get down to work.  The efficiency of the staff is lost in innumerable details; its idea of 
training is merely that of close order formation and outward appearance (bluff).”159  This 
officer’s gloomy and prescient conclusions were, 
  Combat training has hardly begun and is started in the wrong direction.  It is  
  greatly to be feared that if the present mistakes continue the situation will not  
  improve…the divisional staff is responsible for false orientation given to training  
  and it is absolutely necessary, in order to climb out of this rut and avoid appalling  
  and demoralizing losses, that measures be taken and orders  given from those in  
  command.160 
 
None of these comments offered any ringing endorsements of the Americans’ training, doctrine, 
or combat leadership. 
 It could be argued that the harsh assessments of the Americans concealed a hidden 
agenda on the part of the Allied officers, or were merely “sour grapes.”  There is truth in this 
point of view, and painting the Americans as inept amateurs was clearly a way of furthering the 
argument that the doughboys would be best served by being amalgamated into existing Allied 
units, or at least retained under Allied command.  However, one must keep in mind that the 
Allied officers assigned to duty in the United States understood the implications for their battered 
nations and armies if the U. S. Army proved incapable of taking to the field.  There is nothing to 
suggest that any of these officers wanted to see the Americans fall flat on their faces in either 
training or combat.  The criticism that they offered was valid and reflected the veterans’ hard 
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won battlefield wisdom.  
 The Americans themselves appeared at times to understand the holes in their tactical 
training and doctrine.  Regrettably, much of this realization came only after they experienced the 
pain of combat.  From division to division there were great variances in the quality, quantity, and 
the degree of realism given to the tactical training of squads, platoons, and companies.  As 
previously noted, much of this depended upon the local realities of equipment shortages, training 
areas available, the weather, and troop health.  When all the right variables aligned, tactical 
training in the United States could be quite sound and realistic.  Since the time, equipment and 
ammunition was available to Major General John F. O’Ryan, he was able to have units up to the 
brigade level in the 27th Division practice assaults on a simulated enemy trench system supported 
by preparatory fires and a rolling barrage fired by the division’s artillery units using live shells. 
The division commander noted that the “psychological effect upon units subjected to these tests 
was marked,” and that this “rather radical training” helped to better ease the soldiers into their 
later shocks of combat.161 
 The available evidence indicates that the level of detail and realism in the 27th Division’s 
tactical training was uncommon in other units.  The field exercises in other divisions tended to 
range from overly scripted productions to wide ranging free-for-alls.  In most cases the training 
was circumscribed by the knowledge and the abilities that the units’ junior officers brought to the 
field.  For instance, Kerr Rainsford admitted that the military knowledge of most of his fellow 
officers was limited to the IDR and FSR that they had learned at the OTCs.162  As old habits in 
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training and indoctrination are hard to break, this often meant that the officers brought the 
obsolete practices which they learned to the instruction of their own units.  
 The continued uncertainty over the proper balance between training for trench and 
“open” warfare often meant that units approached neither with the depth needed for even basic 
competency.  This tension, however, did not indicate any waning of the officer corps’ faith in 
“American exceptionalism” when it came to tactics.  As a division Chief of Staff recalled, 
  …side-by-side with the instruction and training in the new methods of trench  
  warfare went instruction in the methods and principles of warfare in the open.   
  For it seems to have been at all times the faith and belief of all our Army at some  
  time and somehow this stalemate would come to an end; that finally the enemy  
  would be forced into the open and would have to come to conflict face-to-face  
  and breast to breast; that the general principles of warfare are immutable and  
  unchanged from age to age by the introduction of new appliances and new details; 
  their own methods were sound and in accordance with those principles.163   
 
But, the Americans’ training was not adequately preparing them for that “face-to-face and breast 
to breast” moment against a seasoned and adaptive enemy.  Training that failed to inculcate the 
use of artillery and the employment of supporting weapons (often due to equipment shortages 
and incomplete training) meant that American units and leaders had already conceded key 
advantages to their enemies long before they fired the first shots against the foe.    
 Although the available evidence suggests that officers made diligent efforts to keep 
abreast of rapidly changing doctrines, they seemed to be training concepts that were always two 
or more steps behind the realities or latest tactical developments of the Western Front.  A 77th 
Division officer who attended a number of divisional schools at Camp Upton, New York recalled 
that his instructors “usually concluded their course with a warning that, in view of a more recent 
method having been ordered since the opening of the course, the methods of instruction just 
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taught should not be practiced with the troops.”164  Another 77th Division officer noted, 
“Platoons were for a time divided into grenade throwers…rifle-grenadiers, rifle-men and liaison 
agents, according to the directions of the red pamphlets, recently distributed to the officers and 
carefully marked with the suggestive legend, “Not to be Carried in the Front Line Trenches.”165  
While he was most likely referring to one of the red-jacketed Supplement to Instructions for the 
Offensive Combat of Small Units first published by the AEF in early 1918, by the time his unit 
sailed for France, it had already been supplanted by a new edition published in April 1918.166  
The officer also leaves the impression that even the time his unit spent on the new doctrine was 
rather sparse. 
 It was not until 6 May 1918 that Payton March approved a War College Division reprint 
of the AEF’s April 1918 edition of Instructions for the Offensive Combat of Small Units.  
Factoring in the time it took to print and distribute this manual, it is unlikely that infantry units 
training in the United States received it before late June or July of 1918.  This meant that most of 
the American divisions had either already sailed for France, or were in the process of deploying 
by the time the publication was distributed.167  Although the manual incorporated the AEF’s 
Supplement to Instructions illustrating the combat formations and maneuver drills for infantry 
platoons and companies, it also contained illustrations from a British source that where not in the 
AEF’s original publications.  It is unclear why this series of British line drawings of a platoon in 
the attack were included in the manual.  They were not referred to in the text and more 
importantly, did not match the formations illustrated in Supplement to Instructions.  Although the 
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pictures are quite artistically done, they could only have further complicated the efforts of junior 
leaders to puzzle-out the already confusing American doctrine.168     
 The “lag time” in adjusting emerging doctrine to training hindered the ability of stateside 
instruction to replicate the realities of combat in France. Most divisions spent a lot of time and 
effort in constructing trench systems which their units would use as part of their offensive and 
defensive training.  Some of these systems were quite elaborate with machine gun 
emplacements, troop shelters, communications and reserve trenches, and extensive barbwire 
obstacles. These forms of fortification were discussed in detail in the 1917 War Department 
publications, Infantry in the Defense and Notes for Infantry Officers on Trench Warfare.  
Unfortunately, the mighty constructions depicted in the publications and built in posts across the 
United States reflected more of the realities of 1916 than did they those of late 1917 or 1918.  By 
mid-1917, the German Army had shifted its defensive doctrine to the elastic defense in depth.  
This change moved the Germans away from massing their strength in forward trenches to a 
system of echelonment that employed shell holes, strong points, and trenches sited on reverse 
slopes to slowly grind down any Allied attacks as they slogged through the depth of the German 
defenses.169  The training trench system constructed by the 27th Division at Camp Wadsworth, 
South Carolina had a depth of only 400 yards; far shallower than the elastic defense systems then 
in use by the Germans on the Western Front.170  Thus, the American training in no way 
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replicated either the methods of the German defense or their penchant for well-timed 
counterattacks.   
 The training also continued to present other unrealistic visions of modern war.  One 
officer wrote, “With the completion of the new trench system patterned after a sector of the   
Western Front, the regiment engaged in maneuvers which suggested something of actual war.  
Men leaped over or into real trenches, and advanced cheering in innocent simulation of a real 
bayonet charge.”171  The ease in which the Americans assaulted the trenches, unhindered by 
complex thoughts of the artillery, machine gun fire, and supply, brings to mind the equally 
flawed and unrealistic training given Britain’s “Kitchner’s Army” scarcely two years before.  
These unrealistic visions of war even effected some officers’ conception of their role as combat 
leaders.  While training at Camp Doniphan, Captain Ernest McKeigan wrote home to his wife, 
“…on the battlefield the captain is expected to be way back behind the lines in a ‘dugout’ or 
bombproof with a telephone at his head directing operations. They say we are not even allowed 
to carry a revolver but [are to be] armed with a trench stick.” (original emphasis)172  Although 
McKeigan may have written this to ease his wife’s worries, the passage still offers an insight into 
the mindset that his training encouraged. 
 It is interesting to note that the enlisted men appear to have often had a different 
impression of the field training than did their officers.  In many ways the accounts of these 
soldiers offer a more honest appraisal of what they were learning.  To the folks at home, Private 
George Brown related of his field training, “About three miles out we spotted the enemy and 
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then the fun started.  We have signals to advance and halt- no commands.  We’d run a ways then 
fall down then up and run again.  Imagine those heavy packs and rifles.”173  A soldier in the 77th 
Division observed that much of their tactical training at Camp Upton, New York often 
“degenerated into nothing more than wild games of hare and hound, pursued without the 
slightest regard for military regulations.”174  Similarly, another soldier maintained that during his 
training at Camp Funston, “Exercises in minor tactics made up in aggressiveness where they 
lacked in accuracy.  Both sides claimed victory in many bloodless campaigns… ‘You’re a 
prisoner’ was answered by ‘I killed you half an hour ago.’”175  At Camp Hancock in April 1918, 
Benson wrote, 
  During the past three days we have been very busy drilling under those ignorant  
  officers and hiking.  Yesterday morning we took a ten mile hike, five miles each  
  way to a lake and on the way we had to send out snipers, advance guards etc to  
  watch for [the] enemy.  I was one of the advance guards and it was surely a great  
  game spying around in the woods.  We were supposed to be attacked by cavalry  
  but our companies surprised them in the woods. Our guard discovered where they  
  were, sent one man back to the main body and then they all charged down upon  
  them.  Of course we didn’t have any guns but we all went through the maneuvers  
  just as if we were actually engaged in the present war.  We continued to the lake  
  where we rested for half and hour and then came back…176 
 
These passages suggest that the soldiers involved either did not understand the purposes of the 
exercises and the roles they were to play in their unit’s maneuvers, or were blissfully ignorant of 
how little their carrying-on reflected the realities of combat.  In either case, they do draw into 
sharp focus the underlying problems with American stateside unit training.  Unfortunately, these 
naive soldiers would soon find that their German adversaries played a much rougher version of 
“a great game spying around the woods.” 
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 In addition to the goal of military training to impart important battle skills is the need for 
the experience of that instruction to weld all members of the unit into a cohesive whole that 
enables soldiers and leaders to effectively operate under the stress of combat.  While individuals 
must have a personal knowledge and skill set to perform as soldiers, the individual must also be 
able to perform as a member of a unit if both the person and the group are to survive and succeed 
on the battlefield.  The reason that close order drill (in moderation) has been a cornerstone of 
recruit training in modern armies is that it quickly accomplishes the task of training the 
individual to instantly respond to command while also building the concept of collective action 
and identity.  It was the task of the junior officers and NCOs of the U. S. Army to build this 
corporate identity and cohesion in their units. 
 Although the U. S. Army of the Great War lacked a theoretic or doctrinal basis for 
describing cohesion, it clearly understood that modern warfare had placed even a greater demand 
on small units and had a conception of unit identity that was in line with the later writings of 
S.L.A. Marshall and Darryl Henderson. An experienced Regular officer wrote, 
  Any group of individuals working together for a common purpose is 
  going to establish unconsciously a group spirit of some kind.  This has 
  got to happen.  The leader knows that success largely depends on . . . 
  this spirit. . .By getting to know the men and “how they feel about it,” 
  he keeps in close touch with the spirit. . .and make the men feel a 
  membership in his team.177 
In an April 1918 article in the Infantry Journal, William E. Hocking, a Harvard University 
Professor of Psychology, described the psychological realities of the battlefield that have a 
decidedly contemporary feel.  In an age of “muscular Christianity” and boy’s dime store tales of 
courageous warriors, Hocking described a reality of war where “No one knows in advance how 
he will behave in an emergency that he has never experienced.  But it may be taken for granted 
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that everyone experiences fear.”178  He accurately noted that the “mass attack, while expensive in 
terms of men, is psychologically easier, for it satisfies the protective instinct of bunching 
together.”  He argued that the only way to get soldiers away from this “illusory and fatal 
impulse” was to train the individual soldier and officer to understand what he and his unit had to 
accomplish and where he was to end up at the end of the battle.179 As for unit leaders, 
  It is no longer possible for officers higher than platoon leaders to be personally in  
  touch with their men during attack.  The weight of responsibility for morale is  
  thus thrown on lieutenants and noncommissioned officers, and under present  
  conditions it is difficult for them to retain control.  Men fight best with comrades  
  and in units they are used to.  Men are kept up to their best performance by the  
  eyes of those who know them.180   
 
Thus, nearly thirty years before the publication of Marshall’s Men Against Fire, the concept of 
the modern psychological battlefield, and the cohesion and leadership that units and individuals 
needed to confront it, was understood in certain corners of the American Army. 
 Given this broad understanding of unit cohesion, one wonders why the War Department 
did not do more to promote it during World War I.  Although the War Department was beset by a 
host of problems beyond its control that hobbled its wartime mobilization and training efforts, its 
personnel policies caused unnecessary “self-inflicted wounds” to unit cohesion that seriously 
undermined the army’s overall combat effectiveness and the leadership of its junior officers and 
NCOs.  Some of this was undoubtedly a reflection of the managerial approach to problem 
solving that accompanied the “cult of professionalism.”  As with other Progressive Era reforms, 
part of the Regular Army’s move toward increased professionalism was an effort to inject 
efficiency into military processes and operations.  Reflecting the views of the guru of 
Progressive Era efficiency, Frederick Winslow Taylor, the Adjutant General and other members 
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of the General Staff simply saw the manpower issue as matching human assets to the most 
pressing needs.  Soldiers merely became interchangeable commodities that could be moved at 
will to enhance the overall institutional efficiency of the U. S. Army.  This meant that throughout 
the conflict, the War Department displayed no reluctance in ordering massive levies and transfers 
of soldiers and leaders from one unit to another.  Unfortunately, these frequent, and often 
inexplicable, movements of soldiers in and out of units further crippled individual and unit 
training, damaged the morale of officers and enlisted men, and preempted the efforts of leaders 
to build cohesive combat-ready units.      
 The experience of the 82nd Division is illustrative of the continual building and tearing  
down of the American divisions. In August 1917, the War Department activated the division and 
began to man it with draftees from Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee. Less than two months 
later, with the division approaching full strength and already well into the stage of collective unit 
training, the War Department reversed itself and ordered most of the unit’s enlisted men 
transferred to the 30th, 31st  and 81st Divisions.  The War Department's decision left the 82nd with 
a cadre of only 783 men to rebuild the division's organization.181  A regimental commander 
reported that these transfers left his company commanders with only five draftees in their 
units.182  Nor were the moves limited to enlisted men.  The same officer noted that “each time a 
Signal Corps motorcycle entered camp,” it caused great consternation in his regiment because it 
was bound to be bringing “orders for officers to proceed here, there, and everywhere for duty in 
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the then so-called National Army.”183  More importantly, these moves meant that six weeks of 
cohesion building and training had gone to waste.   
 In late October and November, the division was brought back up to strength with draftees 
from New England and the Mid Atlantic states.  Colonel Julian Schley remembered that the 
arrival of these new men was not greeted with rejoicing by his junior officers.  He noted, 
  These men proved so poorly drilled in general that training had to commence at  
  the beginning.  Up to this time the spirit of the reserve officers had been high and  
  the development of the men under their instruction had encouraged them.  This  
  return to the first lessons again with another set of men discouraged them and  
  created a corresponding slump in their enthusiasm.184  
 
The new levy also contained a large percentage of recent immigrants unable to speak or read 
English.  This further hindered training and forced the division commander to organize English 
classes to give the soldiers the basic language knowledge necessary for combat.185  This problem 
was not limited to the 82nd Division; in 1917 one in three Americans was a first generation 
immigrant, and one in five draftees was foreign born.186   
The division’s manpower challenges did not end with the arrival of the northeastern 
draftees.  In an effort to pool soldiers who had civilian experience in certain crafts and industrial 
jobs, Washington again ordered the 82nd to transfer over 3,000 specialists from its ranks in 
November 1917.  This levy fell hardest among the unit’s NCOs.  One bitter officer remarked, 
The Division believed that the War Department had overlooked one important 
consideration. Although the soldier might be a very good plumber, lumberman, 
blacksmith or structural iron worker, a great deal of Government time and money 
had been expended in making him an even more valuable specialist in his present 
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occupation: namely that of a non-commissioned officer, bayonet instructor, hand 
grenade expert or machine gunner.187 
 
As a result of the ugly wave of xenophobia and nativism that swept over the United States in the 
first year of the war, the division's number of trained men was further reduced by the forced 
discharge of over 1,400 men considered to be enemy aliens by the War Department in March 
1918.188  Although the War Department promised to refill the division with suitable specialists 
and replacements prior to their embarkation, the 82nd received only levies of untrained draftees.  
Some of these raw replacements arrived in the division only days before its departure from the 
United States.  Private Ralph Flynt was inducted into the Army on April 2, 1918; eighteen days 
later he was on board one of the ships carrying the 82nd to France.189   
The disruptions caused by the army’s levy policy were not confined to the 82nd Division.  
The American Expeditionary Forces Order of Battle notes that many National Guard and most 
National Army divisions experienced large turnovers of personnel prior to their movement 
overseas.190  Of the 41 divisions that were sent to France (not including the 93rd Division that 
served with the French as individual regiments), 17 lost an aggregate of at least 10,000 men to 
transfers between the time they were raised and the time that they sailed for France.  Nearly all 
of the remaining divisions suffered losses that ran into the thousands, or had to cope with the 
constant arrival of new and largely untrained men required to being them up to strength. 
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Although the War Department justified the constant transfers of personnel as a necessary evil 
that filled earlier deploying units at the expense of those sailing later in 1918, these moves 
appear to have been made with little or no reasoned thought or judgment.  One wonders if it 
would have been easier to adjust the order in which units deployed rather than sending soldiers 
so promiscuously across the United States. 
The 86th Division was hit particularly hard by the War Department’s orgy of willy-nilly 
transfers and illustrates the problems that the haphazard moves left in their wake.  Like most of 
the National Army divisions, the 86th was initially filled with the first wave of draftees by 
October 1917.  Before that month was out, however, the division was forced to send over 5,400 
of its newly arrived troops to the 33rd Division.  Between January and April 1918, over 100,000 
men were sent to Camp Grant mainly to fill the division’s ranks.  During the same period, the 
post and division lost an aggregate of 80,000 soldiers.  On 30 April 1918, the 86th was down to 
only 10,000 men.  These moves had a profoundly negative influence on the unit’s leaders and 
men.  In just the area of NCO leadership, the division’s morale officer reported that, “it is 
noticeable that the men are not as keen as formerly in competition for noncommissioned rank.”  
He believed that this was due to the fear among the men that, given the recent spate of levies, 
they would shortly be transferred and lose any rank they gained.191   
Throughout the summer of 1918, in an unpredictable and unsystematic manner, the War 
Department again slowly refilled the units by sending drips and drabs of replacements until it 
deployed in August.  Given the disruptions to its training caused by these chaotic transfers, it is 
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not surprising that Pershing ordered the 86th Division skeletonized to provide replacements to his 
other units upon its arrival in France.192      
The War Department’s demand for men with specialized skills or those with the 
education and experience to attend officers’ training wreaked havoc on the already strained 
efforts of lieutenants and captains to identify and train a solid cadre of NCOs.  For example, the 
89th Division’s Intelligence Officer reported that “There is some feeling of discouragement and 
dissatisfaction among the commissioned personnel due to the constant extraction of men from 
this division.”  He noted that the officers, “feel keenly the loss of those men whom they have 
spent months of hard work in an effort to make them trained soldiers.”193  On 22 February 1918, 
another intelligence officer bewailed that training in the 31st Division had been gravely disrupted 
by was the unit’s transfer of 320 “of the best N.C.O.s” to the Leon Springs OTC.194 Likewise, 
Captain Wardlaw Miles noted that “A fierce exasperation burned in the hearts of the Company 
Commanders who were constantly obliged to give to other units their best non-commissioned 
officer material.”195  As alluded to in previous chapters, when they were faced with the steady 
drain of their best soldiers and NCOs, a number of junior officers worked hard to subvert the 
system.   
At the beginning of the war, the soldier’s company commander filled out the man’s 
qualification card listing any specific technical training, education, or experience.  As these cards 
were the local Adjutant General’s only way of determining whether a soldier possessed the skills 
that were needed elsewhere in the army, it was easy for the officers to camouflage the man’s true 
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worth from the prying eyes of the outsiders.  Going one step further, Captain Kerr Rainsford 
admitted that he and his peers came to view the transfers as a “safety-valve” or quick means for 
ridding themselves of, “the man whose face seemed irreconcilable with a steel helmet, whose 
name on the rollcall consisted only of consonants, or who had cast his rice pudding in the mess-
sergeant’s face.”196  As it was also in their interest to have efficient small units, often the 
company commander’s superiors tacitly supported their obstructionism.  After his unit endured a 
particularly large loss of current and would-be NCOs, one regimental commander later confessed   
that he turned a blind eye when his company commanders later listed “especially qualified men 
as farmers” so as to keep the soldier off of subsequent transfer orders.197   
Unfortunately, perhaps, the army’s personnel officers were quick to pick up the captains’ 
subterfuges.  In the Adjutant General Office’s official history of the war, the personnel managers 
condemned the fact that “all too frequent instances came to light where the company commander 
had deliberately hidden the good men by reporting them as laborers or farm hands instead of the 
engineers, accountants, and telegraphers which they were, thus reducing the likelihood of losing 
them by transfer to other companies.”198  To remedy this, the Adjutant General simply had the 
divisional personnel office code all new men’s qualification cards and make copies of the records 
before assigning them to their units.  
 In fairness to the personnel officers, for the first time in the nation’s history, the demands 
of time and mass industrial warfare demanded that the nation and the army devise a system for 
most efficiently using its human resources. Still, one can readily sympathize with the infantry 
company commanders.  Mustering all the fawning condescension that only a grey bureaucrat can 
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wield, the personnel mangers expressed the belief that “nothing is more disheartening to officers 
or soldiers than to see some of their best personnel suddenly removed, just at the time when 
strenuous enthusiastic training has brought about a measure of group competence.”  The 
personnel officers expressed sympathy over the fact that they had taken “the very men of 
superior native ability whom the company commander had selected as promising material for his 
non-commissioned officers and whom he was loath to lose.” But in the end, the minor problems 
of a 250 man company paled in comparison to the Adjutant General’s challenges and the greater 
needs of the army trumped the small unit’s need for good leaders and cohesion.199 
Whatever their justification, the frequent levy of soldiers from the division caused 
massive and lasting disruptions to the training and cohesion of the army’s small units.  In the 
realm of training, the loss of NCOs and privates forced officers to continually readjust their 
training plans to account for the influx of raw recruits. With each new levy, the officers and 
remaining NCOs also had to reassert their authority and try to rebuild the “group spirit” of their 
units.  This constant “reinventing of the wheel” was but another obstacle to the leaders’ efforts to 
advance their own professional development.  An officer in the 305th Infantry described the 
process that followed after “each company had been sifted down to a mere hundred or so.” As 
soon as new men arrived, “all over again, the company commander would have to organize his 
unit, re-size and re-distribute his men in order to balance the platoons; start in once more on the 
rudiments of drill, spending long days on the rifle range teaching the infant mind to shoot.”200 
 On the plus side, Private Archibald Hart believed that while the constant influx of new 
men disrupted the units training, the mixture of “veteran” and green troops allowed the later to 
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be trained more quickly.201  Although this was partially true, these gains were not worth the costs 
in morale and training time.  For example, in March 1918, the Camp Lewis Assistant Intelligence 
Officer reported that in the 91st Division a “lack of arms and the necessity of going back over 
close order drill for the instruction of incoming recruits caused a noticeable slump in the morale 
of some of the men in the infantry regiments.”202  The “old hands’” resentment at having to again 
go through the drudgery of close order drill and other basic tasks would not have aided leaders 
(who often shared the “veterans’” resentments) in crafting esprit de corps within their units.   
 Since the War Department did not approach the issue of reassigning men to fill deploying 
units in any methodical manner, it exacerbated the training problems into both the gaining and 
the losing units.  The Chief of Staff of the 89th Division, for example, freely admitted that to fill 
the War Department’s urgent levy orders, the division had no other choice than to send only 
“partially trained” men to fill the quotas.203  Given the fact that no two divisions were ever truly 
training on the same subjects at the same times, and that the travel times involved in shifting 
soldiers from one post to the next, the units gaining the Camp Funston soldiers now had to 
scramble to fill in the holes in the men’s training.   
 For the units that had lost the soldiers to transfer, they were eventually refilled with 
partially trained men from other posts or, even worse, brought up to strength with recently 
drafted recruits.  For the 89th Division, this meant,    
  Early in May a large contingent of newly drafted men reported in number   
  sufficient to fill all vacancies.  These men were received within two weeks of the  
  departure of the Division for overseas…They were equipped, trained in the  
  elements of marching and of the manual of arms, given their typhoid prophylaxis  
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  and vaccination, all at breakneck speed.  But nearly all of their time they spent  
  upon the rifle range.204 
 
This was a no win situation for all the parties involved.  The new recruits were thrust into an 
alien world where they did not have the time to gain confidence in themselves, their comrades, or 
their leaders.  They were also well aware of their sketchy training and the fact that would all too 
shortly land in combat.  The leaders and “veteran” soldiers of the units in which the new recruits 
were assigned did not know the rookies’ strengths, weaknesses, and dependability, and were 
equally concerned with whether the new men had enough training to allow them to pull their 
weight in action.  
 The levies also further hindered efforts by commanders to standardize their training 
across all subordinate units.  Colonel H. O. Williams reported in July 1918 that the transfer of a 
vast number of relatively trained men, and their subsequent replacement with raw recruits, had 
greatly slowed the training of the 84th Division.  Furthermore, the changes in troops had left the 
division with a poor balance of experienced and green soldiers within its infantry units.  The 
failure of the division staff to reorganize these units after the War Department’s levies mean that 
the 167th Infantry Brigade had a disproportionate level of raw recruits with “less than a week’s 
training under arms.”205  This of course led to a situation where training in that unit fell far 
behind others in the division.  The fact that large groups of raw recruits continually and 
unpredictably arrived in divisions throughout the winter, spring, and summer of 1918, only 
exacerbated the challenges of the army’s small unit leaders.  In the final analysis, the constant 
effort given to integrating the raw draftees into their units, and the time dedicated to constantly 
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rebuilding unit NCO cadres, left even less time for the officers and NCOs to move on to more 
advanced levels of unit training or to devote the time they needed to improve their own 
competence through self-study.   
 As both S. L. A. Marshall and Henderson argued, the close personal bonds and “social 
identities” that link soldiers together and build ties between the soldiers and their leaders in small 
units are the fundamental basis for the cohesion and combat effectiveness of armies. In addition 
to all the wreckage of training and leadership left in the wake of the incessant transfers, the 
greatest damage inflicted by the moves was in these areas.  Two officers from the 89th Division 
were keenly aware of these abiding problems.  Captain Charles Dienst, of the 353rd Infantry, 
noted that the constant turnover of the officers and soldiers of his unit, “seemed at the time to be 
striking at the progress and efficiency of the organization.  There’s something in the association 
of men as “bunkies” that ties them together once [and] for all.”  He recorded a conversation 
between two of these “bunkies” shortly before one of them was transferred to another post. 
    “I’m ready to go,” said the transferred man, “but I should like to go with my old  
  outfit.”  And the man who was left behind answered, “We’re going to be filled up  
  with strangers.  I don’t like it either.”206  
 
In July 1918, the Camp Funston Intelligence Officer reported that morale at his post was being 
undermined by the “constantly shifting of men to other camps.”  He wrote that, “Many 
friendships are no sooner made than broken.  No man knows from one day to the next whether 
he will be in Camp Funston or sent to fill up another division.”207  
 The poignancy of broken friendships masked the deeper problems of unit cohesion.  With 
the exception of some National Guard units, upon entering military service the majority of the 
army’s soldiers were cast into a strange world and largely cut lose from the close association of 
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friends and family.  In the early weeks of training, the soldiers established new bonds of 
friendship and a “surrogate family” developed within their units.  As the levies caused units to be 
“filled up with strangers,” the “surrogate family” was torn apart and was replaced by  “one day to 
the next” uncertainties and worries.  The importance of strong unit solidity is that it provides the 
essential psychological armor that the individual and the unit require to face the mental, physical, 
and spiritual challenges of fighting.  As the transfers cut deep chinks into this psychological 
armor, the ability of the unit’s officers and NCOs to lead in combat grew exponentially more 
difficult.  An officer of the 307th Infantry observed, everything at Camp Upton was so hurried 
and confused, and his unit was so buffeted by constant personnel transfers, that it “never really 
found itself” until it departed for France.208  Since having a unit “find itself” is the goal of 
military cohesion-building, the fact that a unit was unable to accomplish this key task until it 
reached the war zone was an indication of the serious challenges that lay before the AEF.  
The mobilization of the U. S. Army was a mighty but flawed undertaking.  The nation’s 
general lack of military preparation and the press of time resulted in vast shortages of equipment 
and defective and incomplete plans for training the mass of new soldiers and officers.  With its 
flawed personnel policies and other missteps, the War Department itself often tripped-up unit 
training plans and the efforts of its junior leaders to build cohesive units.  The OTC graduates 
were both victims and obedient minions of a training system that improperly prepared them for 
combat and then loosed them to spread ignorance among the draftee masses.  While many 
motivated and well-intentioned young officers and NCOs attempted to transcend the host of 
training and leadership problems that confronted them, their greatest obstacles were their own 
limitations and inexperience.  Captain Charles Dienst recalled that as his 353rd Infantry boarded 
the train from Camp Funston for the embarkation ports, “its equipment was still incomplete; its 
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training was still unfinished; and its organization was still untried…Both officers and men 
realized the inadequacy of their preparation.”209 Regrettably, his unit was far from being alone in 
this sad circumstance. The inbred and ingrained flaws in leadership, training, doctrine and 
organization that the army’s units carried with them to France would bear bitter fruit in the 
campaigns of 1918. 
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Chapter 9 
“My God! This is Kitchener’s army all over again” 
Leader Training in the American Expeditionary Forces in France 
 
 A soldier in the 27th Division’s 105th Infantry recalled that after seeing his unit arrive at a 
British training area in France, one of the British instructors noted with tears in his eyes, “My 
God!  This is Kitchener’s army all over again. We have nothing like this now; we have nothing 
left but boys.”1  While the American chose to interpret the remark as a comment on the poor 
state of the British Army in 1918, the statement could equally be applied to the Americans’ 
innocence and lack of training.  Like the “Kitchener” divisions that swelled the ranks of the 
British Army in 1916, the Americans of 1918 were young, energetic, and woefully unprepared 
for the shock of battle that awaited them.  
 Deploying to France did not end the U. S. Army’s problems with developing competent 
junior leaders.  Officers and NCOs arriving overseas faced new sets of challenges and obstacles 
to their leadership development.  The AEF’s own unique training policies, uncertain tactical 
doctrine, and mistrust of the Allies often hindered efforts to create leaders with the tactical and 
technical skills needed to overcome an experienced and able foe. Moreover, dramatic changes in 
the military situation in 1918 further sidetracked and overshadowed unit and leader training in 
France.  By the time the American units became involved in large-scale combat in the spring and 
summer of 1918, the AEF had made few breakthroughs in improving the readiness of its junior 
leaders to command in war.  General John J. Pershing is reported to have stated, “The only thing 
a soldier needs to know is how to shoot and salute.”2  Although this quotation may be 
apocryphal, in many ways it did encapsulate much of the Iron Commander’s views of discipline, 
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training, and the individual skills he felt were essential to wage modern war. Ultimately, it was 
going to take more than shooting and saluting to prepare company-level officers and NCOs for 
the challenges that awaited them in combat. 
 The training and doctrine of the AEF has long been a popular subject among historians of 
the era.  James Rainey, Timothy Nenninger, and more recently, Mark Grotelueschen have all 
examined the shortcomings of Pershing’s open warfare doctrine and the problems that the AEF 
faced in preparing its units for combat.  Rainey noted that Pershing’s open warfare doctrine 
suffered from inherent contradictions, unrealistic visions of combat, and a rather vague looseness 
in its doctrinal definitions.3  He has also argued that this flawed doctrine, when combined with a 
faulty philosophy of training, shortages of equipment, and unsound personnel policies, undercut 
the AEF’s efforts to effectively train its units for war.4  Similarly, Timothy Nenninger 
maintained that while systemic problems with fielding a large army in France, and the German 
offensives of 1918 dogged Pershing’s efforts to weld the AEF into an efficient fighting force, 
ultimately, things that were under the Americans’ control, such as doctrine and personnel 
policies, could have been better managed to increase the effectiveness of the AEF’s divisions.5 
 In The AEF Way of War, Mark Grotelueschen expands on the arguments of both Rainey 
and Nenninger and agrees with their negative assessment of Pershing’s nebulous open warfare 
doctrine.  However, Grotelueschen maintains that American divisions overcame the AEF GHQ’s 
doctrinal blunders and crafted their own firepower-centric combat methods.  These methods, 
which eschewed the GHQ’s concepts of “self-reliant infantry” for ones that maximized the use 
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of artillery, ultimately led to better combat performance in these adaptive units and fewer 
American casualties. He argues that despite the adherence of senior officers to the GHQ’s “rifle 
and bayonet” dogma, most of the new tactics were spawned by junior officers who had been 
heavily influenced by Allied schools and advisors.6 
 This author has little to add to the debate over Pershing’s open warfare doctrine.  Rainey, 
Nenninger, and Grotelueschen have done a superior job of highlighting the problems with these 
tactics and the flawed assumptions upon which they were based.  Thus, discussion of open 
warfare will be limited to those points where the doctrine intersected with the training of 
company-level leaders.  It is interesting to note that in the War College Division’s Instructions 
for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, the authors used the terms “trench-to-trench 
attack” and “attack in open warfare” to delineate between the different methods of attack.  
However, they also stated, “it can not be too thoroughly recognized that although it may be 
necessary to slightly vary the preparations and forms of assembly for the attack in these two 
circumstances, the actual tactics to be employed will usually be identical.”7  There is much 
wisdom in this statement, and at the company-level and below, much of the debate over the 
tactics, formations, and realities of open verses trench warfare may well have been a tempest in a 
teapot.  For the captains, lieutenants, and NCOs, the problem remained the same: how do you 
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cross an enemy kill zone with enough strength and firepower remaining to defeat the enemy and 
hold the ground that you have gained?  
  Upon landing in France, one of the first major problems that Pershing had to face was 
how to prepare the units under his command, who arrived with wildly varying levels of training, 
to fight an experienced enemy.  Viewing the half-trained state of his supposedly “regular” 1st 
Division in June 1917 underscored to him the Americans’ unreadiness to wage a modern war.  
Pershing believed that only a top-down driven standardized training plan could whip the 
Americans into shape and overcome their glaring shortcomings.  In the fall of 1917, Pershing 
envisioned that all of his divisions would go through a three month program of training, with the 
first month taken up with individual and small unit technical and tactical training conducted 
under the watchful eyes of one of the Allied armies.  The divisions’ second month of instruction 
was to be devoted to learning the intricacies of trench warfare by serving on an inactive sector of 
the lines, and the third month was devoted to large unit training for open warfare.  Pershing 
justified the plan by noting, 
  In order to give the troops the advantage of the latest tactical and technical  
  developments and make up for the defects of training at home, the plan   
  contemplated an additional period of training for divisions of about three months  
  after reaching France.  This gave us an opportunity to secure a certain uniformity  
  in standards, and was especially valuable in affording the newly arrived troops the 
  benefit of experience in the immediate atmosphere of war.8 
 
In other words, this plan would close the Americans’ training gaps and also give them a degree 
of combat seasoning prior to any major combat operations of the AEF.  Pershing envisioned that 
by 1919, the trained and robust AEF would be the key Allied army on the Western Front.9 
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 The AEF GHQ’s first effort to impose a standard training plan on its units came on           
6 October 1917 when it issued the “Program of Training for the 1st Division.”  To some extent, 
this program became the model (or at least the point of departure) for the subsequent training for 
all other AEF divisions.  The memorandum stated that the training would be “based on 
developing sound leadership in succession in the squad, or group, the platoon, the company and 
finally the higher unit.”  The program called for six periods of progressive instruction totaling 16 
weeks of training.  The first two periods, totaling seven weeks, focused on the training of 
individuals and units from squad to battalion.  The third and forth periods devoted three weeks 
each to the training of regiments and brigades.  The fifth period, of three weeks duration, was to 
train the division.  The sixth period ended the divisions’ training with an inspection of the their 
readiness for combat by the corps commander or GHQ.10   
 As with the stateside guide for instructing divisional units, Infantry Training, the 
“Program of Training for the 1st Division” detailed the amount of hours that were to be devoted 
to training all of the subtasks that each echelon required to be tactically proficient.  The biggest 
difference was that while Infantry Training basically stopped at the battalion level, the AEF’s 
“Program of Instruction” extended instruction all the way to the division. 
 The 1st Division program also listed Pershing’s “General Principles Governing the 
Training of Units of the American Expeditionary Forces.”  These principles would be found in 
all subsequent divisional training plans and were even integrated into the plans of some divisions 
still training in the United States.  The AEF’s five training principles were, 
  a. The methods to be employed must remain or become distinctly our own. 
 
  b. All instruction must contemplate the assumption of a very vigorous   
                                                 
 10 AEF GHQ, “Program of Training for the 1st Division, A.E.F.,” 06 October 1917, in, World War Records, 
First Division, Vol. XX, Training First Division (Washington D.C.: Army War College, 1930), not paginated. 
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          offensive.  This purpose will be emphasized in every phase of training 
           until it becomes a settled habit of thought. 
 
  c. The general principles governing combat remain unchanged in their   
          essence.  This war has developed special features which involve special 
      phases of training, but the fundamental ideas enunciated in our Drill 
      Regulations, Small Arms Firing Manual, Field Service Regulations, and 
      other service manuals remain the guide for both officers and soldiers   
                 and constitutes the standard by which their efficiency is to be measured, 
      except as is modified in detail by instruction from these headquarters. 
 
  d. The rifle and the bayonet are the principle weapons of the infantry   
                 soldier.  He will be trained in a high degree of skill as a marksman both 
      on the target range and in field firing.  An aggressive spirit must be 
       developed until the soldier feels himself, as a bayonet fighter; invincible  
                 in battle. 
   
  e. All officers and soldiers should realize that at no time in our history had  
                discipline been so important; therefore discipline of the highest order must  
                be exacted at all times.  The standards of the American Army will be those  
                of West Point.  The rigid attention, upright bearing, attention to detail,   
                uncomplaining obedience to instructions required of the cadets will be   
                required of every officer and soldier of our Armies in France.  Failure to  
                attain such discipline will be treated as a lack of capacity on the part of the  
                commander to create in the subordinate that intensity of purpose and   
                willing acceptance of hardship which are necessary to success in battle.11 
 
These principles highlight a number of the tactical and leadership assumptions that the AEF’s 
training was built upon and offers some insight into Pershing’s conceptions of modern warfare. 
 The “principles of training” make it crystal clear that Pershing intended to train and fight 
using American methods, and that whatever the Americans adopted from the Allies, they would 
still be grounded in the concepts of the IDR and FSR.  This was also seen in Pershing’s fixation 
with offensive operations and the continued superiority of rifles and bayonets. The focus on 
American methods reflected both a faith in American exceptionalism and the continuity of the 
flawed pre-war American doctrine.  However, this may have also been a plank in Pershing’s 
efforts to stave off Allied efforts to amalgamate American soldiers and units into their 
                                                 
 11 Ibid.   
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formations.  If the Americans adhered to a unique doctrine, he could argue that the mixing of 
American and Allied units was unfeasible.  This focus on “American methods” also 
foreshadowed some of the tensions between American and Allied officers that limited, to some 
degree, the effectiveness of instruction given by Allied soldiers to American units. 
 It was Pershing’s focus on making his expectations of discipline in the AEF “those of 
West Point” that caused some of the greatest problems with junior leaders.  Pershing never 
questioned his assumptions that the near automaton-like discipline expected of the army’s cadets 
was suited to the nation’s wartime citizen soldiers and officers.  Just as had been the case in the 
United States, leaders in the AEF found themselves in the quandary of needing to balance the 
call for discipline with the demand of battlefield initiative.  Pershing’s insistence on rigid and 
“uncomplaining obedience to instructions” often came at the price of the enterprise and 
willingness of junior leaders (and their superiors) to make decisions on the battlefield that 
deviated from their last orders.  Ironically, at the same time that Pershing was demanding 
absolute and unquestioning obedience in his subordinates, he was also insisting that the War 
Department change its stateside training practices to bring them more in line with the AEF’s 
doctrine because, “open warfare…demands initiative, resource, and decision upon part of all 
commanders,” and “requires that all organizations be made into highly developed flexible teams 
capable of rapid maneuvering to meet swift changes in situation.”12  As with Pershing, the AEF 
as a whole never resolved this inherent dilemma.  
 This dichotomy was also seen in the AEF’s printed materials.  In Instruction for the 
Offensive Combat of Small Units, battalion and regimental commanders were warned to “prevent 
their subordinates from developing the habit of a rigid scheme of combat, which may dull their 
                                                 
12 U.S. Army Center of Military History, The U.S. Army in the World War, Vol. 14 Reports (Washington D. 
C.: Government Printing Office, 1988), 306.   
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initiative and mental activity,” yet it also stated that commanders must “require the most rigid 
discipline in the ranks.”13  The manual reasonably concluded that officers and men must, 
“become imbued with the idea that initiative, which must be exercised in various incidents of the 
fight, must also be directed to the end desired by the battalion commander, and that all the efforts 
of a unit must contribute to the accomplishment of the commander’s plan of action” (original 
emphasis).14  The problem was establishing the line at which initiative became 
counterproductive or insubordination.  Pershing’s proclamation that any lapses in his perfect 
West Point discipline would be “treated as a lack of capacity on the part of the commander,” 
placed a dead hand on the desire of many commanders to allow their subordinates to test the 
limits of their initiative and independence.  The problem with this approach was that whether 
Pershing or other commanders down the line liked it or not, the modern battlefield was going to 
place junior officers and NCOs in positions where they had to make decisions that countered or 
were not covered in their orders.   
 Whatever the issues that were raised by the “General Principles Governing the Training 
of Units of the American Expeditionary Forces,” at least they represented a desire to standardize 
and focus the training of all AEF units.  These efforts fell far short in other areas.  Although the 
AEF GHQ attempted to craft a standardized training plan, within a week of its issuance of the 
“Program of Training for the 1st Division,” it published a different plan for the training of the 2nd 
Division.  While the “Program of Training for the 2nd Division” contained much of the same 
verbiage as the 1st Division’s plan, the 2nd Division was to undergo eight periods of training 
lasting 19 weeks.  The 2nd Division plan devoted six weeks of training for the individual, squad, 
platoon, and company, and only two weeks each for the training of the regiment, brigade, and 
                                                 
 13 Ibid., 10, 44. 
 14 Ibid., 46. 
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division.  Another difference was that during the two weeks of divisional instruction, the unit’s 
artillery brigade would be fully integrated into the training plan.  It appears that after it published 
the 2nd Division training plan, the AEF GHQ merely changed the name and reissued this scheme 
to other divisions as they arrived in France.15 
 Despite the AEF GHQ’s departure from their standardized training plan between the 1st 
and 2nd Divisions, in early 1918 it still tried to hammer-out a regular training plan for the 
divisions that were scheduled to arrive in France in the spring.  At the Versailles Conference on 
30 January 1918, the AEF and British Expeditionary Force General Headquarters (BEF GHQ) 
agreed to an arrangement where the British would transport to France and train six complete 
American divisions in March and April. This “Six Division Plan” stipulated that “The training 
will be progressive; by platoon, company, battalion, and regiment until such times as the 
American division is fit to take the field as a division, when it will be handed over to the 
American Commanders-in-Chief.”16  
 The plan gave the local British corps commander the responsibility for the Americans’ 
training, and placed American units under British commanders when they were occupying parts 
of the line while attached to British formations.  The British also agreed to provide one officer 
per American infantry, machine gun, signal, and engineer battalion to assist in training. 
American units would be equipped with British weapons during their stint with the BEF.17 
 After consultation with the AEF, on 21 March 1918 the BEF GHQ provided general 
guidelines to its subordinate commanders on training the Americans.  The training was to occur 
                                                 
 15 AEF GHQ, “Program of Training for the 2nd Division,” in NARA RG 120, G5- Army Candidate School, 
Box 1637, File 350 “Information in regard to schools and courses.” This file also contained training plans for other 
AEF divisions that simply substituted the references to the 2nd Division for the new division and changed the dates 
given for the various periods of training.  
 16 U.S. Army Center of Military History, The U.S. Army in the World War, Vol. 3, Training and Use of 
American Units With the British and French (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1988), 36, 59.  The 
six divisions were to be the 77th, 82nd, 28th, 78th, 80th, and 30th. 
 17 Ibid., 37, 61. 
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in three periods (A, B, and C), which roughly corresponded to the AEF’s general three month 
training plan for arriving divisions. 
For example, Period A was to last at least four weeks and was intended to give the Americans 
basic weapons and tactical training.  The British planned to establish divisional schools or send 
their American charges to existing British schools for specialty training.  The schools would 
provide training on the Lewis and Vickers machine guns, hand and rifle grenades, trench 
mortars, musketry, signals, military engineering, and gas warfare.18  In this period, American 
officers and NCOs would also conduct visits to the frontlines for 24 to 48 hours to gain some 
first hand experience in the trenches.  
 During Period B, the British would train the Americans on trench warfare by attaching 
U.S. units to British formations occupying sectors of the front.  This period would begin with 
small parties of American officers and NCOs learning the intricacies of trench warfare 
shadowing their British counterparts in the front lines for 24 to 48 hours.  Once the American 
junior leaders were familiarized with the front, over the course of three weeks, complete 
American units would be attached to British formations in progressively larger increments.  In 
other words, an American platoon would serve at the front as part of a British company; then the 
American company would do a tour as part of a British battalion, and so on up to the regimental 
level.  While attached to a British unit, the Americans would come under the command of the 
British senior officer.19  
 The last phase of training, Period C, was to last three to four weeks, and was intended to 
provide American units, up to the regimental level, with advanced tactical training.  The focus of 
this period was on maneuvering large units and integrating machine guns, liaison, signaling, and 
                                                 
 18 Ibid., 63. 
 19 Ibid., 64. 
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supply into the Americans’ operations. To meet the AEF GHQ’s demand for its units to be 
trained “American methods,” the British specified that all of the training manuals for this last 
period were to be supplied by the AEF.20  
 Unfortunately, the Germans had failed to read the Six Division Plan or Pershing’s other 
training schemes.  The Ludendorff Offensive of March 1918 disrupted the training plan before it 
even got started, and the subsequent German attacks in the spring and summer completely 
shattered Black Jack’s hope for a methodical and standardized approach to American unit 
training.   
 The ferocity and success of the initial German attack on the Somme sent waves of panic 
across the British and French Armies.  Two days after the start of the German offensive, the 
British government wired Washington without consulting Pershing to beg the Americans to 
expedite the transportation of their infantrymen.21  On 7 April 1918, the BEF GHQ directed its 
subordinate commanders to shorten their training periods for the American units under their 
supervision.  Under the new plan, American battalions were to be sent into a quiet sector of the 
line “after a short period of training,” that consisted mostly of rifle firing, specialist training, and 
instruction in gas warfare.22  
 Unbeknownst to Pershing, the British were also working on an agreement with 
Washington and General Tasker Bliss, the American representative on the Allied Supreme War 
Council, to meet the Allies’ growing manpower situation by radically changing how American 
forces would be deployed to Europe.  Under the terms of what became the London Agreement of 
27 April 1918, the Americans and British settled on a plan where the British would transport 
only American infantry, machine gun, engineer, and signal units.  The intent of this plan was to 
                                                 
 20 Ibid. 
 21 Ibid., 71. 
 22 Ibid., 83-4. 
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get warm American bodies into the lines in France as soon as possible to relieve some of the 
manpower strains the Allies were feeling due to the German offensives. The American divisional 
artillery and support units would sail after the emergency passed.23 
 Although Pershing managed to negotiate with the British to ship divisional artillery and 
support units as soon as surplus transportation became available, the changes disrupted the 
AEF’s efforts to train whole divisions as they arrived in France.  This further exacerbated 
existing problems with American combined arms training.  More importantly, the chaos caused 
by the German attacks led to a further fragmentation of the American training efforts as AEF 
regiments and brigades were shuttled across the front in the spring and summer of 1918 to have 
them close at hand in the event of any emergency.  The Chief of the AEF Training Branch, 
Brigadier General Harold Fiske, admitted that while “circumstances invariably prevented… [the 
three month training program] from being carried out,” the AEF at least tried to retain this basic 
concept for the training of newly arrived divisions.  But even Fiske confessed that under the 
crush of events, the programs for the late arriving divisions were severely curtailed, with the 
“open warfare” phase often reduced to “six days to two or three weeks.”24 
 Ultimately, the AEF’s own interferences in unit training and the unsettled situation in 
France resulted in the situation where no two American divisions went through the same training 
programs in France.  An examination of the division assignments listed in the AEF Order of 
Battle and unit histories reveal wildly differing types and amounts of training given to American 
divisional units between April and September 1918.  Although the first four AEF divisions, the 
1st, 2nd, 26th, and 42nd, came the closest to achieving Pershing’s three month training plan, all bets 
were off with the amount of training time the later-arriving divisions received.   
                                                 
 23 Smythe, 100-112., The U.S. Army in the World War, Vol. 3, 91-2. 
 24 “Final Report of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5,” U. S. Army in the World War, Vol. 14, 300-301.  
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 Due to anxious conditions in France following the German’s March offensive, the new 
divisions often found their training disrupted as its units constantly shifted their billets based on 
the events at the front or the whim of far-off staff officers.  The 28th Division’s 109th Infantry 
was a case in point.  The regiment arrived at Calais on 19 May 1918.  When it reached its billets 
on 22 May, it was to begin “a long period of training” under the tutelage of the British Army’s 
Tyneside Scotts.  However, less than three weeks later, after receiving little more than weapons 
training on British small arms, the regiment was on the move to the French sector.  It picked up 
whatever training it could along the way until finally arriving at the French lines near Montmirail 
on 24 June.25  
 The 33rd Division faced similar problems with seemingly arbitrary moves and their effect 
on training.  The division’s 131st Infantry was assigned to a training area in the British XIX 
Corps sector soon after arriving in France.  After working out a training plan with their British 
cadre, coordinating for drill grounds, and establishing firing ranges, the unit “was beginning to 
feel that some practical work was to commence.”  Just as their progressive training was getting 
into gear, the AEF GHQ ordered the unit to move to another sector of the British front.  After 
only eight days of training with a new cadre of British soldiers at their new billets, the regiment 
was again ordered to change its station. After being hurried through “classes in defense against 
gas, bayonet work, bombing, rifle practice, trench mortar and 37mm gun practice,” the regiment 
was ushered into a quiet area of trenches on the British front lines.  The total time from the 
regiment’s arrival in France to their occupation of the British trenches was 30 days, with much of 
it taken up with marches from one area to another.26   
                                                 
 25 Major General Charles M. Clement, ed., Pennsylvania in the World War: An Illustrated History of the 
Twenty-Eighth Division, Vol. I (Pittsburgh: States Publication Society, 1921), 334-5. 
 26 Joseph Sanborn, The 131st Infantry in the World War (Chicago: Privately printed, 1919), 29-35. This 
problem was endemic. After inspecting machine gun units within the II Corps, Major Walter Short reported on        
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 This lack of standardization in the training of American divisions carried with it grave 
challenges for the AEF’s future operations.  One of the main goals of unit training is to create a 
certain uniformity of expected performance in an army’s forces.  Thus, while there may have 
been differences in the human composition between divisions A and B, their superior 
commanders could generally expect the two units to operate and respond to enemy actions in 
roughly similar manners.  Pershing’s desire to “give the troops the advantage of the latest tactical 
and technical developments and make up for the defects of training at home” in his training plans 
was an effort to accomplish this overarching goal.27   
 As American divisions were divided up by brigade, regiment, and sometimes battalions 
for training or operations with the Allies, any degree of standardization was lost.  Since, as noted 
in the last chapter, the divisions left the United States with uneven training experiences, their 
subsequent training in France did not overcome this failing, and at times even exacerbated it.  
Ultimately, American units from the battalion level and above were forces of unknown quality 
and abilities to their higher commanders until they actually saw combat.  The idiosyncrasies 
caused by this fragmentation of training also meant that the instruction given to infantry and 
machine gun companies, platoons, and squads were hit or miss depending on when the unit 
arrived in France and the whims of the times and their trainers.  
 Since the training that the AEF’s formations and leaders received was so distinctive from 
unit to unit, it is difficult to offer more than an overarching impression of the general quality and 
effectiveness of the Americans’ instruction in France.  All American divisions that would 
eventually see combat had some degree of basic instruction under the tutelage of the British or 
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French as soon as they arrived in France.  The first four American divisions were instructed 
mainly by the French and spent more time in training with the Allies than any subsequent 
American divisions.  Grotelueschen argues that in the case of these early divisions (especially the 
1st and 2nd Divisions), this training time allowed these units to shake off the obsolete practices of 
the IDR and FSR and, through their close association with the French, gain a deeper appreciation 
for the primacy of firepower in modern war.28     
 Despite all of Pershing’s ranting about open warfare, the first divisions actually spent the 
vast majority of their training time studying trench warfare.  This extended training, with its 
focus on combining and synchronizing the new weapons of warfare now organic to infantry 
companies and supporting weapons, such as artillery and machine guns, also allowed junior 
infantry leaders to become much more technically and tactically proficient than their peers in 
later arriving divisions.  The officers and soldiers in the early divisions also seemed to have had a 
much more realistic training regimen than those units training in the States.  Major General 
Robert Bullard noted that the 1st Division trained with the French in a vast and detailed training 
trench system where, “nothing was omitted or left to the imagination of the soldier.”  He 
observed, “Almost everything except the actual busting of shells” was duplicated by the French 
to make the Americans’ training as realistic as possible.29  
                                                 
 28 Grotelueschen, The AEF Way of War, 60-3, 203-5.  Not everyone agrees with Grotelueschen’s 
conclusions.  Douglas V. Johnson argues that the 1st Division’s early training was characterized more by show than 
substance.  He concluded that the unit’s training emphasis was “on soldierly bearing and appearance” and that 
“fighting matters appear to be decidedly in second place.”  Douglas V. Johnson, “Training the First Division for 
World War I” in Steven Wiengartner, ed. Cantigny at Seventy-Five: A Professional Discussion (Weaton, Ill.: Robert 
R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, 1993), 69-71. 
 29 Robert L. Bullard, Personalities and Reminiscences of the War (New York: Doubleday, Page and 
Company, 1925), 103. The diary of Brigadier General Beaumont Buck supports the contention that the early 
divisions spent more time learning trench warfare.  Buck, who commanded the 1st Division’s 2nd Infantry Brigade 
from September 1917 to August 1918, left a meticulous record of the training in his unit.  Buck noted that from the 
time of his arrival in France through the winter of 1918 his unit constantly trained on occupying, attacking and 
defending trenches.  It was not until 21 November 1917 that Buck mentioned open warfare at all, and this was only 
to note that he was working on a series of open warfare map exercises sent to his unit from GHQ to prepare his 
headquarters for the third period of its training. Unpublished diary of Major General Beaumont Buck, entry for 21 
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 While the early divisions may have benefited from training with the French, they also had 
to cope with some of the same systemic problems of equipment, junior leadership, and shortages 
of supplies that had also dogged the training efforts of their stateside brethrens.  On top of this, 
they also suffered from having to provide the officer and soldier “overhead” for establishing the 
AEF’s corps and higher headquarters as well as the Services of Supply (SOS).30  The 
experiences of the 1st Division offer an insight into the problems faced by the first American 
divisions in France.     
 As the U. S. Army was woefully short of machine guns, artillery, mortars, and the other 
weapons of modern war, the Americans relied on the overstressed Allies to provide essential war 
material.  Over the course of the war, the French alone provided 3,672 field and railroad artillery 
pieces and 40,884 light and heavy machine guns.31  Despite this largess, the AEF still faced 
shortages that effected soldier comfort and training in its early months in France.  In the late fall 
of 1917, Colonel Robert McCormick noted that in the 1st Division,  
  …supplies were short; clothing could not be kept up; the meat rations had to be  
  obtained from the Canadians; payday was irregular; the mails were dilatory;  
  forge was lacking, and the horses suffered.  Artillery drivers bought oats out of  
  their own scant funds to feed the government horses that the government did not  
  provide for.32  
 
He also noted that when the division moved to the front on 6 January 1918, “it was still short of  
 
much essential equipment, and the artillery had never been supplied with the telephone  
 
equipment needed to train its telephone details.”33  
 Perhaps the most pressing issue that the first divisions faced was the inexperience of its 
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junior leaders.  As he prepared to depart for France in June 1917, the commander of one of the 
1st Division’s infantry regiments, Colonel George Duncan, noted with dismay that only 17 of the 
officers in his unit had at least a year in the service and that many of his best NCOs were to 
remain in the United States to attend OTCs.34  Colonel George Marshall, a 1st Division staff 
officer, observed on 27 August 1917 that, “Owing to the number of officers detached from the 
Division…there exists a serious shortage of field and company officers in the command.  There 
are companies with only two officers present for duty and the latter have rarely had more than 
five months’ service, and frequently less.”35  Although he supported sending officers to the front 
to observe the conditions of modern war, he worried that this, and the future detailing of 15 
officers per regiment to attend schools, would only exacerbate the officer shortage.   
 The relative greenness of the American officers and the steep learning curve they faced in 
modern warfare frequently hindered unit training.  In December 1917, the 1st Division’s 
exasperated commander, Major General Robert L. Bullard wrote, “I have much difficulty in 
getting officers who know anything…many even of our regular officers can never be worth 
anything in this war [they are] unadaptable and immovable.”36  More tellingly, he later noted, 
“The training also showed in American officers, except those of the very latest education, a love 
of tactical prescriptions, rules of thumb, a demand for orders that should fix the method of 
tactical procedure for all things.”37  Even after the division had been in training for nearly six 
months, Bullard’s comments indicate that all was not well when it came to leadership in the 
AEF.  They also suggest that the officer corps had a long way to go to develop the initiative and 
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flexibility demanded of combat on the Western Front.  
 This situation was worsened by GHQ personnel policies that, like those in the United 
States, promiscuously transferred officers from one organization to another.  McCormick 
recalled that in the spring of 1918, “…there was a constant flow of junior officers through the 
organizations.  Those who had received training at the front were ordered to other organizations, 
their places been taken by new arrivals from America and from the artillery schools.”  He 
laconically observed that while, “the system increased the difficulty of conducting the 
division…it was necessary and in the greater interest to preparing the army for its future role.”38  
In an effort to overcome this problem, McCormick’s commander ordered him to establish a unit 
school to teach the new arrivals the lessons that the Americans had learned up to that time about 
fighting in France.  McCormick soon discovered,  
  Our inexperienced troops were ignorant of many military accomplishments not  
  touched upon in this simple course.  The points I sought to cover were essentials  
  in which most of the officers would come to the 1st division from America and  
  from training schools in France either not been taught or had totally failed to  
  comprehend.39   
 
This constant “revolving door” policy also meant that many junior leaders never truly mastered 
the tactical and technical skills of their positions, nor were they able to hone their leadership by 
building cohesive units.  McCormick and the other “old soldiers” of the AEF were also quickly 
learning that the units and officers arriving in France were woefully short of the basic knowledge 
and skills required to fight the Germans, and that time was against them. 
 As noted before, the training of the early American divisions in France was rather long, 
and as such, it was not truly indicative of the training experiences of most of the AEF’s units.  
An examination of the training of these more typical AEF units goes far in uncovering some of 
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the key issues that undercut the combat effectiveness and cohesion of the U. S. Army’s small 
units.  Most of the divisions that arrived from April 1918 to the end of the war, and saw combat, 
managed to at least spend a month or more of their first phase of training with the Allies.  
However, the quality and quantity of this training varied greatly from division to division.  If 
Robert McCormick is to be believed, the only thing that the arriving units had in common was 
their total ineptitude.  He caustically observed of the new units,  
  They had been practiced in marching formations, and receive small arms bayonet  
  training, and had been taught infantry tactics so far as these had developed up to  
  the summer of 1917. They had not studied the use of the modern infantry   
  weapons of assault, the trench mortars or infantry cannon.  They have not learned  
  the use of cover, which only comes from service at the front…They were totally  
  uninformed as to the methods of attack developed and perfected by the French at  
  the end of 1917…40  
 
McCormick’s trenchant remarks neatly encapsulated the challenges that the AEF faced in 
molding its new units, and the French and British trainers who took charge of their instruction 
had their hands full in trying to shape this rude clay into a fighting force.   
 After taking out the first four divisions and those units that the AEF skeletonized or 
transformed into depot divisions, roughly half of the Americans received their first phase of 
training with the British Army.  Although the British generally worked within the framework of 
the original Six Division Plan, their approach to training contained inherent problems that tended 
to negate the effectiveness of the instruction that they gave the Americans.  The British viewed 
the first phase of the Americans training as a crash course in the new weapons of war and as a 
means of honing the discipline of the unpredictable doughboys.   
  The experiences of the 27th, 28th, and 82nd Divisions, who trained with the British in 
May and June of 1918, illustrate the problems with the first phase training plan.  The British 
broke the divisions into battalion or company sized units and widely scattered them around 
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Flanders for training.  Units of the 27th Division, for example, were quartered in a roughly 
rectangular area measuring 14 by 30 miles centered on Saint Valery.41  An officer in the 82nd 
Division wrote, “Our Brigade is badly scattered.  It takes hours to get around.”42  This scattering 
made training in anything larger than a battalion difficult.  Furthermore, the Allies trained field 
artillery and machine gun battalions separate and independent of the infantry regiments that they 
would support in combat. This precluded combined arms training and prevented battalion, 
regimental and divisional commanders and their staffs from learning how to control and supply 
their units as a whole.   
 The actual training that the infantry units received also left a lot to be desired.  In an 
effort to ease problems of supply and the need, after the March offensive, of having American 
units in training readily available to occupy a point in the line, Pershing agreed to the British 
desire that the Americans undergoing their instruction be armed and trained with British 
weapons.  As such, upon arrival in the British sector, the Americans turned in their M1903 
Springfield rifles and other small arms and were issued No. 1, MK III Lee Enfield rifles, Lewis 
Guns, and Vickers machine guns.  Not only did the turn in and issue of new weapons consume 
valuable training time, it also forced the Americans to learn how to operate, maintain, and 
employ a totally novel set of weapons.  This further complicated the efforts of junior leaders to 
hone the technical skills of their soldiers.  First Lieutenant Louis Brockway, recalled that during 
the space of one year, his infantrymen had been issued with four different types of weapons.  He 
noted, “You might say our men were a little confused” by the frequent change in armament.43 
   American accounts of the first phase of training with the British frequently stressed the 
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amount of time their trainers devoted to weapons training.  Although the soldiers often noted the 
time they spent in weapons familiarization and at the range firing, not all of this training 
accomplished much. As with their American cousins, the British Army had a fixation with the 
painstaking step-by-step introduction to weapons known as “naming the parts.”  This method 
focused more on nomenclature than operating the weapon.  The 28th Division’s Chester Baker 
also questioned the utility of much of his weapons instruction.  After he had swapped his M1903 
Springfield for “the hated English Lee-Enfield,” he discovered that the bore of the new rifle was 
“so worn it looked like a shotgun.”  Despite the pointlessness of trying to fire with such a 
dilapidated weapon, he and his comrades were dully sent to the range.  After failing to do much 
damage to the targets, Baker gave his rifle to the British instructor who fired several shots with 
even less effectiveness than the American.  The Britisher merely grinned and said, “Well it’ll 
will get a Jerry at 100 yards.”44 
 Except for those American II Corps divisions who later fought with the British Army, the 
greatest problem with the British weapons training was that as soon as the Americans’ training 
time with the British ended, the doughboys turned in all of the British weapons they had so 
laboriously come to know, and never saw or used their kind again.  The machine gun battalions 
and companies of the 28th Division were issued with British Vickers machine guns and began a 
training program conducted by British officers and NCOs.  Before the month of training was 
even completed, the units were ordered to turn in their Vickers in preparation for the division’s 
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move to a quiet sector of the French front.  Upon arrival, the Americans were issued the French 
Hotchkiss machine gun and began their training all over again.45  This sad farce happened time 
and time again, and wasted valuable training time that could have been employed to better effect 
in other areas.  Lieutenant Colonel Edward Buxton, of the 82nd Division, recalled laconically that 
as soon as his soldiers turned in their British machine guns and other arms for those of the 
French, “The Division…once again addressed itself to the task of obtaining and mastering new 
weapons.”46   
 Despite the inherent problems associated with constantly switching out weapons, it must 
be admitted that given the shortages of machine guns and other modern weapons in the States, 
some soldiers still benefited from basic training with any of these weapons.  Charles Minder 
admitted that his machine gun training was so poor that when he went to the range to fire on 
targets only 50 yards away, he only hit them with three of the 25 rounds he fired.  In a letter 
home he wrote that his lieutenant sarcastically commented on his inability to hit the side of a 
house. Minder noted, “I wonder what they expect of us fellows who were civilians six months 
ago and up to last week had never fired a machine gun!”47  After he returned to the machine gun 
range a few days later, he confessed to his mother, “We all fired 50 shots with the machine guns, 
twenty shots for ranging fire, and thirty for application fire.  They were all the same to me.  I 
don’t know any more what they mean than you do.”48  Although Minder’s firing did improve, 
ultimately he still faced the problem of rapidly changing out one weapon for another.  Minder 
recalled that after training in the States on the Colt machine gun, and spending weeks with the 
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British learning the Vickers machine gun, in Mid-June 1918 his unit finally received the 
Hotchkiss machine guns that they would use in combat.  These sudden changes required that he 
and his officers were “studying night and day, learning all we can about the new French machine 
gun.”49   
The remainder of the training in the first period was a rather mixed lot.  A soldier of the 
28th Division noted that his training “consisted of six-mile hikes each day to a hillside drill field 
where we practiced throwing dummy hand grenades and listened to lectures.”50   Another of the 
division’s doughboys was also far from impressed with his experience with the British.  He later 
recalled, 
  …the doughboys and engineers whiled away the long, warm days, drilling 
  and hiking, doing much bayonet work, polishing and cleaning rifles and 
  other equipment and putting in time as best they could…That may be said 
  to have been one of the most trying periods of their long probation.51 
 
An officer in the division’s 112th Infantry had a different take on the training.  In a very telling 
passage, he maintained that, “Under British training they made surprisingly rapid progress, 
becoming especially skilled in bayonet work.”52  However, the doughboys already had a bellyful 
of bayonet work and needed to address subjects, such as tactical movement and command and 
control, which would serve a more useful purpose in combat. 
 To some extent, the training with the British was also hindered by tensions between the 
British Tommies and the doughboys.  The American chaplain Rabbi Lee Levinger wrote that the 
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Tommies were people "whom our boys could never quite understand."53  Another American 
officer noted,   
  Coming from the rather Anglophile part of New England, I was truly shocked 
  by the hostility of the average American doughboy toward the "Limey."  When 
  word went out that Britishers were billeted in the vicinity, they were positively 
  sought out for a quarrel and a fight.54 
 
The doughboys particularly bridled at the British tendency to denigrate the Americans and their 
avowed belief in the supremacy of the British Empire over her former colony.  A soldier in one 
of the two American divisions "loaned" to the British for operations in Picardy noted: 
  Tommy considered himself a superior soldier to the American and took no  
  pains to conceal it....Our soldiers resented any such attitude and denied that  
  it was a fact.55 
 
In a similar vein, Lieutenant Colonel Ashby Williams noted that the soldiers in his battalion, 
“seemed to take at once a violent dislike for everything British.”  He attributed this to “the 
inclination of the average Britisher to regard anything that Britain and the Britishers do as a little 
better than can be done by anyone else in the world.”56  To deflate the Englishmen's pretensions, 
the Americans seemed to take a perverse delight in proclaiming that AEF actually stood for 
"After England Failed."  Much of the conflicts in Anglo-American relations seems to have 
stemmed from the clash of overblown national egos that both sides brought into the fray.   
 American officers tended to have more positive views of their British Allies and were 
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more avid in their efforts to learn from the veterans.  Many commanders, such as Ashby 
Williams, ordered their officers to attend special lectures from British officers and NCOs on 
trench warfare during their stint behind the British lines.57  Another noted the benefit of 
receiving training that was “up-to-the-minute, vigorous and very interesting,” from those who 
were, “but a few days out of the line.”58  While other officers respected the British for their 
experiences, they still believed that there were limits to what the Americans could learn from 
them.  For example, Captain Evan Edwards, noted of his British NCO instructors,  
  …one could not tell them anything and one could not argue with them.  A British  
  non-com does the accustomed thing.  He does not think.  He dreads anything  
  strange or new.  And his always unanswerable reply ‘It simply isn’t done you  
  know’ produces one to helplessness.59   
 
Despite the knowledge that the British could impart to the American novices, these “clashes of 
cultures” certainly added a degree of friction into the first phase of the Americans’ training. 
 Taken as a whole the AEF’s phase one divisional training plan for infantry units was far 
from a resounding success.  Chief of Staff Peyton March later noted that the pawning off of 
American instruction to the Allies had been a mistake.  He stated,  
  The practical effect of Pershing’s policy was that large bodies of American  
  troops, divisions whose morale was at the highest point, who had four to six  
  months of training…found the keen edge of their enthusiasm dulled by having to  
  go over again drills and training which they had already undergone in America.60   
 
There was much merit in March’s criticism.  Captain W. A. Sirmon, of the 82nd Division, 
lamented on 23 May 1918 that, “The routine is practically the same we had at Camp Gordon.  No 
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one seems to realize the training our men have had, and we are starting them over like raw 
recruits.”61 Far too much of the training in the first phase was a return to the basic recruit-type 
training that the units had to endure in the States.  More importantly, this training did little to 
address the instructional needs of the American officers and NCOs.  For most units, there was 
little to no tactical unit training conducted in the first phase.  However, units did send large 
numbers of American officers and NCOs to British schools during this period.  Unfortunately, 
most of these schools focused more on the basic technical aspects of weapons and not enough on 
their tactical employment.  Furthermore, the schools removed the leaders from their units at key 
times when the leaders should have been focusing on sorely-needed unit cohesion-building.62  
This last problem set a precedent that would later became endemic in the AEF.  
 Although the training of the AEF’s infantry units was slighted, the same could not be said 
for its artillery regiments.  Both the AEF GHQ and the Allies realized that the training of the 
American artillerymen had been rather sparse in the United States and took strenuous measures 
to ensure that the cannoneers received abundant instruction once they reached France.  Pershing 
went so far as to demand that divisions scheduled for deployment send large numbers of 
artillerymen in their advance parties so they could attend French and AEF artillery schools prior 
to the arrival of their units.63  The 5th Division, for example, sent 50 officers and 350 enlisted 
men in their advance party so they could learn the operation and employment of the never-
before-seen French 75mm and 155mm guns and modern indirect fire control.64  While infantry 
formations frequently had their instruction curtailed or stalled by short-notice moves, artillery 
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units seldom faced these challenges.  While the Pennsylvania doughboys of the 28th Division 
were sent to the trenches with less than a month of instruction, their artillery comrades spent a 
full three months of training at Meucon prior to rejoining their already bloodied infantry 
brethren.65  
  Ironically, the American artillery units that received the least amount of sound training in 
the United States, under the relatively short but intense training French and British taskmasters, 
rose to become some of the most effective combat units in the AEF.  The Allied instructors 
showed no mercy on their ignorant charges.  After being sent to a French artillery school, one 
officer noted the trouble that he and his fellow Americans were having with trigonometry.  He 
noted that the French cadre were amazed “that we held commissions in artillery,” and ruefully 
confessed that “The French know this isn’t an Indian war.”66  Historian Mark Grotelueschen has 
gone as far as to argue that the firepower and know-how wielded by these Allied-trained 
artillerymen made them the true practitioners of the “AEF way of war,” and established an 
American obsession with firepower that has lasted to the present.67   
 Unfortunately, this degree of expertise in the American artillerymen came at a price. If 
one looks under the “detached” units listed for American divisions in the AEF Order of Battle, 
you quickly get an appreciation for the amount of time that the AEF’s artillery brigades and 
regiments spent away from their parent units for training.  The 82nd Division’s 157th Field 
Artillery Brigade, for example, was absent from the division for training at La Courtine from      
2 June through 21 August.  The divisions who arrived in the spring and summer of 1918 
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generally underwent their course of training (both in and behind the lines) without the presence 
of their organic artillery units.68  This led to reoccurring problems with infantry-artillery 
cooperation that plagued American operations throughout the war, and all-too-often meant that 
junior infantry leaders had little comprehension of, or experience in, working with artillery on 
the battlefield. 
 Generally speaking, the divisions that trained with the French (or later, the mix of French 
and Americans) during their first phase of training had somewhat of an easier time than those 
who trained with the British.  First of all, there were none of the problems of training on weapons 
that the soldiers would never use in battle.  Secondly, the available evidence suggests that the 
French-trained units underwent fewer disruptions to their training caused by frequent moves.  
Furthermore, the French tended to more seamlessly blend the different phases of training 
together, making their instruction more fluid and coherent to the Americans.   
 The French also seem to have made more of an effort to accommodate the Americans’ 
pride and psyche.  On May Day of 1918, Marshal Pétain issued a bulletin to his subordinates that 
advised them how to train the Americans who were rapidly descending on them.  Pétain warned 
his countrymen that while the Americans were only partially trained, “they have an extremely 
highly developed sense of amour-propre, based on their pride in belonging to one of the greatest 
nations of the world.”  As such, “an attitude of superiority over them should be assiduously 
avoided” and “patience and tact” should be the French trainers’ watchwords.  The Marshal 
wanted the French trainers to stress the need for the integration of all arms in combat and to 
counter the American belief that the French had nothing to offer in the realm of open warfare 
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doctrine.69  This was a major sticking point to the French throughout the war.          
 To a large extent Pétain’s approach worked.  Upon entering the lines with their Gallic 
Allies, an infantry officer of the 29th Division reported, “French soldiers of all ranks were of 
invaluable assistance, and gave freely of their veteran experience in war as far as limitations of 
language would permit.”70 A soldier in the 26th Division was equally impressed with the French.  
He believed that his instruction in trench warfare was very productive.  He noted that his unit 
practiced both offensive and defensive tactics using a very realistic training trench system and, 
following each iteration of training, his officers would participate in detailed critiques of the 
event led by experienced French officers.71 
 Regardless of whether the French or British initially trained the Americans, the pace of 
training in the spring and summer of 1918 was blistering.  Soldiers from the 4th and 91st 
Divisions left detailed records of their training regime during this period that highlight the 
bewildering rapidity of their instruction.  Colonel Christian Bach, the 4th Division’s Chief of 
Staff, recalled that his division had to work hard in their first weeks in France to overcome the 
shortcomings of their initial training at Camp Greene.  Although the unit initially trained with the 
British, it was not until it began training with the French in mid-June 1918 that its units received 
their Chauchat automatic rifles, had the opportunity to throw live grenades, and was able to 
complete the rifle training that one of the division’s infantry regiments had missed in the States. 
Bach noted that in addition to the weapons training, the French also taught the Americans “their 
method of attack,” and “how to pass through barrages with a minimum of loss.”72  
 The record of the 4th Division’s 47th Infantry illustrates the quick tempo of the unit’s 
                                                 
 69 The U.S. Army in the World War, Vol. 3, 294-5.  
 70 John Cutchins and George Stewart, History of the 29th Division, 1917-1919 (Philadelphia: MacCalla & 
Co., 1921), 90.   
 71 Sibley, 48-9. 
 72 Bach, 49-50, 58-9. 
  489
instruction that followed a rather pointless period with the British.  The regiment arrived in 
France on 25 May 1918 and spent much of the next three weeks moving from one spot to another 
in Flanders and Picardy.  It was not until 14 June that the unit began serious training with the 
French Army.  For a month the unit was put through their paces in the following events: 
  17-19 June- The regiment is equipped and trained on the Chauchat and Hotchkiss  
       guns, grenades and mortars.  The unit also dug and trained in trenches. 
  20 June- Brigade open warfare problem 
  21 June- Division open warfare problem 
  23-24 June- Rifle and pistol practice 
  25 June- Open warfare maneuvers 
  27 June- Division open warfare problem without troops 
  28-30 June- “Strenuous drills” 
1-3 July- Rifle practice and on 2 July, the first group of officers and NCOs 
conduct tour of the French trenches 
  5 July- Regiment moves to French reserve trenches 
  7-8 July- Unit training 
  12 July- Division open warfare maneuver 
  15-17 July- Regiment goes into French front lines73 
 
The 47th Infantry’s experience illustrates some of the trends and problems with the Americans’ 
training.  Given the breakneck speed of the instruction, one wonders if the regiment was truly 
able to overcome the unit’s poor stateside training and learn the new methods being taught in 
France.  It is clear from the schedule that the 4th Division devoted much training time to open 
warfare, and an officer in the 47th Infantry stated that “Most drill periods were devoted to 
extended order drill and to the new formations which were soon to be used by the  regiment in 
actual fighting.”74  However, given the rush to get the unit into the French reserve and frontline 
trenches, how detailed and thorough could this training have been?  
 The infantry regiments of the 91st Division went through a similar training program.  
Captain Clarence Minick, of the 361st Infantry, recounted his early training in France in his diary.  
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Soon after arriving in France on 20 July 1918, he observed that his unit was “commencing drill 
like [at] Camp Lewis- only [we] have more spirit I think for we know we are going to get into a 
fight before many months.”75  After a week of getting settled in to their new surroundings, the 
361st Infantry got down to training.  Given the crush of events on the Western Front, the          
91st Division, like many others arriving in the summer of 1918, had its training plans greatly 
abridged.  Given this fact, it is no wonder that Minick’s schedule for August 1918 was rather 
full… 
  2 August – Established firing range “used cans and everything else for targets” 
  3 August- Battalion field problem 
  7 August- Company hike 
  9 August- Brigade maneuvers 
  13 August- 12 kilometer hike 
  16 August- Brigade field problem 
  17 August- He umpired a Brigade field problem in the morning and a Regimental  
         field problem in the afternoon. Both were on “how to take German machine  
         guns.”   
  20 August- Regimental field problem 
  21 August- Regimental field meet competition- events: gas mask donning,  
         semaphore signaling, bugler match, shooting match for rifles, pistols,   
                and automatic rifles   
    22 August- Brigade field problem 
  25 August- Regimental maneuvers 
  26 August- Night maneuvers 
  27 August- Overnight hike 
  31 August- Brigade field problem 
  3 September- Unit begins move to the front.76 
 
While training at Camp Lewis, the 91st Division’s training was plagued by similar equipment 
shortages, a rapid turn-over of personnel, and poor weather that had hindered the training of the  
4th Division.  As with the 4th Division, one does wonder if the pace of the 91st Division’s training 
in France actually allowed it to make up for previous shortcomings in their training as well as 
preparing them for their upcoming debut in combat.   
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 It is hard to gage from Minick’s terse entries the realism of the training in this vastly 
accelerated program.  It is interesting to note that in his description of the brigade maneuvers he 
participated in on 9 August, he wrote, “we hiked and imagined we drove the Huns back for about 
8 kilometers and returned.”77  This seems to indicate that the training had more to do with 
marching than realistically fighting and maneuvering to drive back the Hun.  There are also 
indications that the Americans still retained a penchant for far too much close order drills, the 
outward displays of discipline, and needless ceremonies.  After a guard mounting ceremony 
resulted in half of a unit’s officers missing a lecture from a veteran French officer, the 
Frenchman exclaimed, “Very beautiful ceremony…but I question if you will win ze war wiz 
it.(sic)”  One of the chastened Americans saw the Frenchman’s point and lamented the fact that 
“some of our fat-head generals care more about snappy saluting than accurate gunnery.”78  
 As the Americans entered their second phase of training, learning trench warfare by 
occupying sections of Allied trenches in quiet sectors, the doughboy’s training was again rather 
hit or miss.  Once more, the American training in the line varied greatly from unit-to-unit 
depending on the area of the front the soldiers occupied, the period of the war that they trained, 
and the predilection of their enemy to make mischief during their tour of duty.  In this, the enemy 
played the greatest role in the Americans’ training and seasoning.  The 35th Division’s Sergeant 
William Triplet recalled that his training in the French trenches, 
  …was a kindergarten rather than the first grade in the school of war.  The enemy  
  were Bavarian Gebirgstruppen and they were too easy on us.  They generally  
  behaved like amused adults indulgently watching the antics of mischievous  
  children until the little monsters stepped out of line.  When we really annoyed  
  them we’d get a stinging slap on the wrists…79 
 
When the enemy was active, however, the Americans’ schooling could be brutally direct.  An 
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officer of the 1st Division noted of his foes, 
  The Germans did all they could to assist our training… thus, American   
  indiscretions invariably were punished.  Trenches, reserve positions and batteries  
  which were revealed by the least carelessness receive chastisement.  Sometimes  
  this came in the form of harassing fire, or fire for destruction, or, in the event of a  
  trench raid by either side, the enemy artillery would fire upon every American  
  position known to it.  Thick heads and dull, which had failed to learn the   
  teachings at school, had the lessons of war pounded into them by the German  
  schoolmasters, whose model was: “he who will not heed must feel.”80  
 
Pershing intended that the second phase tour in the trenches “harden and accustom” his soldiers 
“to all sorts of fire and make veterans of the individuals.”81  The early AEF divisions certainly 
accomplished this goal and made great progress in the unforgiving school of hard knocks.  In one 
massive German trench raid against the 26th Division occupying French front line trenches at 
Seicheprey on 20 and 21 April 1918, the unit lost 80 men killed, 195 wounded, and between 130 
to 180 taken prisoner. 82  
 However, most of the divisions that arrived from the spring of 1918 onwards generally 
occupied less active areas of the front, usually in the slumbering French lines of the Vosges 
sector.  Unfortunately, the Vosges sector was often too quiet to provide much practical combat 
experience or give the Americans the seasoning that they so desperately needed.  The lines 
occupied by Lieutenant W. A. Sirmon’s  325th Infantry, for instance, were so quiet that he shot 
quail and gathered plums and apples in no-man's land.83  For nearly two years a tacit truce 
between the French and Germans had kept the sector relatively calm.  Neither the French nor the 
Germans were particularly enthusiastic at having the raw and rambunctious Americans 
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disturbing the region's "live and let live system."84  
 The Americans neither understood nor respected the truce between the French and 
Germans.  When units of the 35th Divisions were assigned to the Vosges front to undergo their 
seasoning in the trenches, the French officers in the sector told the Americans that “it is much 
better to lie quiet…If we do not bother the Boche the Boche will not bother us, and we can rest 
and hold our ground.”  When the eager Americans stated, “That’s a fine way to win the war. 
Let’s go right through them,” the Frenchmen responded “The war will not be decided in these 
hopeless mountains…The high command has no desire for a battle here.”85  Another 35th 
Division doughboy contemptuously noted, “This ain’t a war.  The Frogs and Krauts got it fixed 
up between ‘em to spend their vacations where their ain’t nothin’ to bother ‘em but scenery.”86  
The French officers assigned to the American units did everything within their power to control 
and divert the aggressiveness of the newcomers, but were only marginally successful in this 
endeavor.  Long after the war, a 42nd Division infantryman summed up the greatest source of 
tension between the Americans and their French comrades by writing, “They are a whole lot 
more experienced than we are.  They want to live. We want to fight.”87 
 Despite the pleas of their allies, the Americans tried assiduously to change “the quiet 
Vosges sector to a fairly lively one” with trench raids and other aggressive actions.88  A soldier 
of the 32nd Division remarked that while the French desire to keep things calm in Alsace, “stifled 
a lot of budding initiative,” the Americans were not to be denied.  He boasted that, “Soon shells 
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were falling on both sides of the line, where no shells had fallen for months, and the front line 
trenches were no longer a place to spend a quiet evening.”89  Despite this apparent brisling of 
aggressiveness,  the 32nd Division could not have stirred up much trouble for they only lost 56 
men killed in action or died of wounds and slightly over 300 wounded (most to shelling) during 
their time in the trenches.90  
 In addition to French interventions, other factors also limited the Americans’ 
aggressiveness.  Americans’ accounts of their time in the trenches are replete with sheepish 
admissions of the neophytes’ nervousness and over-reaction in the trenches.  These humbling 
experiences, and the feelings of foolishness that accompanied them, may have done more to cool 
the doughboys’ ardor than French exhortations. While occupying a section of French trench, the 
140th Infantry’s Sergeant William Triplet and his soldiers got a bit spooked.  In response to a 
slight sound in no man’s land, Triplet launched off 21 flares, nearly a months stock of the 
pyrotechnics, and his troops threw 15 hand grenades and fired off several bursts of rifle and 
Chauchat fire.  With daylight, they discovered that they had killed one rat.  He ruefully noted, 
“After this if anybody threw a grenade or fired a shot at night he’d have to show a body or blood 
on the ground at stand to the next morning and the body had to be something bigger than a rat.”91  
Sergeant Triplet eventually concluded that his month of training in the trenches with the French 
was a “vacation from our previous grueling experience…in a never ending pursuit of war on the 
British front.”92   
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 The Americans’ opinion of their training in the trenches was mixed.  A number found the 
experience to be a boring let down.  Sergeant Elmer Straub complained that “I am rather 
disappointed because we can hear only an occasional shot, and things do not seem at all lively.”  
He later caustically wrote of his French allies, “They sure live a soft life and its no wonder they 
can’t win the war.”93  Although Sergeant Richard McBride and his comrades from the 82nd 
Division’s 325th Infantry expected their time in the Allied trenches to be “our Baptism of Fire,” 
they found it to be “a dull period as men sat for days in the trenches gazing intently at the enemy 
lines but seeing nothing to shoot at.  Patrols were made every night without contact with the 
Germans.”94  Soldiers of the 5th Division were equally disappointed at the lack of war-like 
activity on the Vosges front.  The permanence of the trench and shelters, as well as the “live and 
let live system” led one soldier to remark dismissively, “trench warfare was here…in its most 
settled development.”95  One doughboy dryly noted in 1919, “The training in the Vosges did not 
prove of great value to the men in the Argonne battle.”96  The 28th Division’s Private James 
Murrin was not impressed with his unit’s French instructors and believed that the Americans’ 
own previous training was better than that given by the French.97   
 The commander of the 77th Division, Major General Robert Alexander, believed that his 
unit’s experience in the quiet sector of the Vosges had actually done more harm than good, for it 
failed to adequately prepare either the leaders or the men for their coming ordeals.  He noted that 
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in the quiet sector, “an occasional trench raid and routine gun fire had been the limit of their 
warlike activity.”  When the division moved to the front near Vesle, “it was an entirely different 
war…[one where the soldiers] were harassed day and night by shell fire and air raids, troops in 
[the] front line were constantly deluged with gas,” and one where the enemy, “could, and did, 
make movement even of individuals most hazardous.”98  
 Sometimes lack of training areas or realism further hindered the effectiveness of the 
Americans’ training.  George English noted that the 89th Division’s company commanders 
followed the advise of their French trainers and dutifully selected men to serve as critical 
specialists, such as runners, scouts, and signalers.  Unfortunately, the officers later discovered, 
    Neither the training schedule nor the drill ground afforded opportunity for the  
  training of the personnel selected.  The training schedule already included more  
  than could be accomplished.  Runners and signal men therefore either drilled or  
  wasted their time on visual signaling…Limited space on the drill ground made the 
  service of runners unnecessary and safe distance from danger made shelter and  
  cover useless.  As a result of these conditions, officers and enlisted men carried  
  with them to the front false ideas of distance and terrain- the most important  
  information of a soldier in modern warfare.99  
 
Of course these problems would not become apparent to the leaders until they actually entered 
combat. 
 Some Americans took a more positive view of their training and tried to milk the most 
from the experience as they possibly could.  Their time in the trenches seemed to build self-
assurance in the Americans of their capabilities and eased their soldiers into the status of 
veterans.  An officer in the 140th Infantry stated that after his men stopped a German attack, “our 
success in repelling the raid helped the confidence of our men a great deal,” and they also 
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“gained increased confidence in their officers.”100  Unfortunately, this confidence often turned to 
hubris.  After serving in the Alsace sector, a soldier in the 32nd Division’s 126th Infantry 
believed, “the officers and men of all ranks felt certain that they could give a good account of 
themselves anywhere.”101  Another soldier of the division boasted that, “In short order we 
learned most of the tricks it had taken four years to perfect and had figured out a few on our own 
account.”102  Of his time in a quiet sector of the front, a 29th Division soldier keenly observed, “It 
had its advantages and disadvantages.”  He went on to recount, “While it gave the individual 
soldier the exalted morale so valued by military leaders, it also inclined to give him a careless 
disregard for the future and a contempt for enemy power that often induced him to take 
unnecessary chances.”103 
 Other soldiers were equally incisive in their evaluation of their time in the trenches and 
its effectiveness in preparing them for their future combat.  Shortly after the war, the 35th 
Division’s Charles B. Hoyt recalled, 
  The value of the training in the Vosges …must be measured more by the   
  atmosphere of war it gave rather by the actual benefits of the training.  For what  
  the infantry learned of trench warfare was of no practical value to it in carrying on 
  open warfare in the Argonne; for what the artillery learned in emplacing guns it  
  had pretty nearly to unlearn in the days to come; so [too] with the field signal  
  work and medical men.  The importance of the Vosges sector for training was that 
  it also gave the Thirty-Fifth those conductions under which war must be carried  
  on.  Feather beds and waffles for breakfast, they learned, were not a part of it.104 
 
Hoyt’s comments neatly encapsulate the experience of many, if not most, American soldiers as 
they trained for trench warfare during their second phase of training.   
 Given the problematic nature of this training, what did it do to improve the expertise of 
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the AEF’s junior leaders?  Although, as with most things in the AEF, it depended on the units 
involved, for all its faults the training did provide the company-level officers and NCOs some 
practical experience with coping with the fear and uncertainty of combat.  The initial stint in the 
trenches was particularly wearing on the junior leaders.  A soldier of the 305th Infantry recalled, 
“From the caution our platoon lieutenant took in those support trenches, and from the worried 
look he always wore, one would think that the fate of the army, the safety of democracy and the 
political freedom of the next generation depended upon our staying up all night.”105   
 For the first time the officers also had to wrestle with the fact that their actions carried 
deadly implications and that they had to set an example for their men while controlling their own 
fear of the unknown.  Lieutenant W. A. Sirmon freely admitted that during his first trench raid he 
was “badly frightened” and “shaking badly, but swearing to myself I would not run.”106  Other 
leaders found that war was not as tidy as their training had led them to believe.  After one trench 
raid, an officer of the 113th Infantry reported, 
  It was practically impossible to carry out the plan as practiced.  There were no  
  trenches.  The destruction was absolute, and instead of the trench lines they had  
  expected to encounter, the Scouts met shell hole after shell hole, heaps of earth  
  and projecting duckboards and wire, which impeded individual progress and  
  made extremely difficult the task of keeping  groups together.  Each group leader  
  was compelled to act on his own initiative, following only as a general direction,  
  the original plan of attack.107   
 
Their time at the front and exposure to even the briefest of danger did aid officers in honing their 
leadership skills, developing their battlefield wisdom, and furthering cohesion-building in their 
units.   
However, the Americans’ time in the trenches did bring to light serious problems with the 
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training of the AEF’s junior leaders.  While serving on the French front, the 82nd Division lost 44 
men killed in action and another 327 wounded.108  Many of these casualties can be traced back to 
the lack of training of both officers and men.  Seventeen of the 44 soldiers killed were lost in a 
single incident after a German shell slammed into an overcrowded trench.  The War 
Department’s 1917 Field Service Pocket Book had warned officers of the need to disperse their 
soldiers in the trenches for “economizing personnel” and “minimizing the effects of the enemy’s 
artillery fire.”109  This incident highlights the fact that by this late date the officers in this unit 
had yet to even master trench warfare, not to mention “open warfare.”   
Most of the division's wounded resulted from exposure to gas.  A general lack of training 
and supervision by junior leaders in gas warfare would plague the AEF, and ensure that the 
Americans would suffer inordinate casualties to poison gas when compared with the other 
combatants.110  Archibald Hart noted that even after his unit sent soldiers to the Gas Warfare 
School, his company’s gas training was rather sparse.  Upon his return from the gas school, the 
battalion’s gas NCO gave a few lectures and “suggested that we don gas masks marching to and 
from the drill ground.”  After the soldiers followed this advice for a few days, Hart noted that the 
men grew weary of wearing the uncomfortable masks and halted the procedure.  He laconically 
recalled, “that was the extent of our training in gas warfare.”111  In the 89th Division, an inspector 
discovered that one infantry battalion gas officer, “had no training whatever in gas, and who 
knew nothing whatever about the subject, which may account for some lack of knowledge about 
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gas among the Company Commanders.”112 
 Far too many American officers and NCOs took a cavalier attitude toward gas training.  
Leslie Baker, of the 27th Division, remembered that the level of gas training within his unit was 
not as thorough as it needed to be.  He related one incident that illustrates the lackadaisical 
attitude that both officers and men took towards gas warfare training.  When the division gas 
officer queried Baker and his comrades on the extent of their gas training, 
  It will never be forgotten how surprised he was when we foolishly    
  admitted we had never worn our gas marks for four hours [as required]. 
  Consequently, the very next day we were ordered to wear our gas masks 
  from eight o’clock in the morning until noon, which we did- most of us.113 
 
However, he related that since “it was such a wonderful day…and we had wasted so much of it 
in this fashion,” the company commander cut the training short and with a wink and a nudge told 
his soldiers before dismissing them, “I hope that everyone will remember he has had his gas 
mask on for four hours in case anyone should ask him.”114  This casualness and indifference in 
training, sanctioned or propagated by junior leaders, later reaped its own deadly rewards.  In the 
fighting of June 1918, one officer noted in his diary that a “combination of Yank ‘take a chance’ 
carelessness, and German gas, [was] responsible for 85% of casualties so far.”115  
 Inspections of Americans undergoing their training with the Allies also revealed other 
serious deficiencies that could often be traced back to poor leadership and instruction by 
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company-level officers and NCOs.  After inspecting machine gun units within the II Corps, 
Major Walter Short reported on 5 July 1918 that the machine gun training programs for the     
27th, 30th, and 78th Divisions “had not been consistently followed” and that in those units, 
“shooting had been largely neglected.”  Short noted that this fault was due to commanders 
willfully deviating from the training program.116  Less than a month later, an inspection of the 
27th Division revealed that the unit’s officers and men lacked “sufficient knowledge of [the] 
properties of gas and gas defensive measures” and that its infantrymen were “generally deficient 
in map reading, sketching, intelligence, signaling, scouting patrolling, grenade practice, and rifle 
practice.”  More important, junior infantry officers were “not properly instructed in [the] tactical 
handling of platoons and companies.”117  Lastly, on 30 June 1918, Lieutenant Colonel K. T. 
Riggs found that the 30th Division had serious problems with the level of gas warfare and 
machine gun training of the unit’s soldiers.  Furthermore, in the 119th and 120th Infantry, “the 
methods of training used by the officers…[was] sketchy, with the result that men are not 
thoroughly trained.”118   
 The third phase of training, where large unit open warfare maneuvers were to occur, was 
the most variable part of the American training plans.  This phase, more than the others, was the 
one that was given short shrift when training time was curtailed.  As Captain Clarence Minick’s 
diary illustrated, units made efforts to conduct this critical large unit training, but the time and 
realism afforded these events were limited.119  A battalion commander in the 29th Division noted 
that the scant three weeks his unit spent behind the French lines in what should have been their 
third phase of training, “presented the only opportunities the organization ever had for 
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deployment as an individual combat unit, or for problems in attack as provided in the new tactics 
laid down in the instructions from G.H.Q. for open warfare” prior to going into combat.120  
 Despite the importance of these large unit exercises to the overall effectiveness of the U. 
S. Army, they often lacked realism.  Lieutenant Colonel Ashby Williams sardonically recalled 
that just before leaving the French sector, 
  …we had our last of those famous division problems before we went into actual  
  war.  A division problem is where you imagine you have some troops and you  
  imagine there is an enemy and you walk over a field where they are not.  Very  
  simple, isn’t it?  It is, however, the only opportunity the staff officers have of  
  demonstrating to you how much they know about war.  Perhaps the best thing  
  about these problems is that they are easy to  forget when you go to meet a real  
  enemy and have to use common sense.121 
 
All of this sometimes appeared quite comical to the junior officers.  B. A. Colona noted that as 
his unit’s training period came to an end, “Regimental, brigade, and divisional problems began to 
be the rage.  Since nobody below major ever got any information as to what these are all about, 
the troops were usually represented by flags.”122  Colona and his company-grade peers should 
have been more concerned over the antics of their regimental, brigade, and divisional 
commanders and their staffs.  The failure of these exercises to realistically address the higher 
headquarters’ fire support, supply, medical, and command and control functions would soon 
greatly complicate the leadership challenges of junior officers and NCOs. 
 Having addressed the problems of the AEF’s unit training plans, it is now important to 
discuss some of the overarching training issues that influenced the leadership and skills of the 
junior officers in Pershing’s army.  The first of these is the matter of doctrine.  At the close of the 
war, Pershing boasted that the AEF had prevailed due to “its determined insistence on an 
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offensive doctrine and upon training in warfare of movement” and its ability to overcome the 
soldiers’ idiosyncratic stateside instruction with “a system based on correct principles.”123  
Unfortunately, Pershing’s doctrine was never quite as doctrinal as he believed.   
 Senior American commanders and staff officers like to boast that the Americans had 
crafted the most advanced doctrine of the war.124  Hunter Liggett maintained,   
  The American High Command had made a thorough study of the experiences of  
  the French and British during the war in the matter of organization and had, as a  
  basis of our own organization, adopted the best of both foreign systems, with  
  modifications to suit our psychology and problems peculiar to our own   
  development.125   
 
On 4 July 1918, Harold Fiske even conveyed to the AEF Chief of Staff his belief that, "Berlin 
cannot be taken by the French or the British armies or by both of them.  It can only be taken by a 
thoroughly trained, entirely homogeneous U. S. Army," one, of course, trained in “American 
methods.”126  This was all well fine and good on paper, but in execution, the creation, 
dissemination, and training of infantry doctrine was far from clear cut.  
 Even though the AEF’s doctrinal bible for platoons and companies, Instruction on the 
Offensive Combat of Small Units, was largely a translation of a French manual, the contracting 
out of much of the Americans’ training to the Allies ensured a lack of uniformity in tactics and 
doctrine. For example, Captain Wardlaw Miles, of the 77th Division’s 308th Infantry, stated that 
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“Under the tutelage of the British 39th Division, American methods were largely abandoned.”127  
Similarly, Captain John Stringfellow noted that staff officers inspecting his unit training with the 
British were never reticent about criticizing British “methods of conducting combat,” yet his unit 
clung to them as their primary combat technique.128  On the other hand, Captain Paul Schmidt, a 
company commander in the 32nd Division’s 127th Infantry, recalled that during his month of 
training in France, his company underwent intensive instruction in “formations and French 
tactics, under French instructors.”129  However, despite their French training, a 5th Division 
officer maintained, “The Americans still clung to the idea that the rifle was the main dependence 
in warfare, and pushed that training with that arm to the utmost…” 130   
 This system of dueling doctrines certainly complicated the efforts of junior leaders to 
train their units for combat.  In a reflection of this confusion, one 78th Division infantry officer 
observed, 
  …some men would go to a British school and qualify as instructors, only   
  to come back and find that the American system was being used, and vice   
  versa.  Both systems might have had their good points, and did have, but   
  the rate at which orders and instructions and ways of doing things changed  
  from day to day was enough to bewilder old hands at the game; and we   
  were greenhorns.131  
 
Even the French recognized this problem and attempted to get the Americans to take a more 
holistic approach to tactics.  On 10 December 1917, Major Beaugier of the AEF’s French 
Training Mission recommended to General McAndrews, Commandant of the AEF Schools,“ that 
American officers and candidates should not imagine that there are two different ways of making 
war, viz; war in the American fashion, in accordance with the Field Regulations, and war ‘a la 
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Francaise,’ according to the [French] Platoon Commander’s Manual and Trench Polygone.”132   
Unfortunately, the hodge-podge of doctrine was never truly resolved.  The fact that the American 
officers were making distinctions between “American methods,” “British methods,” and “French 
tactics,” does beg to question the degree of uniformity of the training and doctrine of the U. S. 
Army.   
 The other challenge with junior leaders absorbing a coherent doctrine was the rapid pace 
at which tactical methods changed in the AEF.  Kenneth Hamburger maintains that the AEF 
GHQ went to great lengths throughout the war to adjust its doctrine based on its hard won 
“lessons learned.”133  Although militaries must constantly assess their tactical doctrines in 
wartime and make adjustments based on changes in technology or enemy tactics, these changes 
must be accompanied by a period of time for units to absorb and train on the new concepts.  This 
also assumes that the units have a sound grounding in basic tactical skills and principles; a 
problematic assumption for many of the AEF’s infantry units.  
As had happened in the United States, units in training were often drowned in a flood of 
doctrinal manuals and other publications.  In addition to the publications printed in the United 
States by the War Department, the AEF itself printed 154 manuals and pamphlets.  It ultimately 
issued nearly 1.5 million copies of these publications over the course of the war.134  This was 
almost enough to give every doughboy at least one doctrinal manual to carry in their packs.  
Most of the AEF’s publications were technical manuals related to the new weapons filling the 
army’s inventory.  Many of the remaining tactical manuals suffered from some of the same 
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problems that had plagued those of the War Department.  The AEF’s editions of Instruction for 
the Offensive Combat of Small Units and the Manual for Chiefs of Infantry Platoons, for 
instance, contained differing formations and tactics, and the GHQ made no effort at reconciling 
them. 
Again, the officers and NCOs had to become their own interpreters of doctrine as they 
groped their way through their tactical training.  As an officer in the 29th Division lamented,  
  Numerous, varied and exhaustive pamphlets were issued…These were presumed  
  to be absorbed by the officers and imparted to the men.  There was much in them  
  that was good…much that had to be learned and forgotten, because the game of  
  war is not constant; but they were issued in such quantity and covered so wide a  
  scope that it was impossible for officers to master them and at the same time  
  attend to their varied duties…135 
  
Another officer noted that as his unit progressed through training, “More attention was now paid 
to extended formations than had been in the past.” He quickly found that “no formation was 
standard or final.”  This was caused by the fact that, “each new instructor and each succeeding 
pamphlet brought new combinations.”  However, he did admit that “while this instruction was 
indefinite and discouraging at the time,” by its very fluid nature it actually “fitted well into the 
requirements of future campaigns.”136 
 The pace of doctrinal change could be baffling to those junior officers attempting to 
understand and impart the new tactics and formations to their units.  Robert Bullard admitted that 
as soon as his 1st Division came out of its time in the trenches, he instituted a hurried bust of 
training where, “everything new in tactics that we could hear of, whether of the Allies or the 
enemy, we tried.”137  One company commander found out just how quickly doctrinal change 
could occur in France.  Just after returning from a tour in the trenches, Captain B. A. Colonna 
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recalled,  
  …an orderly brought around late that night some red covered books and leaflets,  
  and we were told that these would be put into effect the next day. These were the  
  new system of combat formations, involving absolutely new extended order drill,  
  and formation of the company.  Lieut. Moore had drilled a few times in these  
  formations; the rest of us knew no more about them than the company cooks did.   
  So the next morning we sallied forth, books in hand, and worked the formations  
  out step by step. Everyone was quick to see that this was something like business,  
  as of course our old army regulations were absurd when it came to using the  
  new special weapons, such as automatic rifles, hand and rifle grenades, and so on. 
 
Colonna maintained that given this step-by-step approach, “the new formations were mastered 
remarkably quickly.”138  However, mastering formations and being able to match and combine 
them to account for variations in the terrain and enemy are two separate issues.  The evidence 
suggests that many American units became relatively competent in the former, but not so skilled 
in the later.139  This problem became evident as the doughboys of the later arriving division 
entered combat.    
 Part of the problem of matching tactics and formations to the terrain and enemy was due 
to shortcomings in the AEF’s “official” doctrine. The Instruction for the Offensive Combat of 
Small Units (mostly likely the “red covered” manuals that Colonna referred to) was the closest 
that the AEF ever came to a printed infantry doctrine during the war.140  The manual was a 
departure from many of the pre-war precepts that lived on in the IDR and contained sound advise 
for junior leaders in how to operate in combat.  It decisively departed from the army’s prewar 
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doctrine of “building up the firing line,” by noting, “When a line is stopped by organized 
defenses, which are intact and occupied by the enemy, has little chance of producing success- it 
will simply increase losses.”141  The manual also enjoined junior leaders to always seek enemy 
flanks rather than pushing frontal attacks, and that once platoons and companies came under fire, 
they should break into smaller elements and proceed forward “employing short rushes at top 
speed” or “advance by filtering over ground furnishing but little cover.”142  
  While Pershing and Fiske might cavil over open warfare and the superiority of the 
bayonet steeled rifleman, the Instruction for the Offensive Combat of Small Units advocated for a 
close cooperation and integration of artillery, tanks, mortars, machine guns, and the other new 
weapons of war in assisting the infantry in killing the enemy and taking ground.  Although the 
manual stated the obligatory mantra that “the rifle remains the first weapon of the infantryman in 
all the circumstances of war,” it went on to describe how the infantry had to employ its other 
organic weapons and synchronize its operations with artillery to accomplish its missions.143 
Furthermore, the manual directed company commanders to shatter resistance “by employing all 
the means at hand.”144 
What Offensive Combat of Small Units lacked, however, were the details of application.  
Although the pamphlet provided excellent general guidelines, it was much sparser in its 
discussion of how the junior officer was to accomplish this seamless transition from one 
formation to another and from the approach to the assault.  While it is easy on paper to state that 
the officers must maneuver to attack the enemy’s flank, it was quite another thing in practice.  
Given the uneven training of the army’s junior leaders and soldiers, it was incumbent on the AEF 
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to make the transition of doctrine on paper to doctrine in action as smooth as possible.  Some of 
the manual’s great failings were its illustrations and its texts describing how the leader combined 
formations with tactics.  Although it adequately showed the basic formations, the way that the 
leader was to move his unit from one formation to the other was mostly left to the reader’s 
interpretation of the snaking arrows illustrating the move, or his reading of the somewhat turgid 
accompanying texts.   
While the manual represented a leap forward in the Americans’ tactical thought, the AEF 
continued to adhere to concepts of battle space, and command and control that were unrealistic 
for the Western Front.  As stipulated in the publication, the distances between individuals, units, 
and echelons, when deployed for combat, were also much too close for safety.  For example, the 
distances between individuals for a platoon in the assault echelon of an attack was five paces 
(roughly 8-10 meters), making for a frontage of about 125 meters for each of the two waves of 
the deployed platoons.  These distances were close to the intervals given in the IDR.145   
Based on his experience in combat, Henry Burdick noted shortly after the war that the 
formations presented in Offensive Combat of Small Units were too dense, with poor spacing 
between units and individuals.  He attempted to correct this problem by greatly increasing these 
intervals and increasing the use of “half platoons” to ease command and control.146  While the 
issue of spacing, intervals, and illustrations may seem to be pole vaulting over the smallest of 
historical minutia, as Burdick suggests, small changes in such arcane matters could, and did, 
mean the difference between life and death as a machine gun traversed through its ark of fire.   
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The great hinge upon which the formations presented in Offensive Combat of Small Units 
swung was command and control.  Although combat command and control was the perennial 
problem that plagued all the war’s combatants, it was a particular difficulty for the Americans.  
In an effort to give his units staying power through the depth of the attack, in October 1917 
Pershing convinced the War Department to adopt a massive structure for all AEF units.147  The 
end result of this change was the creation of ponderous 28,000 man divisions, which at the lower 
level were made up of huge 250 man infantry companies and 59 man platoons.  Overnight 
Pershing presented his half-trained junior leaders with monumental problems in maneuver, 
supply, combat, and command by saddling them with these cumbersome units. Offensive Combat 
of Small Units tried to address these challenges by keeping the formations relatively close, thus 
giving the platoon and company commanders a better ability to see and direct their men, and by 
offering these leaders the option of organizing their platoons into “combat groups” or “half-
platoons.”148  The idea was that these divisions of platoons would give the platoon leaders less 
subordinates that they would have to directly control while also creating smaller, more flexible, 
sub-units capable of semi-independent combat action as the situation demanded.  
In theory, the concepts of half-platoons and combat groups were a brilliant solution to 
some of the problems with command and control that dogged infantry operations of the First 
World War.  Offensive Combat of Small Units directly addressed the realities of confusion and 
friction in combat.  It admitted that the use of these sub-units and other “temporary groups” often 
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“can not be avoided on account of incidents of the fight and the conditions of the terrain.”149  As 
such, it was imperative that the soldiers be prepared for these unavoidable eventualities.  The key 
to success was when these planned or accidental groups of men occurred, a leader “whether he 
be non-commissioned officer or private, must rise spontaneously to direct his comrades, carry 
them forward when they hesitate, and prevent them from giving group.”150   
The emphasis that the manual placed on NCO leadership raised troubling issues.  As 
noted in Chapter 8, the lack of any systematic plan for identifying and training NCOs had all-to-
often led to a culture of junior officer micromanagement of their combat units.  For the vast 
majority of American NCOs and privates, nothing in their previous training or experience had 
prepared them for “spontaneously” rising to assume these combat leadership roles.  While some 
American enlisted men later rose to this occasion in combat, they did so spite of, rather than 
because of, their training in the United States and France.  Thus, while the infantry doctrine 
promulgated in Offensive Combat of Small Units was often quite sound, it frequently demanded 
more of junior officers and NCOs than they were prepared to do.          
The way that the new doctrines were used during the Americans’ time in the quiet sectors 
illustrated that while the doughboys may have understood the mechanics of the evolving 
doctrine, their understanding of its application remained dangerously underdeveloped.  This was 
best seen in some of the employment of machine guns.  During the war, the British had 
developed a system of machine gun barrages.  The idea was to use machine guns in an indirect 
fire mode aimed at creating a lethal “beaten zone” of machine gun bullets falling on crossroads 
and other potentially crowded areas behind the German lines.  The goal of this “harassment and 
interdiction” fire (to use the modern term) was to create casualties and undermine German 
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morale by eliminating safe rear areas and slowing the flow of food and supplies to the forward 
trenches.  The American machine gun officers adopted the British method with relish, and at 
times in the war used it to great effect.     
However, the American officers often failed to realize the inherent problems and risks of 
their new-found doctrine.  Sergeant Charles Minder recalled his first exposure to the concept of 
the machine gun barrage while in the Vogues,  
  The Lieutenant came back about ten last night with a spirit level and   
  elevated the gun a certain degree.  Then he turned the gun to the left 
  and I had to go out in front of it, about ten feet, and stick a branch in the 
  ground about three feet high.  Then he turned the gun to the right to a 
  certain point, and I stuck another branch in the ground…Then we started 
  to shoot from right to left between the two branches, and the bullets were 
  supposed to fall on a cross roads behind the German lines…The 
  Lieutenant [later] told us that we did a great deal of damage.  How they 
  got this information was beyond me, unless there are spies behind the 
  German lines…151  
 
The next night the officer again had Minder fire on the target.  He was to fire 50 rounds, wait a 
minute, and then fire fifty more.  They had to keep up the fire for half an hour.  When the officer 
directed Minder to fire on the same spot in the same manner that he had the night before, 
retribution from the Germans was not long in coming.  The Germans mercilessly shelled all 
around his position, and only barely missed the machine gun.152  Being on the receiving end of 
an inexpertly employed doctrine meant that Minder certainly experienced his combat “coming of 
wisdom” long before his officers.  
 The 29th Division also used machine gun barrages as harassing fire against the German 
rear area of their quiet sector of the French front.  An officer in the division laconically observed, 
“The enemy responded promptly with artillery as well as machine gun fire.  As a result the sector 
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lost rapidly its reputation as a ‘quiet sector.’ ”153  To make matters worse, the Germans also 
countered this American aggressiveness with a series of deadly trench raids against the            
29th Division’s infantry units in late August 1918.   
 The Americans tried to counter these brutally effective German raids with raids of their 
own.  Again one sees the doughboys’ lack of training and full comprehension of doctrine. After 
weeks of practice behind the line, a select American raiding party of approximately 125 men 
from K Company, 115th Infantry launched a retaliation attack against the German front lines in 
the early hours of 31 August.  The raid was to be preceded by a five minute bombardment of the 
German trenches by trench mortars and supported by machine gun and 37mm gun fire.  
Although the raid managed to enter the German trenches and kill some of its occupants, it failed 
in its objective of bringing back enemy prisoners.  The Americans were woefully unprepared for 
the enemy’s reaction to their attack.  The raiding party was caught in no man’s land by German 
artillery and machine gun fire and subsequently lost nearly half of its men killed and wounded 
before straggling back to the American lines.  A raid by a company from the 113th Infantry six 
days later again netted no prisoners, but at least resulted in no American fatalities.154   
 Another overarching problem with the AEF’s efforts to prepare its junior leaders and 
units for combat was, ironically, the AEF’s school system.  Soon after arriving in France, 
Pershing and his staff were made painfully aware of the state of the Americans’ ability to wage 
modern war.  The solution to this problem was apparent to the Iron Commander and his 
Leavenworth-trained staff: create a vast system of schools that would train the American novices 
in the new technical and tactical rites of combat on the Western Front.  In his memoirs, Pershing 
maintained that, 
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  A school system would have been desirable in the best of armies, but it was  
  indispensable in an army which had to be created almost wholly from raw   
  material.  The training of troops for combat was, of course, the primary objective,  
  and schools for instructors were merely a means to that end.155  
 
The actions of Pershing and his staff in establishing the schools reflected the precepts of the “cult 
of professionalism” that had so influenced the army for the past twenty years.  True to the 
“cult’s” principles was the unshakable belief of Pershing, Fiske, Bullard, and other key 
commanders and staff officers that education would be the salvation of the American Army, and 
they approached it with a missionary zeal.  Bullard later remarked, 
  Among the officers of the 1st Division there largely prevailed our old idea that  
  experience in war was the only proper teacher of war-making, and that war having 
  come, schools should cease: We should take to the field and learn war there…The 
  division commander and many of his officers seemed to regard the school idea as  
  puerility, a fad of schoolmen; very troublesome and irritating at a time when  
  everybody was getting ready to fight.  These ideas remained among Americans  
  until they had seen real war at the front.  Then every commander wanted officers  
  and men who had been through these schools.  The demand for school instruction  
  soon became so great that it could not be met.156 
 
While this “road to Damascus” moment may have brought the 1st Division’s officers back to the 
high church of education, it also blinded them to many of the problems that the schools created. 
 First of all, the administration and faculty of the schools required a large overhead of 
officers, NCOs, and “school troops” to keep the courses running.  This meant that the GHQ 
constantly levied AEF units for officers and men to fill these slots.  Often, the schools received 
permission from GHQ to retain the best students of their graduating classes to fill their instructor 
needs.  From 5 March 1918 to 11 November 1918, the Infantry Specialist School alone retained 
504 officers from its courses as instructors.  This meant that approximately 9 percent of the 
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students attending the courses did not return to their parent units following graduation.157  
Although these numbers seem low, their significance increased as units began to suffer losses of 
officers due to casualties and other levies of personnel.   
 This means of obtaining teachers for the host of the AEF’s schools and courses 
perpetuated the corrosive “blind leading the blind” system of wartime instruction and 
unintentionally encouraged mediocrity in both the students and instructors of the courses.  As 
one infantry lieutenant commented, “Officers feared to make good grades in school because of 
the danger of becoming an instructor.”158  Of his time at the Engineer School another officer 
noted, “The instructors were 2nd Lts, who had finished the previous course.  It was not their fault 
that they didn’t know [the material], but it was a joke.”159  A 126th Infantry officer noted that 
“every company officer was required to attend” I Corps schools for “a month of instruction in 
new formations and the use of the new weapons we received.”  He complained that much of the 
instruction “was of little account,” and “the instructors generally were officers who never had 
active service at the front and their theories were sometimes complexing to the veterans just in 
from the line.”160  Furthermore, to prevent the potential loss of their best junior leaders, some 
senior commanders opted to send their less talented officers and NCOs to fill their unit’s school 
quotas.  This practice further eroded the quality of instruction in the AEF's schools, prevented 
good officers from obtaining some technical training, and did nothing to resolve the overall loss 
of junior leaders in the units.161  Also, as the GHQ intended that the graduates of these courses to 
be the primary unit tactics and weapons instructors when they returned to their formations, this 
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further hindered unit training.162  
 In addition to the American instructors, the AEF also turned to the Allies for qualified 
teachers.  Unfortunately, the AEF’s officers were just as willing as their stateside peers to limit 
the scope of instruction given by Allied instructors.  Generally, Allied instructors were used only 
for the technical side of weapons training and bayonet instruction.  Some senior American 
officers feared that the Allied instructors were contaminating the Americans with their defensive 
mindsets and focus on “foreign methods.”  This, of course would make the Americans ripe for 
amalgamation.  In July 1918, Harold Fiske wrote to the AEF Chief of Staff, 
  The offensive spirit of the French and British has largely disappeared as a result  
  of their severe losses. Close association with beaten forces lowers the morale of  
  the best troops.  Our young officers and men are prone to take the tone and tactics  
  of those with whom they are associated, and whatever they are now learning that  
  is false or unsuited for us will be hard to eradicate later. . . The junior officers of  
  both allied services, with whom our junior officers are most closely associated,  
  are not professional soldiers, know little of the general characteristics of war, and  
  their experience is almost entirely limited to the special phase of the war in the  
  trenches…The tutelage of the French and British has hindered the development of 
  responsibility and self-reliance upon the part of our officers of all grades.  All our  
  commanders from the division down have constantly at their elbows an   
  Englishman or Frenchman who, when any difficulty arises, immediately offers a  
  solution.  A great fraction of our officers have consequently permitted themselves  
  to lean very largely upon their tutors with a resultant loss of initiative and sense of 
  responsibility.  The assistance of our Allies has become not an asset but a serious  
  handicap in the training of our troops…An American army can not be made by  
  Frenchmen or Englishmen.163  
 
To combat the “bad influence” of Allied soldiers and minimize the “damage” caused by Allied 
training, Fiske had vigorously petitioned Pershing to purge the AEF’s schools education centers 
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of all “counterproductive” Allied influences.  This was accomplished in August 1918 with 
Pershing’s order removing all French and British instructors from the U. S. Army’s schools and 
units.164  Although these purges were never completed, they did rob the AEF of a fruitful and 
labor-saving source of experienced instructors.  
   The AEF’s schools often failed to impart realistic training to their pupils or focused the 
instruction in the wrong areas.  When Major General Robert Alexander inspected the AEF’s 
schools in the winter of 1918, he found numerous problems.  The schools focused on the 
technical and specialist skills of the new weapons of the war instead of concentrating on how to 
best use those weapons.  He reported that the courses should center less on specialist training and 
more on the “fundamentals of the infantry soldier’s education,” which he described as 
“leadership, musketry, and discipline.”  At Gondrecourt, Alexander discovered that one six week 
course was devoted to nothing but the use of the bayonet.  He believed that more than two weeks 
of instruction in this subject was a “waste of invaluable time.”  For all of his fixation on open 
warfare, the general accurately noted that “any system of infantry training must be, for the 
subaltern and sergeant the ability to direct platoons and sections under fire, for the corporal the 
same ability in the control of his squad.”165 
 Alexander’s observations were absolutely on the mark.  The Machine Gun School, for 
example, taught “the mechanical operations of various types of machine guns; practice in known 
distance machine gun firing; calculations for and practice in various methods of indirect machine 
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gun fire; a certain amount of machine gun tactics; pistol and grenade practice.”166  It is obvious 
from the Machine Gun School report that giving the students “a certain amount” of tactical 
knowledge was not the thrust of the course.  The schools failed to find the balance between the 
“technician and the tactician” that was so desperately needed in the AEF’s junior leaders.   
 This flaw was also illustrated in the training of Corporal Fred Takes.  Takes, of the     
325th Infantry, recalled that he spent nearly a month in an AEF school learning the Chauchat 
automatic rifle.  He wrote that the training was mostly technical in nature and that he spent only 
one day of the course in learning the tactical employment of the weapon.  He noted that this 
training was conducted on the drill field and consisted of moving “in lines of skirmish in two 
waves, the first wave firing as they marched.  We walked about 30 yards and then lay down and 
fired for a while.  Then we advanced about 30 yards and jumped in trenches and fired from 
there.”167  Again, the focus was on the mechanics of the weapons and formations rather than on a 
sound appreciation for the gun’s tactical employment. 
As Alexander also noted, in many cases the training was simply overdone.  Too many of 
the AEF’s schools demanded far too much of the student’s time to train subjects that should 
have occupied far less space on the calendar.  As one infantry officer commented soon after the 
Armistice, 
Three weeks courses were given in courses that any reasonable man ought to 
learn in three days.  If he couldn't learn grenade throwing, for instance, in three 
days, he ought not be an officer. . . Somebody's obsession regarding the necessity 
for schools kept about 50% of officers away from their units all the time, when 
they ought to have been giving their time to their men.168  
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This officer’s last observation revealed the greatest problem with the AEF’s school system. 
 In the end, the AEF had to choose between increasing the technical knowledge of its 
leaders in modern warfare or allowing junior leaders to build cohesion in their units by 
remaining with them through the trials of unit training.  Caught between this Scylla and 
Charybdis of training, the AEF GHQ chose to give preference to the schools.  In doing so, the 
AEF’s senior officers merely continued a precedent that had long been established in the Regular 
Army.  In the twenty years leading up to the war, the regulars had simply gotten used to a 
perennial shortage of officers in its units caused by to need the staff and fill the army’s various 
schools.  But what could be safely practiced in peace could not always be so in war.  This fact 
was not lost on the junior officers themselves.  The phenomenal growth of the training courses, 
and their voracious demand for students, led one disgusted officer to quip, "The Germans begin 
a great offensive, and we retaliate by starting another school."169   
  Unit histories and personal accounts of the war are replete with tales of units losing vast 
numbers of officers and NCOs to the AEF’s voracious schools.  The AEF GHQ demanded that 
its units provide a quota of students for each course and brooked no rebuttal from subordinate 
commanders based on unit hardship or military necessity (which of course encouraged them to 
simply send their “lame and halt” to the schools).  One 7th Division officer noted that, “The 
schools alone, prescribed by higher authority…threatened to absorb all the time and energy of 
officers and non-commissioned officers whose principle occupation should have been the care 
and training of their units.”170  Frank Sibley, a Yankee Division infantryman, noted that while 
his unit was undergoing training with the French, it had to supply a steady stream of officers and 
NCOs to fill the new AEF schools.  He observed that given the training that needed to be 
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conducted in the unit, the loss of these leaders was “more than could really be spared.”171 Even 
George Marshall, a high practitioner of the “cult of professionalism,” decried the fact that the 
green divisions bound for the Meuse Argonne Offensive were “absolutely scalped” of their 
officers “in order that the next class at Langres might start on scheduled time.”172 
 Unfortunately, the AEF's draconian schools quota system yanked the leaders from these 
evolving platoons and companies while they were both “learning the ropes” of modern war and 
jelling as identifiable groups.  Generally, a young captain or lieutenant in the AEF could expect 
to attend at least one school during his service in France, and lose approximately one to two 
months of time with his soldiers.  For example, after arriving in France, First Lieutenant C. E. 
Crane was assigned to the 55th Artillery Regiment on 18 April 1918.  Crane spent all of June and 
half of August 1918 in various signal and artillery schools.  When he went into action with his 
unit for the first time on 28 August, he was virtually unknown to his men and had precious little 
time to build a sound and symbiotic command relationship with his soldiers.173  
 As previously noted, the army’s personnel system had severely undermined unit 
cohesion through frequent and sudden transfers of solders and officers.  Little in the training of 
junior leaders had taught them how to motivate, manage, and care for their troops.  The 
interpersonal leadership skills that were not learned in training had to be obtained through trial 
and error by the leaders in their units. All too often, attendance at AEF schools prevented junior 
leaders from gaining the “hands on” leadership experience that bonds units together.  As the 
military sociologist Darryl H. Henderson stressed, combat leaders had to establish “personal, 
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empathic, and continuing face-to-face contact with all soldiers in the unit” to build and maintain 
cohesion.174  He noted that leadership was one of the greatest determiners as to how well a unit 
“hung together” and performed under the stress of combat.  Henderson argued, 
  Men in danger become acutely aware of the qualities of their leaders.  They desire 
  leadership so their immediate needs can be met and their anxieties controlled.  In 
  this regard, well-trained and respected company grade officers and sergeants 
  relay a sense of competence and security to their soldiers and, if successful over a 
  period of time, gain a degree of influence and control over members of their 
  units.175 
 
Soldiers gain this appreciation of “the quality of their leaders” through training, daily contact, 
and shared hardships and experiences.  Unfortunately, the AEF GHQ remained oblivious to this 
demand, and small unit leadership and cohesion in the U. S. Army consequently suffered. 
 Time and time again, doughboys were struck by the sudden transfer or unexpected 
departure of their leaders at critical points in the unit’s history.  An infantryman in the 33rd 
Division recalled that his company had five different commanders during its 18 months of 
service.176  His experience was far from rare.  Connell Albertine and his comrades were 
distraught by the fact that just as they were going to the front to serve with the French, his 
company commander was ordered to a month-long school.  As their lieutenant had already 
departed for another lengthy course, they were detailed an unknown lieutenant to serve as their 
acting platoon leader during their first time in the trenches.177  An officer in the 89th Division’s 
2nd Battalion, 353rd Infantry noted that in the midst of some of the battalion’s most strenuous 
training in France, the battalion commander, several of his officers, and “a picked sergeant from 
each company were called to Langres for special tactical instruction.”  These key leaders did not 
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return to their unit until after it had already moved to the front.178  Another 89th Division officer, 
Lieutenant John Madden, recalled that just as his unit was committed to the Meuse Argonne 
Campaign, he was sent to the rear to fill his unit’s quota for a ten day class in rifle and hand 
grenades.  Because of this assignment, the young officer missed most of the fighting and his 
platoon was left without its leader.179  The absence of the officers at these key points in their 
unit’s history prevented them from sharing the hardships and experiences that tend to weld the 
leader to the led.    
 Ultimately, the GHQ’s decision to privilege schooling over troop time for its junior 
leaders was the wrong one.  Despite the Americans’ glaring lack of technical and tactical 
training, leadership and unit cohesion was still the more pressing issue.  Some in the GHQ’s 
hierarchy also recognized this issue.  In August 1918, an AEF staff officer observed that in the 
27th Division, “The battalion and company commanders were frequently away on courses, thus 
missing the great opportunity of gaining practical experience” of serving with their commands 
on the front line with the Allied armies. He went on to note, 
  While many of the officers have attended a number of courses and have acquired  
  a considerable amount of theoretical and tactical knowledge, their knowledge of  
  their duties as regimental officers is not thorough.  They do not often realize what  
  their position demands of them, what their responsibilities are as regards to their  
  men, and fail to exercise fully their powers of command.180 
 
Sadly, no one heeded this officer’s advice, and the AEF’s schools continued to demand their 
                                                 
 178 Dienst, 35. Another officer lamented that “These schools were continued during hostilities…officers 
were detailed every month to attend these schools, being taken away from their companies while engaged in battle 
and when they could be the least spared, notwithstanding that a great shortage of officers always existed in line 
companies, and when officer instructors could have rendered a greater service by being at the front where they were 
so badly needed.” Gansser, 52-3. 
 179 Quoted in, Berry, Make the Kaiser Dance, 383-4.  Madden’s orders proved to be an unexpected boon for 
the members of his platoon.  Since his platoon was without its leader, it spent much of the battle as the company 
reserve and thus largely missed the bloodletting of taking out ten German machine guns.  Unfortunately, few 
company commanders had the desire or luxury to hold back this degree of manpower, and shortages of leaders 
seldom hindered operations. 
 180 The U.S. Army in the World War, Vol. 3, Training, 213. 
  523
pound of leader flesh from combat units at the most inopportune times. . 
 In April 1918, Pershing convened a board of officers to study the AEF’s overall “lessons 
learned” from the war.  This so-called Lewis Board, named after its chairman Major General 
Edward M. Lewis, found much that had been wanting in the army’s performance.  During the 
proceedings, the commander of the 7th Division, Major General Edmund Wittenmyer, 
commented that,  
. . . Every organization after its arrival in France was to a great extent 
disorganized by the system of instruction adopted by the G.H.Q., in constantly 
withdrawing officers and noncommissioned officers to send them to school; thus 
leaving the organizations entirely without their complement of instructors.  While 
these officers and noncommissioned officers were benefited. . . the organization 
itself lost by their absence more than was gained by the individuals that attended 
the schools. . . The action of superior authorities in taking away large numbers of 
officers of all grades, and enlisted men, to attend school and receive instruction  
 absolutely destroyed all results in the way of instruction in the companies and 
  battalions, and I consider these two organizations to be the very best schools for 
  both soldiers and junior officers.181     
 
Although Wittenmyer’s trenchant observation came too late to aid the AEF, it did at least show 
that some of its leaders understood the price that combat units paid due to the army’s school 
policy.  The AEF’s difficulty in building those vital “face to face” relationships between the 
leader and the led in small units, which Henderson claims is the key to unit cohesion and 
effectiveness, later bore bitter fruit in the combat it endured in the second half of 1918.   
Before closing on the AEF’s school system, it is important to discuss one specific school 
which has a bearing on this study.  On 10 October 1917, AEF General Orders 46 established the 
AEF Army Candidates School.  Colonel Paul Malone, the AEF’s first Chief of Training, made 
clear that the candidates school was “to provide standardized officer material to replace our 
losses in battle.”  Based on British and French estimates that the AEF could expect to lose 75 
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percent of its junior infantry officers per year, he initially planned to have the divisions provide 
150 enlisted men each to attend the course.182   
In December 1917, Pershing directed that the candidates’ school instruction in minor 
tactics would focus on reconnaissance, security (advance, flank and rear guards and outposts), 
combat orders, marches and convoys, camping and billeting, Combat operations (attack, defense, 
and night fighting), minor trench warfare, field sanitation, and liaison.  He further stipulated that 
the “course will be based on Field Service Regulations and Infantry Drill Regulations, modified 
in detail whenever necessary to conform with the present organization of the American units in 
France.”  As a secondary text the school was to use translations of the French Manual for the 
Chief of Platoon of Infantry.  As usual, the school commandant was given no guidance with how 
to reconcile differences between the FSR and IDR with the French manual.183  Ultimately, the 
AEF’s candidate schools commissioned 10,976 officers by 14 November 1918, and was 
planning on having 22,000 more candidates under instruction by January 1919.  Pershing later 
admitted, “It must not be thought that such a system is ideal, but it represents a compromise 
between the demand for efficiency and the imperative and immediate necessity for trained 
replacement officers.”184   
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 In theory, the curriculum of the Infantry Army Candidate School reflected Pershing’s 
demands for more focus on the tactics of open warfare.  In late October 1918, the three months 
of instruction was to total 468 hours of training and study.  The tactical terrain exercises were to 
have accounted for 190 hours of the total instruction with 160 of these hours devoted to open 
warfare training, and only 12 hours on subjects related to trench warfare.185  In other words, the 
tactical training was to have been much more robust and intent than that given to candidates in 
the United States.   
Unfortunately, several factors prevented the AEF’s infantry candidates school from 
achieving these lofty training goals.  As the casualties and the need to man staff positions in the 
SOS and newly formed corps mounted in the summer and fall of 1918, Fiske admitted that “to 
meet the imperative demands for officers several courses had to be considerably shortened.”186   
After completing only two months of his three month candidate school, Joseph Lawrence was 
commissioned in late September 1918 and assigned as an infantry platoon leader in the           
29th Division.187 
 The actual training conducted in the school also indicates that much of the instruction 
given the budding officers was problematic.  The training schedules for the candidate school for 
October 1918 show that a great deal of the training remained at a fairly basic level, with a focus 
on close order drill, bayonet and physical training, and instruction on musketry and grenade 
throwing.  The school also lacked training aids and publications.  A 20 October 1918 
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memorandum from Colonel S. L. Pike, the school director, noted that “instruction in Infantry 
Drill Regulations must be given in the form of conferences as no books are available in France 
for issue.” Pike directed his instructors to use the Manual for Noncommissioned Officers and 
Privates as a substitute for the IDR.  The fact that the school was using a very basic manual for 
instructing officers seemed to have raised few concerns among the cadre.   Furthermore, Pike 
ordered his instructors to focus on “developing smartness and precision in close order 
drill…when adequate facilities for other instruction are lacking.”  Two days later the director 
ordered that until the school could overcome its shortages of equipment and facilities, 
“instructors are expected to exercise ingenuity in making the instruction interesting, as well as 
thorough.” Despite Fiske’s and Pike’s best intentions, it seems as though the AEF’s officer 
training was little better than that provided by the stateside OTCs and COTSs.188   
 Over the course of its history, the AEF’s candidate school suffered many of the same 
problems of the stateside OTCs and COTSs.  Some of lapses in the AEF’s officers’ training 
programs were due to Colonel Pike’s difficulties in obtaining qualified instructors.  As happened 
with the COTSs, Pike resorted to the shortcut of retaining “a number of the smartest and 
enthusiastic graduates” as instructors for new classes.189  In April 1918, he held eight recent 
graduates as instructors. In June, Pike requested that 31 students be retained as instructors, and 
on 26 September, he asked that 82 of the officers who were to graduate on 30 September be 
assigned to teach at the school.190  As was the case in the United States, there would be no end to 
the “blind-leading-the-blind” school of officer instruction in France during the war.  Even Pike 
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had to admit that his instructors, “in most cases, had never received any tactical instruction and 
many had received little serious instruction of any character” prior to their assignment to the 
school.191 Also, the retention of these newly commissioned officers further deprived combat 
units of much needed leadership. 
 At first, the AEF’s candidate school employed Allied instructors to aid in the training of 
its future officers. On 31 March 1918, the school had 23 French officers assigned as instructors; 
with nearly all of them teaching “specialist” weapons, such as machine guns, the Chauchat 
automatic rifle, the 37mm gun, and grenades.192  Keeping with established American practice 
(both in the United States and in France), Pike ensured that the Allied instructors were strictly 
limited to technical training and generally not allowed to stray into areas of tactics and doctrine. 
 Just as in other AEF schools, over time the candidates school sought to purge Allied 
instructors from its cadre.  As early as 26 January 1918, the Commandant of the AEF’s Schools, 
Brigadier General McAndrews, directed the Director of the Candidates’ Schools to provide a list 
of the French instructors that they could dispense with, “without impairing the efficiency of your 
work.”193  However, the real push to rid American schools of Allied instructors did not become 
serious until the summer of 1918.   
 In a confidential 30 August 1918 memorandum to the directors of the AEF’s School of 
the Line, Infantry Specialists’ School, and Candidate School, the overall commandant of the 
AEF’s schools, Brigadier General Smith, relayed that it was his desire to “Americanize the Army 
Schools in every respect.”  As such, he directed his subordinates to determine the absolute 
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minimum number of British and French instructors that they needed for their courses and to 
provide the “names of those whose services may be dispensed with.”194  In response to Smith’s 
directive, Colonel Pike informed his superior that the candidates school had already limited the 
role of the Frenchmen to merely advising the American instructors.  The only subjects that the 
French officers actually taught to the candidates were field fortifications and liaison work.  Pike 
admitted that “while all French officers could be dispensed with,” he believed that this drastic 
step would disrupt training.  He did confess, however, that he could reduce his French cadre 
from 21 to ten officers.  He also stated that his cadre also contained two British NCOs, both of 
whom taught bayonet and physical training.  Pike disclosed that “the relief of these men would 
be of no great consequence.”195  Following Smith’s guidance, Pike gradually reduced his Allied 
cadre, thus exacerbating his existing problem with maintaining a qualified core of instructors.   
 Pike’s purge of Allied instructors could not have come at a worse time.  As was also the 
case with the stateside officers’ training schools, by the summer of 1918, the AEF school was 
having trouble obtaining qualified candidates.   In a telling indicator of the overall training and 
experience level of the AEF’s enlisted men, on 2 June 1918, the candidates school’s Assistant 
Director informed Pike that “no definite degree of training can be assumed in candidates entering 
the School.”  Because of this, “if any but the most elementary subjects occur early in the course, 
a large portion of the candidates will be unable to assimilate the work, and practically none will 
be qualified to act as leaders when detailed day to day.”  He recommended that the first month of 
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the course be dedicated solely to very elementary subjects.196  In the end, Pike confessed,  
  A large number of the candidates reporting had received very inadequate 
  instruction [prior to attending the course]…about 30% had never fired any 
  course with the rifle or pistol, and a small percentage from the staff corps and  
  departments had never received any infantry instruction at all.  Much time,  
  therefore, had to be spent in rudimentary work.  During the short courses, the time 
  devoted to first principles had to be reduced at the expense of smartness and  
  precision. 197  
 
Given that most of the candidates admitted to the course were NCOs, one would have thought 
that this level of rudimentary instruction would have been unnecessary.  If these candidates were 
indicative of the overall state of NCO and soldier training in the AEF, then it was no wonder that 
some NCOs had trouble mastering the tactics called for in Offensive Combat of Small Units. 
The heavy casualties of the summer and fall of 1918 only made matters worse, and the 
quality of candidates continued to slide.  This was seen in the problems encountered in the 
infantry candidates class that began on 15 September 1918.  This class contained 12 candidates 
who had to be removed from the course because they were illiterate and 27 more who stated that 
they had been sent to the course against their wishes and desired to be sent back to their units.  
One of these men, Private Howard B. Peck, stated that he had not even been aware that he was 
being sent to the course until his orders arrived.  When he protested the posting, his commander 
bluntly informed him that “he had to come as there were no other men” to send.198  The 
candidates school’s ravenous demand for students greatly contributed to the overall decline in 
the quality of its students by forcing field commanders to make a hard choice between the 
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immediate needs of their units and the larger needs of the AEF.  Although most commanders 
appeared to have sent their most qualified soldiers to officers’ training, a fair number sent their 
trouble-makers or those men who, like Private Peck, were the most expendable.  
The high demand for officers led to the expansion of the AEF’s officers’ training system 
and caused the AEF GHQ to squeeze its units for more candidates in the summer and fall of 
1918.  The AEF expanded its original branch-specific officers’ candidates schools at Langres, 
Samur, and Mailly, and opened an additional infantry candidates’ school at Valbonne in the fall 
of 1918.  Attendance at the Army Candidates School at Langres more than doubled from 950 in 
June to 2259 in August.  Unfortunately, the fighting in the Meuse Argonne made this surge in 
attendance unsustainable, and by the time that the 15 September course began, its enrollment 
was back down to 1125.199  To fill all of these courses, the AEF GHQ demanded that its 
divisions and other subordinate units provide a monthly quota of soldiers.  On 18 September 
1918, for example, the GHQ informed all its divisions that they would send “twenty five suitably 
qualified soldiers from each infantry regiment” and six soldiers from their machine gun 
companies to Langres by 6 October.200  
This constant levy to fill the divisions’ quotas had immediate and negative effects on the 
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AEF’s combat units.  From July to September 1918, for instance, the 107th Infantry was tasked 
to provide 75 enlisted men to attend the candidate school.201  Levies such as these dealt serious 
blows to the efforts of junior officers to build a competent cadre of NCOs and seriously 
endangered the effectiveness and cohesion of the AEF’s small units.  The list of the officers 
commissioned from the candidates school on 31 October 1918 illustrates the effect that officers’ 
training had on the AEF’s pool of NCOs.  Of the 847 new officers, 41 had been regimental or 
battalion sergeants major and 195 had been first sergeants in infantry or machine gun companies.  
In fact, all but 26 of the graduates had been NCOs prior to attending the school.202  Captain 
Wardlaw Miles noted that the commissioning of a number of 308th Infantry’s NCOs, “proved a 
great loss to the regiment,” and forced him and his peers to scramble to replace these losses prior 
to entering combat.203  This steady drain of NCOs worsened existing problems with enlisted 
leadership and led to a greater entrenchment of the practice of officer micromanagement in 
combat units. 
 The AEF’s schools were not the only source of stress in combat units.  In addition to its 
constant demand for students, many of the AEF’s own personnel policies also obstructed training 
and unit cohesion.  Pershing had originally intended that every fourth division that arrived in 
France would become a depot division to provided replacements for other AEF units.  The issue 
of transforming combat divisions into depot divisions would plague the AEF throughout the war, 
and serve as another obstacle to effective unit and leader training.  Again, the AEF GHQ was 
often the source of the confusion. For example, the 32nd Division was informed that it was to 
serve as a depot division when it arrived in France in February 1918.  This meant that the 
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division’s 128th Infantry had a number of its officers and nearly all of its privates scattered to the 
AEF’s four winds.  The remainder of the division was detailed to unload ships and provide other 
manual labor that the SOS required across France.  However, after a month of serving as a depot 
division and working within SOS, the GHQ reversed itself and returned the 32nd to the status of a 
combat unit.  This presented a number of problems.  One division officer noted that the AEF’s 
cavalier use of the 32nd “took the edge off the fine state of discipline” of the unit’s troops.204  
More importantly, the moribund 128th Infantry could only be brought up to strength by 
transferring men from the division’s other infantry regiments.  This measure further wounded the 
efforts of junior leaders to build unit cohesion and meant that the most of the division’s infantry 
companies were already short nearly a third of their strength.  A soldier in the 126th Infantry, one 
of the units “scalped” to refill the 128th, noted that when his unit was brought back up to strength 
by an influx of recruits, most of the new men “had received very little training before they 
arrived.”205  
 The 32nd Division was not alone in its rather high-handed and short-sighted treatment by 
the GHQ.  After having only been in France for less than two weeks, in late August 1918, the 
AEF GHQ ordered the 7th Division’s 13th Brigade to transfer an average of 80 men per  company 
to provide replacements for the combat-battered 4th and 26th Divisions.206  While in their first 
weeks of training in France, the 36th Division lost 45 officers sent for reclassification and another 
68 officers to transfers or schools.  Shortly thereafter, the division was “called upon to send a 
large portion of its most seasoned personnel to fill gaps in other divisions that had been fighting 
at the front.”207  All of these changes resulted in a constant breaking and rebuilding of platoons 
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and companies with all of the resultant problems in training, morale, leadership, and cohesion 
that came with them.   
 The constant turnover of leaders greatly contributed to the AEF’s shortcomings in tactics 
and discipline.  In August 1918, an AEF staff officer observed that frequent changes in battalion 
and company commanders in the 27th Division had undermined “discipline and efficiency” 
within the division’s units.208  None of this seemed to register with the AEF’s senior leadership, 
and the GHQ’s demands for levies of officers and NCOs never slowed despite what was 
occurring in training or battle.  While training in the trenches, the 77th Division was directed to 
select one NCO and one officer from each company to return to the States to serve as 
instructors.209  On 26 September 1918, just as his unit was preparing to enter the Meuse Argonne 
fighting, the 82nd Division’s Richard McBride recorded that this same requirement was levied on 
every company in his regiment.210  These transfers bit hard into the AEF’s small units.  On         
5 August 1918, Sergeant William R. Phillips wrote in his diary, “My Lieut. Niel of the third 
platoon was sent back to the U.S. to train a new bunch of men.  I sure hated to see him leave.”  
Although Niel was replaced with a new platoon leader, Phillips noted that he too was transferred 
within a week.211 
 Taken as a whole, the AEF’s attempts to prepare its junior leaders for combat floundered 
in the wake of doctrinal uncertainty, rushed, incomplete, or unrealistic training, and ill-conceived 
personnel and training policies.  Although the German offensives in 1918 caused or exacerbated 
some of these problems, many of them were the result of the Americans’ own miscalculations, 
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hubris, and blunders.  Pershing’s efforts to correct the training deficiencies that he believed his 
divisions brought with them from the United States unintentionally damaged unit cohesion in the 
AEF.  The AEF’s elaborate schools system offered scant improvements in the tactical 
competency of the army’s leadership at the cost of great disruptions to the “team building” of its 
small units due to its insatiable demand for manpower.  The fragmented state of the Americans’ 
infantry doctrine added levels of confusion and uncertainly in their training and operations that 
would only be resolved in the crucible of combat. Ultimately, the failure of the AEF’s training 
plan left its ill-prepared junior leaders with no other option than to muddle through their combat 
preparations as best as they could with units that often lacked the “corporate spirit” that was so 
essential to success and survival in battle.  As the AEF prepared to enter major combat in the 
summer of 1918, the unheeded ghosts of Kitchener’s Army warned the Americans of what lay 
ahead.  
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Chapter 10 
 “Gone Blooey”- Rejects, Replacements, and Retreads 
The AEF’s Systems for Addressing Officer Incompetence and Inefficiency 
 
 John J. Pershing was a hard man.  He was exacting in his expectations of efficiency and 
discipline and strictly weighed the ability of his subordinates to achieve results on and off the 
battlefield.  He had an unbending concept of duty and was seldom swayed by friendship or long 
standing personal relationships when it came to accomplishing missions. Major General Robert 
Bullard, one of the AEF senior officers who consistently lived up to the Iron Commander’s 
rigorous standards, had worked close enough to Pershing to fully understand the measure of the 
man.  Bullard noted that when Pershing arrived at the front, he was often “good- humored” and 
“agreeable.” However, Bullard knew “that underneath his easy manner was inexorable ruin to 
the commander who did not have things right.  He shows the least personal feeling of all the 
commanders that I have ever known, and never spares the incompetent.”1  This remark was 
echoed by Major General Robert Alexander, who observed,  
  It may be said…that in the A.E.F. an individual, whatever his grade, had only one  
  chance to demonstrate his capacity or incapacity.  In the later event there was no  
  alternative but to relieve the individual at once.  The times were too critical, the  
  lives of our men too precious, the success of our cause too vital to permit   
  considerations of personal interest to have any weight whatsoever.2 
 
Pershing, a man already predisposed to not suffer fools lightly, fully realized that his personal 
reputation, as well as that of the army and the nation, were inextricably linked to the results 
attained by the AEF.  Given these high stakes, Pershing would try to see to it that no under-
performing Regular Army general, over-the-hill National Guard major, or wet-nosed OTC 
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lieutenant was going to hinder the performance or efficiency of his army. 
 As the AEF established its operational footprint in France and endured its first combat in 
the winter and spring of 1918, the shortcuts that the army had taken to produce its corps of junior 
leaders became glaringly obvious to Pershing and the AEF staff.  Given the challenges that it 
faced, the AEF had to establish a method for identifying and weeding-out those officers its 
commanders deemed unfit, unsuited, or incompetent to perform the duties assigned them.  This 
chapter will examine the establishment and operation of the AEF’s Officer Reclassification 
Centers at Blois and Gondrecourt, France, and their effects on leadership and command climates 
in the AEF.  It will also explore the records of National Guard and National Army/Reserve 
infantry majors, captains and lieutenants sent for reclassification to develop an idea of who was 
being relieved from duty and the reasons given for their removal.  This will provide insights into 
the AEF’s overall problems of leadership and training, as well as indications of the 
characteristics and disabilities that Pershing and his senior commanders found unacceptable from 
junior combat leaders. 
 As with most troubles that the AEF encountered, there were indicators that the Americans 
might have to establish a system for evaluating the competence of its officers long before the 
United States entered the war.  In August 1915, an American military attaché reported that in the 
French Army, “Since the beginning of the war 218 generals and field officers of the active army 
and 395 of the reserve and territorial Armies have been returned to civil life, placed in reserve, or 
retired.”3  Still, the Americans gave little thought to this warning, and it was not until problems 
with officers began to appear in late 1917 that the AEF saw the need to establish a system for 
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evaluating the performance and abilities of its commissioned ranks.   
 On 16 November 1917, Pershing issued General Order 62 directing commanders at the 
division level or higher to establish local boards for the “examination of officers who have 
demonstrated their unfitness.”  The order instructed that “Company, battalion, and regimental 
commanders will observe closely the suitability and fitness of provisional and temporary officers 
under their commands and will report promptly to the division or department commander any 
officer who is not satisfactory for continuance in the service.”4  The divisional boards issued a 
recommendation on whether the officer in question should be allowed to retain his commission, 
or be cashiered pending the approval of the president.  As Pershing’s ability to cashier or demote 
Regular Army and Provisional Regular Army officers was strictly proscribed by law and Army 
Regulations, commanders dealing with the problems of these officers had to submit a more 
detailed report to the War Department explaining the reasons for the officer’s unsuitability and 
make a recommendation as to his ultimate disposition.  The president could accept or reject the 
board’s recommendation and had the option of retiring, demoting, cashiering the officer or 
invalidating any temporary promotions that he had gained during the war.  
 These first steps that the AEF took in addressing problems with the leadership and 
performance of its officers quickly revealed major points of friction.  The need to refer all cases 
that recommended invalidating the commissions of National Guard and National Army officers 
to the president proved too slow and cumbersome, and left the officer involved in the case in a 
long-term state of limbo.  The divisions and other higher headquarters found the establishment of 
temporary and ad hoc boards to be burdensome on the senior officers appointed to serve at the 
hearing and too much of a distraction from the unit’s training and operations.  As the size of the 
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AEF grew, so did the number of officers deemed unfit for combat duty.  The early boards only 
had the ability to recommend that the officer be retained in his present rank and position or 
returned to the United States for discharge.  Given the army’s overall shortage of officers, it 
made little sense to deprive the AEF of officers who, while failing as combat leaders, could serve 
well as officers in the ever-expanding staff and SOS billets. 
 To address the worst of these problems, Pershing established standing reclassification and 
efficiency boards as part of the Casual Officers’ Depot at Blois in March 1918.  These boards 
operated under the guidance of the existing AEF General Order 62, as well as new guidelines 
established on 25 March 1918 in AEF General Order 45.5   Furthermore, on 11 April 1918, the 
AEF’s Adjutant General Benjamin Alvord authorized that, “when it is apparent that an officer, 
who has been ordered discharged, can be of use as a commissioned officer with [the] S.O.S. you 
are authorized to suspend the actual discharge…”6  If those officers redeemed themselves by the 
satisfactory performance of duties in the SOS, their discharges would be voided.  In addition to 
assigning the officer to the SOS, the boards could also recommend that he be returned back to a 
combat assignment in another unit, sent to an AEF school or replacement detachment for 
additional training, demoted to a grade more commensurate with his level of experience, or, if 
the board determined that his “value to the service in any grade or capacity was questionable,” 
that he be sent back to the United States for discharge.7  The Blois depot also held boards for 
1,078 officers rendered unfit for combat duty due to poor health or wounds to determine if they 
could be used in some other capacity within the AEF.8    
                                                 
 5 Ibid., 257-8., Report from Deputy Chief of Staff, SOS, to Commanding General SOS, titled The 
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 Although the Adjutant General and the later Personnel Bureau continued to make minor 
adjustments to the reclassification system, by the spring of 1918 the wartime method for judging 
the fitness and continued utility of deficient officers had been largely established.  While the 
army had held boards to weed out unfit officers after the Civil War and the Philippine 
Insurrection, the establishment of a permanent reclassification depot was a novel idea in World 
War I.9  This departure reflected both the realities of an unprecedented mass mobilization as well 
as the coming of age of American military professionalism as the army insisted on the need to 
police its own ranks of those members of the officer corps who failed (or appeared to fail) to 
meet its standards of conduct and performance.     
 Over the course of the war, over 1081 officers were sent before reclassification boards at 
Blois after failing in their original units.  An additional 270 officers appeared before the Blois 
efficiency board after their conduct or performance had raised questions as to their fitness to 
remain in the service.10  However, these 1361 officers listed in the final report of the Blois 
Casual Officers’ Depot, do not tell the whole story of the AEF’s reclassification system, and the 
actual number of AEF officers cashiered or reassigned was much higher.  For example, while the 
records of the board proceedings for 50 African American infantry officers in the grades of 
major through second lieutenant are in the files of the Blois Reclassification Depot in the 
National Archives, only 31 of these officers are listed (and thus counted) in the Casual Officers’ 
                                                                                                                                                             
Box 2254.  McInerny noted that the AEF had four major classes with which to rate the physical fitness of its 
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Depot final report.11  Furthermore, a file of “proposed eliminations for inefficiency” contains the 
record briefs for an additional 349 officers.  Of the 349 officers who appeared before these 
boards, only 46 had any case files in the Blois records or were listed in the Casual Officers’ 
Depot final report.12  Unfortunately, the place and time of these boards is unknown.  What is 
clear, however, is that at least 1682 officers in the AEF underwent some form of reclassification 
or efficiency board after being relieved of their duties or commands.    
 On 18 December 1918, the AEF GHQ established an additional officers’ reclassification 
depot at Gondrecourt.13  This new depot was to deal only with the cases of combat officers 
needing to be reassigned or reclassified.  With the establishment of the Gondrecourt depot, Blois 
would hold boards only for officers in the SOS and staff agencies.  By the time that the Combat 
Officers’ Deport at Gondrecourt closed on 30 April 1919, it had only reclassified 161 of the 3500 
that had passed through its gates.14  
 In May 1919, the SOS Deputy Chief of Staff estimated that approximately 82,000 
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officers served in the AEF from 1917 through 1919.15  Given this figure, he also estimated that 
“approximately, 1 regular officer in 40, and one temporary [i.e. National Army or National 
Guard] officer in 80 were found unsuited for the duties they were performing and had to be 
reclassified.”16  However, even using 1843 as the number of officers sent for reclassification 
(numbers drawn from Blois, Gondrecourt, and other known cases), that still meant that only two 
percent of the AEF’s commissioned ranks were boarded during the war.  Still, these miniscule 
numbers do not accurately represent the powerful influence that the reclassification system held 
over the AEF’s officer corps.   
 Major General James Harbord claimed that Blois was a “Human Salvage Plant” which 
reclaimed “human beings to an untold and incalculable value.”17  Those sent for reclassification 
did not see it in this same positive light.  Being sent for reclassification was a humiliation for the 
officers involved.  Brigadier General L. M. Nuttman, commander of the Combat Officers’ Depot, 
recalled that the officers awaiting judgment “arrived in various states of mind which ranged from 
extreme anger, through a feeling of injury and a passive acceptance of fate, to an entire loss of 
self respect.”18  To the Regular Army officers, being reclassified generally represented the 
shipwreck of their military careers and the personal knowledge that they had failed the highest 
trial of their profession.  For National Guard officers, being removed from their units meant the 
ultimate embarrassment of returning to local communities with their reputations sullied by the 
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stench of failure.  To the many young National Army officers who had so eagerly filled the pre-
war Plattsburg camps and the wartime OTCs, reporting to Blois indicated that they had failed as 
men by being tested and found wanting in the Rooseveltian world of the “strenuous life.”  
Lieutenant Harvey Harris had a chance encounter with a group of captains who were in route to 
their new assignments after their reclassification boards.  They told Harris that they had been 
treated as “privates in every sense” at the depot, and one stated that “he would have [to work] for 
5 years to get his self respect back.”19  As these officers could attest, Blois was the boogie man 
that haunted in the psyche of the American officer.   
 During the war, the term “blooeyed” or “gone blooey” entered the American lexicon as 
slang for a failure or a colossal malfunction.  In the AEF it carried the same meaning as the 
British Army’s “Stellenbosched” or the French Army’s “Degommes”: an officer cashiered in 
disgrace.20  Even though 882 of the 891 officers assigned to the SOS after their Blois boards later 
“made good” in their new positions, they never truly shook off the impression that somehow they 
were “damaged goods.”21  Soon after becoming the commander of the SOS, Harbord noted, 
  The spirit of the S.O.S. has been rather low.  All officers who fail at the front are 
  sent back to be utilized in the myriad activities of the Service of Supplies where  
  something can be found for one of almost any profession or trade.  This record of  
  failure has had a depressing effect on the spirit of the important work of the  
  S.O.S.  In many ways it is a bad thing, but it seems almost unavoidable.22 
 
Thus, while he could gush of Blois being a “Human Salvage Plant,” in his more honest moments, 
Harbord admitted that for an officer to be reclassified at Blois was the AEF’s version of wearing 
the scarlet letter.      
 Given the perception that American officers had of being “blooeyed,” the threat of being 
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sent to Blois was a cudgel which commanders could use to keep their subordinate officers in 
line.  Captain John Castles recalled that the commander of his infantry regiment launched a 
tirade against his officers and, “ended by saying that twenty-seven new officers from the Reserve 
were coming to join the Regiment and that any one of the old ones who didn’t attend to business 
(i.e. do what suited him) would soon go back to the United States ‘with his tail between his 
legs.’”23  Another officer later remembered that a division commander threatened to send one of 
his brigade commanders “to Blois in disgrace” after a failed attack during the Soissons Offensive 
of July 1918.24  Captain Coby McIntyre stated that one of the few times that he witnessed any 
nervousness on the part of Colonel Frank Hume, the commander of the 103rd Infantry, was 
during field problems in France.  McIntyre noted that, “In the problem the cards were stacked 
against Colonel Hume, and he felt, rightly or wrongly, the high command, never considered too 
friendly to National Guard officers, might look upon any failure on his part as ground for 
removal from his command.”25  Thus, while the actual number of officers sent to Blois for 
reclassification was rather small, the fear that the removals inspired rippled through the AEF and 
influenced the behavior of American officers throughout the war.   
  What more can the records of Blois reclassification depot tell us about the U. S. Army? 
An examination of who was sent to Blois, and the reasons for their boarding, offers interesting 
insights into the overarching leadership and training problems that confronted the AEF during 
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the war.  This also provides a means for understanding the conduct, skills, and abilities that 
Pershing and his commanders expected of their junior officers.   
 The often random process of assigning officers during the war makes it difficult to 
determine with any exactness if any one source or group of officers was over-represented in the 
boards conducted at Blois.  As arriving divisions were skeletonized or transformed into depot 
units by the AEF GHQ, it was not unusual for National Guard officers to be assigned to 
purportedly “regular” or “National Army” divisions.  Shortages of regular and guard officers 
meant that those “National Army” men commissioned from the OTCs and COTS permeated the 
junior officer ranks of all types of AEF combat units. On 7 August 1918, the War Department 
recognized this when it abolished any distinction between Regular Army, National Guard, and 
National Army units in General Order 73.   
 However, using some admittedly rough baseline estimations of the various composition 
of the wartime officer corps, it is possible to draw some tentative conclusions. If, after factoring 
out physicians and those specialists given direct commissions, that roughly 74 percent of line 
officers were graduates of wartime officers’ training camps, then it seems that this group was 
under-represented in the reclassification boards.26  National Guard officers in the rank of major, 
captain, and first lieutenant also appear to have been sent to Blois at a rate greater than their 
overall numbers in the AEF would merit (see Table 10-1).27  This gives some credence to the 
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assertions of Frank Hume and other National Guard officers that their Regular Army superiors 
had embarked on an Uptonian witch-hunt of the citizen-soldiers during the war.   
 While a number, and perhaps most, of the reclassification of National Guard officers 
were justified, it did not change the fact that the removals exacerbated long-standing tensions 
between the regulars and the guardsmen and led to ugly recriminations during and after the war. 
As the 140th Infantry’s Captain Evan Edwards complained, 
  We are told that no word should be spoken that criticizes the individual Regular  
  Army officer.  But the National Guard officer was criticized- stamped by an  
  efficiency board as incompetent or not fully efficient, and the reasons named.   
  Sometimes they were not even named.28 
 
Another guardsman recalled that the regulars held a, “low view of civilian abilities… they thinly 
veil their sarcasm for the military standing of the National Guard.”29 
Table 10-1: Officers sent to Blois by rank and source of commission30 
             Source of           
              Commission 
 Rank 
Regular 
Army 
Regular 
Army  
(Provisional) 
National 
Guard 
National 
Army 
(OTC, COTS, etc) 
Brig. General 10  2  
Colonel 33  21  
Lieut. Colonel 23 0 24 4 
Major 24 2 88 59 
Captain 8 45 140 161 
First Lieutenant 0 27 130 237 
Second Lieutenant 0 8 69 248 
Total & Percent 98 (7.1%) 82 (6%) 474 (34.5%) 709 (51.7%) 
 
 The case of the Regular Army is a bit more complicated.  Colonel John P. McAdams, the 
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Deputy Chief of Staff for the SOS, estimated that 5,000 regular officers (including those with 
provisional regular commissions) served in the AEF.31  If we accept this number, this means that 
Regular they made up only 6.2 percent of Pershing’s officer corps, and were thus only slightly 
over-represented in the Blois reclassifications.  However, while the reclassifications tended to 
fall heaviest on officers below the rank of lieutenant colonel for the National Army and National 
Guard officers, nearly 68 percent of the Regular Army officers sent Blois were lieutenant 
colonels or higher (see Table 10-1).  McAdams explained that this was due to the fact that “the 
differences in the standards of efficiency expected, naturally result[ed] in higher commanders 
being much more exacting in their requirements of regular officers than of temporary officers 
performing similar duties.”32  Although there is much truth in this statement, it does not appear 
that senior regular officers were as willing to show as much understanding of the “temporary 
officers” of the National Guard as McAdams led the reader to believe. 
 Major General Harbord blamed the high number of regulars reclassified on the 
“considerable lowering of standards” that resulted from the commissioning of “young and 
inexperienced” provisional officers.  He claimed that these new officers were promoted far too 
rapidly to ranks and positions that they were unsuited to fill.33  Harbord was correct in this 
estimation; the new officers given regular commissions in the war had as little (or less) training 
as their OTC peers, and were thus equally unprepared.  However, the bulk of the Regular Army 
reclassifications were of its pre-war officers who rose to command positions at the regimental 
                                                 
 31 The Reclassification System of the A.E.F.(Blois), 22. The problem with the statistical analysis of the 
composition of the AEF’s officer corps is finding out exactly how many of the war’s total officers served in France 
from the Regular Army, National Guard, and National Army.  McAdams estimated that the total Regular Army 
officer corps doubled in size to 12,000 during the war, and only 40 percent, or 5,000 served in the AEF.  Ayers 
stated that the total Regular Army officer corps was numbered at only 6,000 during the war. The War With 
Germany: A Statistical Summary, 22. 
 32 The Reclassification System of the A.E.F. (Blois), 22.  In the report, McAdams lumped both National 
Guard and National Army officers under the category of “temporary officers.”  
 33 Harbord, The American Army in France, 484.  Harbord’s comments are nearly a direct copy of those 
made by McAdams on page 23 of The Reclassification System of the A.E.F. (Blois). 
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level and above.  These men were just as unprepared to fill these positions as the provisional 
officers were to fill commands at the company and battalion level. 
 McAdams was right to argue that Pershing and his senior commanders should have 
expected higher standards of professional performance from their Regular Army subordinates. 
The circumstances and conditions that made up the daily world of the pre-war Regular Army 
officers had done little to prepare most officers for the precipitous climb in rank and 
responsibility that accompanied World War I.  Many regulars like John Hines, Robert Bullard, 
and Hanson Ely made the well-deserved assent, while others quickly fell victim to the “Peter 
Principle.”  The relatively high rate of regular officer reclassifications also calls into question the 
degree that the “cult of professionalism” had truly been absorbed by the overall officer corps.  
 Although the regulars were more likely than OTC officers to be reclassified, they did 
benefit from their status.  It was rare for the Blois boards to recommend that an officer under 
investigation be returned to duty with a combat unit.  Of the 1371 officers that McAdams listed 
as being sent through the Blois reclassification and efficiency boards, 150 were returned to 
combat duty.34  However, while only 11 percent of the National Guard and National Army 
officers sent to Blois ever returned to combat units, nearly a 25 percent of the regular officers 
were returned to combat assignments after their boards.35  While this action did represent the 
regulars’ desires to “take care of their own,” McAdams was correct in noting, “the fact that better 
material was not available to replace them had a great deal to do with the policy of giving an 
officer a second trial in another division.”36  He also noted that those reprieved from dishonor at 
Blois profited by the experience and redoubled their efforts to correct their failings.  He asserted 
                                                 
 34 The Reclassification System of the A.E.F. (Blois), Table 4. 
 35 Ibid., 22. 
 36 Ibid., 18. 
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that only 5 percent of the officers who returned to combat duty “were again found wanting.”37     
 Although Blois dealt with the cases of officers from all the various staff, command and 
support positions across the AEF, officers from combat units made up the vast bulk of those sent 
for reclassification.  Only 83 officers were sent to Blois from the vast expanse of the SOS.38  It is 
no surprise then that combat officers comprised the majority of those sent to the depot.  In fact, 
infantrymen, artillerymen, and aviators alone accounted for nearly three quarters of all 
reclassifications.  Nearly 44 percent of all the Blois boards involved infantry officers, and this 
branch made up the largest number of men sent by any single arm of service.  Artillerymen were 
a distant second, comprising over 23 percent of all reclassifications.  Table 10-2 illustrates the 
statistics from the boards based on service branch and rank. 
Table 10-2: Reclassifications at Blois by Branch of Service and Rank.39 
         
    Rank 
 
Branch 
Brig. 
General 
Colonel Lieut. 
Colonel 
 
Major Captain First 
Lieut. 
Second 
Lieut. 
Total 
and % 
Infantry 8 39 29 93 188 143 98 598 
(43.8%)
Artillery 2 7 11 21 58 80 141 320 
(23.4%)
Air 
Service 
0 0 0 6 7 62 26 101 
(7.4%) 
Engineer 0 2 3 13 22 18 12 70 
(5.1%) 
Medical 
Corps 
0 1 3 17 16 28 4 69 
(5%) 
Quarter- 
master 
0 0 2 10 14 10 14 50 
(3.6%) 
Coast 
Artillery 
2 2 1 3 9 16 11 44 
(3.2%) 
Signal 
Corps 
0 0 0 0 15 18 8 41 
(3%) 
                                                 
 37 Ibid., 19, 23. 
 38 Ibid., Table 4. 
 39 This table is based on information found in Tables 1 and 2 in The Reclassification System of the A.E.F. 
(Blois).  It does not include the seven Marine Corps officers and one Navy officer sent to Blois, nor are these men 
counted in the table’s percentages. 
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All 
Others 
0 3 2 10 25 19 11 70 
(5%) 
 
 AEF General Order 45 stipulated that the elimination boards that sat in judgment of the 
officers at Blois consisted of between three and five officers, all superior in rank to the 
defendant.  The boards were to swear in witnesses for both sides of the case, allow the officer 
being boarded to make a statement in his defense, and produce a written record of the whole 
procedure.40 On 7 August 1918, General Order 131 stipulated that the division or higher 
headquarters that was sending the officer to Blois had to forward the board a packet containing 
not only the reason for the adverse action, but also a record of the soldier’s previous military, 
civilian, and educational background, as well as the commander’s “opinion of the capacity, 
qualifications and efficiency of the officer reported on.”41  The order further specified that the 
division corps, or the army commander instituting the procedure (or their chief of staff) was to 
personally notify the officer in question of the reason that he was being sent to Blois.   
 Sadly, the provisions of General Order 113 were not uniformly followed by the AEF’s 
senior officers. The packets sent from the units to the board were frequently late or incomplete.  
For example, of the 515 Blois case files of infantry officers between the ranks of major and 
second lieutenant, five were so incomplete that it was impossible to determine why the officer 
was sent for reclassification, or even to establish the units that had sent them.  In at least 32 other 
cases, the packets only identified the division sending the soldier, and provided little other 
information as to the reasons for their relief. 
 Although the General Order required the relieving officer to provide detailed information 
on the officer being relieved and the events that led to his removal, these statements were often 
                                                 
 40 AEF General Order 45, 25 March 1918.  The board also included a medical officer if the case involved 
the officer’s physical or mental condition, or if a medical opinion had bearing on the case. 
 41 AEF General Order 131, dated 7 August 1918. 
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vague and sketchy.  This caused the members of the board no end of trouble.  The commander of 
the Combat Officers’ Depot reported that the “report was rarely as full and complete as 
required,” and, 
  More often indefinite expressions were used, such as “lacks initiative,” “cannot 
  command men,” or “lacks force.”  It was left to the boards to determine by 
  deposition the specific instances that had brought about the relief.  The provisions 
  requiring a statement as to what duty, if any, the officer was considered fitted 
  for was not always followed.  “None” or “not known” was often given, when it 
  is believed that a little investigation would have given more specific   
  information.42 
 
This obvious lack of any prior investigation of the charges against the soldier by the senior 
officers ultimately responsible for removing him made the process seem unjust and arbitrary to 
those involved.  The commanders of the Blois depot had originally intended that most officers 
would go through the relatively simple administrative process of a reclassification board rather 
than the more elaborate and time consuming process of an efficiency board. The failure of the 
combat units to properly investigate and document the cases of the men they sent to Blois meant 
that the depot often had to conduct reclassification boards using the process of the efficiency 
boards just to establish the facts of the case.43   
 Compounding this problem was the failure of the members of the relieved officer’s chain 
of command to inform him of the reasons that he was being sent to Blois.  The Gondrecourt 
depot commander noted that in some cases, “officers appeared at the depot knowing that they 
were going before the boards, but not knowing the reason for their being relieved.  In a few cases 
the officers did not know until they appeared before the board that their services had been 
                                                 
 42 Report from Commanding General, Combat Officers’ Depot, to the Adjutant General, A.E.F., subject: 
“Re-classification of officers,” dated 22 May 1919, in NARA RG 120, Entry 465, Box 2254, File “The 
Reclassification System at Gondrecourt,” 2-3.   
 43 The Reclassification System of the A.E.F.(Blois), 8. 
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unsatisfactory.”44  The problem of late or incomplete packets led the Blois depot to have its 
Personnel Adjutant interview the incoming officers to “fill in the holes” of the case, obtain an 
assessment of the officer’s personality and capabilities, fill out the required Officer Qualification 
Card (if missing), and to get the soldier’s side of the story.45   
 The records of those interviews in the Blois case files reinforce the point that senior 
commanders often failed in their responsibilities toward the accused officers.  Second Lieutenant 
Robert Hay claimed that his relief came as a complete surprise as he “was informed by [his] 
captain and Major that [his] work was satisfactory.”46  In a similar vein, Lieutenant Evan 
Lindsey asserted that not only did he not know why he was sent to Blois, but that the move came 
as a surprise to both his company and battalion commanders.47  Furthermore, the 145th Infantry’s 
First Lieutenant Crawford Taylor stated that not only did he know of “no reason” for his orders 
to Blois, but also when he confronted his division’s chief of staff over the issue, the senior 
officer “did not know personally what it was” either.48      
 This failure in communication shook the faith of both the officer being investigated and 
the other soldiers associated with the case in the fairness and judgment of their superior officers.  
When he was ordered to Blois, Lieutenant Samuel McClellan was merely informed by his 
division chief of staff that his regimental commander stated that the young officer “was not 
considered qualified for infantry line service.”  When he pressed his superior for more tangible 
details, the chief of staff could not, or would not, provide them.  McClellan appealed to the board 
                                                 
 44 Report from Commanding General, Combat Officers’ Depot, to the Adjutant General, A.E.F., subject: 
“Re-classification of officers,” dated 22 May 1919, in NARA RG 120, Entry 465, Box 2254, File “The 
Reclassification System at Gondrecourt,” 3.   
 45 The Reclassification System of the A.E.F.(Blois), 11. 
 46  2LT Robert Hay, in NARA RG 120, Entry 541, Reclassified Officers National Army and National 
Guard Blois, Box 2300. (Hereafter cited as Blois Case Files)  
 47  1LT Evan Lindsey, Blois Case Files, Box 2305.  For those infantry officers whose reaction to their relief 
was captured by the Personnel Adjutant, approximately 20 to 30 percent stated that they were surprised by the action 
or did not know the cause.  For example see,  CPT Clayton MacNab, Blois Case Files, Box 2305. 
 48  1LT Crawford H. Taylor, Blois Case Files, Box 2315. 
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to return him to a combat unit because “insufficient cause” was shown to justify his 
reclassification and his unwarranted removal was “a permanent stigma” on his military record.  
McClellan even had his company commander, Captain Warner Cook, write to the board 
asserting that the lieutenant’s removal had been unmerited.  Cook stressed that McClellan had 
been removed without his “knowledge or approval,” and that Samuel had consistently performed 
his duties in a “very conscientious and commendable manner.”  The captain went on to note that 
he had “no fault to find with him in any respect.”  Much to McClellan and Cook’s 
disappointment, the board sided with the colonel and assigned the lieutenant to duty in the 
SOS.49 
 Although cases such as McClellan’s left the officers involved feeling that they were 
victims of an impersonal and arbitrary system, other cases reveal that officers could be cashiered 
for very personal and all-too-human reasons.  A number of officers claimed that they had been 
sent to Blois because of personality clashes or personal animus that had nothing to do with their 
competence or abilities.  Captain Gordon Lawson of the 36th Division’s 143rd Infantry 
maintained that he had testified against his colonel for being “yellow,” and after the colonel was 
exonerated of the charge, he knew that “it was only a matter of time before he would be 
canned.”50  Captain Edwin York asserted that he had long-standing problems with his superior 
that dated back to an incident in Texas when York had been assigned to check the officer’s 
accounts and had reported them “confused.”  The captain had also grown tired of always being 
“hounded” by his superior and had been seeking a transfer when he was ordered to Blois.51     
Likewise, Captain Charles Price, of the 313th Machine Gun Battalion, claimed that the “personal 
                                                 
 49  2LT Samuel G. McClellan, Blois Case Files, Box 2307. 
 50  CPT Gordon Lawson, Blois Case Files, Box 2304.   
 51  CPT Edwin R. York, Blois Case Files, Box 2319.  Captain William L. Thompson also claimed that he 
was only sent to Blois because he had requested a transfer to the Air Service.   CPT William L. Thompson, Blois 
Case Files, Box 2316. 
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animosity” of his major had led to his relief.  He also stated that his commander had denied him 
the opportunity to improve his skills by refusing to send him to school after all of the battalion’s 
other officers had been afforded that opportunity.52          
 The 4th Division’s First Lieutenant George Lum also endured the personal wrath of his 
superior after finding himself caught between the demands of two different levels of his chain of 
command.  Lum ran afoul of his regimental commander when the later discovered him carrying 
out an action ordered by his battalion commander that the colonel disapproved of.  After the 
colonel raged that he would have Lum “Court Martialed and thrown out of the army and 
disgraced,” the young officer replied that “any man who made such a statement had to prove it.”  
Two days later, Lum was on his way to Blois.  The Blois Personnel Adjutant checked into Lum’s 
story, and in a rare act of understanding, sent the officer to a replacement division for more 
training before being reassigned to another combat unit.53   
 Lieutenant Edward Dewey’s “run in” with his commander was of an even more personal 
nature.  Dewey claimed that his relief followed shortly after he “had the Colonel’s ‘lady friend’ 
out the night the Colonel had a date with her.”  He maintained that he was “blooyed” to remove 
him as the colonel’s potential rival for the affection of the “lady friend.”54  Cases such as Lum’s 
and Dewey’s demonstrate that units often suffered from tensions and factions that pitted field 
officers against company officers and regulars against citizen soldiers. They also show that 
                                                 
 52  CPT Charles A. Price, Blois Case Files, Box 2311.  For other examples of officers who claimed that 
personal friction between themselves and their superiors led to their reclassification see the following Blois case 
files: 2LT Mancel Coghlan, Box 2292., CPT Robert A. Dobbins, Box 2295., CPT Earl H. Plumber, Box 2311., 2LT 
John C. Smuck, Box 2314. 
 53  1LT George M. Lum Jr., Blois Case Files, Box 2305. 
 54  1LT Edward R. Dewey, Blois Case Files, Box 2294.  Dewey was not alone in having his career hindered 
by matters of the heart.  1LT Lewis Graves stated that his long running problems with his unit adjutant came to a 
head after both officers began courting the same girl.  Graves stated that the adjutant “threatened that if he did not 
stop calling on the girl, he would have him shipped out.”  In a rare show of sympathy, the board sent Graves to a 
replacement depot for reassignment to a combat unit.  Perhaps all is fair in love and war after all.  1LT Lewis E. 
Graves Case Files, Box 2298. 
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despite set standards and regulations, codes of conduct, and the army’s twenty year drive for 
dispassionate and objective professionalism, personal passions, frailties, and vanities were 
involved frequently in the human interactions that comprised combat leadership. 
 The weight that the interviews conducted by the Blois Personnel Adjutant had on the 
proceedings is not clear.  However, his statements as to the character and potential of the officers 
he questioned reveal a host of the prejudices that he, as a regular officer, brought to the table.  
Although his time with each officer was rather short, the adjutant felt free to make sweeping 
generalizations about the man’s personal and professional qualities.  After interviewing 
Lieutenant Jenry Loes, he informed the board that the officer was a “‘Spoiled Child’ type: has 
some pep of youth but lacks practical knowledge to make it really valuable.”55  He labeled the 
36th Division’s Alonzo Drake as merely “a clerk with a born clerk’s nature,” who was 
“absolutely unfitted to be a captain.”56  The adjutant was also quick to dismiss men as “fair 
weather,” “swivel chair,” or “street parade” soldiers, “without power of command at moments of 
stress: no initiative or energy.”57  Of one poor lieutenant, the adjutant concluded that the 
“youngster…[is] not fully mentally developed. [and was] possibly inbred.”58  If these failings 
were true, one must wonder at the standards of the officers’ training camps.  One thing was for 
certain; the Personnel Adjutant had the objective dispassion of a Grand Inquisitor.   
 The adjutant’s comments also point to the power and depth of the regulars’ prejudices 
against National Guard officers.  He informed the board that Lieutenant Montgomery Ridgely, 
was, “a typical N[ationall] G[uard] Officer of the undesirable type, [who] lacks leadership and 
                                                 
 55  2LT Jenry Loes Jr., Blois Case Files, Box 2305. 
 56  CPT Alonzo H. Drake, Blois Case Files, Box 2295. 
 57 Blois Case files of 1LT Benjamin L. Kilper, Box 2303., 1LT Isaac N. Quimby, Box 2311., and CPT 
Claude D. Johns, Jr., Box 2302. 
 58  2LT Foster Marshall, Blois Case Files, Box 2305.  
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the power of discipline.”59  The old regular opined that the Ohio guardsman Captain Arthur 
Wicks owed his position and “earning capacity” to being “a mixer” with political pull.  He 
concluded that the captain was “unwarranted as [a] Capt[ain] in [the] line.”60  Similarly, the 
adjutant noted that the New York guardsman and New York City civil servant, Captain Foster G. 
Hetzel, was “A light weight: conceited regarding his abilities: If not worth more than $100.00 a 
month in a city (political) job why should [the] Government pay $200.00 per month and 
quarters.”61  These remarks reflect the regulars’ unshakeable beliefs that the guardsmen were 
nothing more than military dilettantes who owed their positions to the dirty arts of political 
cronyism.  
 In another case, First Lieutenant John F. McCafferty, a Regular Army NCO 
commissioned from the ranks after 20 years of service, managed to convince the adjutant that his 
relief was caused by the fact that his National Guard colonel was prejudiced against regulars and 
angered over the lieutenant’s strenuous efforts to obtain equipment, food, and other items for his 
soldiers.62  These cases highlight the lack of trust and confidence that often accompanied the 
relations between regular and National Guard officers.  If the Personnel Adjutant’s beliefs were 
at all representative of his Regular Army peers, it is little wonder that guard officers were 
disproportionately sent for reclassification.    
 It was not easy for the officers being reclassified to sway either the board or the 
Personnel Adjutant.  Even when the officer was sent to Blois by mistake, the board seldom 
second guessed the original recommendations of the officer’s superior.  In July 1918, both 
Captain Elbert Fuller’s regimental and brigade commanders wrote to the board admitting that 
                                                 
 59  1LT Montgomery Ridgely, Blois Case Files, Box 2312. 
 60  CPT Arthur H. Wicks, Blois Case Files, Box 2318.   
 61  CPT Foster G. Hetzel, Blois Case Files, Box 2300.   
 62  1LT John F. McCafferty, Blois Case Files, Box 2307.   
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sending him to Blois had been a mistake, and requested that their previous negative 
recommendations be revoked.  Despite the regimental commander’s plea that the loss of Fuller 
would be a “keen loss” to his unit, the board still sent him to the SOS.63 The Personnel Adjutant 
admitted that he was “not supposed to have a heart” when dealing with the cases and generally 
lived by this code.64  In one exceptional case he was so impressed by the fortitude and bearing of 
a young lieutenant who had stood up to his colonel for cursing him, that he recommended to the 
board that if they were going to send the officer to the SOS, he would like to see him assigned to 
duty with the Blois depot.65  Unfortunately, these cases were few and far between, and the 
lieutenant was a rare bird indeed.     
 One of the most common reasons that the number of officers returned to combat duty was 
so low was that the boards seemed unwilling to second guess the field commanders.  Ironically, 
while the depot’s officers complained that the reasons that the field commanders usually gave for 
sending their officers for reclassification were vague or formulaic, the board members 
themselves very frequently merely parroted the verbiage and justifications of the original packets 
in their findings.  In his June 1919 report on the reclassification system, General Wilson Burtt 
maintained that, 
  In most cases [the] investigation disclosed the fact that there was but one   
  conclusion to arrive at, and that was, that the action of the Division Commander  
  should be upheld…There were extremely few cases investigated in the manner set 
  forth, where the conclusions arrived at, showed that any mistake had been made.   
  These cases served only to show that the very highest motives had been the ruling 
  considerations in the request for relief of the officer and leads one to assert that  
                                                 
 63  CPT Elbert E. Fuller, Blois Case Files, Box 2297. 
 64 This statement was drawn from the adjutant’s comments in the case of CPT William McCowan.  
McCown, a 51 year old infantry captain asked not to be discharged on account of his age, and noted that his service 
had “broke up his home” and subjected him to the ridicule of being called a “tin soldier.”  The adjutant pleaded with 
the board to “give him a chance here” for he had run “straight” and “clean.”  The board followed his advice and 
assigned the captain to command a Prisoner of War company.  This was also one of the rare cases where the adjutant 
stood up for a National Guard officer.  CPT William L. McCowen, Blois Case Files, Box 2308.   
 65  1LT Joseph S. Driskell, Blois Case Files, Box 2300.  The board agreed with the adjutant’s assessment 
and recommended that Driskell be reassigned to any combat unit outside of the 36th Division.   
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  the same high standards of personality and character actuated the vast majority of  
  commanders.66 
 
Burtt also asserted that, “very few cases, if any, occurred where officers were relieved from 
command upon snap judgment, for pique, spite, or any other ulterior motive on the part of the 
superior whose order it was.”67  A number of the officers who went through the Blois mill would 
not have agreed with Burtt’s assessment or veracity.  In the end, the reclassification system 
extended the domination of Regular Army officers in all facets of the AEF and reinforced a 
culture within its upper ranks that focused on keeping junior officers squarely “under the 
thumbs” of their superior commanders.  As will be seen, this also furthered the problem of 
developing initiative within the ranks of the AEF’s junior leaders.     
 Having examined some of the problems of the reclassification system, it is now time to 
scrutinize the reasons that officers were sent to Blois.  Given the rising importance of technology 
in warfare, and the trend towards professionalization in many civilian occupations, there was 
often a direct correlation between the specific expectations and demands of the officer’s arm of 
service (especially the more technical ones) and his removal for reclassification.  In April 1918, 
the AEF GHQ established a policy where those officers who failed out of AEF or Allied schools 
would be considered unfit to serve in their respective branches, and thus be sent to Blois for 
reclassification.68   
 This school provision fell hardest on artillerymen and aviators.  For example, of the 318 
records for National Guard and National Army artillerymen in the ranks of major through second 
lieutenant in the Blois case files, 160 (50 percent) were sent for reclassification due to their 
                                                 
 66 Report of Brigadier General W. B. Burtt, to C. in C. American E. F., dated 12 June 1919, entitled, 
“Report upon relief of duty of officers of the combat Forces,” in NARA RG 120, Entry 465, Box 2254, File “The 
Reclassification System at Gondrecourt,” 6-7. 
 67 Ibid., 6. 
 68 The Reclassification System of the A.E.F.(Blois), 5. 
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failure at the DeSourge, Samur, or Coetquidun Field Artillery Schools, or after demonstrating 
that they could not master the technical and mathematical skills required of modern artillery 
officers.69  A good example of this process was evident in the case of the 36th Division’s 
Lieutenant Charles Appling.  Appling was relieved from duty with the 133rd Field Artillery when 
he achieved a grade of only 25 percent at a French artillery school.70  The great number of 
artillerymen reclassified due to course failures reflects the massive technical and tactical changes 
that accompanied the rapid evolution of artillery from a direct to an indirect fire weapons system.  
The enforcement of rigid standards in the artillery schools also helps to explain why the AEF’s 
artillery units became so lethal and effective over the course of the war.     
 The Air Service also placed much emphasis on the training proficiency and technical 
skills of its officers.  It had no place for officers who struggled with the requirements of its 
ground schools or flight tests.  For instance, First Lieutenant Arthur Chamberlain, a graduate of 
the Georgetown University Law School, was reclassified as a military policeman after being 
“relieved from duty with the Air Service on account of his failure in classroom work and 
inability to successfully perform missions assigned to him in the air.”71  Even though Lieutenant 
Powhatan Clarke had twenty flying hours in the United States before arriving in France, he found 
                                                 
 69 This analysis was based on comparing the individual case reports for artillery officers in the grade of 
major through second lieutenant in NARA RG 120, Entry 541, Reclassified Officers National Army and National 
Guard Blois, Boxes 2286-2319.  Of the other artillery officers, 65 (20.4%) were reclassified because they were unfit 
or incompetent for “artillery work” (which might also have been tied to poor technical or mathematical skills);       
59 (18.5%) exhibited poor leadership or an inability to command; ten were too old or physically unfit for duty; five 
were due to inability to work with their superiors; five were caused by misconduct, moral failing or intemperance; 
five more were due to inexperience; three cases were unknown because the files were incomplete; one officer was 
reclassified because he was surplus to his unit, and one more because he was accused of consorting with the enemy.  
These cases also reinforce the point that the official number of 1371 reclassifications is too low.  Blois claimed to 
have reclassified 320 artillerymen of all sources of commission in the ranks of brigadier general to 2LT, yet the 
author found that its files contain the case records for 318 artillerymen in the rank of major to 2LT from the National 
Guard and National Army combined.      
 70  2LT Charles D. Appling, Blois Case Files, Box 2286.  For other examples of reclassification for this 
reason, see Blois case files, 1LT Frank D. Mclony, Box 2307.,  CPT Oscar E. Carlstrom, Box 2291., 2LT Lewis 
Cherry, Box 2292. 
 71  1LT Arthur N. Chamberlain, Blois Case Files, Box 2292.  For further examples, see Blois case files for 
1LT William N. Nelting, Box 2309., 1LT Harry Oatman, Box 2309., 2LT Earl Curtis, Box 2294. 
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that the Neiuport fighter that he was assigned to fly “was too fast for him,” leading his instructor 
to state that he would “never make a successful pilot.”72  Furthermore, Lieutenant Burton Le 
Doux’s instructors believed that after two bad crashes in training the young man would never be 
able “to master the art of flying,” and packed him off to Blois before he could do further damage 
to himself or the Air Services’ limited supply of aircraft.73 
 The unique nature and stresses of flying also led to a number of pilots being sent to Blois.  
In addition to failing in flying school, the greatest reason that pilots were reclassified was their 
“air nervousness” or a fear of flying.  For all of the romance and allure of flying, its reality was 
one of discomfort and sudden terrifying death.  Air men faced a greater proportional number of 
reclassifications due to “nervousness” than any other branch.  This failure of nerve could strike at 
any point in the pilot’s flying career.  For instance, after two crashes during his flight training, 
Second Lieutenant Roy Monahan “lost his nerve” and asked to be reclassified.74  Other pilots, 
such Robert Cole and Fred Nicholson, were ordered to Blois after they had been flying 
operationally and found the constant stress of air combat too much for them.  Cole’s commander 
believed that he had lost his “Air Nerve” and readily endorsed his request for reclassification.75      
  Medical surgeons and physicians also seemed to fall to problems that were prevalent in 
their occupation.  Despite the establishment of the American Medical Association and the long 
term drive for the professionalization of the medical field, a number of doctors ordered to Blois 
were for what today would be termed malpractice or gross violations of the profession’s ethical 
code.  In one instance, Major Frank Neer, and First Lieutenants Harry Goff and Paul Lynch were 
recommended for court martial for a 30 June 1918 incident where their lack of attention to a 
                                                 
 72  1LT Powhatan H. Clarke, Blois Case Files, Box 2292.   
 73  2LT Burton Le Doux, Blois Case Files, Box 2304. 
 74  2LT Roy P. Monahan, Blois Case Files, Box 2307.   
 75 Blois case files for 1LT Robert L. Cole, Box 2293., 1LT Fred W. Nicholoson, Box 2309.  For other 
examples, also see Blois case files for 2LT Frank L. Coghill, Box 2292., and 1LT Rector C. Coffee, Box 2292.  
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wounded soldier led to his death.76  In October 1918, the board found Captain Claude Wills’ so 
grossly negligent in his diagnosis and treatment of sick soldiers that, in a case of poetic justice, it 
recommended that he be sent to the Army Candidate School to be trained as a replacement 
infantry officer.77    
 A larger number of medical officers were sent to Blois because of poor administrative 
abilities or problems with drugs and alcohol.  In addition to their medical duties, a number of the 
AEF’s doctors found themselves in charge of hospitals, aid stations, or other facilities that 
required executive leadership abilities that they had not been adequately trained to fill.  This fate 
befell the 82nd Division’s Major Jackson Barnett when, as a regimental surgeon responsible for 
running a combat aid station, he was unable to keep his unit in the proper “state of efficiency.”78 
 The stress of their jobs and their position’s ready access to drugs and intoxicants meant 
that medical officers often succumbed to the lure of “John Barleycorn.”  The impression one gets 
from the files is that doctors seemed to have had a proportionately greater problem with 
substance abuse than other branches of service. A typical case was that of First Lieutenant David 
S. Carey.  The commander of Base Section 3 relieved Carey from duty “due to his habitual use 
of alcohol and drugs which made him inefficient in the performance of his duties.”79  Before the 
Blois board could discharge him for his poor performance, the doctor’s affliction caught up with 
him.  After a lengthy hospital stay, a disability board found him permanently unfit for duty on 
                                                 
 76  Major Frank Y. Neer, Blois Case Files, Box 2308.  Although Goff and Lynch were part of the 
investigation, neither of their files appears among the Blois records.  Neer’s name is also not listed in The 
Reclassification System of the A.E.F.(Blois).   
 77  CPT Claude L. Wills, Blois Case Files, Box 2318.  1LT Harry Robertson, a dental surgeon, was also 
cashiered for his indifferent execution of his duties and for a habit of turning “suffering men away several times to 
suit his own convenience.” 1LT Harry H. Robertson, Blois Case Files, Box 2312.   
 78  MAJ Jackson H. Barnett, Blois Case Files, Box 2288.  Also see Blois case files for, CPT Edward Davis, 
Box 2294. and Major Robert Donald, Box 2295.   
79 1LT David S. Carey, Blois Case Files, Box 2291. 
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physical grounds and returned him to the United States.80   
 The largest group of officers sent to Blois, and the one with the most direct bearing on 
this study, was infantry majors, captains, and lieutenants.  The 515 case files for these National 
Guard and National Army officers give us a deep insight into the tactical and leadership skills 
and abilities that Pershing and his commanders expected their junior combat leaders to wield.81   
By examining which infantry officers were ordered to Blois, and the reasons given for their 
reclassification, one also gains a greater appreciation of the general shortcomings of the U. S. 
Army in the Great War. 
 The basic statistics of the infantry officers in the grades investigated give a portrait of 
who was sent to Blois.  Of the 515 infantry officers in the grades under examination, only 44 
(8.5%) were in non-combat positions or units.  In 35 other cases, the officer’s unit or duty 
position was unknown (accounting for 6.7% of the total).82  Thus, the vast majority of the 
infantry officers ordered to Blois occupied combat leadership positions prior to their relief.  
Table 10-3 illustrates that a disproportionate number of National Guard majors and captains were 
reclassified over other sources of commission.  In fact, it is only when one gets to the second 
lieutenants that the OTC officers were represented in numbers approaching their overall density 
in the army.  The direct commission officers were all former Regular Army NCOs promoted 
from the ranks.  Although this number seems low, it must be remembered that most of the 
regular enlisted men who received commissions did so after attending officers’ training camps, 
                                                 
 80 For examples of this problem also see the Blois case files for, 1LT Nathan Ferris, Box 2296., Orin L. 
Herring, Box 2300., MAJ Wilbur F. Crutchley, Box 2293. 
 81 Blois also handled the cases of at least 14 Regular Army infantry majors, 29 regular or provisional 
infantry captains, and eight provisional regular first lieutenants. The Blois cases files in NARA RG 120, Entry 541 
only contain the records of National Guard and National Army officers.  The regular officers are unfortunately not 
included in this analysis. The Reclassification System of the A.E.F. (Blois), Table 1.  
 82 This analysis comes from the study of the case files infantry officers in the grade of major through 
second lieutenant in NARA RG 120, Entry 541, Reclassified Officers National Army and National Guard Blois, 
Boxes 2286-2319.  Of the 35 officers whose duty position was unknown, some were still most likely assigned to 
combat units. 
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and are thus reflected in those numbers.    
 Table 10-3: Source of Commission for NG and NA Reclassified Infantry Officers by Rank83 
                  Rank 
Source of 
Commission 
Major 
(Number and %) 
Captain First 
Lieutenant 
Second 
Lieutenant 
National Guard 56 (72.7%) 97 (58.4%) 64 (42.3%) 35 (29%) 
OTC 19* (24.6%) 68 (41%) 85* (56.2%) 83 (68.5%) 
Direct commiss. 1 (1.2%) 0 1 (.6%) 1 (.8%) 
Unknown 1 (1.2%) 1 (.6%) 1 (.6%) 2 (1.6%) 
The percentage is based on the total number of officers in the rank sent for reclassification.  Thus, National Guard 
majors accounted for 72.7 percent of all majors sent to for reclassification  
*Includes one National Guard officer who attended an OTC 
 
 What accounted for the over-representation of National Guard captains and majors at 
Blois?  Firstly, there was the matter of age.  The average age of the reclassified majors was 
slightly over 43 for National Guardsmen and nearly 40 for the National Army officers.  These 
figures only tell part of the story for nearly 39 percent of the guard majors were over 45, with 11 
percent over 50 years of age (as opposed to 21 percent over 45 and 3.5% over 50 for the OTC 
officers).  The oldest major to be reclassified was a 59 year old National Guardsman.  For the 
captains, the average age for guardsmen was nearly 38 while that of the OTC officers was 33.  
Over 40 percent of the guard captains were over 40 years of age (as opposed to 17 percent of the 
OTC officers).  The National Guard majors and captains sent to Blois were on average older than 
the reclassified National Army officers, and also older than the general officer population for 
their grades as a whole.84 
 The older guard and OTC officers accounted for the majority of officers reclassified due 
to being too unfit, slow, or hesitant for combat, or those whose leadership lacked force or 
aggressiveness (see Table 10-5 below).  Pershing had a particular prejudice against officers who 
                                                 
 83 The information in this table came from the individual case reports for infantry officers in the grade of 
major through second lieutenant in NARA RG 120, Entry 541, Reclassified Officers National Army and National 
Guard Blois, Boxes 2286-2319.   
 84 This conclusion is drawn from the statistics provided for the OTC and COTS graduates in Chapters 6 and 
7.  Although there are shortcomings with this comparison, it provides a starting position for further research. 
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were physically unfit or seemingly too old to accomplish their combat duties.85  This belief 
permeated the AEF.  The violence, confusion, noise, and the unrelenting pace of continuous 
operations that characterized modern war made greater physical and mental demands on leaders 
at all levels than had heretofore been the case.  As Hunter Liggett, a man who Pershing first 
doubted had the stamina for command, noted, 
  There was a time in war when a company or platoon commander’s age mattered  
  little, within the limits of manhood and decrepitude, but such may comfort  
  themselves now with the reflection that they are performing duties for which their 
  seniors are no longer competent.  Only youth and physical prime can meet the full 
  impact of modern war.86   
 
The older officers not only experienced difficulty in maintaining the long-term energy and 
fitness required for frontline combat officers, they also tended to be more set in their ways.  
 One of the other factors that tended to cause the reclassification of National Guard 
officers at a disproportionate rate was the collision of their previous training and military 
experiences with those they faced in France.  Their inability to understand and adapt to the 
technical and tactical realities of the Western Front caused a number of guard officers, especially 
majors, to be sent to Blois.  Most of the National Guard majors, and a large number of guard 
captains, had ten or more years experience serving in the guard prior to World War I.  Given the 
overall state and focus of their training prior to the war, many of these older men seemed to have 
had great difficulty in learning the “new tricks” of warfare.  Major Edwin Markle, of the 32nd 
Division’s 128th Infantry was a case in point.  Markel, age 57, had spent four years as an enlisted 
man and thirty-four years as an officer in the National Guard.  He readily admitted that the 
complexity and volume of “pamphlets and training orders” that had flooded his unit left him 
                                                 
 85 John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, Vol. II (New York: Frederick Stokes Company, 
1931), 115-116., James J. Cooke, Pershing and His Generals (Westport: Praeger, 1997), 21-2, 107-8.  
 86 Liggett, A.E.F. Ten Years Ago in France, 257. 
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befuddled and uncertain over how to proceed in the instruction of his unit.87  The 29th Division’s 
Captain Frank Burr offers another example.  Although his commander admitted that Burr, a 34 
year old officer with 17 years of service in the National Guard, was a “competent instructor in 
elementary military” subjects, he failed to understand “the wider field which is now required” of 
a company officer.  He also noted that Burr was clearly out of his depths when he had to occupy 
a section of frontline trenches.88   
 Lastly, the prejudicial attitude that some Regular Army officers held toward their 
National Guard subordinates must also be examined as a reason for the number of guardsmen 
ordered to Blois.  A greater number of National Guard officers were singled out for failures of 
leadership relating to discipline and the ability to control their units than their National Army 
peers.  While the anti-guard sentiments were never as overt as those stated by the Blois 
Personnel Adjutant, one hears in the relief records the criticism that the regulars frequently 
rained on the guardsmen.  Major Albert Gray, a 20 year veteran of the Massachusetts National 
Guard, was accused of not only being slack in his own discipline for arguing with the orders of 
his superiors, but also of coddling his soldiers by “magnifying their troubles or fancied 
troubles.”89  In another example, the 36th Division’s Captain John De Groot was removed from 
his company command for his inability to “enforce strict discipline and obedience” on the 
Texans that filled the ranks of his unit.90  In an army where its Regular Army commander stated 
that the standard of discipline and obedience was to be that of West Point, his senior 
                                                 
 87  MAJ Edwin T. Markel, Blois Case Files, Box 2305. For another example, see the case of MAJ William 
T. Johnson of the 113th Infantry.  Johnson, a 42 year old with 21 years of service in the Virginia National Guard, was 
relieved by his commander for being unable to grasp the intricacies of trench warfare and accomplish tasks such as 
writing and issuing coherent trench orders for his units.   MAJ William T. Johnson, Blois Case Files, Box 2303. 
 88  CPT C. Frank Burr, Blois Case Files, Box 2290.  For another example, see the case of MAJ Walter 
Able, an 18 year guard veteran from the 26th Infantry’s 103rd Infantry.  He was found unable to understand the basic 
employment of his unit’s Chauchats, V.B. grenades, and machine guns under his direction, or have the ability to 
plan a trench raid.  MAJ Walter Abel, Blois Case Files, Box 2286. 
 89  MAJ Albert Gray, Blois Case Files, Box 2299. 
 90  CPT John L. De  Groot, Blois Case Files, Box 2294. 
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subordinates were quick to stamp out any laxness in order and control or the over-familiarity 
between officers and soldiers that they believed characterized guard units. 
 In addition to age, when examining other factors that may have led National Guard and 
National Army officers to the reclassification depot, education was also one of the statistical 
factors that stands out.  The available statistics on the men who attended the OTCs and COTSs in 
1917 and 1918 show that, excluding the SATC students, the percentage of those with some 
college education averaged around 65 to 70 percent.91   On average, the number of officers with 
at least some degree of college education was at least ten to twenty percent lower for the 
reclassified officers than for the available statistics for National Army training officers (see 
Table 10-4).  Even the OTC officers sent to Blois tended to have less education than the overall 
OTC average.   
 This is not to say that the better educated officers tended to be more competent leaders as 
the reclassified officers contained a number of graduates from Harvard, Yale, Princeton and 
other notable schools.  In fact only approximately four percent of the officers studied were 
ordered to Blois primarily because of a lack of basic education or mentality.  However, this 
factor many have been one of the areas that tipped the scales against the borderline officers.  
Furthermore, officers lacking the academic skills for quickly reading, reconciling, and digesting 
a lot of training and doctrinal material may have found themselves overwhelmed by the mass and 
density of army publications that deluged their units. 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
 91 See Chapters 6 and 7. 
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Table 10-4: Education Levels of Reclassified Infantry Officers by Rank92 
       Rank 
 
Level of 
Education 
Major 
(Number and %) 
Captain First 
Lieutenant 
Second 
Lieutenant 
College grad or 
some college * 
43 (55.8%) 76 (45.7%) 82 (54.3%) 67 (55.3%) 
Correspondence 
School  
2 (2.5%) 2 (1.2%) 3 (1.9%) 1 (.8%) 
High School grad 
or some High Sch. 
13 (16.8%) 49 (29.5%) 28 (18.5%) 26 (21.4%) 
Grammar or 
Common Sch. 
6 (7.7%) 12 (7.2%) 18 (12%) 6 (4.9%) 
Trade School** 6 (7.7%) 15 (9%) 7 (4.6%) 6 (4.9%) 
Unknown 7 (9%) 12 (7.2%) 13 (8.6%) 15 (12.3%) 
The percentage is based on the total number of officers in the rank sent for reclassification.   
* Includes attendance at business or normal colleges. 
** Includes business skills / technical training of a vocational nature.  
 The Blois boards shoehorned the officers appearing before them into four broad 
categories: “misfit,” “temperamental,” “inefficient,” or “physical.”  These categories were 
subjective and rather ill-defined.  In general, a “misfit” was an officer whose skills and abilities 
were ill-suited for the position, unit, or branch in which he served.  McAdams added that these 
officers also included those who were in staff departments or branches “whose civilian 
vocational training did not fit them for such assignment.”93  The boards classified over 68 
percent of all officers into this category.94  
 The officers in the next largest group were those that the boards classified as 
“temperamental.”  These officers supposedly possessed personalities, quirks, or dispositions that 
made it difficult for them to work with others or otherwise hindered their effectiveness as leaders 
or soldiers.  This group accounted for 16 percent of all reclassifications.95  
 The “inefficient” category was the murkiest of an already nebulous system of 
                                                 
92 The information in this table came from the individual case reports for infantry officers in the grade of 
major through second lieutenant in NARA RG 120, Entry 541, Reclassified Officers National Army and National 
Guard Blois, Boxes 2286-2319.   
 93 The Reclassification System of the A.E.F.(Blois), 6. 
 94 Ibid., Table 2. 
 95 Ibid. 
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classification.  It appears to have been a catch-all category for officers whose performance or 
general incompetence made them unfit to serve in their grade or position.  They made up 10.5 
percent of the Blois reclassifications.96 
 Last, were those officers classified in the “physical” category.  The boards considered 
these men as physically unfit for combat positions due to age, physical limitations, or their 
inability to take the mental strains of combat.  This included a number of officers sent to Blois 
due to “shell shock.” This reclassification category should not be confused with the physical 
disability boards also held at Blois.  The officers who received a “physical” designation from the 
reclassification board were those that field commanders (or the officers themselves) deemed 
were unable to accomplish their duties due to their psychological or bodily infirmities.  Only 5.5 
percent of all reclassifications were given due to physical inability.97 
 As Blois’ four categories failed to adequately describe the detailed reasons for the 
officers being reclassified, I have further sorted the infantry officers into 14 more descriptive 
groupings.  I freely admit that this system suffers from some of the same subjectivity that marred 
the original.  In many cases, the officers were sent to Blois for a multitude of reasons that often 
cut across the categories listed in Table 10-5. In these cases, I attempted to place the officers in 
the category that seemed to be best indicative of their alleged failing or that which most directly 
led them to Blois.  Despite the inherent shortcomings of this system, it does provide a much 
more nuanced view of the reasons that the officers were relieved of their positions than those 
given by the original boards.  
 The “reasons for classification” in Table 10-5 require some explanation.  Officers who 
lacked force, energy, aggressiveness, initiative, or were too slow or hesitant for combat, reflect 
                                                 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
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characterizations used by the senior officers in their original reports. Thus, if the officer is 
classified as having lacked initiative, that was the pronouncement of his superior at the time.  
These characterizations also denoted those leaders who lacked the personal presence to inspire 
soldiers as well as those unable to act independently of direct orders.  This category is closely 
linked to “lacks leadership.”  “Lacks leadership” signifies those officers who demonstrated an 
inability to train, control, or direct their soldiers to accomplish their tasks or missions.  The 
category “temperamental” retains the original meaning as used at Blois.    
 “Personal moral failings” were those officers whose conduct was at odds with the army’s 
expectations of gentility, morality, or standards of behavior.  Reflecting the morays of the time, 
this category also includes those cases where intemperance led to the officer’s boarding.  It 
should be pointed out that the reclassification system was not linked directly to the system of 
military justice.  If, during the course of their investigation, the board members found that the 
officer in question violated any of the articles of war, it could merely recommend he be sent 
before a courts martial.  While the AEF tried 1,093 officers from June 1917 to June 1919, most 
of those cases had nothing to do with the reclassification system.98  Most of the officers in this 
category had a string of minor moral infractions that never quite added up to a level requiring 
courts martial.  In some cases, once an officer was cleared by courts martial, his commander still 
sent him to Blois just to be rid of him.99     
 The officers listed as “poor unit administrators” failed in the areas of battalion or 
company supply, personnel, and messing, or in the additional non-combat duties that were a part 
of regimental life.  Officers classified under “poor combat performance” were those whose relief 
                                                 
 98 War Department, Annual Report for 1919, 676. 
 99 For an example, of this see the Blois case file for CPT Thomas Sunny, Box 2315.  Sunny’s commander 
charged him with negligence of duty, a tendency toward intemperance and “several misdemeanors he performed 
which were not sufficient to base formal charges for court martial.” 
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from command was directly tied to their, or their unit’s, failure in action.  Finally, “suspected 
disloyalty to the U.S.A.” were those officers sent to Blois based on the accusation that by their 
deeds or words, they had exhibited pro-German or anti-American sympathies.   
  Table 10-5: Reasons for Reclassification of Infantry NG and NA Officers by Rank  
                       Rank 
Reason for  
Reclassification 
Major 
(Number and %) 
Captain First 
Lieutenant 
Second 
Lieutenant 
Lacks, force, 
energy, initiative 
or aggressiveness 
17 
(22%) 
34 
(20.4%) 
39 
(25.8%) 
33 
(27.2%) 
Lacks Leadership 
(ability to control, 
train, discipline 
troops 
12 
(15.5%) 
 
28 
(16.8%) 
27 
(17.8%) 
20 
(16.5%) 
Lacks tactical 
skills or 
professional 
knowledge 
10 
(13%) 
11 
(6.6%) 
15 
(10%) 
13 
(10.7%) 
Too old or unfit 
for combat 
14 
(18%) 
10 
(6%) 
16 
(10.5%) 
5 
(4.1%) 
Temperamental, 
argumentative or  
Insubordinate 
5 
(6.4%) 
9 
(5.4%) 
7 
(4.6%) 
3 
(2.4%) 
Lacks basic 
education or 
mentality 
3 
(4%) 
8 
(4.8%) 
8 
(5.2%) 
4 
(3.3%) 
Too nervous or 
lost nerve in 
combat 
1 
(1.2%) 
14 
(8.4%) 
7 
(4.6%) 
3 
(2.4%) 
Personal moral 
failing 
5 
(6.4%) 
8 
(4.8%) 
4 
(2.6%) 
10 
(8.2%) 
 
Poor unit 
administrator 
1 
(1.2%) 
23 
(13.8%) 
15 
(9.9%) 
12 
(9.9%) 
Too slow or 
hesitant for combat 
2 
(2.5%) 
4 
(2.4%) 
4 
(2.6%) 
1 
(.8%) 
Poor combat 
performance 
7 
(9%) 
14 
(8.4%) 
7 
(4.6%) 
10 
(8.2%) 
Suspected 
disloyalty to USA 
0 2 
(1.2%) 
1 
(.6%) 
0 
Too immature for 
combat duty 
0 1 
(.6%) 
0 3 
(2.4%) 
Unknown 0 0 1 (.6%) 4 (3.3%) 
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 The reasons that the commanders gave for cashiering their Blois-bound officer offer a 
unique perspective into the major pitfalls that the AEF faced in combat leadership.  It is 
significant that the largest percentage of officers, across all four ranks, were reclassified because 
they lacked force, initiative, and aggressiveness.  These figures support the argument that the 
army as a whole had placed too much emphasis on strict obedience of orders and too little on 
training its junior officers on how to act when they were not directly under the supervision of 
their superior commanders.  The case of Lieutenant Owen Nalle, a platoon leader with the                   
29th Division’s 110th Machine Gun Battalion, illustrates this point.  As the tactical employment 
of machine gun battalions required its platoons to be widely dispersed, Nalle’s commander 
believed that he lacked the training, experience and leadership ability to handle a unit requiring 
such independence of action.100  But the question is, where did the system fail?  Did Nalle’s 
inability to exercise initiative and independence result from the poor selection and training of 
officer candidates?  Was it due to shortcomings in his unit’s training in the United States or 
France?  Did his failure result from the inability of his superiors to husband him along in his 
leadership development, or was Nalle just a dud?   
 Too often, the officers sent to Blois were casualties of senior officers who beat them for 
failing to use initiative while simultaneously giving them little space or latitude to develop a 
knack for independent action.  Ten years after the war, Hunter Liggett remarked that “the failure 
of more than one unit,” in the AEF “could be traced directly to the inability of the officer in 
command to delegate authority.”101  He also noted the sad reality where senior commanders tried 
                                                 
 100  2LT Owen Nalle, Blois Case Files, Box 2308.  Nalle, a 22 year old OTC graduate, had been a student at 
the Virginia Military Institute for two years when he entered the service.  The Blois Personnel Adjutant believed him 
to be “too young to handle men.”   
 101 Liggett, A.E.F Ten Years Ago in France., 261. 
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to “do a sergeant major’s, lieutenant’s, or an adjutant’s” job rather than focusing on their own.102  
If Liggett’s observations are accurate, the AEF’s junior combat leaders frequently found 
themselves between the rock of the demands for initiative and the hard place of their superiors’ 
micromanagement.  
   Officers with the slightest degree of introspection quickly became cognizant of the 
limitations of their training, experience and abilities.  These personal reservations, and the 
recognition that their failures may result in the death of their soldiers, certainly restrained some 
officers’ desire for aggressive action or a displays of initiative.  The 30th Division’s Second 
Lieutenant Foster Marshall was a case in point.  Marshall was a 23 year old college student in his 
third year at the University of South Carolina.  He had enlisted in the National Guard in 1916 
and attended the third OTC at Leon Springs, Texas in April 1918. Marshall served as an NCO in 
the 118th Infantry until his appointment came through in July 1918.  Shortly after his first tour in 
the trenches as an officer, Marshall approached his regimental commander and requested that his 
commission be revoked and that he be allowed to serve the remainder of the war as a private.  
The reason he gave for the request was that he did not believe that he had the training or the 
skills to command men in combat.103  In another case, Captain Everett Jewett, a company 
commander in the 106th Infantry, “was loath to order men under his command on any mission 
that might prove dangerous.”  While Jewett’s commander believed that there was no question 
about the captain’s personal courage, and that he had previously been a solid leader and 
administrator, he would never make a good combat officer.104   What degree of initiative could 
                                                 
 102 Ibid., 259. 
 103  2LT Foster Marshall, Blois case files, Box 2305.  The Blois board honored Marshall’s request and 
discharged him as an officer on 26 September 1918.  True to his word he immediately reenlisted as a private. 
 104  CPT Everett B. Jewett, Blois case files, Box 2302.  
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their superiors have expected from Marshall and Jewette?  How many other AEF officers 
suffered from this same paralyzing doubt, and yet soldiered on, hoping for the best?    
 One of the greatest ironies of the reclassification system was that while officers were 
being sent to Blois because of their lack of aggressiveness and initiative, the fear that the depot 
inspired actually worked against encouraging these attributes within the AEF’s junior officers.    
The fear of being “blooyed” motivated many commanders to keep their subordinates firmly "in 
line" by limiting any of their actions or activities that might reflect badly on their commands.   
This fear of removal, and their lack of confidence in the training and abilities of their junior 
leaders, encouraged the micromanagement by senior officers that Liggett described.  As an 
officer in the Inspector General’s office later noted, “Officers commenced to exhibit a degree of 
fear and apprehension lest some unavoidable event, something which they could not control, 
might operate to ruin their careers.”105  Some officers went as far as to prevent their more 
talented junior leaders from attending needed technical schools because of “the danger to 
themselves of being relieved of command for some error made by the less efficient officers.”106   
 In an effort to limit things “they could not control,” senior officers resorted to even more 
proscriptive and detailed orders for their subordinates to follow to the letter. Lieutenant Colonel 
George Marshall, the operations officer for the 1st Division, spent much of March 1918 writing 
detailed plans for trench raids to be carried out by a handful of the division’s platoons.  To 
ensure the success of these small 20 man raids, the patrols were even accompanied by 
experienced staff officers and overseen by the division commander.107  While senior AEF leaders 
                                                 
105 Col. M.G. Spinks, “Major Problems of the Inspector General, AEF, and Their Solution,” lecture given to 
the Army War College, 9 October 1933, USAMHI File AWC 401-A-5., 9.  
106 U.S. Army in the World War, Vol. 14, Reports, 401. 
107 George C. Marshall, Memories of My Service in the World War: 1917-1918 (New York: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1976), 70-73., George Marshall, The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Vol. 1, The Soldierly 
Spirit, December 1880-June 1939, ed. by Larry Bland and Sharon Ritenour (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
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understandably wanted these early American operations to succeed, they set a pattern for 
centralized command and control that haunted and hindered the AEF’s operations throughout the 
remainder of the war. With the specter of Blois never far from their minds, regimental and higher 
commanders seldom allowed their subordinates the latitude to make, and more importantly, to 
learn from their mistakes prior to going into combat.    
 The fact that failures in leadership was the second largest reason given by commanders 
for the relief of their subordinates points to another flaw in the AEF’s combat leadership.  As 
noted in previous chapters, the army itself realized that it had no method for training and 
developing leadership in its new officers.  The “Old Army” system of having officers learn the 
leadership side of their trade during a long-term apprenticeship was unworkable in World War I. 
Major General David Shanks, who commanded the embarkation point at Hoboken, New Jersey, 
had warned in 1918 that “the weakest point in the training of our young officers is their lack of 
knowledge and experience in the handling and management of their men.”108  He sadly noted 
that the army still expected an officer to learn leadership “by intuition and observation…feeling 
his way along, profiting only by the mistakes he may make.”109    
 Despite the fact that the army had no coherent plan for teaching young officers how to be 
leaders, the records of Blois also show that it could be unforgiving to those who failed to acquire 
these skills on their own.  Some failed because the job was simply too big for their training and 
abilities.  When 250 men were placed under his command, Captain James Archer was found to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Press, 1981), 131-133., Forrest Pogue, George Marshall: Education of a General 1880-1939 (New York: Viking, 
1963), 163. 
108 Major General David C. Shanks, Management of the American Soldier (New York: Booklet published 
by Thomas F. Ryan, circa 1917-1918), 4.  Shanks had the booklet published and given free to officers departing 
Camp Mills for France.  It was an expansion on a series of articles entitled “Administration and the Management of 
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be unable to “handle a large company under the existing conditions.”110  In other instances, the 
officers seemed to be at a loss to know what to do as leaders.  For example, there is no question 
that Captain Wilbur N. Farson, a company commander in the 135th Machine Gun Battalion, was 
a poor leader.  He was relieved of command on 6 September 1918 because he failed to exercise 
even basic leadership while his unit was occupying trenches in a quiet sector.  He never visited 
his platoon gun positions and “did not make platoon commander[s] properly instruct [their] men 
in their duties,” and as a result, “an inspection disclosed men in both platoons almost wholly 
ignorant of their duties.”  Despite all these failings, his regimental commander still considered 
Farson to be a “hard, conscientious worker.”111  
 Although personal limitations and character traits certainly played a large role in the 
removals of officers such as Farson and Archer, on the whole the army must also bear some of 
the blame for its failure to properly train its junior leaders.  Given the command climate in the 
AEF, there were also few incentives for senior commanders to allow their officers to make 
mistakes.  The commander of the 2nd Division’s 9th Infantry was one of the few commanders 
who gave his failing officers second chances to correct their deficiencies.  He transferred Second 
Lieutenant Able W. King repeatedly from one of his battalions to another in an effort to give him 
a fresh start and the time to improve his leadership and efficiency.  After King’s continued 
failure to improve, he was finally sent to Blois as a hopeless case.112  
 Those officers reclassified because they lacked the requisite tactical skills or professional 
knowledge were often ill-served by the army’s chaotic training system.  Lieutenant Albert C. 
Pate was packed off to Blois after being in his battalion for less than a month and having been in 
                                                 
 110  CPT James Archer, Blois case files, Box 2286., Also see MAJ Birdsall P. Briscoe, Box 2289., MAJ 
Walter A. Marden, Box 2305., CPT Charles H. Ingram, Box 2302.  Ingram had served 21 years in the Regular 
Army before being commissioned in 1917. 
 111  CPT Wilbur N. Farson, Blois case files, Box 2296. 
 112  2LT Able W. King, Blois case files, Box 2203. 
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command of his platoon for less than a week after he admitted in June 1918 that “he knew 
nothing about drill.”  The board’s investigation showed that after arriving in France as a casual 
officer, his assignment as a town mayor and regimental billeting officer had hindered his tactical 
training.  Pate noted that most of his training in France had consisted of “bayonet drill, close 
order drill and this new formation.”  Despite these failings, Pate, a 14 year veteran of the 
Wisconsin National Guard, had still managed to be promoted to first lieutenant before running 
into trouble in his new unit.113    
 Closely tied to both leadership and initiative was the need for the officer to be a sound 
administrator.  Part of the social contract that exists in all military organizations is the soldier’s 
expectations that his leaders will look out for his general welfare and provide the basics of life in 
return for his military service. Officers who failed to live up to their side of the bargain by 
failing to provide the basic food, clothing, shelter, medical, and personnel support to their men 
by being poor administrators were fatal to their unit’s cohesion and combat effectiveness.  
Officers who failed in these tasks were usually found at the company level, and comprised 
around ten percent of those sent to Blois.  Good examples of the officers reclassified for their 
failures as administrators were Captains Mirandon and Copeland.  The 113th Infantry’s Joseph E. 
Mirandon took so little interest in the “care and feeding of his men” that his regimental 
commander was forced to “devote his personal attention to the matter several times.”114  
 The commander of the 813th Pioneer Infantry noted that Captain Raymond E. Copeland 
had “tried to do everything himself” and as a consequence, “succeeded in doing almost nothing.”  
The colonel found that Copeland was hopelessly inept at accomplishing the routine 
administrative tasks of running a company and had reported two men as being AWOL for three 
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days when if fact they had been on a kitchen detail.115  Sadly, while Copeland and Mirandon 
represent the worst cases, their problems were tied to a larger issue within the AEF of junior 
leaders having only a sketchy grasp of logistics.  Without a strong corps of NCOs to help in 
these matters, the AEF often found its tactical operations dogged by missteps in feeding, 
supplying, and providing medical care for its soldiers.    
 It is interesting that relatively few officers were sent to Blois for reasons that were 
directly related to their failures in combat.  Part of this may have been that the Great War 
battlefield was so unforgiving, that those who made the greatest blunders never survived to be 
boarded.  The fact that few of the officers sent to Blois had been wounded in action may also 
point to a reticence on the part of commanders to sully the reputations of men who had nobly 
sacrificed for the cause (and with luck, wouldn’t return to their units).  Another possibility was 
that the units had managed to weed out their least competent officers prior to combat.  This is 
somewhat supported by examining when the divisions sent their infantry officers to Blois.  
 Nearly a third of the AEF divisions followed a pattern where the removal of their officers 
occurred in waves tied to key periods of their training and operations in France.116  Generally 
speaking, their first, and largest, wave of sending officers to Blois followed their periods of 
training with the Allies or after serving in a quiet sector, and a second smaller wave either 
occurred during or just after major combat operations (see Appendix A for a by-division graphic 
view of when officers were relieved).  For example, the 29th Division sent a major and a 
lieutenant to Blois during their training with the French in July 1918, and relieved three majors, 
two captains, and eight lieutenants soon after leaving their first period in a quiet sector of the 
                                                 
 115  CPT Raymond E. Copeland, Blois case files, Box 2293. 
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Alsace front in August.  The division commander removed an additional two majors, four 
captains, and four lieutenants from their units before the division entered its first real combat in 
the Meuse-Argonne on 8 October 1918.  The division only sent one more major and two more 
infantry captains to Blois between the time it entered combat and the Armistice.117  
 A similar pattern was followed by the 37th Division.  This division had the dubious 
distinction of sending the largest number of infantry officers for reclassification.  During its time 
in France, the division commander, Major General Charles Farnsworth, ordered nine majors, 14 
captains, and 31 lieutenants to Blois.  As a point of comparison, the 82nd Division, which arrived 
in France over a month prior to, and also saw more combat than, the 37th sent only three officers 
to Blois during its deployment.  This just shows that the reality in the AEF was that removal of 
an officer was guided more by the individual commander’s idiosyncratic vision of “good and 
bad” officership more than any objective standard.  Due to this fact, some divisions and 
regiments simply “ate their young” at a greater rate than others (see Appendix B for a by-
division and infantry regiment break down of the number of officers sent to Blois).  While the 
37th Division was training behind the lines or occupying trenches in the Baccarat and Avocourt 
sector of the front in July, August, and September of 1918, it removed four majors, eight 
captains, and 20 lieutenants from its infantry and machine gun units.  After the division was 
relieved from its bloody four days of operation in the Meuse-Argonne, but before it participated 
in the Ypres-Lys Offensive on 30 October, Farnsworth sent an additional six majors, four 
captains, and nine lieutenants to Blois. 
 While the remaining divisions followed no set pattern in their reliefs, they also sent a 
good percentage of their reclassified officers to Blois following their initial training and time in 
                                                 
 117 This analysis is based on comparing the dates given for the officers’ removals in their Blois case files 
with the times that the division was in training, occupying quiet sectors of the front, or engaged in combat operations 
as given in the AEF Order of Battle.  
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the trenches.  This suggests that while much of the training with the Allies and in the quiet 
sectors may have been flawed, it at least allowed commanders to identify and remove some of 
their commissioned deadwood. 
 Those officers removed during or shortly after combat certainly highlight how many 
officers were not prepared for this crucible, but may also indicate the operation of the AEF’s 
command climate of fear.  Many, if not most, of the officers sent to Blois certainly deserved to 
be removed from combat units.  Some however, certainly had their removals expedited by 
commanders wanting to place the blame for their unit’s failures on others, or at least show that 
they were being proactive in correcting any of their unit’s shortcomings.  It is not surprising that 
the number of officers relieved from the 37th, 79th, and 92nd Divisions spiked after their 
lackluster performance in the Meuse-Argonne.   
 Some division or regimental commanders sought to show their toughness to their 
superiors while also dealing with “problem” officers in their ranks.  The 36th Division appears to 
have had an overabundance of these cases.  Shortly after the war, one of the division’s officers 
recalled that soon after arriving in France, the division’s staff was reorganized and a general 
resifting of the unit’s senior officers occurred.  He noted that the first act of the new staff was to 
go after those officers within the division that it deemed “unfit for service” with a vengeance.  It 
made a great impression on him that in a matter of days, the commander of the 71st Infantry 
Brigade, Brigadier General Henry Hutchings, two colonels, two lieutenant colonels, five majors, 
and a number of captains, and lieutenants were relieved of duty and sent to the Officer 
Reclassification Center at Blois.118  As the division got settled in, more removals followed.  One 
of the purged officers, Lieutenant Mancel Coghlan, claimed that he was sent to Blois as merely 
to fill his battalion’s quota for reclassifications.  He maintained that his division commander, 
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Major General William R. Smith, “made a statement he was going to have a board, and if it were 
necessary to have a man before the board, the officer would go back to the States whether or not 
he was inefficient.”119  Interestingly, five of the officers ordered to Blois from the 36th Division 
all claimed that they were eliminated because, being Oklahomans in regiments dominated by 
Texans, they were convenient scapegoats.  All but one of the men came from the 142nd Infantry, 
a former Texas National Guard unit.120     
 Officers from other divisions also claimed to have been scapegoats for the failing of 
superior officers who were later relieved themselves.  The 140th Infantry’s Captain Henry E. 
Lewis noted that the colonel who sent him to Blois had since been relieved in the short time that 
it took him to report to the depot.  While serving as a battalion commander in the 308th Infantry, 
Captain Charles H. Harrington refused to attack the Chateau du Diable on 6 September 1918 for 
he believed that the assault “could not be carried out because of the demoralized condition of the 
men” in his unit.  Harrington noted that he opted to stop his scheduled attack when a promised 
artillery barrage failed to materialize.  Two other officers in the battalion were also ordered to 
Blois, and the brigade commander was also subsequently demoted to regimental command.  The 
board believed that Harrington had been wrongly blamed and removed for the incident and 
subsequently had him returned back to a combat assignment with the 77th Division.121   
 A study of some of the other reasons that officers were reclassified also tells us much 
about the army and the times it served in.  The officers ordered to Blois for their personal moral 
failings also illustrate the code of conduct that the AEF expected of its officers and the taboos or 
                                                 
 119 2LT Mancel Coghlan, Blois case files, Box 2292. 
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morays that it was unwilling to have transgressed.  In some cases, the officer’s transgressions 
attacked the social contract between the leaders and the led as well as the barrier between 
officers and their men.  For example, Captain Augustine P. DeZavala was sacked for lending 
money to his soldiers while charging “usurious” interests rates.122  The board viewed Lieutenant 
Ewart G. Abner as unfit for holding a commission for buying 32 pounds of chewing tobacco 
from the Quartermaster Sales Commissary with the intent of reselling the item to his soldiers for 
profit.123  The senior officers involved in these cases rightly saw the actions of these officers as 
detrimental to the discipline and morale of their units for allowing them to profit from, or prey 
upon, their soldiers. 
 Other moral failings dealt more with the morality-laced temptations of sex and demon 
rum.  Despite the moral standards of Progressive Era America, the army was not quite as 
puritanical in its outlooks as the larger society.  Drinking was fine, as long as it was not allowed 
to influence a soldier’s performance or harm the image of the army or its officers.  The officers 
who could not live within these limits quickly made themselves unwelcome in their units.  
Lieutenant Thomas Hazzard was sent to Blois after twice exhibiting conduct unbecoming an 
officer and a gentleman when he was involved in a drunken brawl with another officer after he 
“goosed” the lady that the other man was escorting.124  Likewise, the commander of Lieutenant 
Joel Bonnie lost confidence in his ability to serve as an officer due to his “excessive use of 
intoxicating liquors.”125   
 The AEF’s view of cases involving sexual misconduct generally reflected similar 
attitudes as with alcohol.  The U. S. Army in the Great War instituted the first widespread efforts 
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to provide sex education in the nation’s history.  While the army encouraged the YMCA 
representatives to pass out booklets pushing sexual abstinence, it also established a large system 
of prophylaxis stations across France.126  However, despite these efforts, if a soldier still 
contracted VD, the AEF’s judicial system showed him little compassion.  As Lieutenant Earnest 
W. Chase found out, this was doubly true for officers.  By contracting VD, Chase had basically 
“damaged government property” by rendering himself unable to carry out his duties.  Upon 
ordering him to Blois, his commander moralistically announced that he hoped that Chase’s 
replacement would be “an officer whose mind is on his work and whose determination is to 
render adequate service to his country without selfish concern for himself.”127   
 When it came to an officer needing to satisfy his sexual desires, the army tended to turn a 
blind eye unless the man’s conduct interfered with his duty or brought the service’s image and 
standing, or that of its officer corps, into question.128  The case of Second Lieutenant Arthur 
Fortinberry was a case in point.  Just before leaving the United States, Fortinberry met and 
married a woman who he had known only a short time.  Shortly afterwards, some of the soldiers 
in his unit informed him that his new wife had been working as a prostitute when he met her.  
An investigation by Fortinberry’s commander verified that the officer’s wife was a woman of 
easy virtue, and the young officer became an object of ridicule within the unit.  The board 
concluded that due to this fact, Fortinberry’s “influence and usefulness as an officer is at an 
end.”129      
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 The one sexual matter that the AEF had absolutely no tolerance for was instances of 
homosexuality.  The Blois files contain at least two cases where officers were accused of 
homosexual conduct.  Second Lieutenant John W. Royer, of the 29th Division’s 111th Machine 
Gun Battalion, was sent before a general court martial in August 1918 for violations of the 96th 
Article of War. Royer was accused of making “advances and invitations of an unnatural and 
immoral nature” to three of his soldiers while on board the ship to France, and of committing 
sodomy upon one of his privates on numerous occasions in June and July.  Although the court 
martial found him not guilty of the charges, his commander had no further use of his services 
and hurriedly sent him to Blois.130 
 The board’s treatment of officers sent for reclassification due to physical and mental 
breakdown, including those suffering from “shell shock” or combat fatigue, was much more 
sympathetic and liberal.  Officers who reported to Blois for “nervousness” or “loss of nerves”   
were treated in a rather enlightened manner. Lieutenant Morris Oppenheim was a case in point.  
Oppenheim enlisted in the Pennsylvania National Guard in 1916 and had served on the Mexican 
border.  His sterling record as an enlisted man, solid performance in combat during the Second 
Battle of the Marne in July 1918, and demonstrated skill with machine guns had led his previous 
commander to send him to the AEF’s candidate school.  When he was commissioned in 
September, the army assigned him as a machine gun platoon leader in the 30th Division.  He 
seemed to have all of the best characteristics sought by the army in its junior leaders.  In fact, for 
his hearing one of his squad leaders noted that “in the advance he had acted so bravely that I 
thought, well we have a Liut. that will stick to us no matter what happened.”  But despite this 
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bravery, he broke under the strain of shell fire during his unit’s attack in the Argonne on           
17 October 1918, straggled from the lines was apprehended in Paris seven days later.  Although 
Oppenheim could easily have been charged with desertion or even misconduct in the face of the 
enemy, his commander and the board members appreciated the strain that combat had put on 
him and agreed that both he and the army would be best served by finding him a non-combat 
billet.131  The board’s tendency towards leniency in these cases also supports historian Ben 
Shephard’s contention in A War of Nerves that the U. S. Army held relatively progressive ideas 
of combat stress in World War I.132   
  One last group of the officers sent to Blois is worth examining for what they tell us about 
American society during the Great War.  At least three of the infantry officers were sent to the 
depot for their alleged pro-German or anti-American statements or actions.  During the war the 
United States was wracked by a propaganda-driven wave of war hysteria.  The xenophobic “100 
percent Americanism,” the belief in the existence of vast enemy spy rings, and a popular anti-
German ground swell all contributed to a toxic domestic environment that encouraged the 
American people to support a massive curtailment of civil liberties and to willingly play the 
informant on any neighbor who seemed at odds with the spirit of the times.133   
 The three cases of suspected disloyalty show that the domestic phobias and fantasies 
were also played out in the U. S. Army.  For example, on the passage to France on the S. S. 
Baltic, Lieutenant Arthur T. Guston stated that German submarines would be “justifiable in 
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sinking this ship.”  His fellow officers believed that his comments failed to show “a proper spirit 
of loyalty” and promptly informed the AEF Intelligence Section of Guston’s pro-German 
sympathies.134  In August 1918, Captain Louis J. Lampke was removed from a company 
command in the 80th Division because the AEF G2 had discovered that his brother had ties to 
German steamship companies and that the captain had been “very desirous of securing large 
scale maps displaying the trench system” and seeking to have certain men with “distinct German 
names” detailed to his unit.135  In the last case, the 28th Division’s Captain Felix Campuzano, 
whose mother was German, was cashiered after admitting to his battalion commander that 
during a recent attack “it was very hard for him mentally to…fight against a people whom he 
had been taught to love and revere.”136  
 These three officers were not the only American leaders to come under suspicion of 
disloyalty during the war.  The files of the AEF Military Intelligence Section reveal that it 
investigated at least 65 other officers for various allegations or suspicions of holding               
pro-German sympathies or other opinions that were un-American.  Reflecting the tenor of the 
times, most of these investigations started with a letter or anonymous tip that expressed some 
doubts about the officer’s heritage, attitudes or actions.  Some of the innuendos merely stated 
that since the officer’s parents, or the officer himself, had been born in Germany, he needed to 
be checked.137   A number of officers were charged with having held pro-German sympathies 
prior to the war, or had family members known for their German sympathies.  The fact that 
Lieutenant Samuel Scherk’s father was a naturalized citizen of German birth, did not want to see 
                                                 
 134 1LT Arthur T. Guston, Blois case files, Box 2298. 
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his son drafted, and refused to buy Liberty Bonds, was enough to have the young officer placed 
under surveillance in May 1918.138   
In some cases merely having a German name and “looking” German was enough to cast 
suspicions on an officer.  The 311th Infantry’s Captain Breen was investigated not only due to 
the fact he spoke German and had once lived in Germany, but also because “the attention of his 
fellow officers was called to Capt. Breen by reason of his appearance, carriage, and manners, 
which suggest those of a German officer.”139   Sometimes, the accusations against the officer 
would have been laughable if the stakes involved were not so high.  Lieutenant Walter Cohrs 
turned informant against a Chaplain Lohr for the latter’s observation that “the peoples in 
Germany kept their homes and grounds in cleaner condition than those in France.”140  Ironically 
a number of American soldiers in the Army of Occupation frequently made the same 
observation.   
 One of the more interesting cases of officers being investigated for their German 
sympathies involved Captain (later Lieutenant Colonel) Walter Krueger.  In June 1918 the 
Military Intelligence Branch informed the chief of the AEF’s Intelligence Section, Colonel 
Dennis Nolan, that it had received a letter from an officer who was attending the AEF’s staff 
college with Krueger casting doubts upon the latter’s loyalty.  The letter stated that Krueger was 
born in Germany, had two brothers and several other close relatives serving in the German 
Army, and expressed the opinion that “I hardly think it fair to our Army to have such a man, 
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even if he is loyal.”141  Nolan reported the findings of his investigation to the AEF Chief of Staff 
six days later. He noted that while Krueger was “a very efficient and well trained officer,” and 
his recommendation was “no reflection upon the loyalty or patriotism of this officer,” he would 
render better service to the army by being reassigned to duty in the United States after his 
graduation from the staff college.142   
 His return to the United States proved only a minor setback in Krueger’s career.  He 
remained in the army after the war and continued to build a reputation as solid performer.  In 
World War II, he rose to command the 6th Army and led it through some of the bitterest fighting 
in the Pacific Theater.  In many ways, Krueger was fortunate in that his investigation did no 
lasting damage to him; many of the other officers sent to Blois or investigated for disloyalty 
were not so lucky.  They, and their reputations, fell victim to a period of American history where 
unthinking passions and virulent propaganda created a perfect storm of slander and innuendo 
that was neatly wrapped and concealed in the patriotic folds of the American flag.     
 In the final analysis, the operations of the AEF’s reclassification centers illuminate much 
about its corps of junior officers and the command climate set by its senior leaders.  Pershing 
was not one to suffer fools of any rank lightly.  Given the frenetic pace under which the U. S. 
Army was cobbled together, and the numerous shortcuts that characterized the American 
mobilization, it was incumbent upon him to identify and weed out those leaders whose training 
and abilities made them unfit to perform their combat roles.  Most of the officers sent to Blois 
probably deserved their fate, but they were merely the worst, or the most unlucky, of an overall 
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corps of junior leaders whose training and experience had not adequately prepared them for the 
tactical, technical, and leadership crucible into which they were thrown.  However, in seeking 
perfection in the leadership of the AEF, Pershing had also encouraged the creation of a command 
climate based on the fear of being relieved of command.  This climate permeated units from their 
very arrival under his command.  One artillery officer reported that a steady winnowing of new 
officers began soon after his unit landed in France in June 1918.  In a very short amount of time 
he witnessed, “two Lieutenants now paymasters.  One Captain [now a] mess officer for life. One 
Major simply relieved from duty.  Lots of others will see Front only via movies.”  He noted that 
officers were being subjected to “efficiency exams daily” that were resulting in “heads 
falling.”143  While the climate that this officer observed pushed commanders to accomplish their 
missions and demand results from their subordinates, it also encouraged them to micromanage 
their units, reduce the initiative of their subordinates, stifle the development of their junior 
leaders, and heedlessly push attacks after it was clear that such efforts were not worth the cost of 
the gain.   
                                                 
 143 Anonymous, Wine, Women and War: A Diary of Disillusionment (New York: J.H. Sears and Company, 
1926), 108. 
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Chapter 11 
 Noncoms, Doughboys and the Sam Brownes: 
The Relations between the Leader and the Led in the U. S. Army 
 
 On 20 August 1917, General Pershing issued General Order 23 establishing the standards 
for the wearing of uniforms in the AEF.  The order stipulated that “when in uniform outside of 
their own quarters all officers will wear the Sam Browne belt except when actually serving in the 
trenches.”1  In one fell swoop, Pershing established a physical manifestation of the differences 
between the officers and enlisted men in France, and also created a badge by which officers 
serving in the United States could be differentiated from those serving overseas.  The belt was 
merely another brick in the regulatory and customary wall that created and maintained the gulf 
between the leader and the led in the U. S. Army.  The fact that the term “Sam Brownes” became 
an enlisted man’s slang for the officers in the AEF shows that the common doughboys and their 
NCOs were well aware of the importance of symbolism and the realities that governed their 
interaction with the commissioned leaders appointed over them. 
 This chapter will examine the personal relations between the leaders and the led in the U. 
S. Army of the Great War.  This discussion will cover not only the relationship between officers 
and enlisted men, but also, the interaction of the enlisted men and their NCOs, and the relations 
between junior officers and their field and flag grade superiors.  While previous chapters have 
studied the Regular Army and its senior leaders’ expectation of their junior officers and NCOs, 
this chapter will look at the issue from the bottom up to uncover what the soldiers required of 
their leaders, and how well the bosses met the expectations of those they led.  This examination 
will offer insight into the cohesiveness of the AEF’s small units as they approached the trials of 
combat.          
                                                 
 1 AEF General Order 23, 20 August 1917. 
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 When examining the relationship between the leader and the led in the AEF, it is 
important to note that much of the evidence from memoirs, surveys, and other sources written 
after the war tends to suggest that officers, NCOs, and soldiers generally got along well.  
Between 1975 and 1983, the U. S. Army Military History Institute received approximately 5300 
responses to a survey it sent to veterans of World War I.2  Two of the questions on the survey 
related directly to the subject of leadership and asked the veteran to comment on the quality of 
leadership in the military as well as any examples they had of particularly good or bad leadership 
they had encountered.  A random review of the surveys indicates that a majority of the veterans 
believed that their leadership was good.  For example, a 28th Division infantryman, Corporal 
Alonzo LaVenture, stated that on the whole, “our officers and noncoms were capable of doing 
[their] duties,” but also noted, “once in a great time we would get a dud.”3  Another veteran, 
Sergeant Major Mervyn F. Burke maintained that “Leadership was uniformly good, particularly 
in the 1st Div, as the majority (at least in 1917) had had good training.”4 
 The doughboys’ generally positive view of their leaders was also shown in the reports of 
base censors soon after the war.  In December 1918 and January 1919, the AEF censors office 
opened and read the homeward bound mail of troops in the 78th, 79th, 80th, and 81st Divisions to 
gage the soldiers’ morale and concerns.  In all of the units except the 81st Division, the soldiers 
were usually satisfied with the leaders and mostly concerned with their return to the United 
States.  The examination of the 81st Division’s mail revealed that there was “a decided 
dissatisfaction over the officers at present assigned to them,” especially in the unit’s infantry 
                                                 
 2 Hermine Scholz, Special Bibliography 20, Vol. 1, World War I Manuscripts: The World War I Survey 
(Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1986), iii-vi. 
 3 CPL Alonzo M. LaVenture, 111 IN, 28th Div, USAMHI WWI Veterans’ Survey.   
 4 SMG Mervyn F. Burke, Headquarters Troops, 1st Div, USAMHI WWI Veterans’ Survey. 
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regiments.5  The revelation about the morale in the division led the AEF GHQ to launch a more 
thorough  investigation of the doughboys’ complaints.  A further examination of 8,485 letters, 
and interviews of 150 of the 81st Division’s soldiers and officers, discovered that “the feeling of 
the enlisted men toward their officers is very satisfactory and all are working in harmony.”6   
 Other veterans were less complementary of their leaders and made it clear that the space 
of 57 to 65 years after the war had not diminished their resentment over the treatment they had 
received in the service.  Howard Supple, an infantryman in the 35th Division, praised senior 
Regular Army officers, but noted that “in the lower grades, with a few outstanding exceptions, 
[there was a] rather mediocre level of leadership.”7  In a similar vein, the 1st Division’s Private 
Elmer Stovall believed that the “ninety day wonders” that came to his unit “lacked the leadership 
ability needed to inspire the respect of the men, especially the older career men.”8  Private Harry 
King, of the 2nd Division’s 23rd Infantry, acidly observed that some of his officers were so bad 
that he wondered why they were leaders as opposed to members of a garbage detail.9   
 Even if the veterans who believed that their wartime leadership was good represented the 
majority view, the ones who presented a more jaundiced view of their leaders point to tensions in 
the relationship between the leaders and the led in the AEF.  Many of the criticisms given by the 
later group were also reflected in wartime records and the memoirs and diaries published by 
soldiers after the war.  These other sources show that tensions often sprang up in AEF units due 
to the failure of leaders to live up to their soldiers’ expectations, the inequality of privileges 
                                                 
 5 Memorandum from CPT B. A. Adams, Base Censor to G-2D, G.H. Am/ E. F., Subject: Examination of 
mail of 78th, 79th, 80th, and 81st Divisions, dated 28 January 1919, in NARA RG 120, Entry 588, Box 129. 
 6 Report of MAJ Albert T. Rich, Assistant Inspector General to The Inspector General, 1st Army, Subject: 
Report of Investigation Concerning Morale in the 81st Division, dated 1 March 1919, in NARA RG 120, Entry 588, 
Box 129.   
 7 Howard Supple, 137th IN, 35th Div, USAMHI WWI Veterans’ Survey. 
 8 PFC Elmer Stovall, 1st Ammunition Train, 1st Div, USAMHI WWI Veterans’ Survey. 
 9 PFC Henry P. King, 23rd IN, 2nd Div, USAMHI WWI Veterans’ Survey.   
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between the ranks, the unequal treatment of regulars, guardsmen and reservists, and the belief 
that superior officers did not understand the physical realities and hardships endured by junior 
leaders and their soldiers.  Part of these problems could also be traced to the fact that the 
hierarchical nature of military service and the reality that “rank hath its privileges” was at odds 
with the larger society’s political and social conceptions of egalitarianism. Even though the 
nation’s traditional concept of egalitarianism was under siege by the ongoing consolidation of 
wealth and power into the hands of fewer and fewer people, the notion of social equality 
remained strong within the ranks of the white native doughboys. 
 Upon enlistment or conscription, the soldier became a ward of the state.  In return for the 
man’s military service, the army, as the state’s agent, became almost totally responsible for his 
health and welfare.  This meant that the society and the soldier expected the army to fully 
provide for the individual’s food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.  The company level and 
below was the crucible where this exchange transpired.  A unit’s NCOs and junior officers were 
the leaders that the army held responsible for administering or providing the vital goods and 
services their soldiers needed.   
 From the company commander to the squad leaders, there existed a social contract 
between the leaders and the led.  The soldiers expected their leaders to provide for their comfort, 
welfare, and heath, and in return the men more or less willingly agreed to follow the orders of 
their leaders and place their lives and labors at the disposal of their commanders.  As an 
institution, the army understood this social contract and had long made paternalism, rather than 
iron fisted coercion, its preferred method for regulating the relationship between officers, NCOs, 
and soldiers. 
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 As has been shown in previous chapters, in its official publications and regulations, as 
well as the semi-official writings of Regular Army officers, the concept of paternalism was 
stressed to the officers commissioned during the war.  It is clear that many, if not most, of these 
officers understood and internalized the paternalistic social contract that governed their relations 
with their soldiers.  Captain Carroll Swan recalled that in his unit he treated his men like “a son 
or brother,” and viewed his company as a “family.”  He maintained,  
  To my mind the company commander has the best job in the service today, and all 
  the Captains I’ve talked to feel that way, and have that strongly developed feeling  
  for their men.  The Captain’s responsibility is a great one.  Every one of those two 
  hundred and fifty boys look to him for everything.  Their morals, there   
  disciplined, their training, their joys and sorrows, their health, their very life and  
  death are in his hands.10  
 
Less prosaically, Hervey Allen, an infantry officer in the 28th Division, simply declared, 
  The men expected to be fed, and they looked to the officers to feed them.  To  
  feed, clothe, equip, and pay the men- that is about all a line officer can do   
  anyway,- pictures of sword flourishers in battle notwithstanding.  Excuses make  
  cold fare…11 
 
This belief that it was the duty of one’s superior to “take care” of you, also extended to the ranks 
of the army’s junior officers.  In a letter home, Captain Earnest McKeignan informed his wife 
that his regiment had received a new colonel and that, “We are glad to have him as our 
commanding officer, as he will know how to take care of us.”12  
 One of the basics of combat leadership is the ability of junior officers and NCOs to 
competently “do routine things, routinely.”  To the soldiers of the AEF, the “routine things” they 
expected of their leaders were the officers’ and NCOs’ abilities to live up to their end of the 
                                                 
 10 Captain Carroll J. Swan, My Company (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1918), 32-3. 
 11 Hervey Allen, Towards the Flame (New York: Farrar & Rienhart, 1926), 7. 
 12 Letter from Captain Earnest F. McKeignan to “Dearest Sweetheart,” dated 6 September 1917, in 
Captain Earnest F. McKeignan Papers, Liberty Memorial Archives, Kansas City, Missouri. 
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social contract by consistently providing the basic goods and services the doughboys required.13  
As George Marshall accurately noted, “War and training here is mud and rain and cold.  The 
officer, platoon chief, who can keep his men’s socks and shoes greased and dry and his horses 
groomed and the picket line above the flood of water and mud- he is the greatest contributor to 
our success in this war.” 14  The leaders who could “deliver the goods” not only tended to build 
cohesive units, but also were able to draw upon a reservoir of good will with their soldiers when 
combat situations demanded hardships and privations.  For example, the 165th Infantry’s 
Sergeant Tom FitzSimmons was characterized by Private Albert Ettinger as “one of those natural 
leaders who men would follow anywhere.”15  Ettinger claimed that the men respected and 
followed the sergeant because “they knew that he would never let them down” and because “he 
always made certain that his men had dry quarters, plenty to eat, and that their boots and 
uniforms were in good condition.”16  When the 165th Infantry became mired in a brutal two day 
attack to take Landres-St George on 14 and 15 October 1918, FitzSimmon’s Stakes Mortar crews 
stuck by their guns and their sergeant despite frightful casualties.17   
 Unfortunately, not all of the AEF’s leaders were up the challenge of “doing routine 
things, routinely.”  On 30 June 1918, the II Corps inspector, Lieutenant Colonel K. T. Riggs, 
found that the in the 30th Division, the officers were not adequately caring for the welfare of their 
subordinates.18  An inspection of the 27th Division in July 1918 revealed that junior infantry 
                                                 
 13 The concept of “doing routine things, routinely,” resulted from conversations held between Dr. Dennis 
Showalter and the author while the former was a visiting professor at the Department of History, United States 
Military Academy in 1998. 
 14  George Marshall, The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Vol. I, The Soldierly Spirit December 1880- 
June 1939, edited by Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 127. 
 15 Albert Ettinger, A Doughboy With the Fighting 69th (Shippensburg: White Mane Publishing Company, 
1992), 147.    
 16 Ibid. 
 17 Ibid., 160-5. 
 18 U.S. Army Center of Military History, The U.S. Army in the World War, Vol. 3, Training (Washington 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988), 221-2. 
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officers were not “sufficiently instructed and zealous in providing for the health and comfort of 
[their] men, especially in matters of rations, bathing, and clothing.”19   
 The inspections illustrated one of the great cracks in the army’s system of paternalistic 
leadership.  There was a great difference between leaders understanding the importance of caring 
for their soldiers and actually knowing how to accomplish the “routine things” that ensured the 
delivery of the required goods and services.  Very little of the training that officers received in 
the OTCs and COTSs was related to the arcane arts of feeding, supplying, and administering 
small units.  The army’s attempts to correct these shortfalls by expanding instruction in these 
areas in the winter of 1918 were overtaken by the dire shortage of officers in the spring and 
summer of 1918.  This problem was slightly less acute for National Guard officers.  Whatever 
the flaws of the tactical training they received on the Mexican border in 1916, the deployment at 
least provided guard officers with much hands-on experience in feeding, sheltering, and 
supplying soldiers in both garrison and field environments.20   
 On the whole, however, most junior officers still had to rely on hard-earned experience to 
learn how to live up to their end of the social contract.  Unfortunately, the experiences of soldiers 
in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign revealed that far too many AEF leaders had difficulties in 
“doing the routine things” of supply and messing that their units needed in combat.  As will be 
seen, the soldiers who believed that their leaders had not lived up to their end of the bargain, in 
turn, failed to provide the obedience and sacrifices demanded of their end of the social contract. 
 Building upon the groundbreaking work of Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, Darryl 
Henderson argues that sound leadership is one of the most important precursors to the creation of 
cohesive and successful combat units.  In Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat, Henderson 
                                                 
 19 Ibid., 208-9. 
 20 U.S. National Guard Bureau, Report on Mobilization of the Organized Militia and National Guard of the 
United States 1916 (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1916), 145. 
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maintains that the most effective leaders were those officers and NCOs who were competent in 
the military skills required of their positions, and who also had the ability to create “personal, 
empathetic, and continuing face-to-face contact with all soldiers in the unit.”21  The junior 
officers and NCOs played the vital role of establishing the norms of behavior that governed the 
unit’s day-to-day operations.  These unit norms set the performance expectations of all of its 
members, and this was a “yard stick” for measuring the performance of the individuals within the 
organization.  Henderson argues that the key role of the leader is to create and use the norms 
within the small group to achieve the goals of the higher military organization. 
  Henderson maintains that the leader derives the authority and influence to establish the 
unit’s norms and achieve the goals of the higher military organization in his unit by drawing 
upon and wielding the four sources of power available to him.  These sources are reward and 
coerce power, legitimate power, referent power, and expert power.  Reward and coercive power 
gives the leader the ability to build and direct group norms by giving the individual positive and 
negative incentives to conform to the unit’s expected behavior.  Rewards and punishment target 
the individual’s self-esteem, sense of security, and acceptance within the framework of the unit 
as a whole, thus giving the leader a great source of authority while also reinforcing the unity and 
loyalty of the group.  Legitimate power is derived from the culture, laws, and values of the larger 
society.  It gives the leader the “official” and legal right to exercise the authority of their 
position.  Referent power is the leader’s ability to control others based on the respect and 
affection that he receives from his soldiers.  The referent leader has built within his unit an 
                                                 
 21 William D. Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat  (Washington DC: National Defense 
University Press, 1985), 108., Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the 
Wehrmacht in World War II,” in The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer, 1948), 280-315.  
Henderson was particularly influenced by Shils and Janowitz’s emphasis on the importance of the small unit 
primary group in maintaining group cohesion, and in the importance of junior officers and NCOs in establishing 
“face to face” relations with their men and in regulating the group’s interaction with the rest of the army.    
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“intense identification” between himself and his soldiers based on his intimate knowledge of his 
subordinates, his proven ability to deal with difficult situations, and his willingness to share the 
hardships of his men.  Expert power is given to the leader when he is “perceived as having 
superior knowledge and ability important to the soldier and his unit” that improves the group’s 
effectiveness or survival.22  Although Henderson argues that units led by officers using referent 
power tended to be the most cohesive, all of the sources of influence were critical to linking the 
goals of the unit to those of the larger organization.  Henderson’s thesis and leadership model 
was borne out in the experiences of the AEF.   
 Time and time again, American soldiers praised those officers and NCOs who truly lived 
the paternalistic ethos and demonstrated by their actions a concern for their men that transcended 
that required by regulation and custom.  Those officers able to draw upon this “referent power” 
through their personality and actions established deep bonds of mutual respect and affection that 
provided a tough psychological armor for their units and its individual members that aided them 
in coping with the strains of campaigning.  This “referent power” required leaders to sacrifice 
some of the distance and privileges of rank to build the face-to-face relationships.  Charles 
Minder noted that during a particularly arduous march, “The Captain did other wonderful things 
for the fellows.  I saw him give a couple of fellows some water from his own canteen.  He 
walked his horse instead of riding him, and that is something that few officers would do.”  He 
also noted that the Captain even carried a soldier’s pack for him when the man seemed to be 
overtaken by heat and fatigue.23 In another example, Private Ray Johnson remembered that after 
the 145th Infantry’s machine gun company was marched to a desolate village behind the lines 
after being pulled from the Argonne drive, the company commander discovered that his higher 
                                                 
 22 Ibid., 112-115. 
 23 Charles Minder, This Man’s War (New York: Pevensey Press, 1931), 108. 
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headquarters had failed to coordinate for billeting and other accommodations.  The captain and 
his remaining lieutenant knew that they had “a bunch of men on their hands who were foot-sore, 
underfed, in low spirits, and on the verge of serious illness” and acted accordingly.  After finding 
shelter for their soldiers, the two officers “took turn standing guard…so that every man could 
snatch some sleep.  Their self-imposed duty lasted until the next morning.”24 
 Regrettably, there was also a downside to leadership based upon referent power.  The 
death of a respected and beloved leader, an event that happened quite frequently during the war, 
could cause a great slump in unit morale and effectiveness and create a great obstacle for the 
officer or NCO who replaced the lost man.  For example, Private L. V. Jacks recalled that a 
“deep gloom settled down” upon his battalion during the Meuse-Argonne fighting after the death 
of their battalion commander, Major Thompson.  The private later wrote that the major, “was the 
only officer who was universally liked and admired by the enlisted men, and his demise 
produced an instant and serious depression.”25  
 Soldiers also expected their leaders to share the privations, hardships, and dangers that 
they lived with on a daily basis, and those officers and NCOs that did so, strengthened their 
referent power within their units.  Corporal Chester Baker was please to note that during his 
unit’s first stint to the trenches “I noticed that the dugout assigned to Lieutenant Thompson 
remained empty.  During the entire engagement that was to come, I never saw him take 
advantage of its greater safety; he stayed in the trenches with his men.”26   The 26th Division’s 
Lieutenant Walter O’Donohue also won the affections of his men by not standing on rank and 
                                                 
 24 Ray N. Johnson, Heaven, Hell, or Hoboken (Cleveland: O. S. Hubbell Printing Company, 1919), 114-5.    
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always sharing the discomforts and hazards of the long marches and battles with his men.  This 
affection and loyalty later paid the officer a great dividend when the dugout he was in collapsed 
during a heavy enemy bombardment.  One of his soldiers saved O’Donohue’s life by braving the 
German shelling to dig the officer out of the collapsed shelter.27   
 This expectation of shared hardship was also applied by junior officers to their superiors.   
For example, after a cold and wet bivouac during an forced march to the front lines, Captain B. 
A. Colonna stated that the thing that most buoyed his and his company’s morale was when they 
woke up to find their battalion commander “sitting up with his back against a tree, wrapped in a 
trench coat- no better off than we were.”28  During the St. Mihiel Offensive, Colonna was also 
surprised and pleased to see “someone higher up than myself dodging shells” when his 
regimental commander and a major from the division staff visited his troops in the reserve 
trenches.  Of his commander, he noted, “it might have been wrong in theory for him to be up 
there, but I surely appreciated it.”29  These incidents built morale and cohesion by physically 
proving to the soldiers that their leaders had a concrete understanding of the conditions under 
which they labored and had a solid conception of the abilities and limitations of their men.  The 
presence of leaders during times of stress and danger also linked them to their soldiers through 
common experiences and demonstrated to the men that their leaders could completely perform 
their duties under the worst of conditions. 
 Conversely, those leaders who failed to share the privations of their soldiers or to build 
the close face-to-face relationships touted by Henderson, often faced a rocky road when they 
tried to command their units.  One of Thomas Barber’s fellow pioneer infantry officers 
                                                 
 27 Stanley J. Herzog, Helmets (Stamford, CT.: The Bell Press, 1930), 57-70, 220-224. 
 28 B. A. Colonna, ed. The History of Company B, 311th Infantry in the World War (Freehold, NJ: Transcript 
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undermined the discipline of his company by never allowing his men to stop their road repair 
work when they came under enemy shellfire, while the officers always took shelter themselves.30  
The 42nd Division’s Charles MacArthur was incensed when his officers ordered him and his 
comrades to work through the night while they went off to sleep in a comfortable dugout.31    
 When faced with their leaders’ failure to abide by the unspoken code of shared hardship, 
the soldiers often refused to be bound by the leaders’ orders, worked to undermine their 
authority, or rejoiced in (and sometimes abetted) the leaders’ downfall.  In the case of the pioneer 
infantry company mentioned above, the soldiers in the unit simply waited for their officers to 
disappear into their bomb shelters before they stopped working and sought cover themselves.32  
In another instance, in February 1918 a company commander in the 26th Division became angry 
that some of his men had fallen out of a cold and dreary march and were riding in the unit’s 
wagons.  The captain, who was riding a horse, ordered his first sergeant to use a pistol if 
necessary to keep the men out of the wagons and moving forward.  When the top sergeant tried 
to tell the officer that the men in the wagons were too sick and weary to march, the officer 
abruptly cut him off and informed the NCO that he would hold him personally responsible for 
seeing that his orders were carried out.  The first sergeant believed that the captain was acting 
irrationally and, after the officer passed, told the sick men to stay in the wagons.  When the 
company reached its destination, the captain found that the first sergeant and most of the 
company’s NCOs had left the formation and headed for the town of Toul in protest of what they 
saw as the officer’s high-handed actions.33  Similarly, Sergeant Elmer Straub noted that some 
men grew so tired of the attitudes and actions of their officers that they staged mini-mutinies 
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against their leaders.  After repeatedly being berated by his horse-mounted lieutenant for moving 
too slowly on a march, one soldier in Straub’s unit threw his equipment into the mud, refused to 
move forward, and informed the imperious officer that “he wasn’t a pack horse.”34 
 The AEF’s enlisted men enjoyed seeing a hated officer or NCO brought low for their 
transgressions against the social contract or the code of shared hardships.  William Clarke 
recalled that his company commander “looked and acted the aristocrat,” and “was aloof and not 
easily approachable.”  He was taken aback by the officer’s unwillingness to either mix with his 
soldiers or to get his hands dirty while training in the United States.  The captain’s actions led 
Clarke to conclude, “How or why he was ever cast in the role of a commanding officer of a 
company of combat troops, I don’t know.”  The officer got his comeuppance during his unit’s 
passage to France.  When word reached the captain of a possible submarine attack on the 
troopship, the officer rushed on deck in a panic wearing an inflatable lifesaving suit that was not 
available for the soldiers.  After being meet with “a great woop and holler of scorn and derision” 
by his unforgiving troops for his ridiculous and frightened appearance, Clarke noted that the 
officer’s “usefulness to his men had ended on the deck” of the ship, and from then on he 
remained a “Captain in name only.”35  All of these incidents illustrate that despite Pershing’s 
efforts to instill the unquestioning discipline of West Point into the AEF, at the lowest levels, the 
concepts of obedience and discipline were governed by ongoing negotiations between the leader 
and the led based on concepts of reciprocity and expectations of shared hardships. 
 Although army regulations and military and civil law gave all officers and NCOs the 
ability to use what Darryl Henderson termed “legitimate” and “reward and cohesive” powers, in 
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the AEF, these were both rather thin and brittle reeds on which its leaders could base their 
authority.  On paper, military law, especially for offenses conducted in wartime, was very 
draconian and allowed for the use of imprisonment with hard labor or the death penalty for a vast 
array of offenses.  Yet, while the raw number of general and summary courts martial increased 
between 1915 and 1918, this increase was not proportional to the massive expansion of the army. 
The actual percentage of soldiers being brought before the courts actually plummeted during the 
war.  In 1916, for example, over 4.7 percent of the army’s enlisted men were tried by a general 
court martial.  In 1918, the percentage of soldiers tried by general military courts dropped to .87 
percent.36  Also, during the war, the AEF only executed ten soldiers.  All of the men executed 
were for the rape or murder of civilians rather than offenses directly related to military service 
such as desertion or misconduct in the face of the enemy.37 
 There were a number of factors that tended to limit the coercive power that leaders could 
wield over their soldiers. As the pace of events grew more rapid in 1918, the AEF GHQ tried to 
limit the numbers of military trials and avoid removing soldiers from the ranks for lengthy trials 
or discharges.  AEF General Order 56, issued on 13 April 1918, curbed sentences that removed 
soldiers from France due to dishonorable discharges or imprisonment at the Disciplinary 
Barracks at Fort Leavenworth.  It also urged commanders to use a court martial only as a last 
resort.38  The following month, the AEF GHQ issued General Order 78, allowing division 
commanders to establish “provisional disciplinary detachments” within their battalions as a 
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means for maintaining order without losing time and combat power to trials or other 
punishments.39   
 The guidance from higher headquarters was clear; Pershing and his senior staff did not 
want time and effort wasted on a lot of military trials.  However, by doing so, the GHQ also 
severely restricted the punishments its subordinate commanders could use to discipline 
reprobates or set examples that might warn-off potential misconduct.  Although the sentences of 
summary courts and non-judicial commanders’ boards could be onerous to the soldiers, few 
seemed to be worried by the threat of these punishments.  The “easy come-easy go” nature of 
promoting NCOs, and the lack of privileges associated with those ranks, meant that the threat of 
demotion was also hollow.  Even worse, some officers found that they had to quickly reappoint 
busted NCOs because no other men in the unit were qualified to hold the positions.40   
 Another factor limiting the effectiveness of punitive measures as a tool to reinforce 
authority was the general lack of knowledge of military law by many of the new officers.  When 
the army moved to the COTS system for commissioning officers, the War Department specified 
that the candidates would receive 13 hours of instruction on military law and the Manual for 
Courts Martial.41  Although this move doubled the amount of instruction given on these subjects 
in the previous OTCs, when the COTS classes were condensed to make up for officer shortages, 
military law was one of the classes that was curtailed.  Thus, new platoon, company, and 
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battalion commanders often had only a most basic and sketchy concept of the coercive powers at 
their disposal. 
 The new officers’ lack of knowledge of military law also led to several occasions where 
the leaders exceeded the punishments allowed by army regulations and the Manual for Courts 
Martial.  Captain Edward Tanner, an infantry company commander in the 90th Division, was sent 
before a reclassification board at Blois in August 1918 for ordering his NCOs to beat or whip 
five men he believed were drunk, ill-disciplined, and insubordinate.  At his hearing, the captain 
maintained that he was not “going to hand these cases over to a summary court” and had 
“wanted [the NCOs] to tend to these things themselves” to build a spirit of responsibility in his 
subordinate leaders.42  It was clear that Tanner did not believe that his actions were either wrong 
or out of his purview as a company commander.   
 In another case where leaders exceeded their authority, the ending was much more tragic.  
After Private Julius VanCamp was found guilty of insubordination and sentenced to extra duty 
by his company commander, he refused to work or obey the orders of the sentry placed over him.  
When informed of VanCamp’s refusal, the company commander and first sergeant assigned a 
corporal to watch over him and “make the man work.”  The corporal interpreted his orders 
literally, and when VanCamp again refused to obey, he began prodding him with a bayonet.  
When VanCamp turned on the corporal in anger, the startled NCO mortally wounded him with a 
stab to the groin.  The regimental commander ultimately preferred charges against the corporal 
and NCO and ordered an investigation of the company commander.43  In both the Tanner and the 
VanCamp cases, the junior leaders believed that they were well within their rights to impose 
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physical punishments on soldier-reprobates for the good order and discipline of their units, and 
in both cases, the leaders’ superiors had to step in to correct their grave mistakes.  In an army 
where senior leaders were fearful of relief, and subordinate leaders were poorly instructed on the 
powers and limitations of military law, it was natural for senior officers to restrain their 
subordinates’ punishments and use of military courts.  
 The soldiers were quick to pick up on the limits of their superior’s coercive power and 
sometimes were more than willing to call the leader’s bluff.  Corporal Paul Maxwell was 
disgusted when his popular company commander was promoted and replaced by “a martinet 
with a sadistic complex.”  He recalled that from the new officer’s first appearance, the officer 
undermined the morale of the unit.  Maxwell later wrote, 
Introducing himself to the Battery he denounced us as a bunch of spoiled sissys  
 and said he hated our guts but he would convert us into a tough fighting outfit  
 or kill us in the attempt…His favorite maneuver was Summary Court Martial, he  
 managed at least one each week.  To some unfortunate individual who made a  
 trivial mistake that meant three days in the Guard House with suspension of pay.  
 My mistake was, at inspection of quarters he spied a small piece of lint between  
 my bunk and Corporal Jones’.  He held us both responsible, and gave us the  
 choice of Company Punishment or Courts Martial.  Jones went down first and  
 chose Company Punishment.  When I got the same proposition I chose Courts  
 Martial.  The Captain jumped to his feet, shook his fist in my face and called me a 
 damned lousy soldier, who would voluntarily besmirch his record with a Courts  
 Martial.44 
 
As the general court martial that Maxwell accepted would have besmirched the record of the 
company and brought the commander’s actions under the scrutiny of his superiors, the flustered 
captain angrily dismissed the charges against Maxwell. 
 The longer that soldiers served, especially among combat veterans, the less willing they 
became to accept leadership based on what Henderson termed coercive or legitimate power.  The 
3rd Division’s Private John Barkley noted that it was tough to be a replacement officer assigned 
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to a veteran unit.  The officers themselves sometime exacerbated this problem by their words and 
actions.  He recalled that during the Argonne drive, 
  The new officers began making themselves unpopular as soon as they arrived.   
  They were replacements.  Not a front-line officer in the lot.  The men were all too  
  desperate to be bothered with forms and they weren’t very respectful.45 
 
After one of the new arrivals yelled, “What’s a matter with this goddam hard-boiled outfit?” and 
accused the men of acting like babies, the veterans informed him in no uncertain terms that they 
weren’t “in the mood for parade ground stuff.”  Although the officer threatened to have the men 
arrested, the soldiers’ hoots of derision drove the man to realize the weakness of his hand and 
beat a hasty retreat.  The term “I’ll put you under arrest” became a running joke among the 
veterans.46   
 Charles MacArthur recounted a similar event in his unit.  Soon after being pulled from 
the Meuse-Argonne attack for some rest and refitting, a new and unpopular officer demanded 
that the men make an extra effort to clean up their surroundings in a badly damaged French 
village.  MacArthur jokingly recalled, 
  All this was woman’s work, and we told the lieutenant so.  We told him to go  
  away and not do that any more.  At first we were very polite, and it wasn’t until  
  Lieutenant Wegner got cross and bad-tempered that we were the least bit severe  
  with him.  Lieutenants are like children that way.  They begin by talking back.   
  The next thing you know they are out of hand and have to be sent to military  
  school.47  
 
Likewise, during the St. Mihiel Offensive, Leslie Langille and his comrades grew so tired that 
they preferred to be left alone to sleep through German barrages rather than being rousted out of 
their slumber by their officers and forced to take shelter.  When the men refused to move, 
Langille recalled, “the officers threatened to court-martial the whole outfit, but a court-martial 
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would be a welcome relief to the mud and rain and shells, so nobody pays any attention to their 
threats and goes on sleeping.”  The men’s insubordinate attitudes were not helped by the fact that 
their company first sergeant had taken up residence in a large dugout and even insisted that his 
meals be brought to him there.48   
 The experiences of Maxwell, Barkley, MacArthur, and Langille all point to the fact that 
the relationship between the leader and the led in the U. S. Army was far from being a one way 
street.  Leadership was based on a system of ongoing negotiations between officers, NCOs, and 
their soldiers where the character, ability, and willingness of the leader to share his men’s 
hardship counted much more than army regulations or the president’s signature on a commission. 
 The ability of AEF junior leaders to base their authority on “expert power” was also 
limited.  As has been discussed in previous chapters, the degree of training and experience 
between junior leaders and their soldiers was rather slim.  Shortly after the war, Raymond B. 
Fosdick, the director of the Commission on Training Camp Activities and the War Department’s 
special consultant on troop morale, conducted an inspection tour of the AEF to gage the overall 
morale of the army in France.  Fosdick reported to the Secretary of War that, 
  In our army both officers and men are drawn from a common economic and social 
  reservoir.  There are plenty of men of superior education and high mental and  
  moral qualities in the ranks of the A.E.F.  Conversely, there are plenty of   
  commissioned and non-commissioned officers who have none of these attributes.  
  I do not believe that an army was ever recruited in which the common soldier  
  possessed such a high average and social experience as in the American Army of  
  1917 and 1919.  By the same reasoning it must be admitted that in no army have  
  the officers been superior to their men by so small a margin.49 
 
Fosdick’s rather stinging indictment of leadership was also shared by some of the AEF’s own 
officers.  Major Robert G. Calder wrote, "In this war our men in the ranks have been superior to 
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our officers, that is as soldiers they were better than the officers were as leaders."50 An artillery 
lieutenant noted, "The United States Army is the best that I have had the chance to observe, but 
this is because of the high grade of its enlisted personnel, and not so much because of its 
officers."51 The AEF’s soldiers were clearly “thinking bayonets” that quickly came to realize the 
personal cost of their officers’ lack of tactical knowledge or skill.  As one captain confessed, "It 
is useless to try to fool the American enlisted man: he soon loses respect for his officers when he 
observes their lack of experience, gained through the school of hard knocks."52   
 The enlisted men also expected that their leaders display coolness and courage in combat.  
This expectation was grounded in long-standing American concepts of manliness as well the 
more recent ideas of war and “the strenuous life” being the ultimate test of character and moral 
fiber.  If an officer or NCO proved himself brave and unflappable under fire, the American 
soldiers seemed willing to overlook many of the man’s minor shortcomings.  One 27th Division 
machine gunner praised his company officers because, “they were with the men at times, and 
their quick decisions, involving as they did all our lives, were such as to steady the men and give 
them confidence in the success of the operations.”53  Albert Ettinger’s faith in Sergeant Tom 
FitzSimmons was based on the fact that the NCO was also cool under fire, led men in combat 
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from the front, and “was courageous, intelligent, considerate of his men, and lucky- an 
unbeatable combination.”54   
 Leaders who failed the test of courage quickly lost the respect and obedience of their 
soldiers and became the objects of scorn and ridicule.  After all his officers had been wounded 
and evacuated in the Argonne fight, Horace Baker’s battalion commander sent his company a 
new lieutenant to take command.  Unfortunately, Baker recalled, “this worthy stayed in the 
dugout the two days he was with us…and I never saw him.”55  By hiding out in the bunker, the 
hapless officer lost all moral suasion with the soldiers.  The men simply acted as if he did not 
exist and went to their remaining NCOs for orders and guidance.  A soldier in the 42nd Division 
recalled that two of the soldiers in his company got back at an unpopular and somewhat nervous 
lieutenant during the Meuse-Argonne Campaign by firing their .45 pistols over the dugout where 
the officer had hidden himself and yelling loudly in “bum German” to increase the man’s 
“distress.”56   
 Of course there was a downside to the soldiers’ expectations of steadfast bravery in their 
leaders.  Keeping up the outward appearance of daring and courageousness was a great 
psychological burden to many officers.  During his first patrol into no man’s land, Lieutenant W. 
A. Sirmon admitted that he was “badly frightened.”  He later wrote, “I was shaking badly, but 
swearing to myself I would not run.”57  Others were pushed to recklessly expose themselves to 
danger in order to “prove” their merit to their soldiers and peers.  As his company was entering 
its first stint in the trenches, a fellow officer noted that Lieutenant Wendell Westover did not 
look well.  Although the regiment’s doctor had diagnosed the officer as unfit for duty due to a 
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high fever and possible tonsillitis, the officer refused to be hospitalized.  Westover replied that 
his refusal was based on the fact that “If I fail to go in [to the trenches] the first night the platoon 
will think I’m yellow.”58  The desire for officers to “prove” themselves in combat led Captain 
John Stringfellow’s regimental commander to issue an exasperated directive to the unit’s officers 
stating, 
  I have had a number of requests from you for permission to lead squads in raids  
  upon the enemy’s trench.  It is properly the duty of a corporal.  If you still desire  
  to do this, I will remove your shoulder bars and place corporal’s chevrons upon  
  your sleeves and put your bars on the corporal.59  
 
These expectations of bravery and the need to “prove” oneself, later contributed to the AEF’s 
high officer losses in combat.   
 One of the other expectations that AEF soldiers had of their officers was their ability to 
balance the needs of the mission with the needs of their men.  The army and its senior 
commanders desired that their subordinates achieve their missions and contribute to the success 
of the overall operation.  The individual soldier’s desire, however, is to survive the mission while 
achieving the greatest possible physical comfort in terms of safety, food, clothing, and shelter.  
While the former’s view is shaped by calculations of strategy and tactics, the latter’s view is 
governed by Abraham Maslow’s “Hierarchy of Needs.”  The junior leader was the one who is 
caught between these two, often diametrically opposed, realities and forced to reconcile the 
needs of the individual with the demands of the larger organization.  This balancing act requires 
the leader to understand the ever changing limitations on military actions imposed by the 
physical and mental needs of their soldiers and also his unit’s role within the missions of the 
higher organization. 
                                                 
 58 Westover, 60. 
 59 Captain John S. Stringfellow, Hell! No! (Boston: Meador Publishing Company, 1936), 143-4.  
 
  610
 Henderson maintains that in cohesive and effective units, the small unit leaders establish 
the norms of behavior that regulate the group’s actions and relations with higher authority.  The 
leaders’ personal relations with his soldiers furthers the accomplishment of the mission by giving 
them a means of collectively coping with fear and privation, while also providing the individual 
soldier a sense that he has some control over his destiny.60   
 A number of the AEF’s junior leaders seemed to have understood this need to balance 
“mission and men.” Some also recognized the fact that this effort to establish a workable 
equilibrium was often a thankless job that pleased neither party.  Lieutenant Wendell Westover, 
of the 2nd Division, recalled that lieutenants held the key position in the army between the 
individual soldier and the impersonal calculations of the rest of the chain of command.  He 
neatly summarized the psychological strain that this balancing act placed on these key officers 
when he wrote, 
  Lightly trained to think in higher terms, understanding comes with much meager  
  information as shifts down to him; he interprets it for his men.  His, the direct and  
  all important task of leadership, of understanding, of living the human and  
  inhuman days with the Men who occupy the ground and gain the decision in  
  battle…To him first comes responsibility- responsibility for other men’s lives.   
  His the closest contact; his the greatest grief.  The Lieutenant is taught that it is  
  necessary to sacrifice men in the attainment of a battlefield objective- then asked  
  to lead  those men into battle.61 
 
These strains were also felt at the lowest levels of leadership.  Corporal Charles Minder, of the 
306th Machine Gun Battalion, mused in a letter home that “ever since I was drafted into the 
army, I never had any use whatsoever for Sergeants,” but as soon as he became an NCO he had 
come to understand the pressure they were under.  Still, he resolved “to be a different kind of 
sergeant than the dirty punks I ran into” when he first got into the army.62  He also lamented that 
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“the disadvantage of being a Corporal,” was that “you’ve always got to act as if you side with the 
officers, otherwise you would have no control over the men at all.”63 
 The pressures and stresses felt by leaders such as Minder and Westover were increased 
when orders by superior officers or staff members seemed detached from the realities of life in 
small units.  Lieutenant Hervey Allen perceptively noted “one of the hardest things for an officer 
to do is to enforce a stupid order when the men are intelligent enough to know better.  This is 
where ‘discipline’ generally and fortunately breaks down in the American army.”64  In his 
farewell address to his company, Captain B. A. Colonna recalled, 
  Now no one knows better than I how many orders you men received, and how it 
  was often beyond human power to obey all of them…The Co. Cmdr. is the one  
  man who can’t pass the buck on responsibility.  We had to take the bushels of  
  orders we received, eliminate those utterly impossible, select those remaining  
  what seemed essential and what we thought the Major and Colonel seemed  
  essential, and then get those things done by the company…And then one usually  
  amasses a balling out for something or other that he has left out.65 
 
These officers all realized that when units went from being colored flags on a map to thinking, 
flesh and blood soldiers, executing orders and missions became a much more complicated 
undertaking than senior officers could calculate. 
 Those officers who were able to find the proper equilibrium between “mission and men” 
were able to reap the rewards of “referent power” among their soldiers, while avoiding the ire of 
their superiors.  Chester Baker recalled that his company commander, Lieutenant Thompson, had 
gained the respect of his men by constantly sharing their privations and issuing his orders more 
as “polite requests” than barking directives. However, it was the officer’s behavior in a single 
incident that won Baker’s undying affection and loyalty.  During a stint in the trenches, 
Thompson ordered Baker to deliver a message to the battalion command post through heavy 
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shellfire.  Upon arriving at the battalion headquarters, the major ordered Baker to deliver a reply 
to Thompson and then to return back through heavy shellfire to the battalion command post.  
After returning to Thompson and informing the lieutenant of the major’s directive to return to 
headquarters, Thompson told Baker, “forget it, Corporal…If he wants another report on 
conditions here, he can come for it himself.”  Baker later recalled, “I thanked God that 
Lieutenant Thompson had his men’s welfare more at heart than the Major did.”66  In this case, 
Thompson believed that the needs of Baker simply outweighed the somewhat lesser needs of his 
battalion commander.   
 By establishing a close personal relationship with their soldiers, some officers also gained 
the insight to know when they should crack down on discipline and when they were best served 
by allowing certain transgressions by their men to go unpunished.  Lieutenant Jeremiah Evarts 
discovered that sometimes good leadership entailed serving as a “heat shield” to protect their 
subordinates from the wrath of their higher commanders.  While his company was occupying 
trenches near Cantigny in May 1918, one of Evarts’ soldiers had a dud artillery shell land 
between his legs and the man “only missed being castrated by about ten inches.”  After this close 
call, the soldier went AWOL and was found the next evening holed up in cave, drunk off a 
looted case of cognac, and threatening to shoot anyone who tried to roust him.  Evarts managed 
to convince the man to drop his weapon and talked him out of his hole.  When Evarts’ company 
commander wanted to have the man brought up on serious charges, the lieutenant convinced the 
captain that the man “was too good a soldier to lose or to break his spirit,” and gave the wayward 
soldier only company punishment for his transgressions.  In the end, Evarts’ ability to shield the 
soldier paid off and the man later did well in combat.67 
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 Despite the efforts of many officers to live the paternalistic ethos of leadership and 
establish strong bonds with their soldiers through face-to-face relationships and shared danger 
and hardships, a number of sources point to the fact that junior leaders often fell short of these 
lofty goals.  In his report to the Secretary of War on the morale of soldiers in the AEF, Raymond 
Fosdick noted that far too many officers tended to act in a manner considered “galling to the 
democratic spirit of the troops."  Although the paternalistic ethos demanded that officers place 
the welfare and comfort of their soldiers above their own, he discovered that… 
  the possession of a Sam Browne belt in the A.E.F. has carried with it advantages  
  out of all proportion to disciplinary requirements or the needs of the occasion, and 
  officers have been allowed and encouraged to claim and even monopolize such  
  advantages in ways that have shown a total lack of the spirit of fair play.68 
 
Fosdick noted that while it was easy for officers to wrangle passes to local towns or to see the 
sights, it was nearly impossible for enlisted men to gain the same privilege.  He even observed 
incidents where officers had ordered enlisted men to give up their seats at the Y.M.C.A. or other 
morale building performances.  He argued that to the average American soldier, “these privileges 
suggest a caste system which has no sanction in America and against which they instinctively 
rebel.”69 
 Fosdick’s accusations were echoed by a number of doughboys. The 1st Division’s 
Sergeant Charles Strikell pointed out, 
  One thing not understood by the enlisted man was the great gulf that existed 
  between a commissioned officer and an enlisted man…The enlisted man could  
  never understand why an officer should have better food, more leave, better  
  quarters than he did.  He could not understand why the officer was always the  
  boss when often he did not know what he was talking about.70 
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Even some officers shared Strikell’s critique.  In a survey of officers awaiting demobilization, a  
number of them expressed regret at their own, or their peers', failure to better safeguard the  
welfare and just treatment of their soldiers.71  An infantry officer shamefully admitted and  
condemned the "tendency of officers to always consider their own comforts and pleasure rather  
than that of their men."72  Another denounced the practice where “officers being able to pull 
stuff…that the same officers would court martial an enlisted man for.”73 
 From their first step onto a troopship going to France to their last step off of the ship  
coming home, the actions of the AEF’s officers drove home to the enlisted men the great gulf  
that existed between the ranks.  Onboard ship, the officers enjoyed sleeping in cabins and eating 
at their own well-supplied mess.  On 10 April 1918, Lieutenant Harris wrote to his parent, “the 
trip over was wonderful…. no trip could be more enjoyable.  The scotch was plentiful and the 
food excellent…. the damnedest pleasure trip I ever took!”74  Things weren’t quite so nice in the 
soldier’s berths below deck.  One 42nd Division doughboy recalled that soldiers were “crowded 
like horses into narrow bunks, with the plainest of food, in total darkness at night, denied even 
the solace of a cigarette except by daylight.”75  Food lines were long, washing impossible, and 
restrictions often prevented men from getting any fresh air topside.  Although there was little that 
most officers on board could do about conditions on the troopships, that was scant consolation to 
the soldiers who saw how “the other half lived.”  One officer sadly recorded that “the officers 
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were well fed and in a civilized fashion in the cabin, which didn’t help matters much for the 
men.”76   
 The inequalities of enlisted life were far from over when the soldiers reached France.  To 
maintain the social distance between officers and their men, the AEF followed the European 
practice of messing and billeting officers separately from the troops while in training camps or 
garrisons.  When occupying a new town, an officer from the regiment or battalion preceded their 
units to arrange with the local French authorities for quartering the unit’s officers and men.  This 
officer also ensured that the lodging for his peers and superiors was the best that the town could 
offer.  While officers were quartered in inns or local residences, the soldiers were billeted in 
schools, churches, or more often, the haylofts of local barns.  Hervey Allen rather shamefacedly 
admitted that while his soldiers made the best of sharing shelter with the locals’ farm animals, he 
and his fellow officers slept in a “real bed, a deep feather bed, in an old peasant’s house.”77  The 
officers’ quartering arrangements frequently included meals with the host family, while the men 
subsisted on the pedestrian bounty of the company kitchen or whatever delicacies they could buy 
from the townspeople.  These arrangements were often so good for officers that one lieutenant 
was moved to write home, “Our life here is damn nice….  I believe [William T.] Sherman was 
too pessimistic” in his view that war was hell.”78  However, one second lieutenant acknowledge 
that given these enforced distinctions, “officers do not live close enough to their men and 
therefore do not learn the personality of each.”79 
 As the American enlisted men came into contact with soldiers in the other Allied armies, 
some became painfully aware of the AEF’s class system.  This especially applied to NCOs.  
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While observing a British unit in the trenches, Corporal Joseph Lawrence noted the higher 
degree of respect and authority that British NCOs were given in comparison to American 
sergeants.  He saw that a British Company Sergeant Major was not only granted more authority 
and privileges than an American first sergeant, but also “as a rule he has more influence with the 
men than do their immediate officers.”80  Lawrence was also surprised that the differences of 
respect, privilege, and authority between the British NCOs and the American peers, extended all 
the way to the rank of corporal.  Likewise, the 82nd Division’s Sergeant Richard McBride 
observed that “The British sergeant is a highly respected individual and of course is accorded 
privileges beyond those of the soldiers in the ranks.”81  He noted that unlike in the American 
Army, British NCOs were assigned quarters in billets rather than barns when in the rear area.   
 Given the strength of the “separate and unequal” status between the ranks of the U. S. 
Army, it is not surprising that some officers continued to assert their privileges even while at the 
front.  Charles MacArthur recalled that one new officer “suffered from acute sensibilities and a 
perpetual desire to assert his rank,” and that it “was rumored that he had caused himself to be 
tattooed with gold bars” in case he was ever found by his soldiers bare-chested.82 Private Jonas 
E. Warrell noted that soon after he found a relatively comfortable place to spend the night after a 
hard day of fighting in the Vesle Sector in August 1918, “the colonel casually remarked that he 
could use my quarters, so as he outranked me by at least a few points, I vacated.”83  During the 
Meuse-Argonne battle, Captain Thomas Barber saw nothing wrong with making a “snug little 
home” in a safe and dry German dugout while his troops slept out in the open in pup tents.  He 
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justified his actions by noting that while the men all had shelter tents, he only had a blanket and 
poncho.84 
 Despite all these transgressions against the paternalistic code, an officer really had to step 
out of line before he was brought to heel by his peers or superiors.  Captain John Stringfellow 
wrote that after one of his fellow officers received a slight wound he appeared at the forward 
dressing station and demanded that the crowd of wounded enlisted men awaiting treatment 
“make way” for him due to his rank.  Luckily, the medical officer in charge of the station would 
have none of the man’s assertion of privilege and promptly ordered the captain to wait his turn.85 
It is hard to say how great the gulf was in the relationship between the AEF’s officers and men, 
but, these incidents all point to the existence of a vast gap between the rhetoric of paternalism 
and the realities lived by the army’s enlisted men.    
 There were other indications that the American officer corps, especially among the ranks 
of the wartime OTC and COTS graduates, had failed to internalize the Regular Army’s pre-war 
precepts of paternalism.  Wartime reports and post-war memoirs and diaries contain incidents 
where junior leaders had abused their power or had used physical force when dealing with their 
enlisted men.  In January 1919, the Morale Branch of the General Staff directed the morale 
officers at stateside posts to conduct surveys of enlisted men awaiting demobilization.  The 
surveys were to gage the soldiers’ attitudes about their military experiences and lasting 
impressions of the service.   
 The soldiers interviewed at Camp Grant, Illinois stated that the things that most galled 
them in their service were the attitudes and unfair actions of their officers and NCOs.  They 
stated, “the man who feels himself humiliated by swearing, punished for an unknown offense, or 
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under the control of ‘hard-boiled’ non-commissioned officers is so engrossed with these ideas 
and resentful of them that it is almost impossible for him to go into training with enough spirit 
and attention for him to learn either well or rapidly.”  As with Fosdick’s report to the Secretary 
of War, the soldiers in the stateside survey indicated that they chaffed under their leaders’ 
demands for absolute authority without any apparent military necessity, and the tendency of 
officers and NCOs to use harsh and abusive language toward them.86 
 The soldiers surveyed at Camp Devens, Massachusetts held similar attitudes to those at 
Camp Grant, but tended to be slightly more detailed in their responses.  When asked of their 
opinions of the relationship between officers and men, most stated that the dictates of military 
discipline required that there be a strict separation between the ranks.  They also acknowledged 
that discipline that might have been viewed by civilians as harsh and undemocratic was still 
necessary to keep the army from turning into a mob.  However, a large number of respondents 
qualified their statements by noting that OTC officers tended to abuse their authority and take an 
unnecessarily strict and unbending approach to discipline.  One soldier noted, “We must have 
discipline in the Army, but not like some of these 90-day lieutenants think.”  Another stated, 
“there is such a thing as carrying [discipline] to extremes, which I have noticed most of the 
National Army officers, who never had a man under them before in their lives, practiced.”87 
 Some soldiers maintained that they had not given up their rights as citizens when they 
entered the service and were quick to denounce leaders who they believed had contravened army 
regulations.  The records of the Morale Branch of the General Staff contain a number of letters 
written by doughboys to political, civic, and military leaders complaining of their treatment at 
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the hands of officers and NCOs.  For example, on 27 August 1918, a soldier assigned to the 153rd 
Depot Brigade at Camp Dix, New Jersey sent an anonymous letter to the national headquarters of 
the American Red Cross complaining of the treatment that he and his comrades were receiving in 
the camp.  The man claimed that the unit’s leaders “talk to us like dogs,” and when a group of 
the recruits spoke to the major about their concerns, they found that “he is just as bad as any one 
else here he curse us out bout coming to him complaining about food.”88 The groups who 
tended to be on the receiving end of much of the abuse by officers and NCOs were non-English 
speaking immigrants and African Americans.  Although historian Nancy Gentile Ford has noted 
that the army, as an institution, made great leaps during the war to accommodate the needs of the 
immigrant soldiers, and that the soldiers themselves were active agents in carving out their own 
space in the military, these efforts had done nothing to eliminate the prejudice and xenophobia of 
the average Anglo-Saxon native-born officer and NCO.89  The Morale Branch and its agents 
received a number of complaints against native-born junior leaders from immigrant soldiers.  A 
group of immigrant recruits informed the Camp Devens Morale Officer that they were glad that, 
  We have escaped the clutches of some non-commissioned officers who   
  continually humiliated us, put us to work at hard labor and often assaulted and  
  kicked us.  The hardest and dirties work was performed by details of us non- 
  English-speaking soldiers.  We are a laboring party, instead of soldiers.90 
 
On 20 July 1918, Camp Devens Intelligence and Morale Officer, Captain Earnest Wood, 
reported to his superior on the General Staff on the problems between the camp’s officers and 
NCOs and its large number of foreign soldiers.  He believed that NCOs were not “treating all 
those of foreign birth with consideration,” and that constantly calling them “foreigners” and 
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“guineas” was turning a “patriotic and loyal soldier” into a disciplinary problem.91  His pleas had 
little effect, for nearly two month later he was still reporting that the camp’s officers held 
negative attitudes toward “non-English-speaking selectives,” and often referred to these soldiers 
as “‘Guineas,’ ‘wops,’ ‘squareheads’, etc.”  He also noticed a tendency for officers to “use 
personal violence” to get the immigrant-soldiers “to perform promptly commands which they do 
not understand.”92 
 The verbal and physical abuse of foreign soldiers was not limited to Camp Devens.  The 
morale officer at Camp Gordon, Georgia noted that several of his sources on the post reported 
that “trouble and ill feelings” were being created by the propensity of the post’s native-born 
leaders calling foreign-born soldiers “various epithets such as ‘wops,’ ‘dagoes,’ etc.”  He 
recommended that the use of such terms should be prohibited.93 
 The relationship between white officers and NCOs and African American soldiers was a 
bit more complex.  On one hand, there were white officers such as Colonel William Hayward, 
the commander of the 369th Infantry, and arch manual-writer Colonel James Moss, commander 
of the 367th Infantry, who consistently displayed a concern for the welfare and success of their 
black soldiers that reflected the patriarchal ethos.  In a May 1918 article in Outlook magazine, 
Moss wrote that when dealing with black soldiers, 
  Make the colored man feel that you have faith in him, and then, by sympathetic 
  and conscientious training and instruction, help him fit himself in a military 
  way to vindicate that faith, to “make good.”  Be strict with him, but treat him  
  fairly and justly, making him realize that in your dealings with him he will always 
  be given a square deal.94 
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Although their paternalism had a twinge of condescension, both Moss and Hayward seemed to 
believe that they were contributing to the “uplift of the race.”95  On the other hand were the 
officers who came to their assignments fully expecting their black soldiers to fail or believed 
that, given their soldiers’ innate racial flaws, they had to be “driven” instead of led and 
controlled by draconian discipline rather than shaped through training and patience. Major 
General Robert Bullard stated that much of the problem of the 92nd Division stemmed from the 
prevalence of the later group among its white senior staff officers and commanders.  Bullard 
noted that, with exception of its commander, Charles Ballou, “not one of them believed that the 
92nd Division would ever be worth anything as soldiers,” and that the white regulars “would have 
given anything to be transferred to any other duty.”96  
  The AEF’s African American soldiers had many of the same expectations of their leaders 
as did white doughboys.  Black soldiers expected the junior leaders, of whatever race, to 
demonstrate courage in battle and to care for their health, comfort, and welfare.  However, the 
black doughboys also seem to have expected their leaders to work on their behalf to eliminate or 
minimize the inequalities that they faced due to their race in the utilization of their units, their 
access to recreation facilities, and their access to justice.  When one of their soldiers was kicked 
by a white NCO for “talking back” while the 371st Infantry was assigned to stevedore duty at St. 
Nazaire, the unit’s black officers confronted the post commander and demanded that their men 
be treated with the respect due all American soldiers.  With this accomplished, “the men went 
back to work overjoyed to know at last that officers of their own color had intervened in their 
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behalf.”97  On a similar occasion, Major Arthur Little, a white battalion commander in the 369th 
Infantry, expressed the outrage of his men when he insisted that an MP officer discipline one of 
his white policemen for beating one of Little’s black soldiers.  The MP officer explained that the 
"niggers were feeling their oats a bit" and that he had been given instructions to "take it out of 
them as quickly, just as soon as they arrived, so as not to have any trouble later on."98  Little’s 
refusal to accept this explanation, and his efforts to have the policy overturned, helped him to 
gain the respect and support of his soldiers.   
 As with other American soldiers, the black doughboys were quick to criticize their 
leaders when they felt that the officers and NCOs had acted unfairly, violated army regulations, 
or failed to live up to their end of the social contract.  In October 1918, a group of African 
American soldiers training at Camp Gordon wrote letters directly to Secretary of War Baker 
complaining of the treatment they received at the Georgia post.  One soldier wrote that not only 
did they not get enough food, but also, “we are in tents [with] no flooring in winter clothing just 
thin blankets no wood to burn.”  He also noted that black soldiers were worked seven days a 
week and were never given passes to Atlanta.  Another complained of inadequate food and 
medical care and the fact that the men had to perform hard labor while sick.99  On 3 November 
1918, a black soldier training at Camp Grant, Illinois reported similar abuse in a letter to his 
hometown pastor.  The pastor in turn, sent it to Emmett J. Scott, the War Department’s Special 
Assistant to the Secretary of War.  The soldier echoed many of the same complaints as the men 
at Camp Gordon and noted the propensity of white southern “cracker officers” to punctuate their 
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commands with curses at the troops.  The man noted, “they treat us as though we are dogs.  We 
are cursed and dogged around just as though we are not human.”100 
 The Camp Gordon soldier’s complaint against white southern “cracker officers” 
highlights one of the greatest problems in the relationship between black soldiers and white 
officers and NCOs.  Many senior War Department officials and officers generally accepted the 
assumption that white southerners made the best possible leaders for African American units 
because they had more experience in “bossing Negros,” and supposedly had a better 
understanding of the psychology of black people.101  Concern over the treatment of African 
American soldiers in a number of stateside camps led the Morale Branch to have its post 
representatives survey and question white leaders of “colored troops” about the state of race 
relations in their units and their attitudes toward, and condition of, their soldiers.  The survey 
also addressed the question of the effectiveness of white southerners as the leaders of African 
American units.   
 The morale officer at Camp Pike, Arkansas reported on 6 November 1918 that, contrary 
to some beliefs, white officers and NCOs did not need to have prior experience in “handling 
negroes” to be successful leaders.  However, he warned that white leaders who felt themselves 
“especially capable of handling negroes because of previous experience among them in labor 
work, and who feels they can only be led by driving,” should not be placed with black troops.  
Unfortunately, the morale officer’s warning seldom seems to have been heeded.102  The African 
American journalist Monroe Mason described the white commander of the 371st Infantry, 
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Colonel Perry Miles, as “a southern gentleman with the well-known proclivities of the ‘South-in-
the-Saddle’ in his veins,” and the colonel of the 372nd Infantry as an officer with “a leaning 
toward southern prejudices.”103  Mason argued that the leadership of white southern officers was 
irreparably tainted with prejudice and racial assumption of the unsuitability of black men to serve 
as officers or soldiers.  
 Statements made by white southern officers tend to back Mason’s assertion that they had 
little faith in their soldiers and consciously or unconsciously undermined the morale and 
effectiveness of their units.  One white battalion commander noted that “the general attitude of 
white officers over negro troops is one of desire to educate and help the negro- an attitude almost 
of pity for his ignorance and hopelessness.”104  One wonders why any officer would want to lead 
“hopeless” soldiers into combat?  These attitudes even reached the highest levels of command in 
the AEF.  Major General Robert Bullard, an Alabaman with experience leading a black regiment, 
wrote, “having passed a pleasant boyhood with the Negroes and had this satisfactory experience 
with them in my early military life, I found myself with most kindly feelings towards them...”105  
Yet, for all of his “kindly feelings,” Bullard admitted in his diary of the 92nd Division, “They are 
really inferior soldiers,” and “Poor Negroes! They are hopelessly inferior.”106  
 It seems that the actions and attitudes of white officers had to be particularly harsh 
against their black soldiers before the army took any action against them. In one instance, 
Captain Timothy Mahoney was investigated by the AEF’s Intelligence Section in May 1918 for 
comments he had made about his black soldiers.  Mahoney was alleged to have stated before 
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leaving the United States, “All I hope is that when they send me across I can line up this bunch 
of niggers of mine into some formation and that a German shell will get them and me.”107  At 
least two white officers were sent for reclassification at Blois due to their “unsuitability to 
command colored troops.  Captain William Caldwell was relived of command in the 92nd 
Division because he lacked the patience and “sympathy for colored troops” required of his 
assignment.”108  The other officer, First Lieutenant Julius Rogovin was sent to Blois because of 
his “natural dislike for colored troops.”  Rogovin believed that his relief stemmed from the fact 
that he was a “Southerner with [a] negro regiment [where the] other officers[,] Northern [,] 
didn’t agree with his mode of handling them.”  He stated “my personal conviction after years of 
intermittent observations in various parts of [the] south” was that one had to “rule a negro with a 
firm hand.”109   Between the overtly crude racism of Mahoney and Rogovin and the 
paternalistically-clad and more subtle racism of Bullard, it was no wonder that African American 
officers and soldiers often had little faith in the social contract that supposedly linked the white 
leaders to the black led.  However, this is a subject that requires much more study and analysis 
than can be provided for in this paper.  
 Although immigrants and African American soldiers had special cause to doubt the 
commitment of their white native-born officers and NCOs to the army’s high-minded concepts 
of leadership, why was this also a problem across the army?  Fosdick blamed the failure of the 
AEF’s leaders to live up to its paternalistic ideas on the inability of Regular Army officers to 
understand that citizen-soldiers required different handling from the hardened men who filled the 
army’s pre-war ranks.  He also maintained that the Regulars had done too well at teaching the 
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army’s new officers that “rank hath its privileges” and the need to guard against over-familiarity 
between the ranks, and had done too poorly at instructing them on their duties and obligations to 
their soldiers. Of the OTCs, Fosdick complained, 
 . . . These schools with their hasty training too often turned out officers 
 with no well-developed sense of responsibility, officers to whom the Sam  
Browne belt and the epaulets were merely the badge of a superior social  
class, the symbols of rights and privileges jealously to be guarded even at  
the expense of the welfare and morale of the men of their commands.110   
Given the actions of some of the AEF’s officers, Fosdick’s assessment seems to have had merit. 
 The regulars’ disdain for the National Guard, and their efforts to imbue the graduates of  
the OTCs and COTS with their own Uptonian visions of “a proper military policy” for the  
nation, gave the new officers a skewed vision of the proper relationship between officers and 
their men.  A number of OTC graduates recalled that they left officers’ training believing that the 
National Guard’s concepts of leadership were fundamentally flawed. After graduating from 
OTC, Lieutenant Maury Maverick was assigned to the 157th Infantry, formerly the 1st Infantry 
Regiment of the Colorado National Guard.  He recalled, “Many of us arrived with big ideas- that 
we would reform this ‘militia regiment,’ with our superior training.”111  Colonel Robert 
Morehead of the 139th Field Artillery noted that soon after his unit began training, he received 16 
new officers fresh from the first OTCs.  He was also taken aback by the fact that,  
  …in the training camp they had been led to have an unfavorable impression of the 
 National Guard and for a long time many of them were dissatisfied with their 
 assignment to a National Guard regiment.  This feeling on the part of Reserve 
 Officers, I subsequently learned was very general throughout the army at the 
 time…112  
 
                                                 
 110 Report of Raymond B. Fosdick to Secretary of War Newton Baker, Subject: Report to the Secretary of 
War on the Relation of Officers and Men in the A.E.F., dated 17 April 1919, in NARA RG 165, Entry 376, Box 18. 
 
 111 Maury Maverick, A Maverick American (New York: Covici Friede Publishers, 1937), 109. 
 112 Colonel Robert Morehead, The Story of the 139th Field Artillery, American Expeditionary Forces 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1920), 33. 
  627
An infantry captain reported that “Regular Army officers as a general thing, openly belittle the 
National Guard,” and worked to “hold back” guard units and officers.113 The success of regular 
officers in molding the graduates of the OTCs in their own image exacerbated or created tensions 
between the leaders and the led in AEF units. 
 The history of conflict between regulars and guardsmen, and the various routes to a 
commission, led to a factional strife within many units that undermined morale and cohesion.   In 
October 1917, Will Judy recorded that  
  I had not been in Camp Logan longer than forty-eight hours when I was knocked  
  down by army caste.  The regulars speak slightingly of the national guard and the  
  guard calls the national army conscripts.  Even within the regular army is a caste  
  of castes, the West Point group; these conspire against their fellows who have  
  come up from the ranks.114 
 
At times, National Guard officers returned the alleged contempt of the OTC graduates with 
disdain of their own.  When Lieutenant Huge Thompson reported to the Rainbow Division’s 
168th Infantry, the unit’s National Guard officers gave him and his fellow reservists a very chilly 
reception.  His new commander told in no uncertain terms that his unit was formerly of the Iowa 
National Guard and it had traditions which the new officer was expected to uphold.115  One of 
the guard officers loudly proclaimed that the new officers were so ill-trained that they “couldn’t 
turn a platoon around in a ten-acre field,” and his first impression of the battalion commander 
was that he seemed to only like two things: “cognac and cursing the helpless reservists.”116  
 One of the greatest sources of factionalism in the AEF’s officer corps was the differing 
views of discipline and the proper relationship between officers and their men held by 
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guardsmen and regulars. Regulars often criticized National Guard officers for failing to 
understand that discipline required the maintenance of a sharp line of separation between officers 
and their soldiers.  A Regular Army corps inspector informed officers of the 35th Division that 
they were “too familiar with their men,” and sniffed, “This divisions bears all the ear marks of a 
National Guard Division.”117  In a 6 November 1918 report on the conditions within the 26th 
Division, Colonel J. A. Baer stated,  
  …this division has babied its men heretofore and as a result there has been  
  continued complaining that the soldiers are tired and overworked.  This does not  
  come from the soldiers but from a few officers who have brought with them from  
  the National Guard a paternal attitude toward the men, and the feeling that their  
  men should be rested and spared further hard work.118 
 
The regular officers often believed that what they saw as lax discipline in the National Guard 
units stemmed from too much fraternization between the ranks.  One regular officer warned 
training camp students that,  
  One of the rules is expressed in the regulation that familiarity between yourself  
  and enlisted men is inadmissible.  This seems like a harsh rule in democratic  
  America, but it is one which you will find necessary to apply, but with sound  
  judgment and discretion.119 
 
The regulars’ view that “familiarity builds contempt” was a cornerstone of the leadership 
principles propagated in the semi-official publications of its officers and in the official 
publications of the War Department.120  It was a concept that was drilled into the heads of 
students at OTCs and COTSs.   
 To drive home their version of proper officer-man relations, Regular officers were also 
quick to discipline officers who appeared to cross the boundary between paternalism and shared 
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privations and fraternization.  Second Lieutenant Homer Davis’ commander sent him to Blois for 
reclassification because he was “lax in discipline” and “mixed” with his soldiers.  Davis also 
drew his commander’s ire for wishing to be billeted with his men rather than occupying separate 
quarters.121  The 135th Machine Gun Battalion’s Lieutenant Harold Reed was also boarded 
because he was “not strict enough with his enlisted men” and “lacked conception of the relations 
between officers and men.”122  Another officer, Arthur Campbell, was reclassified because he 
“had a distinctive and bad effect on the discipline of enlisted men, not only for failing to 
maintain discipline but [also] for permitting and encouraging them to familiarity.”123  The 
message of these actions was clear; “proper officers” built and maintained a strong wall of 
separation between themselves and their men.   
 The regular officers’ efforts to shape the opinions and leadership of OTC graduates seem 
to have borne fruit.  Some of the new officers often commented on the negative effect of 
hometown ties and politics on the efficient operation of National Guard units.  One newly 
commissioned officer noted that when he was assigned to his unit, there was “subtle antagonism 
between N[ational] G[uard] and us of the Reserve.”  After his National Guard superior 
recommended that he “go easy with the boys,” he wrote, 
  He’s a druggist back home […and was always] thinking of post-war business. 
  That’s the weakness of the National Guard.  Too many personal relations.”124  
 
He later bewailed “rotten Nat’l Guard discipline,” which he believed was inevitable, “with men 
and officers so chummy.”125   On 22 February 1918, the 31st Division’s Intelligence Officer 
reported that the unit’s officers were angered at the replacement of senior National Guard 
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officers with regulars.  The staff officer downplayed the problem and stated that the guardsmen 
would be more useful if not assigned to units with men under their command’s “with whom they 
had been ‘buddies’ in civil life.’”126   
 Unfortunately, the regular officers failed to see that the guardsmen’s approach to  
leadership and discipline was often much more effective in building cohesive units than those  
they advocated to their OTC protégées.  Much of the available evidence points to the fact that the  
willingness of guard officers to mix with their soldiers, share in their hardships, and overlook  
minor lapses in discipline, led to a degree of harmony and understanding between officers and  
men that was sometimes muted in Regular and National Army divisions.  Captain Colby  
McIntyre argued that Colonel Frank Hume, the commander of the 103rd Infantry, possessed an  
understanding of the citizen soldier that was often lacking in Regular Army and OTC officers. 
He recalled that when Hume discovered a sergeant of his unit sneaking liquor into camp on  
Christmas Eve 1917, with a wink and a nudge, the colonel told the NCO, “Well go ahead and  
enjoy yourselves.  And tell the boys I wish th’ hell I could be with ‘em, but I can’t.”127  Hume  
tried to drum into his officers that “a soldier was better all around” when he was given a bit of  
freedom and understanding. The National Guard colonel’s personal ties to his men created a tight  
unit able to withstand the battering the unit received at Soissons and the Meuse-Argonne.  
 Other National Guard officers also saw the benefit of building what Darryl Henderson  
termed “referent power” with their soldiers.  Captain Ben Chastaine noted that there was much  
anger in the 36th Division when regulars or wartime reserve officers supplanted guard officers.   
He believed that the National Guard system helped to reinforce unit cohesion and combat  
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effectiveness because the men and officers respected each other.  Despite the regulars’  
fears, he argued that “discipline was not marred” by the fact that the guard’s officers and men  
had known each other socially at home before the war.128  Another doughboy wrote that in his  
National Guard unit, “Instead of the recruit being frightened or timid in the presence of the  
officer and proverbial ‘hard-boiled sergeants,’ they were made to know that their troubles,  
questions, or what- not would be considered thoroughly by both noncoms and officers.”  The  
unit’s company commander saw as his mission to “make the Company one big family.”129 
 Some National Guard officers maintained that what the regulars saw as the guard’s  
greatest weakness, the unit’s attachments to their home communities and pre-war social ties  
between officers and men, was actually the guardsmen’s greatest strength.  Major Emerson  
Taylor noted of National Guard units,  
  In a peculiar sense the regimental commanders were looked upon by the   
  thousands of good men and women whose boys were with the troops as the  
  guardians and friends of those lads as well as their leaders in battle.  In every case  
  they were daily subjected to a very heavy and continual pressure, in the form of  
  direct personal appeals, from their own intimate friends, from men of high  
  position and influence, as well as from pathetic hundreds of anxious, proud  
  fathers and mothers, “to look out for my boy,” “to bring Joe home safe,” “to see  
  that he behaves himself,” “to give Bill a chance,” and so on.130 
 
National Guard enlisted men understood that when the war was over, they would have to return  
to small towns or neighborhoods where their civilian standing would be influenced by their  
reputations as soldiers.  
 However, Emerson Taylor also noted that the benefit of close unit cohesion based on a  
regiment’s special bond with the local community also placed a great strain on the guard  
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commanders.  He recalled that his regimental commander had to “assume a position of  
responsibility to the community which was the home of their respective regiments,” and “he was  
expected to bring glory and renown to his home town.”131  That these “community  
leader-officers” were expected by the folks at home to “bring Joe home safe” added another  
source of anxiety for guard commanders.  Several men in Colonel Frank Hume’s 103rd Infantry  
stated that they were moved by the fact that when their commander “read each day’s casualties  
report he would stand there and cry” because he realized that he now had to write letters home to  
his friends and neighbors informing them of the loss of their sons, fathers and husbands.132 
 While many American soldiers appreciated the technical and tactical expertise of Regular  
Army officers, a number of National Guard and National Army soldiers criticized their  
leadership and standoffish behavior. The junior leaders were also critical of their Regular Army  
superiors’ abilities to motivate and lead citizen soldiers. Corporal Edmund Grossman, for  
instance, believed that his National Guard commanders were much better than the West Pointers  
who replaced them. Unlike the guardsmen, he found regulars officers “snobbish and distant” and  
unable to inspire soldiers by their personality.133  One officer stated that “Regular officers [were]  
too slow to realize that they were dealing with a citizen army.”134 Company officers accused  
their regular superiors of “Prussianism:” a haughty and arrogant disregard for American soldiers  
and democratic ideas caused by the assumed superiority of the senior officer’s worth, prestige,  
and position.  One officer complained that, “Regular officers failed in many cases to get the best  
work out of the new men, because they treated them like niggers.  No man keeps his self-respect  
when bullied, ragged and brow-beaten.”135   
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 There were several repercussions for this divergence of opinion on “proper discipline” 
between National Guard and Regular Army officers.  First of all, the efforts by regular officers to 
replace “inefficient” guard commanders was often a blow to the morale of their units.  National 
Guard officers justly believed that the regulars launched witch hunts to remove senior 
guardsmen.  One 35th Division soldier recalled, “It seemed that all National Guard officers who 
occupied positions of prominence soon disclosed traits that made them unsatisfactory to the 
acting commander of the division.”136  The division’s Clair Kenamore lambasted his Regular 
Army commander, General Lucien Berry, for failing to understand citizen soldiers. He noted,   
  His knowledge of men, such as knowledge is understood in civilian life, was  
  necessarily limited.  He viewed everything with a military eye. He believed  
  implicitly in his unerring ability to estimate a man at first glance, and he felt that  
  once he made that estimate, he must abide by it... The strict life of the army does  
  not qualify a man to judge his fellows who have followed civilian pursuits.137  
 
Kenamore maintained that the replacement of a number of National Guard commanders with 
regular officers caused a decline in the morale of the 35th Division that contributed to its poor 
showing in the opening days of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.138  Morale in the 26th Division 
was also shaken by the removal of the ever-popular Major General Clarence Edwards by 
Pershing on 20 October 1918.  Years after the war the 26th Division’s were still smarting over 
Edwards’ relief. One veteran recalled, “Oh my, but the boys were absolutely furious.  We all 
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loved General Edwards; you always felt he was concerned with the division and everyone in 
it.”139   
 Another fallout from the regulars’ approach to discipline and officer-man relations was 
the unintentional attitudes and skewed perceptions of leadership that it often inculcated within its 
corps of junior OTC and COTS officers.  There was no monopoly on poor leadership in the AEF.  
The ranks of National Guard, Regular Army, and National Army officers all had their share of 
martinets or incompetents.  However, the OTCs appear to have produced more than their share 
of officers with a strict conception of discipline and obedience and inflated senses of their 
positions and prerogatives.  As the curriculum, tone, and leadership of the OTCs were provided 
by the Regular Army, then regular officers must accept much of the blame for this problem.  
After pumping the candidates up with Uptonian denouements of lax National Guard discipline 
(as previously noted), and releasing them to lead units with only the sketchiest concepts of 
leadership, it is no wonder that the new officers sometimes failed to grasp the responsibilities of 
their positions or the customary and regulatory limits on their powers.  Despite the regular’s 
precepts of paternalism, one OTC graduate went so far as to claim, “The officer in charge of the 
training company I was in at Plattsburg, said that soldiers should be treated more as dogs than 
men.”140  Although the candidate may have misunderstood what his Regular Army instructor 
was teaching, the fact that the statement stuck with the new officer is an indication that the 
camps’ training of leadership was problematic and contradictory.   
 A number of training camp officers believed that the army’s system of training and 
acculturation of junior commissioned leaders was flawed and failed to prepare new officers for 
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their role as combat leaders.  These critics were often enlisted men who had been commissioned 
during the war.  Their ability to view the army’s leadership from “both sides of the fence” gave 
them unique insights into the problems of officer-man relations.  An infantry lieutenant 
observed, 
  [There is] too large a gulf between officers and enlisted men.  I’ve been both and 
  know it is not necessary.  It is feudal in tendency and undemocratic.  It does not 
  make for better discipline in most cases.  Familiarity breeds contempt, but the  
  chasm is too great at present.  It should not be possible for an officer to deal in  
  personalities of a belittling and inhuman kind.141  
 
In the Morale Branch Officers’ Survey, several officers commented that the army could 
overcome its leadership problems if it required officers to spend time in the ranks before being 
commissioned. One officer noted that “this experience is necessary to teach a young officer to 
understand his men.”  Another stated that this practice would be beneficial because “the great 
source of friction was ignorance of the men’s conditions and attitudes” by their junior officers.142 
 The infantry lieutenant’s condemnation of an officer with “a belittling and inhuman kind” 
of personality, points to one of the major shortcomings of the new officers.  The historian and 
World War II veteran, Paul Fussell, complained that one of the most irritating, soul-crushing, and 
morale-sapping elements in the relationship between the leader and the led during the Second 
World War was the overweening presence of what he termed “chickenshit.”  In defining and 
describing “chickenshit,” Fussell notes, 
  It does not imply complaint about the inevitable inconveniences of military life:  
  overcrowding and lack of privacy, tedious institutional cookery, depravation of  
  personality, general boredom.  Nothing much can be done about these things.   
  Chickenshit refers rather to behavior that makes military life worse than it needs  
  to be: petty harassment of the weak by the strong; open scrimmage for power and  
  authority and prestige; sadism thinly disguised as necessary discipline; a constant  
  “paying off of old scores”; insistence on the letter rather than the spirit of   
  ordinances.  Chickenshit is so called- instead of horse- or bull- or elephant shit-  
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  because it is small-minded and ignoble and takes the trivial seriously.    
  Chickenshit can be recognized instantly because it never has anything to do with  
  winning the war.143     
 
“Chickenshit” was a concept that would have been instantly recognizable to the American 
veterans of the Great War.  For the fathers and older brothers of the “G. I. Generation,” the 
source of “chickenshit” was those young officers of “a belittling and inhuman kind” produced by 
the officers’ training camps and schools. 
 The “waging of chickenshit” was the source of frequent comment by the war’s 
doughboys and revealed the deep current of resentment that some of the new officers 
intentionally or inadvertently built-up in their units.  The following examples provide an 
indication of the scope and impact of “chickenshit” in the AEF.  Private Albert Ettinger recalled 
that his company of the 165th Infantry was unlucky enough to have assigned to it an OTC 
graduate who was “meaner than hell and disliked by most of the men.”  This second lieutenant 
“thought himself a combination of Caesar, Napoleon, and Hannibal,” and refused to listen to the 
experienced NCOs of the unit.  Soon after arriving in the unit, the officer kicked Ettinger when 
he found him sleeping after drill and humiliated him in front of the company.  The unit’s enlisted 
men grew so tired of the lieutenant’s behavior that they constantly sought ways to bring him 
down, and enjoyed playing him off against the company’s other officers who equally loathed the 
martinet.144   
 While billeted in a shell torn French town close to the front, Corporal Frank Faulkner of 
the 23rd Infantry used a lull in the fighting to wash and dry his mud-covered leggings.  Leaving 
the leggings to dry, he went to the nearby company kitchen to get grease to oil his boots.  The 
officer of the day spotted Faulkner near the kitchen and placed him under arrest for appearing in 
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the cratered streets out of proper uniform.145  In Archibald Hart’s company, one lieutenant 
developed a reputation for both meanness and pettiness.  In front of one of soldier’s visiting 
parents and girlfriend, the lieutenant ordered the man to give him his rifle for inspection.  Since 
the man was on guard duty, he was not permitted to relinquish the arm to anyone.  After the 
officer repeated the order and the soldier gave him the rifle, the lieutenant placed the man under 
arrest and marched him to the brig- thus eliminating the possibility of the soldier receiving a pass 
to spend time with his family.146   
 The attitudes and posturing of young officers quickly alienated Private Paul Maxwell 
from his first moments in the army.  As his train arrived at Petersburg, Virginia, “Before anyone 
could move, a Second Lieutenant, fresh out of training school, entered each end of the coach 
barking orders a la Black Jack Pershing.”147  Upon reaching the Camp Lee, the group of recruits 
were met by a long-service regular NCO who, Maxwell noted, was much more courteous and 
professional and “not at all like the strutting, newly commissioned 2nd Lieutenants who were 
literally bursting at the seams with self importance.”148   
 It did not take Maxwell long to become familiar with the inanity of army life and the 
advantages enjoyed by his officers.  Along with 20 other recruits that arrived with him in camp, 
his first duty was to move a pile of lumber from one location to another location a few hundred 
yards away.  It was poring rain at the time and they had yet to be issued any raincoats or 
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ponchos, and were thus, “soon soaked to the skin.”  Maxwell could not fail to notice that the 
lieutenant supervising his rather wet detachment was, “wearing a rubberized hat cover, long rain 
coat and rubber boots” and gave no thought to the men’s discomfort.149  The young soldier 
generally praised the long-service Regular Army senior officers and NCOs he encountered.  He 
stated that those notables, “far outweighed the disdain I feel for the small minority of junior 
officers whose conceit and lack of ability should disqualify them for positions of Leadership.”150   
 Soldiers resented the petty indignities that poor, or thoughtless, junior leaders could heap 
upon them.  In one unit, the company commander would curtly remind a soldier that “You’re at 
attention” if the man eased his body after saluting and reporting to him.  Furthermore,  
  When the captain entered the lower hall and “Attention!” was not called, or was  
  called in a weak voice, the man who failed in his duty was made to repeat   
  “Attention!” until he could call it out and call it out loudly.  For him who failed to 
  leap to his feet at the same warning, there were a few jumping lessons until he  
  acquired the agility of a jack-in-the-box.  If a new recruit, after a week or two in  
  the battery, was asked by the captain for his name, and answered, “Brown,” all the 
  officials from the lowest ranking corporal to the ranking lieutenant were brought  
  to account for that man not knowing enough to affix his title “Private.”151 
 
The other extreme of such pettifoggery was the tendency of officers to see their soldiers not as 
individuals but rather as an anonymous mass.  Charles MacArthur chaffed at the practice where 
“Hey you” became the universal nickname given to soldiers by officers.152  Captain Will Judy, of 
the 33rd Division, shrewdly observed that the soldier preferred “to be called by his name rather 
than private,” because his name was “his last hold on individuality.”153  
 Officers who stood on their dignity, demanded undue privileges, or enforced petty and 
trifling regulations left a lasting and negative impression on the soldiers they encountered.  The 
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actions and attitudes that Lucian Truscott witnessed in junior officers in World War I influenced 
his leadership even after he became a general in World War II.  Shortly after being 
commissioned from the ranks in 1917, Truscott noted,     
  Young officers were impressed with the concept that it was the responsibility of  
  every officer to enforce all orders and to maintain the customs and traditions of  
  the service.  Some young officers seemed to  regard this as almost a recreational  
  activity…Woe betide the hapless recruit who passed one of these “ninety day  
  wonders” without rendering the appropriate honors or with blouse unbuttoned or  
  uniform otherwise awry.  “Well soldier, where do you think you are going?”   
  “Down town.”  “Don’t you know you’re supposed to say ‘Sir’ to an officer?”   
  “Yessir.”  “Well, let’s see you salute properly.”  Then repeated salutes and  
  corrections until the officer was satisfied…and then the soldier would go on his  
  way, his evening ruined.  Then the young officer would seek another diversion.   
  No doubt such incidents were repeated in every town adjacent to military camps.   
  It is not surprising that so many men ended the war with a hatred of things  
  military, for which they blamed the Regular Army.154   
 
Luckily, a bit more experience with troops seems to have weaned most of the new officers from 
their attachment to the “chickenshit” that Truscott and the other soldiers listed above had 
witnessed or endured.  
 It is impossible to know how prevalent the abuse of power and status was in the AEF’s 
officer corps.  The number of references made to it in the Morale Branch Officers’ Survey and 
other accounts by participants indicate that it certainly happened more frequently than it needed 
to. The fact that a number of junior officers recognized and condemned the practice points to a 
probability that it was common enough to merit their comments.  For example, one officer 
remorsefully noted that “there is considerable ‘bullying’ and ‘lording it over’” enlisted men by 
officers “that accomplishes no useful purpose.”155  Hopefully, Corporal Maxwell was right in his 
estimation that it was only a “small minority of junior officers whose conceit and lack of 
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ability…disqualify them for positions of Leadership.”156 However, that minority of leaders who 
continued to revel in the assumed power and glory of their august positions remained a drain on 
small unit leadership throughout the war and contributed to the litany of other problems faced by 
the AEF. 
 Sadly, the Regular Army’s efforts to instill a great social distance between the ranks, and 
insistence upon absolute discipline and obedience by soldiers to officers, was so pervasive that 
even those officers who rejected the notions often found it difficult to challenge those 
institutional norms and expectations.  The shared danger and conditions of combat tended to 
bring officers and men together.  Unfortunately, the institutional expectations sometimes meant 
that this meeting of the minds was short lived.  Captain W. A. Sirmon recalled with sorrow that 
soon after his unit was pulled out of the Argonne fighting, his commanders returned to “tin-
soldering.”  He noted, “officers so lately snuggling by the most humble privates in shell holes, 
were once again bedecked in their Camp Gordon dignity.”157 
 Aside from the issues of officer-man relations, the AEF also faced friction between its 
company, field, and flag-grade officers.  One of the major criticisms of the senior officers by 
their captains and lieutenants was that the majors, colonels and generals were out of touch with 
the new realities of war.  Captain Mark Clark, who later commanded the 5th Army in World War 
II, noted that a number of old Regular Army officers were out of their depths when confronted 
with the realities of modern warfare.  He recalled that one old major’s professional horizons 
seemed to be limited solely to inspecting his soldiers feet during marches and training to make 
sure that they were following proper procedures for podiatry care.  He ruefully noted, “So many 
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of these old-timers were just out of it when it came to the tactics of the type of war we had in 
France.”158   
 Likewise, Second Lieutenant Herman Dacus recalled that shortly before the St. Mihiel 
offensive, his regiment received a new colonel who had spent most of the war in the Philippines.  
The colonel tried to convince his veteran junior officers that “the best way to wipe out a machine 
gun was to crawl up on it a half mile across on open field.”  At the end of the first day’s fighting 
at St. Mihiel, the same officer ordered Dacus’ company commander to have his company dig 
complete trench lines instead of foxholes for its overnight stay, even though the unit was in 
reserve and not near the front lines.  After the colonel left, the captain and the lieutenant “forgot” 
to issue the order.159  The commander of the 80th Division’s 160th Infantry Brigade, Brigadier 
General Lloyd Brett, told one of his dumbfounded officers, “we have attacked the Germans 
twice, and all that instruction in America, telling us about the new methods of warfare was so 
much foolishness.  It’s the same old Indian warfare.  There is nothing new about it.”160 
 Junior officers were even more critical of staff officers.  One soldier denounced the fact 
that “the staffs in the rear had no experience at the front,” and “were bothersome in their 
ideas.”161  An infantry officer in the 82nd Division was equally irritated at the interference of the 
staff officers of his higher headquarters.  On 6 September 1918, he noted, 
  Worse than a German offensive is the drive of staff officers launched against us 
  by someone higher up.  I spent several hours listening to staff officers who have  
  never had even an ambush patrol beyond our own wire, tell how an enemy  
  machine gun nest should be cleared out.162   
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In a similar vein, Lieutenant Hugh Thompson wrote that while his unit was serving its tour in the 
front line trenches of a French sector, a senior inspector from GHQ ordered another officer to 
fire the flare signaling the artillery to fire a protective barrage. The colonel wanted to “test” the 
artillery to see if they were on their toes and ready to fire.  Although the young officer tried to 
explain to his superior that such tests were ordered via telephone, and that the flares were only 
for real emergencies, the colonel gave the officer a pointed lecture on insubordination and 
ordered the man to fire the flare.  Thompson recalled that “the colonel had then demanded, 
during the resulting volcano” of fire that the junior officer “have the barrage stopped and had 
been dumbfounded to learn that no one could halt the whiz-bangs once the signal for the barrage 
had been given.”  The colonel’s rather silly actions unmasked the supporting artillery’s gun 
positions and fire plans and forced much reorganization and movement the next day.163 
 Captains and lieutenants were also angered by discourteous or high-handed treatment at 
the hands of their superiors. The junior officers, who were in many cases well-educated business 
or professional men, were not used to being treated in a patronizing or brash manner.  
Dissatisfied with his brigade commander's lack of tact and leadership, one captain indignantly 
noted, 
The General has ridden us so constantly and consistently about picayunish details 
that he has his entire staff demoralized.  I appreciate the difference between 
disciplinary reprimand and a cursing out.  The General isn't careful [about] which 
he uses these days.164   
 
As his company passed his car-borne regimental commander during the march up to the line for  
the St. Mihiel Offensive, Captain B. A. Colonna was greeted by the colonel’s impatient 
exhortations for his unit to “Step out.”  Since the soldiers had been marching for hours on roads 
that were little more than patches of deep and glutinous mad while weighed down by full packs 
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and ammunition loads, Colonna recalled that his men “showed our military discipline and 
Christian forbearance by not saying what we thought of this request.”165  One officer decried that 
“the majority of work in the army is obtained by nagging at subordinate officers and by threats of 
various kinds,” while another noted that “General officers [were] usually childish and autocratic 
in minor details.”166  As will be seen in the next chapter, field and flag-grade officers were just as 
quick to criticize their subordinates for lack of initiative, clumsy tactics, and poor leadership.     
 For all of the problems with this methodology and, sometimes, conclusions, S. L. A. 
Marshall was correct when he noted, “The battlefield is cold.  It is the lonesomest place which 
men may share together.”167  The ability of soldiers to overcome the isolation and inertia that this 
unique human environment creates is unit cohesion that is built, nurtured, and maintained by the 
organization’s junior leaders.  Darryl Henderson argues that the leaders that are most effective in 
building this small unit solidarity are those who are consistently competent in their positions and 
are able to a build relationship with their soldiers based on the close bonds of mutual 
understanding and respect.   
 When examining combat leadership in the AEF, there were many obstacles that hindered 
the creation of this type of leadership.  Many, if not most, of the army’s officers, especially from 
the National Guard, were able to overcome these pitfalls to lead their units with grace, 
competence, and skill.  Unfortunately, a number of other officers fell victim to the egotism of 
power and privilege, and the Regular Army’s strict vision of discipline, obedience, and the 
separation of the ranks.  These officers proved themselves to be burdens to their soldiers and 
detriments to the effectiveness of their units.  Furthermore, backbiting and mistrust between 
Regular Army, National Guard, and National Army officers, and also between the leaders and 
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the led of all ranks, undermined cohesion and further damaged the fighting power and morale of 
the AEF by spreading discontentment and uncertainly within the army’s units.  When these 
leadership issues were added to the AEF’s other problems in training, doctrine, and personnel 
policy, the army faced a rough and bloody road as it entered major combat operations in 1918.         
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The School of Hard Knocks: 
Combat Leadership in the AEF 
 
 The French Marshall Ferdinand Foch is credited to have remarked that “It takes 15,000 
casualties to train a major general.”  Although this assertion sounds rather cold blooded to 
modern ears, the Marshall was offering an honest assessment of the grim internal logic of combat 
in the Great War.  None of the major combatants was truly prepared for the bleak realities of the 
mass attritional warfare they encountered on the Western Front.  Sadly, senior officers had to 
pass through the bitter schooling of experience, a schooling whose matriculation was paid for in 
time and the consumption of human life, before they could understand even the vaguest outlines 
of the battlefield challenges that they faced.  If Foch was right about the number of casualties 
required to train a general in World War I, one wonders how many casualties did it take to train 
the war’s company commanders, and the platoon and squad leaders?   
Marshal Foch also made one other incisive observation.  He once advised young officers, 
“There is no studying on the battlefield.  It is simply a case of doing what is possible, to make 
use of what one knows and, in order to make a little possible, one must know much.”1 Many of 
the problems faced by the war’s senior leaders were the same as those faced by junior leaders; 
they differed only in scope and scale.  Both had to find the enemy and divine their strength and 
intentions, employ fires to suppress or neutralize the enemy, coordinate fire with maneuver, 
match tactics and movement to the given terrain and enemy, plan and execute resupply efforts, 
and maintain command and control to keep their subordinates directed toward achieving the 
mission of the higher headquarters.  In other words, this was the “much” that Foch believed the 
leaders had to know “in order to make a little possible.” As the captains, lieutenants, and NCOs 
learned how to accomplish these vital tasks, what was the acceptable “wastage” of soldiers in the 
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school of hard knocks?  As the AEF entered major combat in the summer and fall of 1918, this 
unforgiving school was open, and the answer to this disconcerting question was unknown.  
 Before examining the combat performance of the AEF’s junior leaders and the challenges 
they faced in the second half of 1918, it is important to discuss the nature of combat on the 
Western Front.  This will focus mainly on the problems of the attacker, for the AEF was on the 
tactical and operational offense through most of the period of its active campaigning.  First of all, 
the confluence of a number of factors created a “perfect storm” of attritional realities that tended 
to favor the war’s defender over its attackers.  Attacking infantry faced grave challenges in 
bringing forward enough firepower to suppress the enemy defenders long enough for the assault 
to cross “the fire swept ground.”  Tactical communications, especially those used for controlling 
artillery fires, also favored the defenders.  The attacker’s often cumbersome means for 
communicating with his superiors or supporting artillery had to be carried forward with him 
during the assault.  Any failure in communications might delay needed reserve forces and 
precious supporting fires or prevent senior officers from exploiting success or avoiding disaster. 
 The war was above all an artillery war.  Few attacks on the Western Front gained any 
degree of headway without a thorough and concentrated use of artillery fires.  Unfortunately, 
artillery presented the attacker with a great dilemma.  The attacker had to use large amounts of 
artillery to enable the infantry to “break in” to the defender’s lines.  However, the use of that 
artillery so cratered and scared the landscape that it made it exceptionally difficult for the 
attacker to move forward the reinforcements, supplies, and cannon that enabled him to turn the 
“break in” into a rapid and winning “break out.” 
 With the attacker lacking the mobile communications, logistics, and fire support to turn 
tactical success into an operational victory, combat became a grinding attritional contest.  This 
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contest pitted the staying power of the defender against the will and ability of the attacker to 
accept the cost of coming to grips with the enemy.  The 2nd Division’s Lieutenant Wendell 
Westover offered a vivid example of these sad attritional realities in his description of an infantry 
platoon’s efforts to reduce a German machine gun position during the attack on Blanc Mount 
Ridge in early October 1918.  He observed, 
  The section attacking a Boche machine gun, deployed in a long thin line; first a  
  few men on one flank would rush forward a short distance, then, as the fire was  
  directed at their attack, those on the other end would make a quick advance.  The  
  flanks were creeping outward and the line developing into an arc which would  
  eventually envelop the gun position- that is if a sufficient number of survivors  
  was left to reach it.  This was no parade ground demonstration, even though it was 
  nicely executed.  Already five men lay still on the ground over which they had  
  come.  The right squad sprang up and forward.  One, two, four men dropped;  
  staggering, slumping forward to the ground.  The rest threw themselves into shell  
  holes and paused.  They were close now, but where there had been thirty men a  
  few moments before, only nine were still able to move.  Of these, two more fell in 
  the final assault.  There was a pause at the gun, and they spread out and continued 
  to advance- carrying on the attack under a newly appointed leader.2  
 
Despite the efforts of all the major combatants to change the tactical equation illustrated in 
Westover’s passage by fielding new technologies (such as poison gas and tanks), developing new 
tactics (such as the techniques of infiltration), or adjusting the weight, mix or method of artillery 
fires, none was able to break the attritional realities that bound them during the war.  The odds 
remained stacked against the attacker, and his successes, like that of the 2nd Division’s platoon, 
were generally pyrrhic in nature. 
 None of the war’s leaders was able to change the Great War’s ugly and fixed attritional 
core.  Tactical, operational, and strategic victory only came when the enemy reached the point of 
exhaustion.  As no one could change this core reality, the attacker could only adjust the variables 
of combat on the margins of this type of war in an attempt to tip the attritional balance ever-so-
slightly in his favor.  It was on these margins of attritional warfare where combat leadership 
                                                 
 2 Wendell Westover, Suicide Battalions (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1929), 209. 
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came into play.  On these margins, a small unit leader could try to wring every possible 
advantage out of a given combat situation by adapting his tactics, employing his firepower, and 
using his manpower to inflict relatively more damage on the enemy than was absorbed by his 
unit.  In other words, the battalion, company, and platoons were still going to bleed men, but the 
question was, in that bleeding, could the leader compel the enemy to hemorrhage his human and 
materiel resources at an unsustainable rate?   
 The “margins of combat” in attritional warfare were related to both the materiel and the 
moral.  The material aspects dealt with numbers: numbers of men, numbers and quality of 
weapons, amount and quality of food, and amount of ammunition.  The moral aspects were tied 
to the training and confidence of the soldiers and leaders, the willingness of soldiers to sacrifice 
for their comrades and cause, the ability of the leader to match tactics, formations, and weapons 
to variations in the terrain and enemy, and the ability of the leader to inspire, over awe or cajole 
his troops to follow him.  This examination into the effectiveness of the AEF’s junior combat 
leaders will focus on their ability to manipulate the variables of manpower, weapons, tactics, and 
the power of leadership to achieve their missions within the bounds of “acceptable losses.”       
 Defining “acceptable losses” is problematic because it shall always reside in the eye of 
the beholder, especially when it relates to an attritional war.  One could argue, with some 
validity, that the Allied armies’ ability to grind the German forces down in 1918 meant that 
regardless of any “wastage” at the tactical level, the means of attrition ultimately achieved the 
strategic end.  While accurate, this thought was far from comforting to the American soldiers of 
the war.  During the Great War, American units remained in combat well after enduring 
casualties that would render modern U. S. Army companies and battalions combat ineffective.  
However, the participant accounts suggest that the AEF GHQ and the American soldiers 
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understood the definition of “acceptable losses.” For example, the GHQ was shocked by the 
losses of the Aisne-Marne Campaign and took steps to prevent such future bloodletting.  As there 
was, and is, no universal standard for “acceptable losses” or the point at which a unit becomes 
combat ineffective, the author will leave it to the reader to draw their own conclusions based on 
the evidence and statements made from the participants themselves. 
 In examining small unit combat leadership in the AEF, we must start with an 
understanding of the tactical world in which the junior leaders lived, and the “physics” that 
governed their combat.  “Combat physics” is about matter and energy: those physical realities 
that circumscribed the junior leader’s range of options in combat.  An example of this would be 
the weight and ammunition consumption of a machine gun.  The “combat physics” of an M1914 
Hotchkiss machine gun informs the leader that regardless of any desire to have this weapon with 
the forward assault elements, its 109 pound mass will generally mean that its overburdened crew 
will fall behind as the less encumbered riflemen push forward, or that its struggling and easily 
identifiable crew will draw the attention of the enemy long before the gun could be brought into 
action.  Unlike scientific physics, the “laws” of combat physics are not fixed.  Thus, while the 
weight of the machine gun did not change, the ability of the crew to bring the gun into action 
could be governed by intangibles such as the physical and mental state of the crew after days in 
combat, their morale, the inspiration (or lack there of) of leadership, or the skill or luck of the 
crew in finding a safe route to the objective.  Understanding the tactical world of the junior 
leaders and combat physics provides an opportunity to recognize more clearly the range of the 
possible when it came to their actions and leadership in battle.    
 The first thing to note of the junior leaders’ tactical world was its chaotic nature.  This 
was not just the typical and all important fog and friction of combat, but also the overarching 
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chaotic atmosphere that characterized life in the U. S. Army during the war.  As has been noted 
in previous chapters, junior leaders were constantly buffeted by change- change in weapons, 
change in doctrine, and change in personnel.  Each of these changes brought with it technical, 
tactical, and leadership realities that increased the complexity of leading small units.   Not long 
after the war, Colonel John Parker noted that with the wartime ballooning of support weapons, 
“the infantry organization has now reached such a complexity that the infantry regiment in 
combat is difficult to manage; from the unit command of a platoon leader up to include the 
regiment as a whole.”   He pointed out that “the platoon leader has at least seven different 
weapons, four of which are organized in teams that lose their efficiency with the loss of a single 
expert.  The company commander has the same problem, and the battalion commander has it in a 
still greater degree.”3  When the Americans entered major combat in the forth year of the war, it 
was an army of 1914 thrust with bewildering rapidity into 1918.  As Parker alluded to, in very 
short order the Americans had to adopt new organizational schemes, weapons, tactics, and 
concepts of waging war that were alien to their previous ways of thinking and acting.  Leaders at 
every level were confronted with new realities for which nothing in their previous education, 
training, or experience had prepared them to meet.  It was into this maelstrom of change that the 
junior leaders of the AEF were thrust. 
 When examining the tactical world of the AEF’s infantry captains, lieutenants and NCOs, 
it is wise to start with the role that artillery played in the lives of their units.  Unquestionably, 
artillery was the king of the tactical world faced by the AEF’s junior leaders.  It was the greatest 
casualty producer during the war. It voraciously gobbled men during large scale battles and 
                                                 
 3 COL. John Parker, “Simplifying the Organization and Tactics of Infantry,” Infantry Journal, Vol. XVI, 
No. 7 (January 1920), 567. 
  651
constantly nibbled away at them in the line during periods of relative quiet.4  For the attacker, 
artillery offered four great hopes: first, that its preparatory fires would destroy enemy troop 
concentrations, strong points, and barbwire;  second, that its counter-battery fires would stave off 
the fury of the enemy’s artillery; third, that its rolling barrages would suppress the enemy’s 
defense fires and force them underground, thus allowing the infantry an easy crossing of the 
deadly ground; lastly, that the shelling of the enemy’s rear areas would impede the flow of 
reinforcements and supplies to the front line long enough for the attackers to consolidate their 
gains.  Without the powerful support of artillery, the attacking infantry seldom had any chance to 
achieve their objectives unless they were willing to undergo a dreadful bloodletting.    
 Historian Mark Grotelueschen notes that some of the AEF’s senior leaders, such as Major 
General Charles Summerall, recognized the attritional nature of the Great War and embraced a 
doctrine based on the of seizing limited objectives by attacks using a liberal amount of artillery.  
Furthermore, as American divisions came to appreciate the firepower realities of modern war and 
woke to the fact that the GHQ’s “open warfare” was not a viable solution to the tactical 
challenges confronting them, they devised their own firepower and maneuver solutions to 
minimize casualties while still destroying the enemy.5  Allowing for detailed planning, logistical 
preparation, and good liaison between the infantry and the artillery, the American cannoneers 
were a lethal bunch.  
 There can be no question that the American artillery grew to be a fearsome weapon in the 
last six months of the war.  Time and time again in the fall of 1918, German officers commented 
                                                 
 4 Beaumont Buck recorded that in the weeks leading up to the Cantigny battle his brigade lost an average of 
50 men per day, the vast majority to artillery.  Unpublished diary of Major General Beaumont Buck, Beaumont 
Buck Papers, U.S. Army Cavalry Museum Archives, Ft. Riley, KS. 
 5 Mark E. Grotelueschen, Doctrine Under Fire: American Artillery Employment in World War I (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 2001), 141-152., Mark E. Grotelueschen, The AEF Way of War (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 36-8, 343-352. 
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on the effectiveness of the doughboy artillery.  The Germans facing an attack by the American 
2nd Division at Blanc Mont in early October 1918 noted that the American preparatory fires 
knocked out 50 percent of the machine guns of one of the machine gun companies of the        
74th Reserve Infantry Regiment and caused 25 percent casualties in another.6  An officer of the 
German 102nd Infantry regiment reported, 
  Only when there is an incomparably strong artillery preparation, as on 23 October 
  1918, when our forward garrisons lacked sufficient shelter, can an [American] 
  attack gain ground.  The artillery preparation was effective because a monstrous 
  amount of artillery was expended.7 
 
Although this German officer was dismissive of American infantry and disdainful of the AEF’s 
prodigious use of shells, his comments also betrayed an element of fear and foreboding. 
 It was not just the Germans who were impressed by the power of the American artillery.  
A number of doughboys also praised the work of the guns.  Captain Clarence Minick, a company 
commander in the 361st Infantry, was impressed with the effectiveness of the American artillery 
on the first day of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.  On 26 September 1918, he wrote in his diary, 
“our barrage of the night before had been wonderful for ‘she’ had done the dirty” for there was 
nothing left of the German front lines.8  In a board convened in April 1919 to study the “lessons 
learned” of the war and recommended changes to infantry organization, Major R. C. 
Birmingham, of the 11th Infantry, flatly declared “it is always necessary to have artillery 
preparation in order to make a successful advance without ruinous losses.”  In the heresies of 
heresies, he even went so far as to state, “rifle fire in the late war has not proved to be the 
                                                 
 6 Ernst Otto, The Battle at Blanc Mont (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1930), 31-3. 
 7 Report from the 102nd Regt. to the 63rd Inf. Bde, NARA RG 165, Box 200, German Miscellaneous File.  I 
thank Dr. D. Scott Stephenson, Department of History, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College for bringing 
this report to my attention.  
 8 Entry for 26 September 1918 in the dairy of CPT Clarence J. Minick, Clarence J. Minick Papers, Liberty 
Memorial Archives, Kansas City, Missouri. This sentiment was shared by soldiers of the 47th Infantry, who noted 
that the power of the American artillery only grew over time in the Argonne. James E. Pollard, The Forty-Seventh 
Infantry, A History 1917-1918-1919 (Saginaw: Press of Seeman & Peters, 1919), 66., Grotelueschen, Doctrine 
Under Fire, 120-5. 
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important factor it was thought to be.”9  
 Although the artillery was inextricably linked to the American infantry’s chance of 
success, it was far from being a tactical panacea.  The effectiveness of artillery in World War I 
was tied to a number of factors governed by combat physics and the Clasusewitzian fog and 
friction of war.  The greatest problem of the artillery was responsiveness: the ability for the guns 
to provide immediate fires for the attacking infantry to destroy or suppress the enemy defenders 
wherever they were encountered.  American artillery was most effective when it had the time to 
identify confirmed and probable enemy locations, had amassed enough shells to destroy these 
targets, and had seamlessly coordinated its fire plan with the infantry’s scheme of maneuver.  It 
was generally in the initial bombardments of an offensive, or the preliminary bombardments 
supporting planned attacks, that the gunners, commanders, and staff planners had the time 
needed to bring these requirements into alignment. 
 It was after the initial planned bombardments that the infantry and artillery began to run 
into problems.  The major obstacle to responsive fires and good liaison (to use the period term) 
between the infantry and artillery was communications.  Shortly after the Armistice, the AEF 
GHQ convened a board of senior officers to examine the overall changes that should be made to 
American organizations, tactics, and doctrine based on the AEF’s combat experience.  The 
Superior Board reported that during offensive operations, the artillery’s greatest problem was the 
lack of “a fully organized system of observation and quick communication adapted to the new 
conditions” of the attack.  The board’s officers wrote that “the position of the enemy guns and of 
his infantry were not known as had been the case in trench warfare, and the machinery for 
                                                 
 9 General Headquarters American Expeditionary Force, Report of Officers Convened By Special Orders    
No .98, GHQ AEF, 09 April 1919, Appendix R, 1. (Hereafter cited as the Lewis Board) in USAMHI Library, 
Carlisle Barracks, PA. 
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getting this information, for quickly transmitting it, and for promptly securing adjusted fire were 
not adequate.”10   
 The need for “securing adjusted fire” was predicated on the changing nature of the 
enemy’s defense.  On 5 September 1918, the AEF GHQ published Combat Instructions in the 
hope of preventing American commanders from repeating some of the costly mistakes that AEF 
units had made during the summer battles of 1918.  Combat Instructions bluntly informed the 
American commanders that “the German machine gun constitute the principle weapon to be 
encountered by our infantry.”11  The heavy losses of their infantry increasingly led the Germans 
to substitute machine gun firepower for its diminishing manpower.  From the Aisne-Marne to the 
Meuse-Argonne, the American infantry faced enemy defenses that consisted largely of well 
sighted, protected, and concealed machine gun positions.  These positions were generally tied in 
with flanking units with mutually supported interlocking fields of fire.  As the Germans went to 
great lengths to conceal these positions, the attacking American infantry generally did not find 
them until the Germans opened fire.  The cheapest (in terms of casualties) and most effective 
means for countering these positions was for the American infantry to use artillery.  However, 
this required that someone at the point of the attack had to be able to contact the artillery and 
then accurately adjust its fires onto the enemy machine guns.  This is where the system broke 
down. 
 At the battalion, company, and platoon level, at the point of impact between the 
American infantry and the German defenses, tactical communications were limited to wire, 
                                                 
 10 AEF GHQ, Report of Superior Board on Organization and Tactics (Chaumont, France: AEF GHQ, 
1919).  (hereafter Superior Board) The Superior Board was convened under Paragraph IX, AEF GO 68, dated 19 
April 1919, 41. For an example of this problem also see the 5th Division’s attack near Cunel on 11 October 1918, 
The Society of the Fifth Division, The Official History of the Fifth Division (Washington D.C.: Privately published, 
1919), 143-5. 
 11 AEF GHQ, Combat Instructions (Chaumont, France: AEF GHQ, 5 September 1918), 8. 
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runners, visual signals such as flares, or carrier pigeons.  Each of these means of combat 
communications had built-in flaws that circumscribed the ability for the unit to call for and 
adjust artillery fires.  Wire communications, the linking of telephone cables between field phones 
and switchboards, were the quickest and most responsive means that forward commanders had at 
their disposal for staying in contact with their higher headquarters and artillery units.  
Unfortunately, this wire had to be spooled out by signal parties who moved with the infantry as 
they pushed forward.  This was a laborious and dangerous task. One signalman recalled that,  
  The St. Mihiel affair was a veritable nightmare for the telephone men in the  
  artillery.  After the first jump-off we were advancing so rapidly that it was nearly  
  impossible to maintain communications; and at no time was it more important. 
  We would advance to a new position, and just about the time we had   
  communication we would advance again.  It kept up this way for five days and  
  nights.  We would lose men and equipment so fast that I wonder we did anything  
  at all.  For example, we were always out of wire.  We would use German wire, or  
  any old wire we could we could lay our hands on.12           
 
Although the pace of the advance slowed during the Meuse-Argonne Campaign, the problems 
described in this passage continued to plague wire communications to the end of the war.  
 Wire communications were also vulnerable to shell fire and accidental disruption.  In the 
offense the line was laid on top of the ground or hastily strung from trees or other accessible 
locations.  Of course this meant that any random shell, passing vehicle or clumsy doughboy 
could sever the connection with ease.  A lineman later wrote that the “universal lament” of 
signalers was that “artillery, with their heavy gun carriages and cumbersome equipment, were 
everlastingly ripping up their field wire and imposing upon the already overburdened signal 
troops a never-ending task of maintenance.”13  If the line was broken between the infantry and 
the guns, someone had the time consuming task of following the wire back and repairing the 
break.  This task was often done under enemy fire.     
                                                 
 12 A. Lincoln Lavine, Circuits of Victory (Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1921), 507-8. 
 13 Ibid., 511. 
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 The infantry could also use visual signals or carrier pigeons to contact the artillery.  
Visual signals could be sent via rockets, very gun flares or flashing electric lights.  The use of 
visual signals required that both parties see and understand the meaning of the signals.  While 
this sounds to be quite simple, it was not always so in practice.  A battalion commander in the 
353rd Infantry noted that during the St. Mihiel operation the division and regiment’s system of 
communications was so convoluted that just minutes prior to the unit going over the top, he and 
four of his company commanders were “earnestly engaged in trying to get an understanding of 
the signals to be used and the meaning of them.”14  Another trouble with visual signals was that 
it was difficult to convey anything more than a simple message.  Although a signal flare or 
rocket easily indicated that the artillery should lift its fires or fire on a pre-determined target, it 
was quite another to use them for the involved process of calling for and adjusting fire on 
unplanned targets or targets of opportunity.  
 The use of carrier pigeons was also problematic.  The Signal Corps trained over 15,000 
birds during the war and claimed that “they delivered more than 95 per cent of the messages 
intrusted (sic) to them.”15  However, the birds were susceptible to gas and could be difficult to 
manage.  As with so many things in the AEF, units seemed to get them just as they were going 
into the line.  As his battalion was moving forward for an attack in the Argonne, one infantry 
officer recalled that a regimental signal officer gave him a number of pigeon cages to carry 
forward as well as “a lengthy discussion as to the care and keeping of that particular species of 
                                                 
 14 Captain Charles Dienst, et al., They’re From Kansas: History of the 353rd Infantry Regiment, 89th 
Division, National Army (Wichita: The Eagle Press, 1921), 261. Hervey Allen recalled that just as his unit was going 
into its attack on Fismes in August 1918, each platoon was issued with rockets to signal for an artillery barrage.  He 
noted that the problem was, “for the most part, none of us had the slightest idea how to use” the rockets, and they 
had come with no instructions. Hervey Allen, Towards the Flame (New York: Farrar & Rienhart, 1926), 220-1.  
 15 War Department, America’s Munitions 1917-1918: Report of Benedict Crowell the Assistant Secretary of 
War Director of Munitions (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1919), 581. 
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bird and the method of sending messages and the like.”  He was dismissive of the bird’s 
capabilities and pushed them off on a signal sergeant rather than taking them to the front.16 
Limits in the number of available birds, and to the number of cages that the infantry could carry 
in the front line, restricted the number of messages that could be sent by carrier pigeons by any 
combat unit.  The units of the “Lost Battalion,” for example, only carried forward seven birds 
during its attack into the Argonne Forrest.17   
 Lastly, the leaders at the battalion level and below could use runners to keep in touch 
with their higher headquarters and artillery.  Runners were the slowest and most vulnerable 
means of communications.  As a result of the 1st Division’s  experiences during the Aisne-Marne 
Campaign, Major General Charles Summerall made a futile attempt to prohibit the use of runners 
for tactical communications, because they were “slow and uncertain and the casualties among 
them are out of proportion to the service that they render.”18  Runners were also susceptible to a 
wide range of human frailties.  In the midst of the Argonne fighting Lieutenant Joseph Lawrence 
sent his two runners back to warn his superiors of a possible enemy counterattack, only to have 
the pair disappear.  A search for the missing men later found the two sleeping in an abandoned 
German dugout.  When questioned, they confessed to having failed to deliver the message and 
                                                 
 16 Ashby Williams, Experiences of the Great War (Roanoke: Stone Printing, 1919), 126-7. Williams noted 
that in some units soldiers ate the pigeons as their rations ran low.  
 17 Robert H. Ferrell, Five Days in October: The Lost Battalion of World War I (Columbia: University of 
Missouri Press, 2005), 25-7, 36.  Ferrell attempts to debunk the legend of Cher Ami, the pigeon credited with 
carrying a message that stopped the fratricidal fire of American artillery on the Lost Battalion on 4 October 1918.  
However, the “Lost Battalion’s” pigeons did ensure that the battalion was never truly lost, as a bird released on        
3 October informed the 77th Division of its location.  Also see, Thomas M. Johnson and Fletcher Pratt, The Lost 
Battalion (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1936), 73-76, 135-7.  It must be noted that the “Lost Battalion’s” 
first pigeon message from the pocket did request American artillery support to silence a German battery shelling 
their position.”  However, it only gave a general direction from which the shells were coming, and thus the 
American gunners still had to locate and adjust fire on the guns.     
 18 Memorandum from Major General C. P. Summerall, Commander 1st Division, dated 25 August 1918 in 
War Department, World War Records, First Division, A. E. F. Regular, Vol. II, Field Orders, First Division June 1, 
1918, to Sept. 18, 1918 (Washington DC: Army War College, 1930), not paginated. 
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“protested that they were not yellow- they were worn out, dead tired.”19  Also, sending runners 
back and forth to report required adjustments to artillery fire was inefficient and ineffective.  In 
its Notes on Recent Operations Number 3, published to capture the lessons learned from the St. 
Mihiel Offensive and the first week of fighting in the Meuse-Argonne, the AEF GHQ denounced 
the “general tendency…to place entirely too much dependence on the telephone, and, when the 
telephone fails, to resort immediately to messengers without attempting to use any other 
instrument over the lines already installed.”20  Sadly, the infantry units closest to the front often 
had little recourse but to turn to runners to deliver its messages.      
 All of these issues exacerbated problems of fire support and command and control. Clare 
Kenamore argued that at least some of the confusion that characterized the 35th Division’s 
performance in the opening days of the Argonne Offensive was due to its chaotic signals and 
communications system.  Wire forward was broken by fire; runners were killed and wounded; 
troops were uncertain of the meaning of signal flares and rockets, and some of the flare 
cartridges issued did not fit the flare guns of the division’s officers.  When asked the location of 
one of the infantry regiments, one senior division staff officer could only say, “I wish I 
knew…and I wish I knew even where the brigade headquarters are.”21 Kenamore was not alone 
in pointing to the inadequate means for combat communications.  An officer in the 140th Infantry 
recalled of his unit’s experiences in the Argonne and its baleful influence on fire support, 
                                                 
 19 Joseph D. Lawrence, Fighting Soldier (Boulder: Colorado Associated University Press, 1985), 121. 
 20 AEF GHQ, Notes on Recent Operations, No. 3, dated 12 October 1918, 20. 
 21 Clair Kenamore, From Vauquois Hill to Exermont (St Louis: Guard Publishing, 1919), 136-8.  For other 
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Publication Society, 1921), 348. 
  659
  Another real difficulty lay in the lack of signal equipment.  The artillery had been  
  furnished with excellent wireless equipment- but none was given to the infantry,  
  therefore it was useless.  The telephone equipment was lacking, and the rocket- 
  signals were of such a character as to be useless.  The artillery- our own artillery-  
  was ready to do its duty…But it was hampered by lack of information, as it was  
  compelled to depend entirely on liaison through runners, and the information  
  provided was not always correct.  The runners displayed the greatest heroism  
  …and many of them gave their lives on the field.22 
 
Although American divisions made heroic efforts to correct the immediacy and responsiveness 
of artillery support by establishing intricate systems of liaison between infantry and artillery 
units, the AEF was never truly able to overcome the technical barriers this prevented rapid 
communications from the front line to the guns.23   
 To offset the artillery’s lack of responsiveness, the fire plans of the American divisions 
focused on providing heavy pre-planned preparatory fires and rolling barrages.  The preparatory 
fires were intended to destroy identified and suspected enemy locations.  The rolling barrage was 
based on the assumption that the preparatory fires were never going to kill all of the defenders, 
but by having a curtain of fire land just to the front of the advancing infantry, the enemy would 
be forced to seek shelter from the shells and thus be unable to fire on the attacking Americans. A 
rolling barrage required that the infantry and artillery adhere to a centralized and strictly 
regulated plan that was difficult to change after the fires began.  As the rolling barrage proceeded 
at a fixed rate, the onus was on the infantry to stay as close to the falling shells as possible.  
When all went well, the effect of the rolling barrage was decisive to the success of the infantry.  
An infantry officer in the 36th Division remembered that during a 27 October 1918 attack on the 
Forest Ferme, his soldiers “followed the barrage so closely that they were almost ‘leaning against 
it.’”  The tactic worked so well that they caught the Germans while they were still in their 
                                                 
 22 Edwards, From Doniphan to Verdun, 54-5. 
 23 Grotelueschen, Doctrine Under Fire, 128.  Grotelueschen notes that the 2nd Division made the best 
progress in synchronizing the firepower of the artillery with the maneuver of its infantry. However he notes that the 
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shelters and took their objective with light casualties.24 
 Regrettably, the rigidity and complexity of the fire plan frequently often left the infantry 
without the vital support of suppressive fires at the very moment they needed them most.  The 
divisions that arrived in the summer of 1918 faced a very steep learning curve when it came to 
planning and coordinating artillery fires.  In his official report of his unit’s action in the St. 
Mihiel Offensive, the commander of the 89th Division’s 353rd Infantry, Colonel James Reeves, 
was critical of the artillery fire plan.  Not only was it late in arriving, it was also so complex that 
it was impossible to be understood by “even the company commanders, much less the platoon 
commanders.”25  More importantly, unless there were very close liaison between the infantry and 
the artillery (to include intact communications links), anything that delayed the infantry advance, 
even momentarily, soon left the doughboys without protection as the barrage move forward on 
its set timelines.  Delays in orders to attack, unexpected enemy contact, uncut barbwire, or 
merely the difficulty that combat-worn and heavily-laden soldiers had in crossing muddy and 
shell-torn ground could all result in the dreaded “loss of the barrage.”  This sad fate even struck 
seasoned units with much experience in infantry-artillery cooperation.  On 15 October 1918,  
officers of the veteran 3rd Division’s 38th Infantry complained “that there was no way of holding 
the barrage on an objective when the infantry front line has been held up.”26 
 Other factors also limited the effectiveness of the artillery support given the American 
infantry.  The IX Corps commander, Major General Henry Allen argued that when American 
units took the time to plan their operations with a view of synchronizing the firepower of all the 
arms with the maneuver of the infantry they did usually accomplished their missions, “with 
                                                 
 24 Chastaine, 229-233.  
 25 Dienst, 257-9. 
 26 Quoted in Memorandum from LTC James McIlroy, Forward Office, 1st Army Inspector General, 
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relatively small losses.”  However, “when orders were given to exploit the ground to the 
front…the losses were often greater.”  He maintained, “the cause of this was the continuation of 
the advance without proper preparation due to want of time to study the new front and to bring 
up the artillery to where it could be used.”27  Artillery was not an asset that a division or brigade 
commander could turn on like a tap.  It took time to move the guns into position, to plan targets, 
and to build stockpiles of shells for prolonged bombardments.  As early as August 1918, the AEF 
GHQ reported in its study of the Aisne-Marne battle that “In several instances barrage orders 
were not received by the units charged with their execution in time to permit the numerous 
calculations necessary.”28  Two months later, GHQ was still lamenting the difficulty in using 
divisional artillery after the initial advance due to the need to find targets and move forward.29 
 Recognizing the problem and being able to fix it were not the same.  Some things were 
simply beyond the ability of the artillerymen to repair.  Artillery commanders always had to be 
mindful of the range limits of their guns.  At some point in the battle they had to move their 
cannons forward to keep the advancing infantry within the protective umbrella of their fires.  
Unfortunately, the forward movement of weighty cannons and caissons, and more importantly, 
bringing forward the tons of shells consumed by the guns on a daily basis, was a challenge for 
the AEF throughout the war.  In moving forward, the artillery and its vast logistical tail had to 
traverse devastated areas that slowed their movement to a crawl.  This fact was not lost on the 
infantrymen.  In the Meuse-Argonne, Ray Johnson stated, “we had been advancing too swiftly 
for the artillery supporting us, which was having great difficulty in moving up through the 
                                                 
 27 General Headquarters American Expeditionary Force, Report of Officers Convened By Special Orders 
No.98, GHQ AEF 09 April 1919, 9-10. (Here after cited as the Lewis Board) in USAMHI Library., Appendix S, 1. 
 28 AEF GHQ, Notes on Recent Operations, No. 1, issued 7 August 1918. 
 29 Notes on Recent Operations, No. 3, 10-11, 16-18.  The report stated of the opening day of the Meuse-
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devastated terrain we had won.”30  This sluggishness was worsened when the artillery had to use 
overburdened road networks like those of the Meuse-Argonne region.    
 There were limitations to what even the heaviest American artillery bombardment could 
do.  If the timing of the fires was off and the infantry “lost the barrage,” if the fires did not 
neutralize the defenders, or if the infantry was simply unlucky, the effectiveness of the artillery 
was muted.31  If, for whatever reason, the coordination between the infantry and the guns broke 
down, infantry commanders were generally left with no other option than to push forward 
without support.  Following the attacks in the Meuse-Argonne from 26 to 30 September 1918, 
the AEF general staff admonished field commander that “advances were generally too slow and 
too cautious. The fruits of victory were, therefore, not what they might have been.”  GHQ 
criticized the tendency of infantry commanders to “remain inactive in the presence of relatively 
small hostile forces while waiting for orders, or for artillery support, or for machine guns, or 
missing grenades, etc.”  The staff’s solution was simple: 
  It is seldom wrong to go forward.  It is seldom wrong to attack.  The best way to  
  clear up a doubtful situation is to advance. In the attack it is better to lose many  
  men than to fail to take ground.  Inaction is the worst military crime.32 
 
 The veiled threat in this message to infantry commanders was clear, and only stated what 
had long been known within the ranks of the AEF’s officer corps.  Despite the AEF’s 
acknowledgement that artillery played a key role in the infantry’s success, the failure of the 
artillery was no excuse for the infantry to delay an attack.  This point was made abundantly clear 
to Captain Charles Harrington, an acting battalion commander in the 308th Infantry.  He was 
                                                 
 30 Ray N. Johnson, Heaven, Hell, or Hoboken (Cleveland: O. S. Hubbell Printing Company, 1919), 96. For 
a similar complaint see Emil B. Gansser, History of the 126th Infantry in the War With Germany (Grand Rapids: 
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relieved from command and sent to Blois on 5 September 1918 for refusing to attack during the 
Oise-Aisne drive after a promised artillery barrage failed to materialize.33  This ugly reality also 
confronted the commander of the 32nd Division’s 126th Infantry on 28 August 1918 when the 
unit’s planned rolling barrage never occurred.  After waiting 15 minutes, the commander made 
the agonizing decision to move forward only supported by the fire of his own machine guns.  
After two days of battling without much artillery support, the regiment was reduced to an 
effective strength of less than a thousand men.34   
 For all the power of the American artillery, it could be a very fickle and temperamental 
tool.  Infantry leaders at the company level and below had little to no say in the planning of 
artillery fires and very limited means to request artillery support after the battle began.  Thus, for 
infantry captains, lieutenants, and NCOs, either the artillery fires came or they didn’t.  In either 
case, H Hour was H Hour and the infantry was going over the top with the fires or without them.   
 Although it is easy to deride Pershing for his desire to create “self-reliant infantry,” the 
sad truth was that at some point in every one of the AEF’s engagements, the terrain, the 
Americans’ proximity to the enemy, or the break down of the coordination and cooperation 
between the infantry and its supporting artillery and machine guns, threw the American 
infantrymen upon there own resources.  At these points, the doughboys could only rely upon the 
weapons that were organic to their companies, platoons, and squads.  Given this reality, it is 
important to understand the capabilities and limitations of the weapons at the infantry’s disposal 
and the levels at which they were controlled and wielded.  This exploration will help to further 
define the tactical world of the junior infantry leaders and the skills they needed to succeed on 
the “margins of combat” in this attritional war.   
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 The world of the infantry small unit leader was generally bounded by the confines of his 
regiment.  Like all organizations in the U. S. Army, the war brought massive change to the size 
and composition of the regiment.  Prior to the war, a full strength infantry regiment consisted of 
51 officers and 1,500 enlisted men.  With the exception of a provisional machine gun company 
containing six guns, the unit’s remaining soldiers were armed with rifles or pistols.35  By June 
1918, the infantry regiment had grown to 112 officers and 3720 enlisted men.  The regimental 
commander also controlled an organic machine gun company with 16 guns, a Stokes Mortar 
section of six tubes, and three 37mm guns.36  
 The regiment was divided into three battalions each under the command of a major, and 
each battalion contained four rifle companies. The battalion contained no organic support 
weapons except for automatic rifles and rifle grenade launchers within their companies.  
However, it was standard practice in the AEF to attach the regiment’s machine guns, Stokes 
Mortars, and 37mm guns to the lead assault battalion in the attack.37  Given the relative scarcity 
of these heavy weapons, there were seldom enough to go around, and the battalion commanders 
seldom further detailed these weapons to his infantry companies. 
 The challenge for battalion commanders was how to integrate these support weapons into 
his maneuver scheme and tactics to best aid his infantrymen in accomplishing their missions.  To 
achieve this, the battalion commander needed a firm grasp of the inherent technical capabilities 
and limitations of these weapons, as well as an idea of how they needed to be employed and 
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supplied to be effective in combat.  If the commander understood these realities, the employment 
of support weapons was one of those variables on the margins of attritional warfare that could 
materially aid him in reducing friendly casualties while still accomplishing his unit’s mission.   
 Let us examine these weapons and the challenges and benefits they brought.  Heavy 
machine guns were the most common support weapons used in the AEF. The AEF generally 
used three types of machine guns: the French M1914 8 mm Hotchkiss, the 30.06 caliber M1915 
U.S. copy of the British Vickers gun, and the 30.06 M1917 Browning gun.  The Hotchkiss gun 
was issued to the first 12 American divisions that arrived in France.  The 11 divisions that 
arrived between May and June 1918 were equipped with the M1915 Vickers, and all the 
divisions arriving after June were issued the M1917 Brownings.38  Each of these guns had 
inherent advantages and disadvantages that affected their tactical use.    
 The M1914 Hotchkiss Gun had a rate of fire of 400 rounds per minute, but was fed by 
inserting 25 or 30 round metal strips into the side of the weapon.  Although some of these strips 
could be connected into a 250 round “semi-articulated belt,” this was a rather clumsy and fragile 
arrangement.39  This machine gun had four major draw backs.  First, it was an air-cooled gun, 
and thus was liable to overheat during prolonged firing.  In all machine guns, overheating can 
result in jams or in the premature “cook off” of rounds due to heat, resulting in an uncontrollable 
“run-away” gun that continues to fire until the belt is expended or the gunner cuts or twists the 
belt to jam the weapon.  The second problem with the Hotchkiss was the system for loading its 
metal strips.  This meant that the gun’s actual rate of fire was determined by the assistant 
                                                 
 38 War Department, American Munitions: 1917-1918, 169.  
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gunner’s dexterity and quickness in feeding the fragile strips into the weapon.  The gun’s fixed-
height tripod gave the weapon a high silhouette, making its crew more vulnerable to enemy fire.  
The greatest problem was that with gun and tripod the Hotchkiss weighed a whopping 109 
pounds.  This made their crews slow moving targets to the enemy as they lugged this ponderous 
weight forward.40  
  The M1915 Vickers Gun fired 500 rounds per minute utilizing 250 round cloth belts.  
Although lighter than the Hotchkiss, its 98 pound weight (with full water jacket) was still quite a 
load.41  The M1917 Browning Gun proved to be one of the best machine gun designs of the war.  
John Browning’s weapon fired 500 rounds per minute, but he was able to reduce the weight of 
the gun and tripod to 84.5 pounds (with full water jacket). Although the Ordinance Department 
Although the Ordinance Department intended to replace all of the AEF’s machine guns with the 
M1917, the pace of operations gave them no time to accomplish the change-out, and only 1,168 
actually made it to the front before the Armistice.42   
 Both the M1915 Vickers and the M1917 Browning suffered from the inherent limitations 
of water-cooled machine guns.  The water jacket that surrounded the gun’s barrel had to be kept 
full to sustain prolonged firing.  The weapons were equipped with a condensation can to catch 
the steam created by the hot barrels during firing.  Unfortunately, water in the jackets was still 
lost in the process, thus requiring crews to have ready access to relatively clean water sources 
during combat, and if the crews brought the water with them in the condensation cans, it add an 
additional weight burden on the already encumbered men.  There was also a rather cumbersome 
process to refill the water jackets.   
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 All of the era’s machine guns were prodigious consumers of ammunition.  The iron laws 
of physics dictated that there was only so much ammunition that the crew could bringing with 
them into action.  This required that the officers have an effective system for bring ammunition 
to the front, or they had to rely on ammunition carriers detailed from the infantry to move the 
weighty burdens forward into battle.   
 When properly employed, machine guns offered infantry units immediate firepower to 
deal with a host of combat challenges.  Much like artillery, the machine guns could fire over the 
heads of the attacking infantry to suppress enemy defenders.  They could fire to the flanks or rear 
of the infantry attacks to prevent the enemy from bringing forward reinforcements or supplies.  If 
rapidly brought forward to objectives recently seized by the infantry, the machine guns could 
break-up the German counter-attacks that invariably followed an American tactical gain.43  
 To get these effects, however, the battalion commanders had to overcome a number of 
obstacles.  First and foremost was their own ignorance of how to use their attached machine gun 
units.  The summer battles of 1918 highlighted this major problem. At Chateau-Thierry in July 
1918, Major C. A. Dravo, a machine gunner in the 42nd Division, observed that “the battalion 
commanders had their hands full with a thousand infantrymen and had neither the time nor the 
opportunity for any study of the situation as might be applied to the machine guns attached to his 
command.”44  Captain A. M. Patch recalled that “there was no machine gun plan” for the          
1st Division’s machine gunners supporting the unit’s infantry attacks during the Soissons drive.  
Patch noted that few infantry battalion commanders gave the machine guns any missions, and 
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thus, “the assistance [the guns] really rendered the infantry, constituted a deplorable and 
disastrous spectacle.” The outcome of these missteps was that after four days of fighting, 80 
percent of the machine gunners were casualties and approximately 85 percent of their equipment 
was destroyed or abandoned.”45  Likewise, Edward Johnston, another participant in the Aise-
Marne battles, noted that the machine gunners suffered heavy casualties because they “simply 
followed the attacking waves” and were given no direction from the infantry battalion 
commanders they were supporting.46  
 The AEF GHQ and some senior commanders tried to address these problems and prevent 
this breakdown in cooperation from reoccurring in future battles.  In the Notes on Recent 
Operations, Number 1 issued after the American attacks of 18 to 31 July, the GHQ castigated the 
infantry battalion commanders for not adequately directing their attached machine gun 
companies, and berated the machine gun company commanders for their lack of initiative in 
employing their weapons and advising their superiors of the gun’s best use.47  Major General 
Charles Summerall, the commander of the 1st Division, demanded that his subordinates improve 
the responsiveness of their heavy machine guns to the needs of the infantry by establishing a 
stronger system of liaison between the two units.  He also required that machine guns and other 
support weapons “must at all times be under the eye of a known leader, who is able to preserve 
cohesion and compel energetic action.”48   
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 Both the GHQ and Summerall identified the key problems with efficiently using these 
weapons as training and leadership.  It was clear that neither the infantry nor the machine gun 
commanders had the requisite training to properly employ the guns in combat.  Part of this was 
the fault of the AEF’s own schools.  Major Robert Calder, commander of the 1st Division’s       
3rd Machine Gun Battalion, argued that the army’s support weapons “were seldom used to best 
advantage” because “the personnel was trained in the technical side of the weapons, they were 
not sufficiently familiar with their tactical employment.”49  Colonel Joseph Sanborn noted that 
the machine gunners of his 131st Infantry were given very good instruction on how to operate the 
Vickers Guns at an AEF school, but, the school “had no competent instructors in tactical 
employment of guns which was to be deplored.”50  Also, looking back to the scant amount of 
time spent on training candidates on machine guns and the other support weapons in the OTCs 
and COTSs, it was little wonder that their graduates often lacked a basic understanding of these 
tools.   
 At times the gun crews even lacked the basic technical training described above.  One 
doughboy recalled seeing the results of the poor training of the crews of support weapons during 
the attack on Romagne in October 1918.  He noted that the nearby machine gunners “had 
carelessly let their gun get overheated, and when the gunner who was holding the piece withdrew 
his finger from the trigger the weapon continued to shoot.”  The crew panicked and let loose of 
the “runaway” gun, which “began to plunge and buck, firing wildly in every direction.” 
Unfortunately, this incident resulted in the wounding of two nearby soldiers.51  Considering the 
lack of even fundamental training illustrated by this example, it was going to take time and 
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experience to create the degree of integration between the infantry and machine guns that was 
demanded by the GHQ and Summerall. 
 After enduring the “school of hard knocks” during the Aisne-Marne and Oise-Aisne 
Offensives, some of the AEF’s units puzzled out ways to weld their support weapons more 
closely to the infantry that they were intended to support.  After a week of fighting in the Meuse-
Argonne, the AEF General Staff reported “the use of machine guns generally showed a decided 
improvement over previous operations,” but went on to warn that, “much more remains to be 
done before they exert the continuous influence throughout the fight.”52  As green units were 
pushed into their first major actions, they too were schooled by the taskmaster of experience.  
The 29th Division Joseph Lawrence’s noted that after the attack of the 113th Infantry stalled on  
10 October 1918, 
  An attempt was made to break the German lines with machine guns, and as I lay  
  in my hole I saw the machine gunners rush forward through the infantry and  
  mount their guns.  I do not believe that they fired a shot; the gunners were mowed 
  down before they could pull a trigger.  Those that could, dragged themselves into  
  shell holes and abandoned their guns.  Our colonel was later criticized by General  
  Morton for the loss of life…for he contended that if the infantry could not break  
  the enemy lines, machine gunners who were handicapped with heavy equipment  
  and guns that could only be mounted in exposed positions should not be expected  
  to do so.53   
 
Despite the improvements that some units made in infantry-machine gun liaison, overall, the 
AEF Inspector General found that throughout the Meuse-Argonne Campaign the AEF’s infantry 
leaders still lacked the “know how” to employ their support weapons and were thus “unable to 
derive much benefit from these arms.”  Even in cases where the weapon crews were well trained, 
the inability of the infantry commander to establish a system of liaison with the support weapon 
units hindered the responsiveness of their fires.  Where this liaison was lacking, most of the 
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support weapons acted “independently cooperating [with the infantry] as best they can.”54  
 Although the AEF Inspector General singled out the late-arriving inexperienced and 
under-trained divisions as being the most egregious in properly using machine guns to support 
infantry attacks, even the seasoned AEF divisions had difficulties in this area.  A General Staff 
officer inspecting the 3rd Division on 15 October 1918 reported that officers in the 38th Infantry 
“found it impossible in their regiments to have close liaison with the machine gun commander,” 
and it was better to leave the machine gun units to “function independent of instructions of 
infantry battalion commanders.”55  If veteran officers of the storied 38th Infantry were having 
difficulties in using support weapons, how far out of their depths were the infantry officers of the 
newly-arrived divisions?  
  In addition to machine guns, each infantry regiment also had an organic Stokes Mortar 
platoon equipped with six tubes, and a 37mm gun section of three cannons.  Both of these 
weapons were intended to give the infantry quick and responsive tools to destroy or suppress 
German machine gun nests or strong points.  The regimental commanders generally attached 
these weapons to their leading assault battalions in the attack.  When properly handled, these 
weapons were very effective in accomplishing their intended missions.  Unfortunately, they also 
suffered from inherent limitations.   
 The 3 Inch Stokes Mortar was the “trench artillery” most used in American infantry 
regiments.  It had a maximum range of around 800 meters and fired an 11 pound high explosive 
charge.  The barrel, bipod and base plate weighed 108 pounds.  Its ammunition was even more 
                                                 
 54 “Notes Made by the Inspector General A. E. F., During the Active Operations from 12th September 1918 
to 11th November 1918,” in NARA RG 120, Entry 588, Box 116.  The IG’s observations were also reflected in many 
of the comments made by members of the Lewis Board. Appendix H, S, and X. 
 55 Memorandum from LTC James McIlroy, Forward Office, 1st Army Inspector General, Subject: Report of 
Inspection of 3rd Division 15 Oct. 18., dated 15 October 1918, in NARA RG 120, Entry 590, Box 4. 
  672
cumbersome and difficult to bring forward into battle than that of the machine guns.56     
 The 37mm gun, or “one pounder,” fired a flat trajectory 1.2 pound high explosive shell 
with a maximum effective range of 1,000 to 1,500 meters.  Its accuracy made it an ideal “sniper 
weapon” for eliminating enemy machine guns and lightly armored pill boxes.  Unfortunately, the 
gun and tripod for the weapon weighed a hefty 170 pounds.  It goes without saying that both the 
regimental Stokes Mortars and 37mm guns were difficult to man-handle over anything but the 
flattest and smoothest terrain, features sorely lacking on most of the AEF’s battlefields.57    
 The Stokes Mortars and 37mm guns suffered the same problems of employment as the 
machine guns; if the infantry officers did not know how to use and supply them, they were of 
little value in combat.  During the Aisne-Marne Offensive, the use of the 37mm guns was very 
uneven.  While some units used them to good effect in destroying machine gun nests, “The 
general failure by others to use the one-pounder was because the regimental commanders did not 
assign them to attacking battalions,” or simply left them in the reserve.58  Colonel Robert 
McCormick noted that in the divisions that arrived in the spring and summer of 1918, 
“knowledge of modern battle conditions was wanting.”  He observed,  
  They had received their trench mortars and their infantry cannons only a short  
  time before and did not know how to use them.  Some regiments marched through 
  the whole campaign without taking these indispensable weapons from their trains.  
  They were, in consequence, badly in need of material with which to attack  
  German machine gun nest at close range.59   
 
McCormick’s comments had some validity.  For example, when the 35th Division’s               
145th Infantry attacked on the first day of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, its Stokes Mortars and 
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37mm guns were at the trail of its formation, where it was nearly impossible for them to move 
forward to support the attacking infantrymen in any timely manner.60 
 Despite all of the shortcomings in training and leadership, in fairness to the infantrymen 
and support weapons crewmen, it must be pointed out that some of the failure to more effectively 
use these tools simply came down to the physics of combat.  All of the support weapons, and the 
ammunition they fired, were very heavy and cumbersome.  One must keep in mind the difficulty 
that the crews had in keeping up with the relatively unencumbered riflemen over difficult, 
muddy, and shell-torn ground.  A machine gun officer in the 79th Division stated that as he 
moved his unit forward to support the attacking infantry in the Argonne, “So deep were the shell 
holes and mine craters that the ammunition carriers were even unable to carry two small boxes of 
ammunition.”  The soldiers removed the ammunition belts from the boxes and wrapped them 
around their bodies to free their hands to crawl through the slippery obstacles.  He remembered 
“at times the guns and tripods had to be thrown from the bottom of the crater up to the top to a 
man waiting to receive it” and the gunners fought the terrain just as much as the enemy.61  
 Another machine gun officer, Lieutenant Malcolm Helms, quickly discovered the innate 
problem of using support weapons in the attack while serving as a platoon leader in the 1st 
Machine Gun Battalion during the Soissons Offensive.  Ordered to attack with the infantry and 
then set up their guns as soon as the doughboys stopped to be ready for any German 
counterattacks, Helm recalled, “carrying our machine guns and heavy cases of ammunition we 
soon fell behind the infantry…We could see them up ahead while we were floundering through 
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the shell holes of our barrage with our heavier loads.”62  Private Ray Johnson, a machine gunner 
with the 37th Division, simply stated that keeping his guns up with the infantry led to “the 
exhaustion of our reserves of strength by the weight of our equipment.”  He went on to note, “It 
requires every ounce of guts a man possesses to keep pace with the infantry when he is loaded 
down with fifty pounds of extra weight.”63   
 Although the preceding passages were from machine gunners, they were equally 
applicable to the crews of Stokes Mortars and 37mm guns.  A number of sources point to the 
effectiveness of these weapons in destroying German machine gun positions, but in the same 
breath complain about their difficulties in bringing them forward.  For example, an officer with 
the 29th Division noted that, “trench mortars by reason of their lack of mobility and difficulty of 
keeping them supplied with ammunition are not considered efficient weapons in mobile 
warfare.”64  In a report issued three days after the Armistice, the commander of one of the AEF’s 
most combat experienced units, the 2nd Division’s 3rd Infantry Brigade, admitted that while his 
units had used their one-pounders and mortars before the infantry went over the top, “after that 
time…the 37 m.m.’s and stokes could not keep up with the advancing troops.”65  While most of 
the officers sitting on the post-war Lewis Board recommended retaining the 37mm gun until a 
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lighter weapon could be developed, they tended to see the Stokes Mortar as “a trench weapon” 
that had little future in warfare.66 
 In addition to the problems of training and mobility, one of the other major drawbacks to 
the use of the support weapons was their logistical requirements.  The ammunition for these 
weapons was heavy, cumbersome, and usually carried forward by hand.  In any heavy 
engagement where units encountered numerous enemy strong points or machine gun nests, the 
supply of ammunition for the infantry’s support weapons could be exhausted quickly, and 
bringing up fresh ammunition was nearly always a chore.  This was particularly the case for the 
Stokes Mortars.67  The 6th Infantry discovered this fact while trying to force a crossing of the 
Meuse River at Brieulles on 3 November 1918.  After his unit ran out of ammunition for the 
Stokes Mortars and machine guns he was using to destroy the German positions that ringed his 
crossing site, Lieutenant Colonel Hodges felt that he could not wait for the every-tardy resupply 
of ammunition for these weapons.  He pushed forward using whatever remaining firepower he 
could muster.  However, without any effective suppression of the German machine guns, the 
American attack ground to a halt with heavy casualties.68   
 The problem of bringing up ammunition was further exacerbated as the campaigns drug 
on the physical condition of the crews deteriorated.  In some cases, units tried to overcome the 
problem of keeping the support weapons supplied by providing their crews with carrying parties 
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drawn from infantry companies.  However, at times these carriers could be very unreliable.  
During the Aisne-Marne Campaign, American machine gunners complained that soon after the 
guns began to move forward, their infantry carrying parties “almost invariably abandoned the 
squad during the assault and took part in the fight with their own units.”69  Without carriers, the 
crews were left to muddle through as best as they could.  As his unit moved forward for the 
British Army’s attack on the St. Quentin Canal in late September 1918, Leslie Baker recalled 
that his company “cracked” from exhaustion while lugging 50 pound ammunition boxes to the 
front lines.  He credited his lieutenant for saving the day when the officer ordered his men to 
abandon the heavy boxes by the side of the road and move to the trenches without them.70  
Although the officer accurately assessed the condition of his soldiers and chose to place “men 
over mission,” he did so at the risk of dramatically reducing the effectiveness of his machine 
guns.  
 The remaining non-organic support weapons that were sometimes encountered at the 
battalion level or below, such as accompanying artillery guns and tanks, also require some 
discussion.  The use of accompanying guns was an attempt by some of the AEF’s units to 
overcome the problem of responsive artillery by placing a 75mm gun or other full-size cannon 
under the control of the assaulting battalion commander.  Like most things in the AEF, the 
variety of experiences with these weapons meant that their use was a mixed bag.  On one hand, 
an officer from the AEF Inspector General’s office reported that the accompanying guns attached 
to an infantry battalion of the 82nd Division managed to destroy eight German pillboxes in one 
day.  However, another division inspector found that in the infantry, “the average battalion 
commander had not enough experience in handling a battalion of infantry to warrant his paying 
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sufficient attention to his accompanying support battery” and many of the leaders forgot that they 
had the guns at their disposal.71  Some artillery officers also believed that the practice of 
providing the infantry with accompanying guns hindered their ability to mass artillery fires and 
usually led to the gun’s “misuse or enforced idleness.”72 
 The same ambivalence that characterized the use of the accompanying guns also typified 
the infantry’s experience with tanks.  Infantry-tank cooperation was seldom trained, and 
misperceptions about the weapon’s capabilities and limitations were common among infantry 
leaders.  One tank corps officer ruefully noted, “It’s surprising what they asked us to do.  
Doughboys to Generals have set us up against places a battleship couldn’t capture.”73  While 
tanks often provided the infantry with the mobile firepower they needed to “break in” to the 
German defenses, the weapon’s mechanical unreliability and limited numbers, the lack of a solid 
system for tank-infantry cooperation, and the failure of infantry commanders to give the tanks 
definite and attainable tasks, prevented tanks from playing a more significant role in the tactical 
world of most American infantry junior leaders.74 
 As infantry units became more experienced in the use of the support weapons discussed 
above, it seems that most became more comfortable with their use.  This is illustrated in the 
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experiences of the 89th Division’s 353rd Infantry.  At the close of the unit’s first major combat 
action at St. Mihiel, the regimental commander reported,  
  The most weapons used were the Infantry rifle and the hand grenade, in   
  connection with the machine guns attached to the 2nd or leading battalion.  I saw  
  very little use made of rifle grenades, very little of automatic rifles, and little or  
  nothing accomplished by either the one-pounders or Stokes mortars.  Each of the  
  last mentioned special weapons fired a few shots, but usually there is reason to  
  believe that some of the shots of the Stokes, as usual, fell short and injured our  
  own men.75  
 
However, by the time of the 353rd Infantry’s attack on the Bois de Barricourt on 1 November 
1918, the colonel had overcome his initial skepticism and fairly gushed at his unit’s ability to 
coordinate the fire of rifles, Chauchats, 37mm guns, and Stokes Mortars to destroy German 
machine gun nests.  There were some problem that time and experience still could not overcome.  
For example, the effectiveness of his mortars was still hindered by “the impossibility of keeping 
of a supply of ammunition” for the weapons.76  Even with all this additional firepower, the 
officer still maintained that “as heretofore, the main work was done by the infantry rifle,” and 
that the rifle and automatic rifles were the weapons most utilized in overcoming the “points of 
resistance encountered.”77  
 While the 353rd Infantry commander’s comments may seem like the ranting of a disciple 
of the Pershing school of “open warfare,” he merely expressed the fact that at some time in the 
fight, his infantry companies still had to move in to terrain and kill Germans aided only by the 
weapons they had at hand.  The AEF’s infantry companies and platoons were where “self-reliant 
infantry” truly existed.  It was also at this level where the AEF’s battles were fought and all of its 
shortcomings in training and leadership became most apparent.  It is critical to understand the 
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organization of infantry companies, platoons, and squads to comprehend the challenges facing 
their junior leaders and what could be expected of them in combat.  
 At full strength, an American infantry company in the AEF was composed of six officers, 
48 NCOs and 207 soldiers (a table of organization for an American infantry company and 
platoon is in Appendix C-1). This was over twice the size of the pre-war infantry company.78  
The commander could employ the firepower of 16 automatic rifles, 24 rifle grenade launches, 
and 192 rifles (excluding weapons used by cooks and other non-infantrymen).79  This firepower 
was equally divided among each of the infantry company’s four rifle platoons.   
 The full-strength rifle platoon consisted of one officer platoon leader, three buck 
sergeants (one being the platoon sergeant), eight corporals (usually squad leaders), and 47 
privates (see Appendix C-2).  The rifle platoon had four automatic rifles, six rifle grenade 
launchers, and 48 rifles.  The AEF rifle platoon leaders generally employed their units either as 
one large mass, as half-platoons which divided the control of the unit between the platoon leader 
and platoon sergeant (with the officer still retaining overall direction), or as four combat groups 
divided by weapons type (see Appendix C-3).  The last organization would have two combat 
groups of automatic riflemen, one of hand bombers and rifle grenadiers, and one that consisted 
solely of riflemen. 
 While the firepower of these companies and platoons was exponentially greater than 
those of 1916, their ponderous size made them exceptionally difficult for company commanders 
and platoon leaders to control.  The AEF GHQ was quick to dismiss the concern of some senior 
officers that the increase in the size of infantry companies and platoons would overwhelm the 
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already struggling junior leadership.  In May 1918, Colonel Hugh Drum, the GHQ Assistant 
Chief of Staff, responded to criticism of its large formations by arguing,  
The difficulty of infantry combat of today is due not so much to the inability to 
control men as it is the lack of men available to meet each new situation.  
Difficulties of control arise through lack of sufficient men and not through an 
excess.  There is not doubt in my mind that the platoon leader that controls only 
20 men in a task requiring 50 will make more tactical errors than if he had an 
excess of 30.  The tendency to disperse 20 men so as to accomplish the task 
requiring 50 will often lead to disastrous results.  Moreover it is false practice to 
organize an army on the assumed capabilities of the platoon leader.  Platoon 
leaders are more easily made than supply systems, artillery, organizations, etc.80 
 
Drum’s convoluted rationale for retaining the bloated companies and platoons was not borne out 
in combat.  The commander of the 7th Infantry Brigade, Brigadier General Benjamin Poore 
argued, 
 I believe that the infantry officers will agree that we have used too many men in  
  our combat formations and the inevitable result was greater and probably   
  avoidable losses.  The companies were too large to be handled by officers of  
  average ability and little experience.  Even a highly trained and experienced  
  officer found great difficulty in handling a company of 250 men.81 
 
Poore’s comments were echoed by the III Corps Commander, Major General John Hines.  Hines 
maintained that “the difficulty of handling infantry in action prohibits the control of more than 
32 men by one platoon leader.  I think this consideration would limit the control of more than 
175 or 180 men by one captain.”82  As will be seen, the difficulty that junior leaders had in 
controlling their massive units contributed to the tactical sluggishness of the AEF’s units during 
the opening weeks of the Meuse-Argonne.   
 As with the heavier support weapons, the armaments that were organic to the AEF’s 
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infantry platoons and companies also possessed inherent advantages and limitations.  The most 
common infantry weapon was the M1903 or M1917 rifles.  While the M1917 was longer and 
heavier than the M1903, the operation and rate of fire of the weapons were relatively identical to 
the individual infantryman.  Both weapons fired a 30.06 cartridge from a five-round internal box 
magazine.  Although the rifles were sighted for much greater ranges, their effective range was 
350 to 600 meters, depending on the skill of the firer. The aimed rate of fire for the weapons was 
roughly 15 to 25 rounds per minute, which was governed by the skill of the individual soldier in 
reloading the weapon using five-round stripper clips.  The basic combat load for the infantryman 
was the 100 rounds that he carried in his cartridge belt, but this could be increased by the soldier 
carrying one or two 60 round bandoleers.  
 The most common automatic rifles used in the AEF were the French M1915 Chauchat 
and the M1918 Browning (soldiers fighting with the U.S. II Corps had the British Lewis Gun).  
The 8mm Chauchat weighed 19 pounds, had a maximum rate of fire of 400 rounds per minute, 
and was used by the first 23 American divisions in France.83  It garnered a reputation for 
unreliability in the AEF; in fact, one American officer characterized the weapon as “a villainous 
piece of unreliable makeshift.”84  However, in the hands of a trained and careful gunner, it 
provided a fairly light and powerful addition to the firepower of the American infantry.  The 
chief source of the weapon’s problems was its fragile 20 round magazines.  The magazine had 
windows cut in one of its sides to allow the gunner to quickly check to see how many rounds it 
had remaining.  Unfortunately, if the gunner was not careful, mud allowed into these windows 
jammed the magazine or gun.  Any slight bending or deforming of the fragile magazines 
prevented them from feeding or being loaded. The combat load for a Chauchat gunner and two 
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assistant gunners/carriers was between 19 to 20 magazines, depending on the type of carriers 
used.  Since each magazine weighed two pounds, the choice of combat load could quickly over-
burden the crews.85       
 The divisions that arrived in France after June 1918 were armed with the Browning 
Automatic Rifle (BAR).  The BAR weighed 16 pounds and had a rate of fire of 550 rounds per 
minute using 20 round magazines.  Although the BAR was lighter than the Chauchat, it should 
be remembered that it was still nearly double the weight of the standard infantry rifle. The basic 
load for a BAR gunner and two assistant gunners/carriers was between 20 and 24 pounds 
depending on the cartridge belt and bandoleers used by the crew.  The weapon was much more 
reliable than the Chauchat and was able to produce a large volume of killing or suppressive 
fire.86   
 Lastly, the company commander and platoon leaders could call on the firepower of their 
organic hand and rifle grenades.  The most common rifle grenade used by the AEF was a copy of 
the French Viven-Bessiere (VB) Grenade.  The VB grenades were fired from “trombone” 
grenade dischargers mounted to the standard issue M1903 or M1917 rifles.  The gas created by 
the firing of a standard ball cartridge produced enough power to hurl the grenade up to 200 
meters.  While the Ordnance Department’s Bernard Crowell reported that “any man within 75 
yards of an exploding rifle grenade is likely to be wounded or killed,” the actual burst radius of 
the 17 ounce projectile was much less, and any enemy soldiers employing the barest of overhead 
cover had little to fear from the grenades.87  The commander of the German 102nd Infantry 
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observed, “Much use is made of rifle grenades [by the Americans] but without much success.  
The bursting point is set too high and the dispersion is limited.”88  
 The combination of rifles, automatic rifles, and grenades theoretically gave the American 
small units the firepower they required to deal with most of the tactical situations they 
encountered.  However, there was always a sharp divide between theory and reality.  The 
soldiers and leaders of small infantry units often lacked a sound grasp of how to employ their 
organic weapons.  As this was one of those variables on the margins of attritional war where the 
leaders could gain a slight advantage in grinding away at the enemy, any inability to use these 
weapons constituted a major flaw in the combat leadership of the AEF’s junior officers and 
NCOs.   
 In a 25 August 1918 review of the 1st Division’s recent operations in the Aisne-Marne 
Offensive, Major General Charles P. Summerall concluded that even in his veteran unit, infantry 
officers and NCOs were failing to get the best use from the weapons at their disposal.  A        25 
August 1918 report noted that when it came to the use of the Chauchat automatic rifle,  
  …these important weapons were virtually turned over to the individual carrier and 
  gunners for such use as they were able to make of them.  Many were not fired at  
  all, others were fired at random.  Automatic rifles were fired from the hip without  
  need, and the ammunition was often needlessly expended…sometimes the guns  
  were abandoned because the men were tired, or because the ammunition was  
  exhausted.  None but the automatic rifle teams had been taught to operate them,  
  and some of these men had only a short period of service and did not know how  
  to prevent or correct jams.  In some cases the guns were continuously fired until  
  they became intensely heated.89 
 
These problems were not limited to the 1st Division; the Notes on Recent Operations Number 1 
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issued by GHQ after the campaign recorded that “Many organizations failed to use the fire of 
rifles and auto-rifles to assist in the advance.”90  First Sergeant Harold C. Woehl, of the  
32nd Division’s 126th Infantry, reported that on 28 August 1918 during his company’s first day of 
action in the Oise-Aisne Offensive, “Company H had no automatic rifles, no pistol ammunition, 
no hand or rifle grenades.  Just our trusty Springfield rifles and plenty of guts.”  Although Woehl 
did not explain why these key weapons were missing, the end result of their absence was clear.  
As the company attacked toward Juvigny, it was pounded by enfilading German machine gun 
fire that it could not suppress. On that day of fighting, the company lost 16 men killed and 27 
wounded.91   
 Part of the problem of properly using these weapons were the same ones that plagued the 
larger machine guns and 37mm guns: weight and ammunition consumption. Soon after the 
Soissons drive, a 1st Division officer noted, “It is evident…that the loads of the automatic rifle 
and machine gun men are very much greater than the loads of men carrying the service rifle.”  
He went on to point out,  
  This difference of load, and consequent difference of mobility, are not apparent in 
  trench warfare but at once make themselves felt when troops must move for long  
  distances over difficult terrain.  The men carrying the heavier weapons fail to  
  keep up with those carrying lighter weapons and either fall behind or abandon the  
  heavier weapon for a lighter one which enables them to follow.92 
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It was not just that the weapons themselves were heavy, but also that the ammunition and 
accouterments that went with them also added to their crew’s burden.   
 Captain Ashby Williams estimated that his riflemen marched into the Meuse-Argonne 
Offensive with 60 to 65 pounds of weapons and gear each.  Although some units opted to shed 
the lower half of their soldier’s packs prior to going into action, the Doughboys were still 
weighed down by loads of approximately 40 to 45 pounds.93  With the extra weight of his 
weapon and ammunition, a Chauchat gunner would have gone into action with 15 to 18 more 
pounds of gear to carry than the average rifleman.94  This estimate would not have been much 
less for a gunner with a BAR.  While these details may sound minor, that extra weight slowed 
down the responsiveness and agility of the weapons teams (making them more vulnerable to 
enemy fire), and encouraged the less disciplined of the gunners to ditch these valuable weapons 
at first opportunity.    
 Major General Charles P. Summerall tried to address both the issue of weight and the 
proper employment of these weapons.  In late August 1918, he directed that company 
commanders and platoon leaders place their automatic rifles under the control of a competent 
NCO trained in the tactical employment of the weapon.  He ordered that all of the soldiers in his 
infantry companies would learn how to fire the Chauchat so anyone could serve on an automatic 
rifle team in the event of casualties.  To ease the load carried by the automatic rifle team 
members and solve the units’ problems with restocking ammunition in combat, Summerall 
further stipulated that every soldier in an infantry company would carry an extra loaded 
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Chauchat magazine into action.95  Unfortunately, the standard M1910 American infantry pack 
had little enough space for the soldier’s rations and spare clothing, let alone the rather bulky half-
moon magazine for Chauchat.  Summerall’s other goals were more attainable.  However, while 
the 1st Division solved some of its issues with infantry commanders using their weapons to their 
best effect, this was not always the case in the AEF’s other divisions.  Colonel George Marshall 
noted shortly after the war that company commanders were glacially slow “in learning how to 
combine fire action with maneuver.” 96 
 Another of the variables on the margins of attritional warfare that the AEF’s small unit 
leaders could influence was their use of tactics.  Here, small unit tactics is defined as the art of 
applying or adapting general formations, maneuver, and firepower to the specific challenges 
presented by an enemy on a given piece of terrain.  The end result of tactics was simple: 
accomplishing the mission given to the unit by the higher headquarters, and in the process, 
inflicting as much damage on the enemy as possible while preserving as much of one’s own 
manpower as feasible.  To wring the best results from tactics, junior infantry officers and NCOs 
had to be well versed in the capabilities and limitations of the weapons and their soldiers and be 
able to adjust their formations “on the fly” to balance the needs of protection with firepower.  
Leaders also had to grasp how to use the terrain to minimize one’s own casualties while also 
placing the enemy at a disadvantage, and they had to be able to issue orders in the heat of combat 
that directed their subordinates to accomplish the leader’s goals and intent.       
  It was in the area of tactics that all of the American shortcomings and shortcuts in 
training were laid bare.  From the use of terrain and formations to the combining of fire and 
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maneuver, American small unit leaders generally showed themselves to be rather sluggish, 
doctrinaire, and ham-fisted in their application of tactics.  This is not to cast blame on the 
officers and NCOs themselves of this tactical clumsiness.  No infantry captain was willfully 
incompetent or clapped his hands in joy at the thought of leading his soldiers to destruction.  The 
simple fact was that much of their training and experience had not prepared them for the 
complex task of leading 250 men across difficult terrain against a skillful and desperate enemy.  
As their training had been poor, their schooling at the hands of the Germans was painful. As one 
infantry battalion commander commented, since his junior leaders had failed to learn the 
required tactical skills and knowledge prior to combat, the “officers…must learn their business 
from day to day at the expense of their trade in human beings.  The latter must bear the cost of 
this learning and pay the price of every experiment in the process.”97 
 As early as the battles in the summer of 1918, the AEF GHQ was noticing worrying signs 
that the tactical skills of the army’s infantry officers and NCOs were somewhat lacking.    
The American losses during the Aisne-Marne Offensive were particularly heavy and unexpected.  
While insufficient artillery support and mistakes by senior French officers certainly contributed 
to the bloodletting, at the battalion and below, it was much more a case of poor tactical skills 
rather than these operational missteps that added to the butcher bill.     
 The common mistake of American infantry leaders was to confuse tactical formations for 
tactics.  Formations were merely a means of moving soldiers forward by balancing mobility with 
protection and the ability for the leader to rapidly deploy his soldiers to meet situations in battle 
using fire and maneuver. In a lecture given shortly after the Armistice, Brigadier General Frank 
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Parker neatly encapsulated the tactical challenges that faced American small unit leaders.  He 
observed, 
  The object of the infantry attack is to come into physical contact with the enemy  
  and to be alive at the same time.  This war has demonstrated the fact firepower is  
  practically independent of numbers; a small efficient, determined combat group  
  consisting of very few men produces a most powerful and destructive fire.  The  
  problem then consists in pushing forward a maximum of fire with a minimum of  
  personnel, this personnel so manipulated as to present a minimum target to hostile 
  fire, artillery and small arms.   
 
Parker went on to state that the most important element of the division was the platoon, “as it is 
the substance out of which the Division is made- if this substance is not solid the division will be 
a weak structure, incapable of standing strain.”98   
 In the summer operations, the AEF’s junior leaders seemed to have fallen into two broad 
camps: those whose formations and deployments were based on a hodgepodge of techniques, and 
those who rigidly kept to the tactical system illustrated in Offensive Combat of Small Units. In 
the Notes of Recent Operations that followed the Aisne-Marne Offensive, the GHQ staff reported 
that during the fighting, “An endless variety of attack formations was used.” It also provided an 
example where a company commander had so failed to understand tactical deployments that he 
positioned a single platoon on a frontage of 600 meters, negating any hope that the platoon 
leader had of commanding his unit.99  An infantry NCO noted that during his company’s fighting 
in August, his commander “quickly formed one ‘skirmish line’ of the old style”100 as his 
preferred method for attacking German positions.  Both of these passages indicate that some 
small unit leaders were assembling their tactical formations and techniques from a host of 
doctrinal and non-doctrinal sources.  For example, the formations described by the NCO show 
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the continuation of tactical concepts from the pre-war IDR.  That such a mélange of formations 
and tactics was still in use in the AEF in mid-1918 should come as no surprise.  The fact that 
American units had been bombarded with rapidly changing tactical techniques from British, 
French, and American sources certainly encouraged an “a la carte” approach to formations and 
tactics. 
 The other, more common, extreme was those leaders who unbendingly followed the 
formations given in Offensive Combat of Small Units.  Although the distances between soldiers 
and echelons in the manual were too short, there was nothing inherently wrong with the tactical 
concepts and intent of the manual’s formations.  The problem was in the leader’s application of 
those formations to the terrain and enemy.  In the AEF’s Combat Instructions, Pershing decried 
the fact that, 
  Attack formations of platoons, companies, and battalions are everywhere too  
  dense and follow too rigidly the illustrations in the Offensive Combat of Small  
  Units.  Waves are too close together; individuals therein have too little interval.   
  Lines are frequently seen with the men almost elbow to elbow and seldom at  
  intervals greater than two to three paces…All formations are habitually lacking in  
  elasticity; there is almost never any attempt to maneuver, that is to throw supports 
  and reserves to the flanks for envelopment.  Scouts, if used, are frequently only a  
  few yards in front of the leading waves…Subordinate officers display little  
  appreciation of the essential situation and how to best meet its requirements.101    
 
This point was also made by Captain Manton Eddy of the 39th Infantry.  The 4th Division’s 
assault to the Vesle River on 3 August 1918 progressed in strict adherence to the formations 
pictured in Offensive Combat of Small Units without adjusting them in any way to account for 
the enemy’s dispositions and the terrain the Americans encountered.  Eddy later recalled that his 
unit’s close formation “was a sight that must have made the German observers gasp in 
amazement, for before them lay an artilleryman’s dream.”102   
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 Training units to move in formations and to change from one formation to another is 
relatively easy.  In fact Captain B. A. Colonna, the commander of B Company, 311th Infantry, 
claimed that “the new formations were mastered remarkably quickly” in his unit.103  The difficult 
part was for the leaders to understand the linkages between those formations and the tactical 
techniques of fire and maneuver that they had to employ to overcome the German defenders.  
These difficulties were magnified when the junior leaders experienced trouble with command 
and control due to casualties and the normal fog and friction of combat. 
 The Americans’ tactical clumsiness was not lost on the Germans.  A staff officer in the 
headquarters of the German 7th Army reported on 23 July 1918 that when the Americans 
attacked, 
  [Our] defense was too strong for the limited attack power of the enemy infantry. 
  When the fire protection of the artillery ceased, when the tanks were lost, only 
  seldom did it continue forward.  It gave ground to every counter-attack even 
  when made by inferior German numbers.  As a result of its dense formations, 
  which was to give the infantry feeling of its own power, it suffered heavy, bloody 
  losses whenever it encountered our artillery fire.104 
 
The end result of the dearth of tactical savvy in the summer of 1918 was high casualties as the 
Americans attempted to smother the German positions under the weight of the doughboy’s mass 
formations. The consequence of some junior officer’s tactical ineptitude left a lasting impression 
on Private Horatio Rogers.  The 26th Division soldier later remembered,    
  Turning back across the fields I passed between groups of dead Americans lying  
  in short windrows as they had been mowed down by the machine guns from the  
  woods.  Wave after wave had evidently assaulted from the ditches along the road  
  before the survivors had obtained a foothold in the woods.105 
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The dead Americans that Rogers viewed were far from rare.  In the 1st Division alone, the 
butcher’s bill was 234 officers and 7083 men killed, wounded, missing, or captured.  The  
26th Infantry lost all of its field grade-officers, and one battalion of the 28th Infantry lost all its 
officers except one the first day of the battle, and that remaining officer was wounded on the 
second day of the drive.106  The 28th Division’s 110th Infantry suffered over 1100 casualties in its 
repeated attempts to take Cierges by frontal attack on 28 and 29 July 1918.  One of the unit’s 
officers honestly admitted that after charge after charge “up the bare slope of the hill,” the failure 
could be summed up as, “artillery was insufficient, team work lacking, and information 
regarding the terrain meager.”107  Another observer noted, “the men moved with such precision 
that it looked more like a drill than a great battle.”108  
 The veterans of Soissons and the other summer battles often profited from this school of 
hard knocks.  Edward Johnston, an officer in the 1st Division, recalled that in May to July of 
1918, the unit’s infantry regiments usually attacked in mass waves that moved “forward 
ponderously with heavy losses against hostile fire, with no apparent effort to utilize cover.”  The 
infantry’s “attack formations were generally too thick,” and the doughboys exhibited a “tendency 
to attempt to overcome resistance by shock rather by fire and shock combined.”  He did note, 
however, that the survivors of these encounters gained a large degree of battlefield wisdom and 
experience.  Johnston claims that during the Soissons battle his 28th Infantry learned from the 
French Moroccan soldiers how to advance by “moving at a run from shell-hole to shell-hole,” in 
a style “utilized by the European veterans.”109  Overall, however, Johnston had to admit “training 
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in musketry, combat practice, employment of maneuver, and tactical use of its auxiliary weapons 
was so deficient [in the AEF] as to greatly increase its losses in the attack.”110 
 In other units the process of internalizing the “lessons” of recent operations proceeded 
more slowly.  The 28th Division’s Hervy Allen noted that the Soissons drive was a bleak coming 
of age for his soldiers.  He emphatically stated,  
  It was the grim common sense of the ‘doughboy’ and not our obsolete and  
  impossible tactics that won the ground.  Oh! the precious time wasted in our  
  elaborate, useless, murderous ‘science’ called ‘musketry.’  It was as much out of  
  style as the musket from which it takes its name.  Teaching it should be made a  
  court-martial offense.  It is murder in print.  Battles were not fought in lines.111  
 
Although Allen’s assessment was correct, there was still much to be learned by his unit.  For all 
“the grim common sense of the doughboy,” it did not stop his battalion from still using dense 
formations of infantry shortly afterwards in its disastrous attacks on Fismes and Fismettes.112  
 As the Americans moved into their first independent operation at St. Mihiel, the tactical 
acumen of the AEF’s infantry captains, lieutenants and NCOs was very much a mixed bag.  
Some of the AEFs more experienced divisions had made great strides in infantry-artillery 
cooperation and in instilling a degree of tactical flexibility in their small units.113  Some had 
learned the benefits of thoughtful preparations and in taking time to understand and logically 
responds to a given tactical situation rather than trying to bull forward.  Colonel H. P. Hobbs, the 
inspector of the 26th Division, observed during the St. Mihiel drive,  
  Our troops had learned much during the Second Battle of the Marne.  On   
  September 12th I followed, closely, the 101st Infantry and noted particularly 
  that the infantry worked with much more caution and much better team-work 
  and control than they did during the Second Battle of the Marne.  The advance 
  was not delayed by this caution, in fact, much time was saved and our losses 
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  greatly reduced.114 
 
Unfortunately, the coming of tactical wisdom was not universal. 
 The St. Mihiel Offensive was the first real taste of combat for many of the division that 
arrived in the spring and summer of 1918.  Despite the efforts by the GHQ to use its Notes on 
Recent Operations and Combat Instructions to spare the new divisions from the mistakes of its 
predecessors, the actions of the green units at St. Mihiel highlight the fact that the AEF’s 
methods of transmitting its hard-won “lessons learned” were largely ineffective.  The new 
divisions repeated the mistakes of pushing infantry forward in mass formations and failing to 
match firepower with maneuver.  The small unit leadership exhibited in these units continued to 
illustrate the army’s overarching problems with leader training and initiative.    
The experience of the 82nd Division is illustrative of leadership problems in the “new” 
divisions and the AEF’s failure to instill the “lessons learned” from its previous battles into the 
newcomers.  While the division’s role in the operation was small, St. Mihiel uncovered that 
many of the division's infantry officers and NCOs were as deficient in the basic skills of map 
reading and small unit tactics as had been the case of the divisions involved in the Soissons 
drive.  The confusion caused by these deficiencies is best illustrated by comments made by the 
3326th Infantry's Lieutenant Justus Owens in a letter that he sent to his mother soon after the 
battle, 
We left our present positions about 9:00 P.M. . . . We headed for our objective 
after cutting thru our own wire, but hadn't gone far until we decided we were 
headed in the wrong direction . . . It afterward turned out that we were headed in 
the right direction at first and lost out (and ourselves) by turning right . . . We 
wandered around in the rain and slush and mire of no-mans land for several hours 
. . .We finally located our woods about 2:15 A.M.  It was still so dark that we 
could hardly see anything, so I placed my men in one corner of the woods and 
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told them we'd hold tight until it got lighter.115 
 
Luckily for Owens and his soldiers, their objective had been abandoned by the Germans.  
However, his blundering attempts to find the objective and his failure to clear it while he still 
possessed the cover of darkness put his soldiers at great risk and gave his men grounds to 
question his leadership. Owens admitted that after their night of futile wanderings his soldiers 
were wet, tired, and in “bad humor.”116   
Not all of the 82nd Division's soldiers were as lucky as Owens' command.  George 
Loukides, a private in H Company, 326th Infantry, noted that his officers "were not trained for 
combat and the privates paid for it."  He recalled that at St. Mihiel his company lost "many 
killed" when their officers led an attack across a dangerously open field in broad daylight.117  
Alvin York wrote that during the 328th Infantry's attack on Norroy the regiment's companies "got 
mussed up right smart," and his unit’s inability to protect its flanks or adequately maneuver its 
units allowed the Germans to enfilade the American positions.118   
The St. Mihiel operation also pointed to the continuing inability of infantry units to adapt 
their formations to the ground and the enemy and the Americans’ penchant for resorting to 
frontal assaults when coming in contact with the enemy.119 Even experienced small unit 
commanders continued to fixate on maintaining the dressing and alignment of their unit 
formations as they pressed forward. Private Charles MacArthur was amazed that during one 
infantry attack by the veteran 42nd Division,  
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 The doughboys were scrambling out of their trenches . . . Their officers ran after  
  yelling: “Dress on the right you gosh dam lousy doughboys!”…The doughboys  
  strung along like crowds following a golf match, slowly and deliberately, dressing 
  on the right whenever they were told.  Here and there a man stumbled and fell.   
  The line moved on under a cataract of shrapnel and high explosive.120  
 
MacArthur’s account was backed by Lieutenant Hugh Thompson, an infantry officer in the 42nd 
Division.  Thompson recalled yelling for his soldiers to “keep your three-yard interval” and 
recalled the efforts he made to keep his soldiers in strict formation when they attacked in the first 
wave of the St. Mihiel Offensive.  He soon admitted the futility of retaining the lock-step 
methods of his training under heavy enemy fire as, “all thought of controlling the scattered line 
gave way to fearful self-preservation.”  Thompson realized that “We’d be killed if we lay still” 
and that “there was a gambling chance if we charged ahead,” and began to move his men 
forward by “a mad dash” from cover to cover.121  Under the press of necessity and grim reality, 
Thompson had accidentally stumbled upon the proper use of movement and terrain.  
 Here again, the German defenders offered an honest assessment of the fighting skills of 
their American foes.  The Intelligence Officer of the German Army Detachment C, facing the 
Americans at St. Mihiel reported, 
  The American advance at the time of the infantry attack was entirety schematic,  
  and betrayed a great lack of skill in the movement of the support waves following  
  in dense formations over the terrain….[They] gave an impression of awkwardness 
  and indecision.  Neither the officers or men knew how to utilize the terrain.  If  
  they encountered resistance they did not try to seek shelter, but fell back walking  
  upright.  The Americans do not know how to move either forward or backward by 
  crawling on the ground or by sudden rushes.  They first lie down, then try to rise.   
  The Americans are absolutely ignorant of fighting in a field of shellholes.122 
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The German noted that while the average American soldier “is doubtless[ly] brave,” he “is  
ignorant of the proper behavior in the course of an attack,” and “grenades put him to flight at 
once.”  Of the doughboy’s officers,  
  The command is extremely bad and without initiative.  The enemy has obviously  
  many officers, but they all lack an aptitude of command. Their embarrassment  
  was obvious when they attained their initial success.  They found themselves at a  
  loss in the presence of a new situation, and were not capable of exploiting the  
  success. 
 
As they had done after the Aisne-Marne Offensive, the Germans’ trenchant observations 
provided sad evidence of how little the Americans had learned, and how far they still had to go. 
 For most of the new divisions, their participation in the St. Mihiel Offensive was not  
long or intense enough of them to gain the degree of experience that they required to season their 
officers and soldiers for the operations that lay before them in the Meuse-Argonne. Of the 
experiences of the 80th Division in the battle, Captain Ashby Williams later wrote “I dare say that 
few of us realized, even at time, that we had taken part, though a bloodless and inconspicuous 
one, in the great historic St. Mihiel drive.”123  An infantry officer in the 89th Division wrote in his 
after actions report of the St. Mihiel Offensive, “the formations adopted and the means at hand 
proved adequate for overcoming the resistance met.”  However, he was also circumspect enough 
to admit, “had the enemy chosen to occupy his works in stronger force and offered a stiffer 
resistance, it is believed that our lack of time for thorough consideration of orders and study of 
maps would have cost us severely.”124  The false impression and illusions that the soldiers of the 
5th Division had taken from St. Mihiel were later shattered by the realities they faced in 
attempting to take Cunel on 11 October 1918.  As one officer stated, “the men still remembered 
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the victorious rush at St. Mihiel and dashed forward impetuously.  But it was a different enemy 
here, one who was sticking till the last and fighting for every foot of ground.”125  Unfortunately, 
even if these units had been so inclined, the issuing of orders and the movement of troops to their 
staging areas for the Meuse-Argonne Offensive left no time to correct the leadership deficiencies 
again brought to light by the St. Mihiel fight.   
 The Meuse-Argonne Offensive was the AEF’s largest and most deadly battle of the war.  
Pershing hoped that the campaign would vindicate his insistence on an independent American 
Army trained in the fine art of “open warfare.”  Instead, the Meuse-Argonne turned out to be a 
47-day ordeal that pushed the AEF to the breaking point. General Hunter Liggett, the I Corps 
commander, noted that the region was, “a natural fortress beside which the Virginia Wilderness 
in which Grant and Lee fought was a park.”126  The German defenders had occupied the region 
since 1914 and had placed much effort into preparing and sighting the fortifications of their 
Geselher, Freya and Kriemhilde defensive lines.   
 The Meuse-Argonne was not only crisscrossed with a vast array of natural and man-made 
obstacles, but the Germans had made great strides in tying these obstructions into a system of 
interlocking and mutually supporting machine gun and artillery positions.  The Germans 
attempted to offset their losses in manpower with increases in machine guns.  For example, the 
German 123rd Infantry Division involved in the neighboring Blanc Mont fight was down to 89 
officers and 1,705 men by 7 October 1918.  It could still wield 198 heavy and light machine 
guns, or roughly one gun for every 11 German defenders.127   
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 Even with fully trained officers and soldiers, the Argonne Forest and the rolling hills of 
the Meuse region would have presented a formidable obstacle to any army.  The complexities of 
the terrain and the German defense required that junior leaders have a “master’s degree” in 
tactics while most of the American junior officers were barely out of the grade school of the 
profession.  The Meuse-Argonne Offensive was the litmus test of the AEF’s junior leadership. 
The great losses and near disintegration of American units in the battle was the price that the 
AEF paid for its failure to properly train and develop its company level officers and NCOs.  
 It is evident from the reports of wartime German units and American staff officers of the 
AEF Inspector General Office, post war officer boards, participant accounts, and the AEF’s 
casualty rolls that as the AEF entered into the Meuse-Argonne the junior officers and NCOs in 
its infantry companies and platoons were still facing difficulties in matching their tactics to the 
enemy and terrain they encountered.  The continued inability of these leaders to combine 
formations, maneuver, and firepower came at a great price to themselves and their units.  The 
casualties caused by these missteps undercut the morale and effectiveness of the AEF and fueled 
a personnel crisis within its ranks that only deepened the army’s other systemic problems. 
 Given the nature of the enemy defenses, any American small unit attack that did not 
synchronize formations, maneuver, and firepower was likely to fail. In Pershing’s Combat 
Instructions, the commander fairly pleaded with his infantry platoon leaders and company 
commanders to suppress and pin the enemy machine gunners to the ground with American fire 
from the front or flank while maneuvering some portion of the unit to attack the German position 
from the flank.  He urged that “Where strong resistance is encountered, reinforcements must not 
be thrown in to make a frontal attack at this point, but must be pushed through gaps created by 
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successful units, to attack these strong points in the flank or rear.”128  Pershing’s admonitions 
were absolutely correct.  But what seemed so easy on paper at Chaumont was much more 
difficult for junior leaders to actually carry out in the tangle of the Argonne sector.  
 To some extent, the young leaders could be forgiven of their tactical sins.  Even well 
planned and executed attacks faced the reality that seeking the enemy’s flanks was easier said 
than done.  Soon after his battalion of the 79th Division started advancing on Montfaucon in the 
opening hours of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, Major Charles DuPuy came to the disturbing 
realization that “the tactics which we had learned, proved to be of little value.”  He discovered 
that, 
  We had always been taught to attack and take a machine gun by the flanks, but in  
  trying to do so we simply ran into a frontal fire from a machine gun on one side or 
  the other of the one we were trying to take, so that it was necessary a great many  
  times to simply charge a gun from the front and both flanks, and take it regardless 
  of our losses, which, per gun captured, averaged ten to twenty men.129   
 
This dilemma was also noted by Brigadier General George C. Barnhart, who commanded the           
1st Division’s 2nd Infantry Brigade through some of the Argonne fighting.  He noted that the 
tactics used by the AEF seldom enabled it to overcome enemy resistance without heavy losses 
and pointed out that when American units tried to flank one machine gun nest, the flankers  
merely stumbled into the fire of a another well-sighted gun.130   
 Colonel E. G. Peyton, who commanded the 80th Division’s 320th Infantry, echoed DuPuy 
and Barhart’s observations in this description of the fighting in the Argonne: 
  Here in this irregular line troops gave battle to the German machine guns that  
  could be seen only at rare intervals.  The enemy intrenchments (sic) afforded  
  every advantage in position, concealment and for enfilade fire.  Time and again  
  rushes were made from the front and flank against the nests only to be met by a  
  curtain of lead that was absolutely impassable…Here lives were needlessly lost in 
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trying    to rush through this curtain of lead.131  
 
When faced with such tactical conundrums, the junior leaders tended to either push the attack to 
the limit, and, as the 28th Infantry’s commander, Colonel Adolph Hugeut, put it, sacrifice 
“themselves and their men to put the Machine gun out of action,” or became so cautious and 
hesitant that their units gained little from their losses.132   
 The AEF’s junior leaders continued to make some of the same grave mistakes in adapting 
their formations to the terrain as had been made in the AEF’s earlier campaigns.  Soon after the 
Armistice, the AEF Inspector General produced a summary of the observations that its inspectors 
had made of the American units in combat from 12 September to 11 November 1918.  These 
observations were able to show the army’s steep and costly learning curve during its heaviest 
period of action and a general assessment of the effectiveness of its combat leaders in 
overcoming the challenges thrown at them during the fighting.  
 The report noted that in the opening weeks of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, the 
“infantry would advance in their proscribed attack formation until they would run into machine 
gun fire, they would then halt and call for a barrage or for artillery preparation and would 
advance in frontal attack upon the machine gun nests, suffering heavy casualties” when the fires 
were not forthcoming.  The inspectors pointed out that “serious losses at first were suffered 
through the fact that the infantry would be held up by some few machine gun nest long enough to 
loose the protection of their barrage.”  Towards the end of the operation, the infantry junior 
officers had gotten better at combining suppressive fires to pin down machine guns while small 
parties of soldiers moved around the guns to attack them from the flanks.  The artillery also 
became more adapt at holding their creeping barrages when the attacking infantry became 
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stalled.  Sadly, the report noted a continuing problem where, 
  Although orders were issued respecting formations in depth the reserve lines  
  kept crowding forward whenever the attacking battalions were held up.  In 
  several instances this resulted in serious machine gun casualties in the support and 
  even in the reserve battalions.  The rear lines could not be made to see that their 
  crowding forward did not help the attack but merely fed the men to machine  
  guns.133 
 
Unfortunately, the Inspector General failed to provide any analysis of why the AEF made 
progress in some tactical areas while it continued to struggle in others.  A possible explanation is 
that heavy losses of junior leaders doomed the AEF’s small units to a constant cycle of new 
groups of officers and NCOs endlessly having to learn the same lessons over and over again.     
 The AEF Inspector General noted that across the army, leaders were making fundamental 
tactical errors or mistakes in judgment that were leading to ever greater numbers of casualties.  
Junior leaders all too often failed to make proper reconnaissance of the terrain over which they 
were to attack prior to the actual assault.  Planning was based mostly on maps, with little to no 
effort made by the leaders to match the plan to the actual terrain and enemy in the area.  The 
failure of reconnaissance meant that American attacks often blundered into German positions 
causing unnecessary casualties and throwing off the time lines of the operation.  A soldier in the 
328th Infantry, for example, reported that when his company attacked near Sommerance on  
14 October 1918, it lost 38 men in one brief encounter after his platoon leader led his unit across 
an open field without conducting even the briefest of reconnaissance.  The platoon leader, 
Lieutenant J. W. Hatton, was also killed in the action.134 
 The AEF Inspector General, Major General Andre W. Brewster, became so concerned 
about the lapses of sound combat leadership among the AEF’s junior officers that he expressed 
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his belief that drastic measures needed to be taken to correct the deficiencies.  On 21 October 
1918, he wrote to the AEF Chief of Staff that,  
  As soon as the present period of active operations ceases, a series of platoon  
  leader schools should be established through which all platoon leaders should  
  pass before the next period of active operations.  Not only have platoon leaders  
  shown lack of resource when confronted with situations on the battlefield but they 
  seem to have forgotten the use of the various instruments of the offense in their  
  platoons.  When stopped, instead of developing all of their resources, they have  
  frequently pushed forward blindly and had their platoons suffer heavily.  The  
  platoon is the basis of the offensive and our platoons in this last offensive have  
  not developed all of their offensive power nor have the platoon leaders kept their  
  men together.  In many cases they have not realized the importance of their  
  command as a complete fighting unit.135   
 
Although the war ended before the Inspector General’s recommendations could be put into 
effect, the existence of the memorandum and the force of his statements highlight the fact that 
the GHQ was growing increasingly concerned with the abilities of leadership of its junior 
officers corps. 
 The Inspector General and the GHQ had good reasons to be concerned.  Time and time 
again, American officers were leading their men forward in mass formations against the frontal 
and flanking fire of machine guns. An artilleryman in the 32nd Division observed one of these 
attacks in the early days of the Meuse-Argonne drive.  He was mesmerized by one attack where, 
  The infantry advanced with courage and seemed to be making good headway.   
  We noted that all their dead lay in little circles.  It was instantly clear to us that  
  they must be entirely inexperienced, or they would never group together while  
  enemy field-gunners had them in sight.  Most of the dead had been killed by a  
  light shell dropped dexterously into the center of the ring.  Occasionally their  
  officers scattered them but it was difficult to keep them apart.  They were   
  evidently coming together for comfort and sympathy, forgetting that in their  
  situation the best comfort lay in keeping far apart and offering enemy gunners the  
  smallest possible target.136  
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The infantryman John Barkley saw the results of a similar one of these failed attacks launched by  
the 5th Division against Cunel in October 1918.  He later wrote, 
  They had evidently tried to hold their formations as they burst from the woods,  
  and had met with machine gun fire from the opposite hill.  They were lying now  
  in wave formations.  Some of them must have rolled and twisted as they died, but  
  not enough to disturb the outlines of that wave.137 
 
However, Barkley’s own leaders seemed little better in directing his company than had those of 
the dead men lying on the hillside.  To the soldier in the ranks, like Barkley, the experience of 
combat and their officers’ conduct could seem bewildering.  As his unit attacked through the 
Bois Des Ogons, he recalled, “Suddenly a heavy rifle fire and automatic rifle fire opened directly 
ahead.  I heard somebody yell, ‘Lets Go!’ and we ran straight forward.  At the same time the 
Germans on the right end of the line opened up on us with dozens of machine guns.”138  Without 
better training to fall back on, the junior leaders of Barkley’s company limited their tactical 
options to massing their units against the closest source of fire. 
 The experience of trying to lead the oversized American units into combat in the Argonne 
sector was equally bewildering to many of the officers themselves.  Lieutenant Joseph Lawrence 
admitted that during his unit’s attack on the Bois des Chenes on 10 October 1918, “I had 
difficulty keeping my line straight and moving forward in the midst of the chaos, and the men 
gathered in groups in spite of all the sergeants and I could do…”139  Lieutenant Maury Maverick, 
a new replacement officer with the 1st Division’s 28th Infantry, was completely unprepared for 
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his first experience in combat.  When his veteran officers ordered a frontal attack near Exermont 
on 4 October, Maverick recalled, 
  Most of us who were young American officers knew little of actual warfare- we  
  had the daring but not the training of the old officer of the front.  The Germans  
  simply waited, and then laid a barrage of steel and fire.  And the machine gunners  
  poured it on us.  Our company numbered two hundred men.  Within a few   
  minutes about half of them were either killed or wounded…everything happened  
  that never happens in the storybooks of war.  We literally lost each other.  There  
  were no bugles, no flags, no drums, and as far as we knew, no heroes.  The noise  
  was like great stillness, everything seemed blotted out.  We hardly knew where  
  the Germans were.140   
 
Under the circumstances encountered by Lawrence and Maverick, the leaders could only draw 
upon their meager training and experience to puzzle out a solution to their tactical problems.    
 As Maverick stated, the young officers had all of “the daring but not the training,” to 
cope with the German machine guns.  In these situations, junior officers tended to pick the 
tactical paths of least resistance, both in terms of using terrain and tactics, to attack the enemy.   
Under-trained and inexperienced leaders and soldiers are predisposed to follow routes that offer 
the easiest way forward.  They tend to follow paths and opens rather than try to push through 
areas that are thickly wooded or overgrown.  This fact was not lost on the German defenders in 
the Argonne.  A company commander in the 78th Division recalled that the Germans attempted 
to canalize the Americans by “barring all other approaches with barb wire” except for paths that 
led directly into the guns’ field of fire zone.  He noted that this tactic was very effective because, 
“after you’ve struggled in barb wire for a while you’ll take a chance on machine gun bullets to 
get on a path.”141  The officer claimed that after a few sorrowful experiences with this German 
technique, he and his men became more adept at avoiding them.  
 Despite the growing awareness of these German machine gun tactics, American infantry 
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units still continued to make many of the same mistakes in attacking them throughout the war.  A 
veteran soldier in the 42nd Division, Martin Hogan, recalled that his officers and comrades came 
to use “all that they had learned about fighting against men in cover” in his unit’s actions in the 
Argonne.  What stayed with him, however, was that even after realizing that “the paths that led 
to the enemy machine-gun nests were almost unthinkably bad,” leaders continue to rush through 
them “front-on, again, and again and again.”142 
 It is interesting to note that these tactical failings were not limited to those American 
units fighting as part of the AEF.  The 27th and 30th Divisions, attached to the British Army 
during all of their active campaigning, exhibited similar lapses in leadership. In an after actions 
report of the Ypres-Lys Offensive, an officer from the 30th Division noted, 
 The natural tendency of men seems to be to rush . . . (machine gun) nests in  
  frontal attacks instead of using a flanking or enveloping movement…Small unit  
  leadership: next to lack of liaison the most glaring defect. Small unit leaders wait  
  to be told how to do every little thing and use little or no initiative of their own,   
  do not assume enough responsibility. In all training of men, they have been too  
  dependent on officers telling them not only what to do but how to do it . . .   
  Platoon leaders have not had instruction and almost no practice in the actual use  
  of maps and aerial photos. 143   
 
Even with the benefit of close contact with experienced Allied troops and British schools, 
American junior leaders remained hobbled by their poor initial training.  
 American junior leaders also demonstrated shortcomings in their knowledge of gas 
warfare as well as in key leader tasks such as map reading.   During the Great War, the 
Americans lost over 1400 men who were killed outright or later died in hospital wards due to gas 
poisoning.  The AEF hospitalized over 70,552 men for gas exposure, and gas accounted for over 
27 percent of the army’s total combat related casualties. An unknown number of these 70,552 
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men later died of complications brought about by gas exposure or limped on with poor health for 
the rest of their days.144  By 1918, the major European combatants had reached a point to where 
gas had, for the most part, become a weapon of harassment; one that degraded the effectiveness 
of their soldiers without causing an unmanageable number of casualties. This was not the case 
with the AEF.  As the figures above show, the AEF lost considerable manpower to gas exposure. 
Most of the reasons for the AEF’s relatively high losses to gas pointed to poor training and 
leadership.  The reports of gas attacks against American forces compiled by E. W. Spencer in 
1928 consistently noted that the AEF’s officers, NCOs, and soldiers where woefully untrained in 
gas warfare.  In addition to training, failures in leadership, such as the lax enforcement of gas 
discipline and poor decisions by officers and NCOs, also caused unnecessary losses. 
 In a number of incidents, the officers set bad examples for their soldiers in their personal 
gas discipline, or put their men at risk due to their own ignorance.  An inquiry into a gas attack 
on the 1st Division’s 18th Infantry on 4 May 1918, uncovered a deplorable lack of gas discipline 
among the regiment’s officers and soldiers.  The investigation revealed that many of the 693 men 
hospitalized in the attack had been poisoned when they had not been warned of the attack and 
had remained unmasked in poorly protected shelters.  The unit’s leaders had failed to enact 
effective warning measures nor ensured that gas sentries were properly placed and instructed.  
One of the worse lapses in leadership was the poor example set by the unit’s officers.  The 
regimental commander, regimental gas officers, and several of the unit’s other officers had taken 
to wearing an unauthorized French gas mask rather than the cumbersome, uncomfortable, and 
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more effective Small Box Respirator.  This gave their soldiers license to follow their lead, and 
some were stricken while using the ineffective French M2 masks.145   
 On 8 October 1918, the 7th Division’s Chief of Staff issued a memorandum informing his 
officers that “casualties due to gas bombardment are all the more deplorable in view of the fact 
that they are preventable.”  He noted that the key to reducing gas casualties was for officers to 
maintain strict discipline in forcing their soldiers to wear their masks and in properly conducting 
unmasking procedures.146  The Chief of Staff’s last point identified one of the major leadership 
failures when it came to gas warfare: officers and NCOs simply did not know when to order their 
soldiers into or out of their gas masks.  
 A gas attack against the 26th Division on 10 October 1918 resulted in 111 casualties in 
the 101st and 102nd Field Artillery which “was caused principally by premature removal of 
respirators.  They were ordered off by Lieut. Ford in charge of Battery B, 102nd F. A. soon after 
the shelling stopped.”147  In another case, a battalion of the 386th Infantry had to hospitalize over 
200 men for gas exposure after it was hit by a German gas attack on 6 October 1918.  An officer 
from one of the gassed companies “gave the order to remove masks in less than two hours after 
the bombardment.”  The Division Gas Officer reported, “I cannot understand how any officer 
could be so ignorant of the effects of mustard gas to issue such an order and this order was 
responsible for at least two-thirds of the casualties in this attack” (original emphasis).148   
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 Junior leaders also had some difficulty in mastering the art of land navigation.  There is 
an old army joke that the most dangerous man on the battlefield is a second lieutenant with a 
map.  Sadly, during World War I, the second lieutenant in question was also joined by his 
captain and major when it came to map reading and orienteering.  In an examination given by the 
II Corps Headquarters to a mixed group of field grade officers immediately after the war, only 5 
out of 57 leaders tested could accurately locate map coordinates.149  The ability of leaders to use 
maps and compasses to report their positions, plan fire support, and find their way to tactical 
objectives was a vital combat skill that was not given the emphasis needed during the training of 
the AEF’s officers and leaders.  Given the tangled terrain of the Argonne sector, leaders 
frequently had to follow compass directions just to move forward.  Yet, an officer in the              
5th Division stated that training in the use of a magnetic compass was not given to his unit until a 
lull in the Argonne drive, after the area’s terrain had demonstrated to the unit the need for such 
equipment and training.150 
 Failures in land navigation could have critical implications for small unit actions.  
Corporal Berch Ford, a soldier in the 16th Infantry, recalled that during the Soissons drive, his 
platoon discovered that its lieutenant could not read a map, and had taken the unit far beyond 
their objective.  The unit was fortunate that the platoon sergeant was a long service regular and 
reoriented that platoon after telling the officer that he was taking over command.151  During the 
Meuse-Argonne fighting Captain Sam Woodfill got into an argument with a fellow company 
commander whose inability to read a map was jeopardizing his unit.  Woodfill noted, “Instead of 
makin’ for the woods I had just patrolled they were goin’ straight toward another wood which we 
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knew was chuck-full of Germans.”  While he managed to talk the other captain into changing his 
course, the mixed-up officer left Woodfill still declaring that he knew exactly where he was.152 
 While all of this paints a rather bleak portrait of American junior leadership, it must be 
stated that not all American leaders made these mistakes or failed to learn from their experiences.  
Some officers actively sought to adapt their tactics to the challenges that confronted them.  The 
diary of Harold C. Woehl indicates that the officers of the 126th Infantry experimented with new 
tactics and methods of organizing and fighting after their heavy losses in the Aisne-Marne and 
Oise-Aisne Campaigns.  On 20 September 1918, First Sergeant Woehl recorded that his 
company received orders from the regiment to practice fighting “in line of gangs.”  This was 
different from the “combat groups” listed in Offensive Combat of Small Units.   Rather than 
having squads organized around a single weapon, as was done in “combat groups” (i.e. two 
automatic rifle squads, a bomber squad, and a rifle squad), the “combat gangs” were to be all-
arms squads built “with the Automatic Rifle as a group nucleus.”153   
 First Lieutenant Fred Jankoska, the company commander for H Company, 126th Infantry, 
also displayed a marked ability to change his formations and tactics to suit the combat situations 
he encountered.  For example, on 1 October 1918 he opted to send the company’s first and 
second waves forward “a few men at a time filtering forward from shellhole to shellhole to 
advance our line” rather than attacking in the lines of platoons as directed by Offensive Combat 
of Small Units.  Although the assault encountered heavy fire and slowly ground to a halt, the 
company only had three soldiers killed in the action.  The next morning Lieutenant Jankoska 
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again changed his method of attack.  To cross an unavoidable 100 yard wide swath of open space 
he infiltrated the deadly ground by sending one man over at a time. The move forward proceeded 
at a snail’s pace under constant enemy artillery and machine gun fire, but the company suffered 
the loss of only one wounded man.154   
 Why was Jankoska able to do this while other officers failed?  Part of it was his longevity 
in the unit.  He had been in the regiment since it had arrived in France, and had been assigned 
with H Company since early August.  Jankoska was a veteran of the school of hard knocks, and 
had lived through the experience while many of his fellow company officers had fallen to death 
or wounds.  If “lessons” are to be learned in small units, their leaders must live through the 
ordeal to tell the tale.  Furthermore, Jankoska’s superiors were willing to ignore the aspects of 
the doctrine coming out of Chaumont that did not match the realities of combat.  This 
willingness to abridge or discard the “book” when it was not relevant supports Grotelueschen’s 
contention that tactical adaptability in the AEF often came from below.  Sadly, few of the 
divisions that arrived in the summer and fall of 1918 had the time, experience, or ability to 
advance to this level of tactical common sense.   
 It must also be noted that learning at the school of hard knocks could be very costly in 
terms of human lives.  A 42nd Division infantry captain admitted to a division inspector on  
22 October 1918 that the experience had forced him to change his formations and tactics.  He 
had originally placed all of his automatic rifles in his first wave of attack so they could 
immediately fire on any machine guns they encountered.  Unfortunately, he found that in doing 
so, all of the automatic rifles were quickly “put out of action early.”  He intended to group all of 
his automatic rifles and rifle grenades in the second wave the next time his unit advanced.  
Although it was good that the captain was learning from his past mistakes, the automatic rifle 
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squads decimated in his first attack probably did not share in the joy of their leader’s self-
discovery.155   
  The available German sources also point to the lack of training, initiative, and skill of the 
American small unit leaders.  German officers were endlessly surprised by the density of the 
American formations and the penchant of their leaders to launch frontal attacks with little to no 
regard for the terrain and the German dispositions.  The German commander facing the             
1st Division’s attack against Exermont on 4 October 1918, reported that “The mass concentration 
of men was so large that the one wave pushed the other forward in a certain sense.”156  One after 
action report of the 31st Bavarian Infantry Regiment stated, 
  Even when deployed the enemy suffered bloody losses.  The separate and isolated 
  groups coming in carelessly at first, were at once subjected to the withering  
  concentrated fire of light and heavy machine guns…Gaping holes were torn in the 
  lines of riflemen, entire columns being mowed down…They were visible at great  
  distances and offered excellent targets…One could plainly observe that the unrest  
  in the ranks grew every minute.  Lone individuals and frequently entire  
  detachments ran aimlessly about.157      
 
Tim and time again, from the Aisne-Marne to the closing weeks of the Meuse-Argonne fight, 
German officers described the American attacks as being made in “dense masses” or “dense 
waves.”158  As late as 20 October 1918, the commander of the German 170th Infantry Regiment 
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reported, “in action the American appears very awkward.  The hostile infantry attacks in large 
masses, at times in as many as 15 waves.”159 
 Some German sources also made the same observations of the American fixation for 
maintaining rigid formations regardless of the tactical situation as had been made by the AEF’s 
inspector generals.  Ernst Otto, a German officer facing the 2nd Division’s attacks on Blanc 
Mont, praised the bravery and their tenacity of the Americans, but he later noted that his enemy’s 
lock-step effort to keep formation and tendency to remain in dense “battalion-columns” resulted 
in many of the American losses.160  On 26 October 1918, the commander of the German 111th 
Infantry Regiment reported that the U. S. Army “is effective solely on account of its mass action 
and its freshness.”  The Germans also observed, “A certain naïveté manifests itself during 
assembly.  In this connection the Americans conduct themselves rather boldly, indicating their 
inexperience.”  He went on to argue, 
  The advance of the hostile infantry was not consistent.  On one hand it advanced 
  in skirmish lines, another time in file, then again in light groups, even though 
  the terrain was not favorable for such.161 
 
 Although it might be easy to discount the German views as “sour grapes” or wishful 
thinking, their observations were echoed in the comments made by officers sitting on the boards 
that collected the AEF’s “lessons learned” from the war.  During the Lewis Board, Brigadier 
General Malin Craig, one of the U. S. Army’s shining intellectual lights, argued that throughout 
the war, “our men still inclined to go forward in close masses and to take shelter in masses, 
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instead of reducing the size or the target by intervals.”162  Colonel Gordon Johnson pointed out 
that, “the tendency to belt straight ahead within a given sector was the cause of not only of many 
losses, but [also] of the failure to properly use all the means at hand for overcoming 
resistance.”163  Thinking back on his wartime experiences, Major Robert Calder, commander of 
the 1st Division’s 3rd Machine Gun Battalion, was moved to state, “In this war our men in the 
ranks have been superior to our officers, that is as soldiers they were better than the officers were 
as leaders.”164  The members of the Superior Board concluded that “untrained leaders were too 
often found in the line,” and that this “oftentimes jeopardized the chance of success and 
unquestionably increased the casualties within our ranks.”165   
 Even some experienced American units could fall into the tactical traps described by the 
Germans and lamented by the Lewis and Superior Boards.  George Cornish, an officer in the      
1st Division’s 26th Infantry, recalled that the “normal” attack formation used by his unit during 
both the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne Offensives was to place two companies abreast in the 
lead echelon with “each company with two platoons in the first wave and two in support [in the 
second wave].”  The platoons were to deploy “with one-half [its strength] in the front line and 
one- half in the second,” with “50 meters between the lines, 100 meters between waves.”  The 
battalion’s remaining two companies were to support the advance and remain 400 meters behind 
the assault companies.  In this formation, the battalion frontage was 600 meters, and its depth, 
with an attached machine gun company, was 1200 meters.  While these formations were nearly 
identical to those given in Offensive Combat of Small Units, their spacing was 100 meters wider 
than the frontage given in the manual.   
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 Even with these changes, the formation proved too dense during the regiment’s attack on 
the Exermont Ravine on 4 October 1918.  The regiment’s 1st Battalion was particularly hard hit 
and had “practically lost all of its officers and suffered about 50% casualties” during the 
advance.  The 2nd Battalion maneuvered a bit more skillfully, breaking out of the “normal 
formation” and moving forward “in squad columns widely deployed” and crossing “the exposed 
ground by infiltration.”  This suggests that even within the same regiment, you could have one 
commander who rigidly adhered to “doctrinal” formations and techniques, like the 1st Battalion 
commander, while others, like the 2nd Battalion commander, adapted to the situations they 
encountered.  By the end of the day, the 26th Infantry’s attack had seized a mile of ground at a 
cost of 565 officers and men.  Although it generally benefited from superior artillery support 
during the next seven days the regiment was in the line, and advanced a total of five miles, the 
assaults had cost the regiment 41 of the 84 officers and 1600 of the 3300 men it had entered the 
fighting with on 3 October 1918.166    
 In addition to the poor use of tactics and formations by junior officers, a number of 
German officers noted the American tendency to lose any element of surprise by their 
predictable sequences of preparing for, and executing, attacks.  Colonel Baumfelder, the 
commander of the German 102nd Infantry Regiment, reported on 1 November 1918 that the 
Americans generally provided their enemies indicators of their future actions long before going 
over the top.  He observed, 
  The Americans betray their offensive intentions repeatedly, by conspicuously  
  orienting themselves on the terrain before the attack.  They show themselves 
  as individuals and groups, apparently officers, during the day, by walking  
  around noisily with unfolded maps without any cover.  The preparations for an  
  attack are also repeatedly carried out in conspicuous fashion, so that our artillery 
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  and machine gun fire can disrupt them… 
 
  The [American] attack is carried out not in firing lines but in little groups in rows 
  or packs, moving unskillfully over the terrain offering lucrative targets for  
  machine guns and infantry.  The American soldier is brave and bold, lacks the  
  proper junior leadership and often shows himself to be improperly trained.  If 
  our artillery and machine gun fire comes into effect properly, the opponent is 
  thrown into confusion and the attack comes to a halt.167 
 
The commander of the German 170th Infantry also noted that the doughboys always signaled the 
location and direction of their coming attacks with a very predictable morning assault preceded 
by a bombardment lasting several hours.168   
 The propensity of the Americas to “telegraph their punch” gave the Germans an obvious 
tactical advantage.  As they expected the Americans to make morning attacks preceded by 
artillery fires, in was not uncommon for the Germans to lose their own artillery and machine gun 
fires on identified and possible American assembly areas for the coming attack.  One German 
officer reported during the Argonne fight, “when annihilation fire  is placed on the hostile 
assembly areas in a timely manner, a part of the force of the assault is taken from the enemy.”169  
The Germans were fully aware of the Americans’ lack of basic training in gas warfare and used 
this knowledge to delay, disrupt, or halt the doughboys’ attacks before they gained momentum. 
“The Americans are very much afraid of artillery fire and especially gas shells,” a German 
officer noted, and, “a few yellow cross shells [Mustard Gas] are sufficient to start the gas alarm 
                                                 
 167 Report from the 102nd Regt. to the 63rd Inf. Bde, NARA RG 165, Box 200, German Miscellaneous File.   
 168 “Relative to experiences as to the method of attack of the Americans,” 170th Inf. Regt., dated 15 October 
1918, in World War Records, First Division, A. E. F. Regular, Vol. IV, German Documents: Meuse-Argonne. For 
other German reports noting the tendency of the Americans to betray their intentions to the enemy, see, 
“Experiences relative the method of attack of the Americans,” 169th Inf. Regt., dated 25 October 1918, in World War 
Records, First Division, A. E. F. Regular, Vol. IV, German Documents: Meuse-Argonne., “Experiences during 
recent actions,” German 37th Division, dated 13 October 1918, in World war Records, First Division, A. E. F. 
Regular, Vol. IV, German Documents: Meuse-Argonne.  
 169 “Experiences during recent actions,” German 37th Division, dated 13 October 1918, in World War 
Records, First Division, A. E. F. Regular, Vol. IV, German Documents: Meuse-Argonne.  
  716
and considerable confusion.”170  The German officer’s assertion was confirmed by the 
Americans themselves.  During an attack in the Meuse-Argonne on Hill 378, an officer in the 2nd 
Battalion, 313th Infantry reported “the enemy fire and gas were so bad that the Battalion became 
somewhat disorganized and lost the barrage.” Although the battalion gained its objective, it only 
did so with very heavy losses.171  Lieutenant Hervey Allen also admitted that when his battalion 
was hit with German gas, “the usual result was great trouble.  Platoons and companies lost touch 
with each other, and there was great difficulty in giving orders or having them understood.”172  
 One of the gravest criticisms that the Germans levied against the American junior leaders 
was their lack of initiative in combat.  On 26 October 1918, the commander of the German  
111th Infantry Regiment reported to his brigade commander that, “All American attacks had a 
very limited objective.  The successes were never exploited, as otherwise on many occasions this 
could have had disastrous consequences [for the Germans].”173  After his encounter with the 
Americans in September 1918, another German commander noted, 
 The [American] leadership was altogether clumsy…most of them do not possess 
  the qualifications necessary of leadership.  It was impossible to overlook the 
  embarrassment displayed by the Americans as soon as their initial aims were 
  achieved. They helplessly faced their new positions, unable to take any advantage 
  of them…Favorable opportunities to overtake and encircle us were allowed by 
  them to go by…As soon as the infantry, charging straight ahead, had achieved its 
  goals, leaders, as well as the rank and file, were nonplused.174   
 
Lastly, a German regimental commander explained, “As soon as [the Americans] had a success 
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he failed to exploit it but remained in position for hours without moving forward in the 
terrain.”175  
Adding to this lack of small unit initiative, German officers frequently noted the benefit 
that their units gained from the inability of their American foes to maintain adequate fire support 
for their assault units after the preliminary and rolling barrages. An officer of the German  
169th Infantry maintained that, “after the infantry attack is launched, in most cases there is no 
liaison between the artillery and the infantry; the American artillery always seems not to learn 
the location of the forward line until later and as a result either does not fire at all or rather [fires] 
far into the rear.”176  Another German officer stated, “Liaison between [the American] infantry 
and artillery was poor. This manifested itself primarily during the [German] counter-attacks.  
Then the hostile artillery was silent in most cases.”177 
 The failure of American infantry-artillery cooperation and of the AEF’s junior leaders 
was a disastrous combination.  In both cases, the American inactivity allowed the Germans to 
mass and launch their inevitable counterattacks to dislodge the Americans without fear of 
retaliation by the doughboys’ artillery or much reaction from their infantry.  A German infantry 
commander reported with great relish that in those situations, “A single counter-attack impaired 
the whole activity of the enemy for days and cost less casualties and demand less on the nervous 
energy of the [German] troops than the wait under very heavy artillery fire without cover.”178 
Compounding this problem, American Inspector Generals had found that in the fighting at St. 
Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne, “our infantry did not dig in during temporary halts.  In many 
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instances…the infantry did not dig in, and were quickly blown off the height by concentrations 
of enemy shell fire which invariably resulted in it becoming necessary to retake the position with 
loss of men.”179  This fact was illustrated during an American attack against the German        
151st Infantry on 11 October 1918.  Although the American assault succeeded in collapsing the 
enemy’s defenses, the failure of the Americans to either capitalize on their success by continuing 
their attacks against the fleeing Germans, or to at least consolidate their gains, allowed the 
German commander the time to halt the rout of his troops by deploying his regimental staff as 
skirmishers and collecting the men retreating from the lines.  The counterattack launched by 
these hastily assembled scratch forces succeeded in pushing the Americans back to their start 
point.180 
 It was in instances such as these that the U. S. Army’s general failure to teach its junior 
leaders how to exercise intelligent initiative came back to haunt the AEF.  Although junior 
officers were often cognizant of their own shortcomings and lack of experience, they generally 
resented the micro-management of their superiors.  The company grade officers argued that the 
direct involvement of senior officers in the command and administration of their companies 
diminished their authority and leadership within their units.  An infantry captain decried what he 
saw as “interference by officers higher than Company Commanders in those problems of 
responsibility and duty of the Company Commander, with the result that Company Commanders 
were often mere figureheads.”181  One officer resented the fact that "in most places the junior 
officers, especially Reserve and National Guard officers, have been treated more as dishonorable 
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and dishonest men...and not treated as officers should be treated."182  Another captain noted the 
tendency of senior leaders to treat their subordinates “as if they were irresponsible and had no 
idea of right and wrong.”183   
 The senior officers seemed to justify their micro-management on the grounds that junior 
leaders could not be trusted to carry out important assignments without their close supervision.  
This perceived need to regulate junior officers further stressed already overburdened senior 
commanders and staffs and also created command climates where initiative and independent 
decision-making were not prized or encouraged.  As a second lieutenant noted shortly after the 
war, 
  There are too many instances of Colonels doing Platoon Leader’s work. There are 
  too many lieutenants doing the work of sergeants.  There is a tendency on the part 
  of the General Staff itself to direct the simplest movements of small units in detail 
  instead of giving a general outline in orders and leaving the details to be worked 
  out by those who are commissioned for that purpose.184 
     
There seems to be much truth in the accusations of both sides.  In Notes on Recent Operations 
Number 3, the AEF GHQ went so far as to admonish commanders for their constant 
“interference in the province of subordinates” when issuing orders.185  Major General Edmund 
Whittenmyer condemned instances where “superiors directed the work of units of inferiors, the 
results were not satisfactory, and, in my judgment, there resulted a loss in accomplishment.”186 
These admonishments did little to change the army’s culture of micromanagement.  Of his 
regiment’s action in the Argonne, for example, the 42nd Division’s Lieutenant Colonel William 
“Wild Bill” Donovan recalled, “There were green company commanders with the 
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companies…There were times when I had to march at the head of the companies to get them 
forward…(the) new men needed some visible symbol of authority.”187  While Donovan’s 
micromanagement was perhaps justified, he seemed oblivious to the long-term implications of 
his actions.   
 Shortly after the war, Major General Robert Alexander stated that in his 77th Division 
there had been a general failure in “the development of individual initiative along proper lines” 
among his junior leaders.  He noted, 
  It did not seem to me that the Junior officers and non-commissioned officers 
  realized the importance of maneuvering as a means whereby successful results 
  might be attained with a minimum of losses.  This was not due to any lack of 
  good will or earnestness.  It was simply due to the fact that their instruction had  
  either not been conducted along lines that would impress upon them the vital  
  necessity for such maneuver, or the course of instruction through which they had  
  been put had not made upon them the impression desired.188 
   
The AEF Inspector General agreed with Alexander’s assessment and laid the fault for much of 
the U. S. Army's problems on the lack of responsibility and initiative on the part of the junior 
officers.189 Unfortunately, the AEF’s senior leaders failed to see their own culpability in their 
subordinates’ failures.  To a great extent, the command climate that Pershing instilled in the AEF 
only served to exacerbate the problem of initiative in his commanders.   
 While the senior officers often criticized and distrusted the abilities of their subordinates, 
the AEF's junior leaders frequently held equally low opinions of their superiors.  Like their 
subordinates, the senior leadership had virtually no experience with massed artillery, machine 
guns, tanks, or the other technological changes affecting the battlefield.  The junior leaders 
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chaffed under what they considered the field grade officers’ hypocritical criticisms of their 
competency.  The junior officers countered contempt with contempt and lashed their superiors 
with telling accusations.  One young officer blasted the "lack of experience and common sense in 
the handling of large bodies of troops by some higher officers," while another bluntly wrote "the 
field officers and many general officers did not understand their work."  An infantry lieutenant 
accused, "In battle, General and Field Officers remained far to the rear, but after the battle they 
came and bitterly criticize[d] the work of the combatants, when if the higher officers had been in 
their proper places they could have personally directed the fighting."190 
 The junior officers’ most striking criticism was that their superiors often lacked basic 
command skills and were out of touch with the realities of modern warfare.  In the Morale 
Branch survey a field artillery officer commented, "Many Commanding Officers were ignorant 
as to what their organizations were capable of doing in action. That is they expected the 
impossible at times and did not take advantage of things they could do at times."191  These 
charges had some merit.  Soon after the war, field-grade officers in II Corps schools were found 
to be unable “to write a clear, concise message, and had small conception of the general tactical 
principles employed in offensive movements."192   
 The inability of senior officers to issue clear and timely orders often hobbled the 
operations of their subordinates.  One 4th Division machine gun battalion commander 
complained that, 
   Consideration is not given [by senior officers] to the absolute necessity to move  
  and properly…[deploy] troops in combat. Battalion and company commanders  
  were kept in the dark almost up to the last moment and then comes the order, the  
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  execution of which is to be practically immediate and with no chance to properly  
  study the ground or maps.  This was not because there was not time enough from  
  the time the attack was planned but because the staff took too long and gave the  
  line too little time.193 
 
Incidents were rife in the AEF where the foot dragging of senior headquarters in issuing orders 
directly caused unnecessary casualties among the attacking troops.  A mix-up in orders for an 
attack by the 2nd Division’s 23rd Infantry on 6 June 1918 so delayed the issuance of instructions 
to the unit’s company commanders, that in order to make the attack time, they had to sprint back 
to their companies and push the men over the top with little guidance or direction.  The attack 
commenced without artillery support and the regiment’s Stokes Mortars and 37mm guns were 
eliminated by enemy fire.  The American attack was checked by German machine gun fire and 
the regiment “suffered severe casualties.”194   
 A similar series of events happened to units of the 36th Division when they were attached 
to the 2nd Division for an attack on St. Etienne on 8 October 1918.  The 2nd Division’s attack 
orders for a 6:15 AM attack were not briefed to the company commanders of the attached       
141st Infantry until 6:11 AM on the morning of the assault.  In fact, “the battalion commander of 
the front line-battalion of the 141st Infantry was just in the act of imparting detailed instructions 
to his company commanders when the rolling barrage commenced.”195 After losing the rolling 
barrage, the attacking battalions suffered heavy casualties and the attack stalled shortly after it 
began.  By the end of the day, the attacking 71st Infantry Brigade had lost 33 percent of its 
officers and 23 percent of its enlisted men. 
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 The 36th Division’s Captain Ben Chastaine noted that prior to the abortive attack “only 
the smallest amount of information had been obtained of the position” and “no maps had been 
distributed to the companies and only the most general idea of the terrain was to be had.”196  He 
denounced the fact that the combat instructions given to the officers were so rushed and sketchy, 
“they were useless as far as the commanders of the combat units were concerned.”  One 
company commander never even received these incomplete orders, for the runner sent to bring 
him to the battalion commander’s hurried orders briefing was killed and his message 
undelivered.  When the absent commander noticed that the battalion was attacking, he quickly, 
but belatedly set his own company into movement. The ill-planned attack was a disaster, and in 
the confusion, the “troops of the supporting battalion coming up from the rear only served to 
make the line denser and increase the number of casualties.”197  
 Based on their study of the Great War, officers at the Infantry School later admitted that 
“instances abound in which attack orders were received after the hour specified by the order for 
the jump-off” of the attack.198  Given the minute planning required to make the American 
artillery effective, such last minute issuing or changing of orders often ensured that the 
outwardly improvised attacks would fail or at least saddle junior leaders with a host of new 
complications.  For example, the morale and effectiveness of the 140th Infantry, a unit already 
wracked by heavy casualties, were further shaken by last minute changes to formations and 
orders it received only minutes prior to its newly scheduled attack time on 29 September 1918.  
One officer angrily noted, “the higher commanders were in a state of confusion and excitement 
and to this cause was undoubtedly due much of the confusion of the troops.”  The ill-planned and 
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poorly-supported attack against a strong German position produced predictable results, and it 
quickly bogged down.  When the brigade commander ordered the troops to return to their start 
line, panic ensued.  A 140th Infantry staff officer reported, “instead of doing as ordered by 
Officers and NCOs, they started to break and run, almost turning into a stampede.  Men of all 
regiments, Officers and NCOs were headed to the rear.”199  
 In instances such as these, the fear of relief and disgrace led far too many senior officers 
to push attacks long after their chances of success were past.  This reality was not lost on the 
enlisted men.  On 11 October 1918, the 325th Infantry launched an attack across the Aire River 
near St. Juvin to route the Germans entrenched on a ridge to the north of the town.  The frontal 
assault made grudging headway against the strong German positions.  One of the regiment’s 
soldiers, Sergeant Victor Vigorito, recalled that the order from higher headquarters was to “push 
steadily on, regardless of the cost.”  He noting in trying to carry out those instructions, “we lost 
280 officers and men in a few minutes,” and claimed, “it was the worst piece of wholesale 
murder I saw in the whole war.”200    
 It is probable that the willingness of infantry commanders to attack without artillery 
support, or to follow orders that were based on faulty assumptions, stemmed from the fear of 
repercussions if their attacks did not go off as scheduled.  When senior officers told their 
subordinates to take or hold ground “at all cost,” too many officers seemed willing to follow 
those instructions without question.  After the Germans dropped a lethal combinations of gas on 
the 82nd and 89th Divisions during a relief in place on 7 and 8 August 1918 near Seicheprey, the 
two divisions suffered a combined total of 47 men killed and another 759 evacuated for gas 
exposure.  An investigation concluded that “the large number of casualties was in part due to the 
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lack of knowledge, on the part of officers and men involved, concerning Mustard Gas.”  
Furthermore, “When the men went into the line they were told to hold their positions at all costs, 
and apparently men and officers alike considered it almost a point of honor to remain despite the 
Mustard Gas...”(original emphasis).201 
 Another such incident occurred on 7 November 1918 when the 79th Division directed that 
each of its infantry company commanders send out a 16 man patrol to locate machine gun nests 
and bring back German prisoners.  Captain Arthur Joel, a company commander in the 314th 
Infantry, recalled, “One’s first opinion naturally was that there must be some mistakes in the 
orders.  To send a patrol across the lines in broad daylight …seemed like suicide!”  Despite great 
reservations and the gnawing feeling that the orders were a mistake, Joel philosophically 
shrugged that “orders were orders” and sent the men out.  As he had predicted, the patrol was 
shot to pieces by machine gun and artillery fire.202  A similar event occurred on 10 November 
1918, when First Lieutenant Glen Gardiner, of the 5th Division’s 60th Infantry, delayed attacking 
Juvigny for approximately 12 hours.  The officer’s delay ensured that that objective was not 
captured prior to the time that the Armistice went into effect at 11:00 AM on 11 November.  
Gardiner claimed that the two companies given him to command for the attack were “short of 
ammunition and had no grenades,” lacked artillery support and also had not been fed.  For his 
decisions, Gardiner’s commander sent him to Blois for reclassification.203   
 Although AEF commanders stated that they wanted their junior leaders to exercise 
initiative, in choosing his men over the mission in the waning hours of the war, Lieutenant 
Gardiner had, of course, not exhibited the “right kind” of initiative.  The failure of the AEF’s 
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senior leaders to reconcile their demands for absolute obedience to orders with the need for their 
small unit leaders to exercise initiative left junior officers and NCOs unsure of what the “right 
kind” of initiative actually looked like.  This failure led to some of the army’s most ironic 
moments.  When his unit was pulled out of the lines around Cantigny in late May 1918, 
Lieutenant Jeremiah Ewarts was ordered to follow a given route to the rear area and not to 
deviate from the path.  After finding that the route was under observation by German balloons 
and being shelled, Ewarts quickly diverted his unit off the road and moved it across country by a 
safer path.  Just as he reached his destination, the lieutenant was accosted by a division staff 
officer who questioned him about his failure to obey orders and stated that he would report his 
actions to the division commander.  In the end, the young officer was reprimanded for his 
intelligent and common sense use of initiative.204   
There is an old army expression that “shit rolls downhill.”  It reflects the fact that when 
one’s superiors are feeling the heat for some problem or are being goaded into action by their 
bosses, inevitably you (and consequently your subordinates) will be spurred in a given direction.  
The same captains that complained of the micromanagement of their superiors, seemed to have 
had little compunction of exhibiting the same behavior toward their own lieutenants and NCOs.  
In training and combat, the American junior officers demonstrated a propensity for consolidating 
decision-making and supervision into their own hands.  On 17 October 1918, the 6th Division’s 
Inspector General reported, 
  Experience and observation convinces me that in our Army sufficient   
  responsibility is not placed upon squad leaders-and they are not impressed with  
  that responsibility.  The squad is the unit around and upon which our Army is  
  [built], and can easily be supervised by one man- whereas it is absolutely   
  impossible for one man (the Company Commander) to properly attend to the  
  needs and wants of each man, by himself.  We have yet to learn a proper sub- 
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  division of duties, and a distribution of responsibility, and only by making each  
  squad a real “unit” is military efficiency to be obtained. (original emphasis)205 
 
One officer recalled that a fellow captain had won the favor of his commander by “going through 
all the prescribed motions” in his daily duties.  The officer was so intent on keeping up 
appearances for his boss that he “supervised himself” the routine work of his soldiers, “least his 
executive officer might slip up on some of the ritualistic detail.”206   
 The end results of these actions were predictable.  Junior leaders that were separated from 
their commanders by accidents of the action or casualties, often found themselves unready to 
assume the mantel of command themselves.  For example, during the fighting in the Argonne 
sector on 7 October 1918, the 82nd Division’s Inspector General complained, “the failure of some 
squad leaders to meet the demands of succession of command, and exercise aggressive control in 
platoons which had lost the lieutenants and sergeants” had exacerbated the unit’s straggler crisis 
and caused much of the sluggishness that characterized the division’s recent attacks.207  
 The failure to use their initiative when the tactical situation demanded often came with 
dire consequences for their units.  During the Argonne drive, Lieutenant Joseph Lawrence waited 
impatiently for one of the trail companies to come up to support his unit’s tenuous hold on the 
frontlines.  When the supporting company failed to appear, Lawrence sent runners to find the 
missing unit and led them forward.  The runners found the needed company firmly ensconced 
some 75 yards behind Lawrence’s embattled unit.  When Lawrence pleaded for the commander 
to move his company forward, the officer replied that he had been placed there by their battalion 
commander, and he would not move unless ordered to do so by the major.  When Lawrence 
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found the major to inform him of the situation, the superior officer berated him for leaving his 
company, ordered the lieutenant out of his dugout, and promptly went back to sleep. 
Unfortunately, when the major discovered his mistake the next morning and ordered the support 
company forward, it was chewed up by German fire as it advanced in the daylight.  The 
company commander who had initially refused to take the initiative to support Lawrence the 
nigh before was also killed in the move.208 
 It would be wrong to say that American junior leaders actively avoided taking the 
initiative.  There are a number of examples where their timely actions were critical to the 
accomplishment of missions or saving American lives.  For example, Stanley Herzog observed a 
particularly effective use of initiative by some junior officers of the 26th Division during the 
Aisne-Marne Offensive.  After the doughboys of the 102nd Infantry had been held up by a 
German strongpoint, a lieutenant commanding an artillery battery, on his own, coordinated with 
the nearby machine gunners to bring the enemy positions under the synchronized and 
concentrated fire of their collective artillery and machine guns.  This effective suppression 
allowed the infantry to advance and seize their objective.209  In another instance, when his 
regiment was held up by heavy German fire while trying to cross a Meuse River canal on  
4 November, the 5th Division’s Captain Edward Allworth swam the river with the remainder of 
his company and managed to dislodge the German defenders.210  However, these incidents 
transpired in spite of, rather than because of, the training the leaders had previously been given.    
 Ultimately, the outcomes of these various and assorted lapses in small unit leadership 
were the line of dead and wounded that they left in their wake.  These losses in turn led to a 
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steady erosion of morale, unit cohesion, and the combat effectiveness of the AEF’s infantry 
companies, platoons, and squads.  The AEF suffered over 256,000 battle casualties during the 
war.  Of these, slightly less than 50,000 were killed in action or died of their wounds.  While 
these statistics pale in comparison to the losses of the other powers, well over half of the 
American casualties occurred in the last seven weeks of the war.  Of the AEF, Marshal Foch 
commented, “It can be stated that the percentage of its losses in relation to its effectives engaged 
and to the length of time it was in the field was found to be the highest of all the Allied armies in 
1918.”211   
 As its casualty numbers make it an “average” AEF unit, the experiences of the 82nd  
Division is useful to illustrate the effects of poor tactics and leadership in the Meuse-Argonne.  
The division's first three days of combat in the Argonne shocked the doughboys with its ferocity 
and deadliness.  In the six months that the 82nd Division had served in France prior to the Meuse-
Argonne, the division had lost a total of 133 soldiers killed in action, 1244 wounded or gassed, 
and 13 captured.  From 7 to 10 October, the 327th Infantry alone suffered the loss of 118 soldiers 
killed, 700 wounded and 96 captured.  When the 82nd Division was relieved from the lines on 30 
October 1918 after 23 days of continuous fighting, the unit had lost 902 soldiers killed in action, 
4897 wounded and 185 taken prisoner.212   
This level of casualties was devastating to the AEF’s small units.  After three days of 
impaling itself on the German defenses at Belieu Bois and the Bois d’Ormont in late October 
1918, the 26th Division’s 101st Infantry, 102nd Infantry, and 102nd Machine Gun Battalion had 
been sadly depleted.  One black joke in those units ran that when they were pulled from the lines, 
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their replacement’s asked “Hey, Buddy! What Company?” Only to hear the retort, “Company? 
Hell, it’s the whole damned regiment!”213  This sad joke was not far off the mark.   
The units’ frontal attacks had left many corporals commanding companies and had forced 
the consolidations of battalions and their subordinate units.  Company A of the 102nd Machine 
Gun Battalion was to have had six officers and 172 men.  When it came out of the line on 
 29 October, it was down to one officer, eight NCOs, and 47 privates.  The unit’s one officer was 
a lieutenant from the 101st Infantry that had been assigned to the company when it lost all of its 
officers in combat.  To top it off, by 4 November, the company had lost three of its NCOs to 
direct commissions or officers’ training.214 
Company E of the 107th Infantry had already lost a number of its officers to transfers, and 
NCOs to the AEF candidates’ school, and the steady drain of its leaders only worsened once it 
entered combat in August 1918.  Soon after being relieved from the British trenches near Mt. 
Kemmel, the company was ordered to send two of its best NCOs to officers training.  In its 
attack on the Hindenburg Line on 28 September, the company strength stood at three officers and 
170 men.  Within 24 hours, all of its officers were dead and the unit had been whittled down to 
only 46 men.  Although the company was down to only four sergeants and six corporals, on         
2 October, two of its remaining sergeants were ordered to the candidates’ school.  Ten days later, 
the unit lost two more NCOs to officers’ training and one of its new officers to gas poisoning.  
When the depleted company reentered the fight on 18 October, it lost its new company 
commander, when the novice officer led a frontal attack on a German machine gun nest.215  
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Between the times that it entered the lines around St. Mihiel on 22 September 1918 until 
it was relived from their sector of the Meuse-Argonne on 5 November 1918, B Company of the 
311th Infantry was decimated and rebuilt three times.  An attack that the company participated in 
on 26 September in the St. Mihiel sector, which was intended to draw the Germans’ attention 
away from the American main effort in the Meuse-Argonne did not go well for the company.  
German machine guns and artillery fire shredded its ranks, and every effort the commander made 
to flank the German guns merely landed it in another kill zone.  In the confusion of the fight, the 
company commander lost all touch with one of his platoons and did not regain it until late in the 
afternoon when he stumbled across its six unwounded survivors.216   
On 12 October the company was brought up to strength after receiving 104 replacements, 
who, unfortunately, contained a large number of men that “had never fired a rifle and were not 
familiar with the use of the gas mask.”217  As there were still only two officers in the company, 
all of the platoons were commanded by buck sergeants.  Three days later, the company reentered 
combat in the Meuse-Argonne.  In the midst of the fighting on 17 October, three of the 
company’s NCOs, including one of the acting platoon leaders, were ordered to the Army 
Candidate School.  One of these sergeants was killed by artillery fire only an hour before he was 
to leave for the school.  When the company was relived from the lines on 26 October, it was 
again down to a strength of less than two platoons.  Furthermore, the regimental commander 
assigned one of the company’s two officers to another unit to make up their shortage of leaders. 
Soon after leaving the front, the company commander was ordered to attend the Army School of 
the Line for a six week course, and the unit, now down to one officer and 80 men was 
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reorganized as a platoon.218  
Before the company reentered the fight on 29 October, it was again replenished with 
replacements.  However, after only a single day of fighting, the unit’s manpower had again 
shrunk to less than two platoons.  Furthermore, the mortal wounding of the company’s only 
officer and other loses of junior leaders meant that when the unit reorganized into two platoons, 
both were commanded by a corporal and the company was led by a buck sergeant.219   
 There are a number of things that the narratives of these three companies have in 
common.  All highlight the underlying deadliness of the attritional war that the AEF faced.  They 
also demonstrate the overall indifference of the AEF GHQ to the needs of its small units.  
Regardless of the condition of a unit coming out of action, or their need to retain NCOs and 
officers to rebuild the cohesion of their outfits and serve as a point of continuity for passing on 
the unit’s hard won “lessons learned,” the quotas for the AEF’s bloated school system took 
precedence over all else.  This was a key mistake, for the AEF never copied the British practice 
of always leaving a portion of battalion officers and NCOs out of a given action to serve as a 
cadre to rebuild the unit in event of heavy losses.  In the British Army, these cadres were 
expected to retain the unit’s collected battlefield wisdom and “know how” to pass on to the 
replacements that would soon fill its ranks.  The examples also illustrate the steady and heavy 
hemorrhaging of junior officers and NCOs those small units endured to casualties and other 
requirements. 
 The most deadly position in the entire AEF was that of a company-grade infantry or 
machine gun officer.  By far, infantry and machine gun units made up the greatest percentage of 
the AEF’s fatal casualties.  Nearly 52 enlisted infantrymen out of 1000 were killed in action or 
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later died of wounds.  Infantry and machine gun officers, though, suffered over 80 men killed or 
died of wounds for every 1000 officers from those branches.  As a point of comparison, the 
AEF’s casualties for artillerymen were eight out of every 1000 officers and nearly six out of 
every 1000 enlisted men.220  On average, there were six men wounded for every one man 
killed.221  Using this rough figure as a guide, over 560 infantry and machine gun officers out of 
1000 were killed or wounded during the Great War.  Although the author could uncover no 
information on the casualty rates among infantry and machine gun NCOs, it is probable that their 
loss rates fell somewhere in between those of the officers and privates.  The evidence of losses 
among NCOs from period narratives seems to back this assumption.     
 These losses in leaders had significant ramifications for the combat effectiveness of the 
AEF.  As you might recall from Chapters 8 and 9, officers tended to be the best trained personnel 
in the new divisions.  Although much of this training was rather poor, the loss of these struggling 
“subject matter experts” did result in a relative decline of “know how” in small units.  As Darryl 
Henderson noted, the small unit officers and NCOs played the vital role of setting and 
maintaining the behavioral norms of their units and served as the intermediaries between the 
higher headquarters and the individual soldiers.  When these leaders were lost, cohesion and 
effectiveness declined.   
 In their seminal work “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,” 
Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz argued that German units continued to fight effectively as 
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long as they remained part of a cohesive small unit “primary group” that cared for its members’ 
physical and emotional needs and possessed leadership that balanced the needs of the men with 
the demands of the mission.  They argued that the effectiveness of the Wehrmacht began a 
steady decline in the winter of 1945 as soldiers became increasingly isolated physically from 
their comrades, when their “familial ties” to home were broken, when unit leaders became 
unable to meet their soldiers’ physical survival needs, and when the close bonds between group 
members and its leaders were shattered by casualties. 
 Shils and Janowitz maintain that in the German Army of World War II, the heavy loss of 
junior officers and NCOs “resulted in a reduction in the amount of face-to-face contact between 
officers and men and in reduced feeling of the officers’ protective function.”  Furthermore, as the 
Germans were rebuilding by consolidating depleted outfits and filling them with replacements, 
“the top non-commissioned officers often did not have sufficient time to promote the growth of 
strong identifications between themselves and their men.”222   
 In the fall of 1918, the AEF’s small units suffered from many of the same challenges that 
bedeviled those of the Wehrmacht in 1945.  The leadership in the AEF’s small units was 
constantly being rebuilt due to casualties or the loss of leaders to AEF schools or other 
requirements.  Lieutenant Joseph Lawrence recalled that of the 11 other officers assigned with 
him to the 29th Division after graduating from the AEF candidates’ school in September 1918, 
seven eventually made it into the fighting in the Meuse-Argonne.  Of these seven, three were 
killed in action and two more were wounded and evacuated.  Only Lawrence and one other 
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officer survived the battle without a scratch.223 Lieutenant Henry Thorn, of the 79th Division’s 
313th Infantry, reported that his regiment’s four-day attack to seize Montfaucon had cost the loss 
of 45 officers; 12 of whom were killed in action.  To make matters worse, as soon as the 
regiment came out of the line, orders came down to send one officer per company to the II Corps 
schools.  Their places were filled by a replacement captain and 15 replacement lieutenants.224 
 The AEF’s junior officers came and went in infantry companies with a bewildering 
rapidity.  Company A, 1st Battalion, 308th Infantry, had seven different company commanders 
from July to November 1918.  During the same period, Company B had five commanders; 
Company C had six, and Company D had four.  The battalion’s turn-over of lieutenants was just 
as great.  C Company had 21 officers pass through its ranks in those same four months.225  The 
308th Infantry’s experience was far from uncommon.  In the 27th Division’s 107th Infantry, on 
average each of the unit’s line companies had over 16 captains and lieutenants assigned to them 
over the course of the war.  The regiment’s A Company suffered the most changes in its officers, 
with 25 being assigned to it during the war.226  Interestingly enough, the AEF GHQ had some 
inkling of the negative effect of these changes.  In August 1918, an AEF staff officer observed 
that frequent changes in battalion and company commanders in the 27th Division had undermined 
“discipline and efficiency” within the division’s units.227  Unfortunately, this complaint went 
unanswered. 
 The effect of this revolving door change over of leaders was the break down of the vital 
“face to face” relationships between the leaders and the led and the negative effect that the 
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changes had on the morale and cohesion within the AEF’s infantry companies.  As his unit 
entered the Meuse-Argonne, John Barkley noted that “officers were like passing shadows with us 
now.  It hardly paid to try to get acquainted with them” for they generally and quickly became 
casualties.228  The casualties that his unit soon suffered in the Argonne later led him to note, “the 
regiment was in bad shape.  We’d been cut to pieces a dozen times, and the remains reorganized 
so often that nobody knew what he belonged to.”229  Following ten days of bloodletting in the 
Argonne, a soldier in the 78th Division’s 312th Infantry observed, 
  The previous days of fighting had depleted the numbers until there were left not  
  more than an average of sixty men in each rifle company.  No battalion could  
  boast of more than five line officers, while the lack of non-commissioned officers  
  was a serious handicap.  A thorough reorganization was necessary, a division of  
  rifle companies into two platoons in place of the customary four and a   
  redistribution of officers to provide at least one to each company- fortunate indeed 
  [was] the company commander who could boast a subaltern to assist him.  Hasty  
  appointments of acting non-commissioned officers to lead the subordinate   
  elements followed as a matter of course.  No longer did the officer have an  
  intimate personal knowledge of the individuals under his supervision…”  
  (emphasis added).230 
 
A number of doughboys echoed these sentiments. For example, Private Milton Sweningsen, an 
infantryman in the 35th Division, reported that this unit was so wracked by the loss and 
replacement of leaders that “I hardly knew the officers of my own company.”231 
 These losses could have an immediate and negative effect on a unit’s performance and 
cohesion.  Private Charles Flacker, an infantryman in the 28th Division’s 112th Infantry, recalled 
that his company suffered so many casualties among its leaders that low-ranking men from the 
ranks had to fill the positions.  After that, he noted, it was “every man for himself” in the 
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company.232  After the near disintegration of the 35th Division in the opening days of the Meuse- 
Argonne Campaign, Colonel Robert McCormick remarked that “casualties among the officers 
were undoubtedly responsible for a great deal of the disorganization,” and that “most of the 
straggling and confusion was caused by men getting lost and not having leaders, and not from 
any deliberate design to go to the rear in order to avoid further fighting.”233  During the  
5th Division’s time in the Argonne, the division inspector reported that due to heavy losses, “in 
some organizations the officers had been on duty for a very short time, and did not know the 
men, nor did the men know the officers.  Apparently a great many men did not know their 
officers by sight.”  This presented insurmountable obstacles to the division’s cohesion and 
contributed to its lackluster combat performance.  The officer remarked that when the 11th 
Infantry was sent forward to relieve another unit in the line, “it was shelled by the enemy, and 
the men scattered.”  He went on to report that “a great many stragglers resulted from this…and 
the other regiments also lost a large number of stragglers by the confusion caused by the 
relief.”234 
 The losses of junior officers and NCOs also created a nearly insurmountable personnel 
crisis for the AEF during the Meuse-Argonne Campaign.  As previously discussed, the 
unexpectedly high loss of infantry officers in the summer and fall of 1918 had forced reductions 
in the time allotted to officer candidate training in the United States and in the AEF.  As small 
units were deprived of leaders who had gained a modicum of experience in the school of hard 
knocks, their places were filled by men whose lack of training led them to repeat many of the 
same  tactical mistakes that had laid their predecessors low.  Private Herman Dacus laconically 
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recorded that “most of the replacement officers made good, if they were lucky enough to come 
through a couple of battles” unscathed.235  Here was one of the AEF’s fundamental dilemmas.  
The AEF’s junior leaders were caught in a vicious cycle where inexperienced but brave officers 
and NCOs were being killed and wounded, only to be replaced by other inexperienced and brave 
officers and NCOs.  How could units learn from their previous experiences when their leaders, 
the ones tasked with interpreting and disseminating this battlefield wisdom, were chewed up at 
such a rapid rate?  Herein lay the reason why the AEF never truly experienced a marked 
improvement in its combat effectiveness during the war.   
 High casualties and the constant levying of NCOs from the AEF GHQ to fill quotas for 
the AEF Candidates’ School also undercut the ability of small infantry units to learn from their 
combat experiences.  The records of Company H, 126th Infantry noted that the vast majority of 
the soldiers and officers it lost to wounds never returned to duty with the company. When the 
company came out of the lines from the Oise-Aisne drive on 31 August 1918, it had lost 26 men 
killed, and two officers and 38 men wounded.  Of the wounded, 23 never returned to the 
company; eight returned to duty by the end of August; six more by the end of October, and one 
did not return until after the Armistice. The 126th Infantry was pulled out of the line for the final 
time during the Meuse Argonne Campaign on 18 October 1918.  From the 1st to the 18th of 
October, H Company lost two officers and 20 men killed in action, one officer and 107 men 
wounded, three missing, and three evacuated for illness.  Of the wounded, 69 percent never 
returned to duty with the company; 12 percent returned to duty the same day they were wounded, 
and 19 percent returned to duty after the company’s final combat action.  Although some of the 
wounded who did not return to the company for duty may perhaps have been assigned as 
replacements for other organizations, their experience was lost to H Company for the duration of 
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the war.236 In addition to the loss of officers and soldiers to casualties, it must be noted that 
Company H also lost one first sergeant to wounds and two first sergeants to the AEF Candidates’ 
School between 29 September and 26 October 1918.237  The loss of these key experienced NCOs 
was a further blow to the unit.     
As noted in Chapter 9, by the fall of 1918, the AEF Candidates’ School was having 
difficulty finding qualified men to fill its ranks.  Although the NCOs sent by Company H were 
by all accounts stellar soldiers and leaders, that could not always be said for the candidates that 
other units sent to the school.  Given the heavy casualties among junior officers, some enlisted 
soldiers chose to improve their chances of survival by remaining in the ranks.  In a letter home 
dated 25 October 1918, Sergeant Benjamin Heath wrote, "I could get an opportunity to go to the 
infantry training camp, but I would rather come home safe and sound without a commission than 
perhaps not at all."238  Fendell Hagan, a first sergeant in the 140th Infantry, had similar 
sentiments and chose to stay with his unit in the Argonne rather than report as ordered to the 
OTC.239  Given the school commandant’s belief that the quality of candidates he was receiving 
in late 1918 was in great decline, the AEF would have been better served by leaving the 
experienced NCOs in their original units rather then trying to make officers of them.240  
 High casualties and the levying of NCOs for schools also exacerbated the AEF’s already 
dire need for qualified NCOs. An officer with the 77th Division stated on 24 October 1918 that 
“the question of non-commissioned officers in Infantry Companies of this division is serious,” 
due to heavy casualties among their ranks and the lack of men “with sufficient training” to 
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replace them.241  The Lewis Board concluded that combat losses among infantry NCOs led to a 
drastic reduction in the quality and reliability of small unit leaders in the last months of the war.  
The board maintained that “nearly every survivor who belonged to a rifle company, and who was 
not a complete mental failure, of necessity had to become a non commissioned officer in order to 
rebuild a cadre that could absorb the replacements.”  This fact, they maintained, led to the AEF 
having to rely on a cadre of “poorly trained and rather dull non commissioned officers.”242   
 The AEF’s problem with junior leaders was not just that inexperienced second lieutenants 
were having difficulty commanding their platoons, it was also the fact that casualties were 
rapidly promoting those novices to company, and sometime even battalion, command.  The loss 
of officers was so great in the 77th Division’s 308th Infantry in the Meuse-Argonne that second 
lieutenants “just out of training school” were assigned as company commanders.243 
Joseph Lawrence reported that the 113th Infantry suffered so many officers casualties that one of 
the newly commissioned officers that reported to the regiment with him on 6 October was a 
company commander by the 10th of October. When this officer was killed a few days later, he 
had only been an officer for 20 days.244  In a similar case, after his battalion’s costly assault 
south of the Vesle River during the Ainse-Marne Offensive, the 4th Division’s John Hull was 
transferred to take command of a line company, even though he was still but a second lieutenant, 
because all of the company’s other officers had been killed or wounded in action.245 
 Sometimes, the result of these young officers rapidly ascending to their “Peter Principle” 
level was deadly.  Heavy officer casualties in Horace Baker’s unit had placed the command of 
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the battalion into the hands of a lieutenant in early November 1918.  The officer was clearly out 
of his depth and decided that in the battalion’s attack on Brandeville it was best to push the 
attack without putting out patrols.  The unit quickly blundered into the German defenses and the 
attack became a hasty retreat.  Baker later confessed that given the strength of the German fire, 
he did not “deem it a disgrace to have fled from that fatal field.”246  After regaining his 
composure, Baker again moved forward to try to rejoin his company.  In the “fatal field” that he 
had initially fled,  he discovered “American soldiers, dead and wounded, but nearly all 
dead…actually lay in windrows, just as the lines had stood when the machine guns had mowed 
them down.”  The frontal assault had cost Baker’s company 19 dead and so many wounded that 
the company strength was down to 60 percent.247 
 The heavy losses in the AEF’s infantry companies dealt a double blow to the cohesion of 
the units.  One of the blows was the break down of the intense group identity that soldiers had 
tried to build with their comrades despite the endless levies of personnel that had wracked the 
divisions forming and training in the United States.  Soldiers returning to their units after 
convalescence from wounds or sickness were often shocked by the changes in personnel that had 
occurred since their departure.  When Private Irving Abrahams returned to his company after 
being hospitalized for 45 days for wounds he received during the Soissons drive, he noted “In 
my old company I felt like a stranger, for so many of the old crowd had been killed at the time 
that I got mine.  Replacements had come, however. The ranks were full.”248  Private Duncan  
Kemerer recalled that when he returned after a month in the hospital that there were “very few of 
my old buddies left” and that the company was now composed “of mostly drafted men, and all 
new officers.”  In the preceding month, the company had lost all of its officers during the Oise-
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Aisne drive and had one captain and two lieutenants killed leading the company during the 
Meuse-Argonne.249   
 Officers were not immune from the psychological effects of the loss of friends and 
comrades. In a letter home on 5 August 1918, Lieutenant John Horton described his first combat 
with the 47th Infantry as “a big smell of pure hell.”  Horton, a West Point graduate from the Class 
of 1917, noted that in three days of fighting during the Ainse-Marne Offensive, he “lost 80 men 
in his company, including 2 off[icers] wounded & 1 killed,” and that at the end of the drive only 
five officers were left in his battalion.  While he joked to his father, “Am I not lucky?” he also 
asked him not to “tell mother what I have been through.”250  A week after posting the letter, the  
21 year old officer was wounded by shell fragments and sent to a hospital to recover.  When he 
returned to his unit on 12 October 1918, he observed sadly, “there aren’t many of the original 
bunch left.”251   
 These rapid changes in leaders and the break down of “buddy groups” undercut the 
ability of small units to stand the shock of battle.  When one fights with strangers, one never 
knows the other’s abilities, skills, and reliability.  The 111th Infantry’s Duncan M. Kemerer 
stated that during the Argonne offensive his unit had learned how to spread out their formations 
and send scouts out “so we would not suffer heavy casualties by so many troops walking into a 
trap or German lines.” But heavy losses in leaders and experienced soldiers meant that his 
regiment was less successful in using these techniques once it was moved to the Thiaucourt 
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Sector in mid-October.  During an attack on 4 November 1918, the Germans caught the 
American in the open with small arms, artillery and mortar fire while also laying down a heavy 
barrage to the rear of the doughboy’s formations to block their escape.  Kemerer noted that after 
taking heavy casualties, “we were ordered to retreat which became, I am ashamed to say, to 
resemble a route as everybody started to run” to escape the fire.252     
 The other blow to unit cohesion was the steady decline of the soldiers’ faith in their 
leadership. Shils and Janowitz argued that “the men must be sure that their officer is duly 
considerate of their lives: they must know that he does not squander his human resources, that 
the losses of life which occur under his command will be minimal and justified.”253  Given the 
clumsiness of the American attacks and the casualties that resulted from them, some soldiers 
started to wonder if their leaders were “duly considerate of their lives.”  This problem was 
compounded when their leaders made decisions that seemed to the doughboys to lack common 
sense or purpose.  In his diary entry for 11 October 1918, Private Fred Takes wrote that he and 
his comrades were demoralized by their company commander’s refusal to allow his platoon to 
pull back 25 yards from an exposed position being heavily shelled by the Germans.  After 
suffering several losses, the men disobeyed the commander’s orders and pulled back on their 
own.  As a result of this shelling and a series of ill-planned attacks, Takes’ company was down to 
only 35 men by 16 October.  After his officers ordered the company to attack a German position 
that had withstood previous assaults, Takes wrote, “when we got the orders to go over the top at 
5 A.M. we were disgusted, thinking they [his company and battalion commanders] wanted to kill 
us all off.”254   
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 Along similar lines, Wilbert F. Stambaugh noted that after his captain was killed in 
action, his replacement inspired little confidence in the men.  He was disgusted by the fact that 
the “newly commissioned lieutenant did not understand action in war [and] tried to force us 
beyond our own artillery fire.255  In another instance, Sergeant William Triplett of the 35th 
Division witnessed the devastating failure of a frontal attack against the town of Cheppy on the 
first day of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.  Triplett noted that some adjoining companies from 
the 138th Infantry, “tried to do a ‘Charge of the Light Brigade,’ only they didn’t have any forces 
to get away on.  The stretcher men were gathering ‘em in and lining ‘em up” for the rest of the 
day.”256  The junior officers of the division continued to throw their soldiers against the German 
defenses in frontal attacks for the next three days.  As one member of the division recalled, the 
units “simply had melted under machine gun fire.”  After four days of uninspired slugging the 
35th Division had lost 8023 men.257  The unit’s morale was so shattered by the action that it was 
withdrawn from the line, never again to see significant combat.     
It did not take long for the soldiers to realize that their officers’ lack of skill was 
hazardous to the average doughboys’ health.  They resented the rather nonchalant indifference 
that some officers held toward casualties.  In his after action report of the Argonne battle, 
Captain John K. Taylor informed his regimental commander,   
  To hasten the movement of the men to the front line positions here, I told them  
  not to mind the bullets, that most of them were from our own machine guns.   
  Upon seeing two men fall dead and another wounded by my side, I overheard a  
  man say "our machine guns are sure hell."258 
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In his cavalier bragging to his superior, Taylor seems to have missed the fact that his soldiers 
were being critical of his leadership and decisions.  Whether unskillfully charging into machine 
gun positions or carelessly and unnecessarily exposing their soldiers to fire, the leader’s poor 
combat leadership was breaking down their soldiers’ trust and confidence.  As one captain 
argued, "It is useless to try to fool the American enlisted man: he soon loses respect for his 
officers when he observes their lack of experience, gained through the school of hard knocks."259   
A sergeant in the 1st Division explained why some of the doughboys viewed their officers with a 
jaundiced eye by simply stating that the soldiers “could not understand why the officer was 
always the boss when often he did not know what he was talking about.”260 
 Some of the dissatisfaction expressed in the sergeant’s statement was also evident in the 
remarks made by some of the wounded evacuated from the Argonne fighting to the AEF’s base 
hospitals.  On 3 November 1918, the agents working for the 83rd Division’s (Depot) intelligence 
officer at La Mans reported the statements made by wounded men from the front in local 
hospitals.  He recorded that “several of the men said that the American disaster at Argonne 
Wood was the result of bad officering.  Companies were bunched together and were easy victims 
of Boche machine guns.  Two of the men quoted a chaplain as saying ‘someone will be held 
accountable for the officering here.’”261 
 The historian Leonard Smith argues that during the war units of the French Army 
developed an unofficial system where the soldiers regulated their aggressiveness based on a 
“cost/benefit” negotiation with their officers.  If the soldiers believed that a given attack was of 
great importance to the nation, they willingly sacrificed themselves to win the contest.  If, on the 
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other hand, the benefits gained from the operation were not worth the cost in human lives, the 
soldiers held back their full support and made only half-hearted attacks.  Smith notes that the 
break down of this social contract between the French leaders and the led fueled the mutinies of 
1917.262  The soldiers of the American Army never even came close to approaching the depths of 
despair that helped push the French Army into mutiny.  However, there is evidence that some 
doughboys sought to conduct similar “cost benefits” negotiations with their officers or otherwise 
limit their leaders’ command options.  The AEF Inspector General noted a troubling tendency 
among the army’s junior officers to not follow orders or adequately supervise their execution.  
He stated, “when violations of such orders were brought to the attention of the junior line 
officers they would answer, ‘well, I gave the order to stop it.”  This led to a condition where “the 
soldiers do not obey or respect the orders of their officers, and the junior officers often appear 
timid about enforcing their orders.”263  This polite refusal to follow certain orders seems to have 
been more common when inexperienced replacement officers were placed over veteran soldiers.  
 Stanley Herzog recalled that in some instances officers did not know the limits of their 
soldiers’ abilities and endurance.  When soldiers reached these limits they believed that they had 
met their end of the social contract, and accordingly limited their aggressiveness.  During the 
 26th Division’s attack during the Aisne-Marne Offensive, a company of infantrymen near his 
artillery position “refused to go forward.”  He defended their actions by noting that it was “not 
that they were cowards, but they were so fatigued that there was no strength left in them.”264 
 Where the bonds between the junior leader and his soldiers were strong, officers were 
sometimes forced to make agonizing choices between following the orders of their superiors or 
                                                 
 262 Leonard V. Smith, Between Mutiny and Obedience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 11-19. 
263 “Notes Made by the Inspector General A. E. F., During the Active Operations from 12th September 1918 
to 11th November 1918,” in NARA RG 120, Entry 588, Box 116. 
 264 Herzog, 81. 
 
  747
the desires of their enlisted men.  One of the most noteworthy incidents of junior leaders 
choosing to place men above their mission occurred in early November 1918 and involved the 
26th Division’s 103rd Infantry.  On 5 November 1918 an officer from the 78th Division discovered 
that soldiers in the regiment’s outposts in the Bois d’ Haumont had established an informal “live 
and let live” truce with the Germans residing only 20 to 75 yards opposite them.  The Germans 
had told the American soldiers in the area that they expected peace at any moment and saw no 
point in risking their lives. The Germans refused to surrender because they feared reprisals 
against their families if they were reported as deserters.  Both the Americans and the Germans 
agreed that if forced to fire, they would aim high, give warning to the other of impending attacks 
or raids, and, in the event of artillery bombardment, would signal the guns to shift their fire away 
from the opposing frontlines and outposts.   
 An investigation by a senior division officer uncovered that units from both the 103rd and 
104th Infantry had been involved in the truce.  The officer also discovered that while at least one 
battalion commander and a company commander had ordered their soldiers to fire on the enemy, 
the soldiers in the outposts claimed that “they had seen nothing to shoot at,” or that “the order 
had not reached the men.”  Although “no officer would admit that he knew of any condition of 
laxity existed,” the investigator believed that some of them were turning a blind eye to the 
practice.265  One of the battalion commanders, Major Elson Hosford, stated that orders had been 
issued by the brigade commander, Brigadier General Charles Cole, to limit aggressive action 
against the enemy, a charge that Cole denied. The incident resulted in the relief of Hosford, Cole, 
and the commander of the 103rd Infantry, Colonel Frank Hume.  It also gave Pershing an added 
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pretext for relieving the 26th Division commander, Major General Clarence Edwards, from 
command.266   
 Although the refusal of units to attack or efforts by doughboys to restrain the authority of 
their officers were rather rare, there were other avenues that soldiers could follow to circumvent 
the orders of their leaders.  A path that some soldiers took to remove themselves from combat 
and the orders of their leaders was to resort to self-inflicted wounds.  As AEF units became 
increasingly involved in major operations in July 1918, the army witnessed a dramatic increase 
in self-inflicted wounds.  The 1st Division alone had 72 cases during the month.  Of these only 
one had been proven to be intentional, but 11 more were due to “willful carelessness” or other 
“intentional misconduct.”  On 8 August 1918, the AEF Adjutant General, Brigadier General 
Robert Davis, warned Pershing that he feared a recent spike in self-inflicted wounds might 
foreshadow greater problems for the army in the future.  He pointed out that “unless this 
tendency is checked it may become prevalent at times when morale is weakened by great strain.”  
Davis recommended that the most effective and appropriate punishment for soldiers found guilty 
of deliberately injuring themselves was for them to be set “at hard labor in the most dangerous 
place where labor of soldiers is necessary.”267   
 In response to Davis’ concern, the AEF Chief of Staff directed all units to submit reports 
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on self-inflected wounds within their organization to the AEF Inspector General.  In August 
1918, the AEF Inspector General received reports from 14 divisions of 179 cases of self inflicted 
wounds.  Of these, the divisions claimed that 131 were accidental, 13 were intentional, and in 25 
cases, the investigators could come to no definite conclusion on the soldiers’ intentions.  These 
figures point to both the poor level of weapons training in the AEF, as well as the fact that some 
of its soldiers were so dissatisfied with their lot, or so afraid of combat, that they were willing to 
injure themselves to get out of their units.268  Although these measures helped to reduce self 
inflicted wounds, the problem was never eliminated.  On 17 October 1918, the 6th Division 
Inspector General, V. M. Elmore reported that between the time that the division entered 
Gerardmer Sector on 6 September 1918 until it was relieved from the sector on 12 October, the 
unit had 44 cases of self-inflicted wounds.  Although 15 of the cases were accidental, the 
remaining 29 were “intentionally inflicted, with a desire to evade and avoid further active 
service.”269  Luckily for the AEF, the number of self-inflicted wounds or efforts by soldiers to 
incapacitate themselves never reached the crisis point that Davis feared. 
 The easiest and most common way for a soldier to remove himself from the control of his 
leaders was simply to straggle from the lines.  The AEF’s problems with straggling were evident 
from its earliest operations.  Major General Robert Bullard recalled that during the AEF’s 
summer battles between the Marne and Aisne Rivers,  
  …far back behind our lines and camps my provost marshal now began to gather  
  large numbers of American soldiers from…various divisions.  The French   
  villages were full of them.  Relative to the number of American soldiers that had  
  been here, the stragglers were few, but actually their numbers were great.  Popular 
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  public perceptions to the contrary notwithstanding, we had in our army dead-beats 
  and deserters, evaders of battles and danger.270     
 
However, the massive number of stragglers in the Meuse-Argonne sector in September and 
October of 1918 reached crisis proportions and weakened the effectiveness of the AEF’s units by 
their drain on combat manpower.  After the war, Major General Hunter Liggett estimated that 
approximately 100,000 soldiers had straggled from their units in the first month of the Argonne 
drive.  Between 900,000 and 1.2 million American soldiers participated in the campaign.  If 
Liggett’s estimate is correct, round ten percent of the army’s manpower simply stopped fighting 
and straggled towards the rear.   
 It is difficult to uncover how closely Liggett’s figures matched reality.  However, there is 
enough evidence to give at least some indication.  During the Argonne fighting, the AEF 
Inspector General stated that,  
  One division reported that it had only 1600 men in the front line including an  
  Engineer battalion that had been sent forward…This division was taken out of the 
  line and upon arriving in its rest area it was found that the infantry regiments  
  alone had in them 8418 men not counting the Engineer battalion.271 
 
The Inspector General rightly concluded that the 6,000 soldiers who appeared in the rest area 
were stragglers from the division’s front line units.272  When the 91st Division was pulled out of 
the Meuse-Argonne fighting on 4 October 1918, a V Corps inspector reported that in its ten days 
of combat, the unit had lost 148 officers and 3197 men killed or wounded.  More alarmingly, the 
officer noted that seven officers and 2206 soldiers were missing, but added hopefully “it is 
expected that this item will be reduced.”273  In Raucourt, the lieutenant in charge of the town 
                                                 
 270 Robert L. Bullard, Personalities and Reminiscences of the War (New York: Doubleday, Page and 
Company, 1925), 251. 
 271 “Notes Made by the Inspector General A. E. F., During the Active Operations from 12th September 1918 
to 11th November 1918,” in NARA RG 120, Entry 588, Box 116. 
272 Hunter Liggett, A.E.F. Ten Years Ago in France  (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1927), 207.  
 273 Report of Inspector, V Corps to Inspector General, AEF, Subject: Extract Report of Division Inspector, 
91st Division, dated 5 October 1918 in NARA RG 120, Entry 590, Box 1.  
  751
rounded up “between 600 and 700” stragglers from the 1st Division on 8 October 1918.274  Four 
days later, the 36th Division’s Military Policemen claimed to have rounded up “500 men of the 
division classed as stragglers.”275  The same month the Military Police units of the 2nd Army 
arrested 439 men for being AWOL, and another 370 men for the same offense in November.276  
Although it is impossible to accurately establish the number of men absent from the AEF’s 
combat units, it is clear that the figure was substantial.   
 What was equally clear was that the AEF’s senior leaders were cognizant of the dangers 
that these stragglers presented to American operations.  For example, the inspector attached to 
the 37th Division reported that on 2 October 1918, he had found so many stragglers in the unit’s 
rear area that he estimated “that combat troops only had 80% in strength due to this fact.”277  
Given this drain on combat power, the AEF’s senior officers took actions to reign in these 
disappearing doughboys. Lieutenant Colonel Troup Miller, a 1st Corps staff officer, stated that,  
“It was found necessary in addition to the line of straggler posts formed by the Division to 
establish a line in rear of each Brigade in order to reduce to a minimum any attempt at straggling.  
Troops of this purpose were taken from the reserve.”278  He pointed out that the first time men 
were caught, they were simply returned to their units; the second time, they were turned over to 
the military police for trial and put to “the most disagreeable work that could be found.”  The  
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1st Corps also tried to shame the soldiers back into line by making the reprobates wear “a large 
white placard…upon which was printed in conspicuous black letters ‘straggler from the front 
line.’”279   
 The V Corps G-1, Colonel A. W. Foreman, stated that by 18 October 1918 the number of 
stragglers had grown “to such an alarming proportion” in the First Army that the corps formed a 
4,500 man “Hobo Barrage” to “systematically mop up and thoroughly search all dugouts, houses, 
hospitals, railheads, Y.M.C.A.’s, etc in the area assigned to them.”280  Additionally, his corps 
established three tribunals under the direction of an officer at Recicourt, Avocourt, and 
Montfaucon to interrogate all stragglers brought in to determine if the soldiers caught where truly 
stragglers or had been unjustly arrested.  In a short amount of time, the “Hobo Barrage” arrested 
719 soldiers and returned over 150 “unauthorized stragglers” to their units.    
 The commander of the 82nd Division, Major General George Duncan, noted that after a 
spike in the number of stragglers from his unit, he was forced to order his subordinates to “post 
file closers behind each platoon, in addition to the usual straggler’s posts” and to direct his MPs 
to continually search likely straggler hiding or congregation points in the unit’s rear.  He also 
required platoon leaders to carry a list of all their unit’s members which they constantly checked 
at halts or lulls in the battle to keep an accurate tally of their losses and quickly identify any men 
who had straggled from the lines.  By these methods, the division’s strength rose by over 500 
“fighting effectives” between 25 and 29 October, without including replacements.281  In a similar 
move, on 30 October 1918 the commander of the 89th Division ordered his MPs to move their 
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straggler line “forward to a point three hundred meters in the rear of the front line” and to move 
forward “in very close contact with the advancing infantry.”282 
 Unfortunately, these steps were not enough to stem the tide of stragglers.  In a 21 October 
1918 report to the AEF Chief of Staff, the AEF Inspector General, Major General A. W. 
Brewster, observed that despite efforts to stem the tide of straggling with patrols and stationary 
posts, “any quick witted straggler can get through these lines, especially at night.”283  Even when 
senior officers attempted to rally the troops and send them back to the lines, they met with little 
success.  Captain Thomas H. Barber noted that one angry brigadier tried to halt the steady parade 
of “skulkers” going to the rear and even drove some back by threatening to shoot them himself.  
Barber recalled, “it struck me as a very remarkable performance, as the skulkers merely went 
around and back another route; but at least it seemed to afford the old gentleman considerable 
satisfaction.”284   
 Contrary to the statements of senior AEF leaders, the U. S. Army was never able to 
resolve its straggler problem.  As late as 9 November 1918, the 2nd Army Provost Marshal 
warned his subordinates that “straggling has been allowed to become a menace to the success of 
operations,” and ordered them to “take such definite, immediate, and aggressive steps as will 
insure without question the immediate apprehension and return of these men to their proper 
places in [the] line.”285  Between 28 October 1918 and 1 November 1918, the MP companies 
operating straggler posts in the 1st Army area of the Meuse-Argonne sector rounded up 613 
stragglers.  On 30 October alone, the MPs apprehended 193 stragglers. The stragglers came from 
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22 different AEF divisions, with the vast majority of them coming from infantry regiments or 
machine gun battalions.286  These apprehensions were likely only a small fraction of the 
stragglers roaming the AEF’s rear area.  If Brewster was correct, and a “quick witted straggler” 
was able to avoid arrest, the number of absent soldiers probably continued to number in the 
thousands. 
 The greatest problem the AEF’s senior leadership faced in halting straggling was simply 
a shortage of resources.  As the number of American stragglers continued to grow at an alarming 
rate in the second week of the Argonne drive, the 33rd Division inspector reported to the AEF 
Inspector General, Major General Andre Brewster, that the fact that “there is but one [MP] 
company of three officers and one-hundred and forty-four men, covering an area difficult to 
access in many cases of practically sixteen square miles,” limited the ability of the MPs to 
apprehend stragglers and also accomplish their other missions.287  During the Argonne, drive at 
least two division commanders requested a troop of cavalry from their corps commanders to 
drive stragglers out of woods and other sanctuaries in their rear areas.288 
 Wendell Westover claimed that much of the problem with straggling and malingering 
stemmed from the impossibility of having any effective punishment for the reprobates.  Even 
when commanders were successful in bringing charges,  
  …the Court-Martial was so frequently overruled by soft, slab-sided desk   
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  hounds…that discipline was hard to enforce anyhow.  What did they know about  
  the added danger to an outfit going in, incomplete because some quitter had  
  dropped out with ammunition?  What did they know of the instant effect on  
  morale by desertion of just one man at a critical time, to say nothing of the added  
  losses if such spirit was allowed to extend, or the operation was hindered by lack  
  of men?289  
 
As senior commanders had limited the ability of their junior officers to punish wayward soldiers 
in any meaningful manner, the soldiers faced few repercussions for their straggling.  In most 
cases the stragglers were merely returned to their units without further action. 
 While often depriving junior leaders of much of their coercive and “legitimate power,” 
senior officers were quick to blame these officers and NCOs for failing to maintain discipline 
within their units.  An Inspector General investigation of straggling in the 1st Army stated the 
causes for the problem were a “Lack of discipline among both the officers and soldiers,” a “lack 
of personnel and supervision of the men by the battalion and company commanders,” and a “lack 
of leadership by platoon leaders and sergeants.”290  The report maintained that one of the primary 
reasons for the crisis was that “platoon leaders do not know where their men are,” and made little 
effort to track them down.  The Inspector General’s belief that the failure of junior leadership led 
to straggling was accurate and legitimate.  When examining the straggler crisis, one can see that 
junior officers and NCOs were unable to retain the control and discipline of their units.  The 
reason for this failure was due to a host of leadership issues, some of which were beyond the 
control of the leaders involved.  
 The key question that must be resolved is, why did the doughboys straggle from the front 
lines?  Unfortunately, few stragglers gave any reasons for their absence other than they were lost 
and became separated from their units.  For many soldiers this was an honest and accurate 
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confession.  The difficult terrain of the Argonne region, morning fog, and battlefield smoke 
resulted in a number of doughboys truly becoming detached from their commands. On              
10 October 1918, the 82nd Division’s Inspector General reported that “an unestimated number of 
men, reported to be considerable, have returned to their regiments during the past 24 hours 
stating that they had become separated and temporarily lost in the woods or during darkness.”  
The inspector remarked that “their present attitudes and desire to fight indicates the truth of most 
of these statements.”291  Private Ray Johnson, a machine gunner in the 37th Division, noted that 
during the Argonne drive some men, “being separated from their outfits by chance shellfire or 
orders to spread out, wandered helplessly about or attached themselves to other advancing 
units.”292  One such refugee, the 91st Division’s Private Vernon Nichols, spent three days 
wandering leaderless in “no man’s land” after he and two other soldiers lost contact with his 
company on the first day that his unit was committed to the Argonne battle.293  Nichols and his 
comrades spent their time fighting with whatever American units they encountered, and would 
then leave the unit to find food or attach themselves to someone else as the spirit moved them.   
 In moving through the jumbled terrain in the Meuse Argonne, the problems with the 
AEF’s junior leaders’ ability to command and control their enormous companies and platoons 
became apparent.  The experiences of Captain Clarence Minick illustrate the problems that 
company commanders faced in maintaining control of their units.  On 29 September 1918, his 
company was part of the 91st Division’s attack to seize the high ground to the northwest of 
Montfaucon.  After fighting through most of the morning, Minick’s battalion halted while the 
brigade commander attempted to sort out some of the confusion and mix-up of units that had 
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occurred earlier in the day.  At 2:30 PM, Minick’s battalion was ordered forward to seize 
Gesnes.  Shortly after leading his unit forward, Minick discovered that he was missing most of 
his company. The only elements under his control were one and a half platoons.294   
 Minick later discovered that prior to the jump off of the attack, a runner from battalion 
headquarters had given a message to one of his missing platoon leaders ordering the company to 
attack immediately.  When the platoon leader asked the runner if Minick had been informed of 
the change in orders, the messenger answered yes.  Unfortunately, the order did not reach Minick 
for some time, and the platoon leader, who was out of direct contact and sight of the rest of the 
company, moved forward as directed.  Minick confessed that due to this confusion, his company 
“was pretty badly disorganized.”  Despite these mix-ups, the captain still managed to take 
Gesnes, but suffered heavy losses in the process.  After consolidating his hold on the town, 
Minick had to give up his hard won gains after the unit on his flanks pulled back and left his 
position untenable.  Minick was not able to find his wayward platoon and squads until 7:00 AM 
on 30 September. 
 Minick’s battalion was ordered to attack again on 30 September 1918.  The events of this 
day were as confused and tragic as the day before.  The American lines were in such a state of 
disorder that Minick’s battalion and company were filled with soldiers from various units of the 
91st, 37th, and 35th Divisions.  Officers simply corralled all the soldiers they came across and 
pushed them forward in the attack.  The cohesion of this pick-up team was sparse, and as the ad-
hoc unit came under heavy German fire, soldiers began to melt away.  By 1:00 PM the attack had 
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ground to a halt, and the American troops returned to their jump-off line.295 Although part of this 
debacle was due to circumstances beyond Minick’s control, the young officer still made little or 
no effort to ensure that his subordinates where briefed and ready for the attacks of 29 and 30 
September.   
 This degree of confusion could even occur with experienced leaders and units.  Despite 
nearly 20 years of soldiering, Samuel Woodfill was not immune from problems with command 
and control.  While attacking near Cunel on 12 October 1918, the terrain and vegetation of the 
area presented Woodfill a situation where, 
  I could see some of my men creeping up near me.  I signaled them to move  
  forward.  I knew [First Sergeant] Nelson was somewhere to my right.  The  
  company was scattered through the wood; I had lost control of them as a unit.  It  
  was every man for himself…Those soldiers of mine, some of them so green that  
  they’d hardly smelled powder before, were on their own now.296  
 
Woodfill won the Medal of Honor for that day’s action, but it was only after he basically shook 
off the mantel of company leadership and fought his way forward as an individual rifleman that 
he claimed that honor.  One wonders what his “green” solders thought of being left “on their 
own?”  
 In trying to retain control of their units and direct them towards accomplishing the unit’s 
missions, junior officers were often hobbled by their lack of trained and experienced NCOs.  
Given the size of the AEF’s companies and platoons and the lack of effective tactical  
communications, junior officers were dependent upon their NCOs to aid them in leading their 
extended or scattered ranks.  The inability of some NCOs to step in to their leadership roles led 
to dire consequences.  An infantry battalion commander remembered that after his companies 
were shelled, the unit lost all order and cohesion.  He wrote, 
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  Over the suddenly disorganized mass the mere handful of officers, without the  
  slightest voluntary aid from the noncommissioned officers, are able to exercise  
  but little control.  The battalion is hopelessly scattered in the woods for the time  
  being.  All semblance of organization has vanished.297  
 
In another instance, Private John Barkley recalled,  
  A group of our men led by a lieutenant, the last of our company officers, 
  tried to cross the road.  The lieutenant dropped…We found one of our sergeants  
commanding what was left of the company.  The sergeant completely 
lost his head.  He sent a detail out to bring the lieutenant in.  They were 
all hit before they got to him. The sergeant ordered me to form another 
detail, go out in close formation, and come back with the lieutenant.  I 
asked the sergeant to wait a little, then let me take Mike and go out  
alone. . . I said “There is no use killing any more soldiers by sending them  
out there now.”298  
 
A senior 82nd Division officer complained on 7 October 1918 that far too many of the unit’s  
squad leaders had failed to “exercise aggressive control” in their units following the loss of their 
officers and NCOs.299   
 Given the little emphasis that the army had placed on selecting and developing its 
wartime NCO corps, it was little wonder that they often proved unable to either assist their 
officers or assume the mantel of leadership themselves.  The 7th Division’s Corporal Frank 
Dillman went so far as to state that his officers had done so little to uphold the status and 
authority of their NCOs that, “the boys virtually refused to work except when a commissioned 
officer was over them.”300  Given the casualty rate among officers, this shortcoming was a fatal 
flaw.  As an officer in the 119th Infantry lamented, his NCOs “have been too dependent on 
officers telling them not only what to do but how to do it.” He criticized the failure to allow the 
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NCOs “to make and correct their own mistakes with less interference from officers.”301  It must 
be stated that these observations reflected a general systemic problem in the AEF.  There were 
numerous occasions where NCOs demonstrated superior leadership and tactical ability.  
However, in these cases the NCOs had been “thrown into the deep end” of the tactical pool and 
forced to swim out of grim necessity.  Again, in rising to the occasion, they generally did so by 
overcoming the systemic barriers that limited their responsibility and in spite of their previous 
training and experience. 
 Officers often compounded their problems with command and control, and further 
undermined the ability of their NCOs to operate on their own, by failing to brief their soldiers on 
the details and intent of their unit’s missions.  Private John Nell, an infantryman in the 77th 
Division, remembered of his time in the Argonne, “we enlisted men never knew much about our 
movements, only what we were told and what we could see and hear.  The woods were so thick; 
our vision was only in and around where we were standing or walking.  We did not know what 
day of the week or day of the month it was the entire time.”302  Private Milton B. Sweningsen 
stated that when it came time for his unit’s attacks in the Meuse-Argonne, “I guess the officers 
knew [the plan], but privates were given no such information.”303   
 Without any clear conception of the details of their missions and cut off from the orders 
of their officers, some soldiers straggled because they simply had no clue of what else to do. 
During an attack on 29 September 1918, Private Sweningsen noted the isolation and fear that he 
felt after being separated from his unit without adequate knowledge of what he was supposed to 
do.  As he moved forward, he recalled, “I can’t remember seeing any of our company on either 
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side of me because the undergrowth was so thick.”  Breaking out of the woods and undergrowth 
he found no trace of anyone, American or German, and none of his comrades followed him out 
of the woods.  He remembered thinking, 
  What to do? It did not make sense to me to start attacking alone.  This was not a  
  one-man war.  I knew that there were no soldiers anywhere I could see, so I guess  
  I started for the rear.  Somewhere that morning there had been a rumor that we  
  were about to be relieved; that may have influenced me to head back.304 
 
While his men worked along the road on 1 October 1918, Captain Thomas Barber found large 
groups of soldiers aimlessly wandering around the rear area.  One party consisted of a sergeant 
and 28 men, and another was made up of a corporal and 30 men.  They had straggled back to 
recover the packs that they had left when they went into action and claimed that their officers 
were all dead.  Barber made no effort to organize these stragglers.305  One of the reason 
Sweningsen and the men encountered by Barber straggled was because their officers had 
neglected one of the major tenants of combat leadership: keep the men informed of the 
commander’s intent to enable them to react to the unexpected.    
 While men lost from their commands were accidental stragglers, it is clear from the 
evidence that many of the men absent from the ranks did so with deliberate intention.  These men 
absented themselves from their units in a calculated effort to remove themselves from combat.   
Private Horace Baker, a soldier who admitted to frequently leaving the lines, drew a sharp 
distinction between his actions and those of the doughboys that he found lurking in abandoned 
German barracks behind the lines.  To Baker, these men “were stragglers pure and simple, 
willfully playing out of battle, or in stronger terms deserters,” while he was simply out of the 
lines for a break and always intended to return.306 The AEF Provost Marshal also differentiated 
                                                 
 304 Ibid., 18-19. 
 305 Barber, 82-3. 
 306 Baker, Argonne Days, 119-120. 
  762
between common stragglers and “battle stragglers.”  A straggler was “a soldier absent from his 
unit without permission or who cannot produce satisfactory evidence that he is on duty,” while  
“battle stragglers” were “N.C.O.’s or men who straggle from the immediate fighting line, or from 
their units, when these units are moving up to the immediate fighting line.”307  Battle straggling 
carried the connotation of deliberateness.  
 The available evidence suggests that the largest number of cases where men straggled 
from the line was directly related to the failure of junior leaders and their superiors to live up to 
their end of the social contract.  Masses of men simply left the lines because their officers had 
failed to provided for the soldiers’ basic needs for food and water.  Combat logistics, the forward 
push of rations, ammunition and supplies and the rearward movement of casualties, had long 
been a sore spot in the AEF and the cause of much straggling.308  For example, during the Aisne-
Marne operation, the 2nd Division’s MPs reported that,  
The difficulty of getting the food to the troops soon resulted in looting for the men 
were searching the whole country for deserted chickens, rabbits and scant food 
supplies left by the villagers.  Looting and straggling went hand in hand for it was 
noticed that in nearly all cases where arrests were made the looter was found also 
to be absent without leave from his organization.309 
 
During the St. Mihiel Offensive, the IV Corps Inspector General, Colonel Edward Carpenter,  
also noted the difficulty that the units had in getting rations to the frontline troops, and that 
“reserve rations were repeatedly eaten without the orders of the organization’s commander and at 
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other than proper time.”310  The problem with getting rations and supplies to the frontlines 
became even worse when the AEF moved into the Meuse-Argonne region.  The region had a 
very limited road network and four years of fighting and shelling had left large swaths of the area 
nearly un-trafficable for the army’s heavy artillery and supply wagons and trucks.311   
 Within days of the start of the offensive, soldiers were already complaining about their 
lack of rations.  Officers in the 79th Division’s 313th Infantry noted that during their attack to take 
Montfaucon during the opening days of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, “It had been nearly 
impossible to get rations and the food carried in the packs had been consumed…and together 
with the lack of food and rest, the troops were in a pretty exhausted state.”  Ultimately, the 
soldiers of the regiment went nearly four days without any food except for their reserve 
rations.312  Between 12 and 14 October 1918, Company H, 126th Infantry’s mess sergeant was 
unable to bring rations up to the line.  The units made due by having returning stretcher bearers 
bring up hard bread and cans of corn beef.  On 15 October the only supplies brought forward 
were hard bread and bandoleers of ammunition.  When the company commander sent back 
rations carrying parties on 16 October, the men were “too tired, wary, and weak to carry the 
marmite cans of hot food thru the back area brush and shell holes.”  As a result, the only rations 
the company again received was hard bread.313  The artilleryman L. V. Jacks recalled that despite 
the best efforts of his unit’s cooks during the Meuse-Argonne, the lack of food meant that they 
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“tightened their belts, for downright starvation seemed imminent.”314  If things were bad for 
artillery units behind the lines, it was even worse for the infantrymen battling forward of them.    
 One of the fundamental tenants of the army’s paternalistic leadership and the social 
contract between the leader and the led was that the officer would provide his soldiers the basic 
necessities to maintain life and health.  Shils and Janowitz argued that one of the major factors in 
the decline of the Wehrmacht’s cohesion and effectiveness was that its unit leaders became 
unable to meet their soldier’s physical survival needs.315  As with the soldiers of the Wehrmacht, 
when leaders failed to live up to their end of the bargain in providing for their survival needs, 
doughboys felt justified in withholding their participation in military operations by straggling 
from the lines in search of food.  
 On 9 October 1918, the Inspector General for the 82nd Division reported that over 100 
soldiers from the 78th Division had straggled into his unit’s rear area between the night of 8 
October and the morning of 9 October.  He declared that “all of these men asked for food, stating 
that none of them had anything to eat since the night of October 7th,” and “some men stated that 
they had had nothing to eat for a longer period than two days.”  All admitted that “no permission 
had been given to leave their camp,” but their officers had made no effort to account for their 
men, nor given them any indication when food would arrive.  He also noted that “the personal 
appearance of these men indicated a general disorganized condition, as evidenced by torn and 
shabby clothing, unbuttoned blouses and overcoats, failure to shave for several days.”316   
 Private Horace Baker, admitted that he “went on an exploring trip” from the frontline 
during the Meuse-Argonne fighting but stated in his defense that “the pangs of hunger were 
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largely responsible for this.”  In his defense, after stealing a large can of corn beef from the field 
kitchen of another division he returned back to the front to share his loot with his comrades.317 A 
soldier in the 82nd Division recalled that his unit was so short of food on 11 October 1918 that he 
was forced to rifle through the pack of a dead German to get the man’s black bread.  After two 
more days without food, he straggled from the lines to try and find some rations.318  Sometimes 
even officers were complicit in this form of straggling.  Captain Thomas Barber’s company grew 
so short of food during the Argonne Offensive that he selected four men that he “judged good 
thieves” and sent them to the rear to beg, borrow, or steal whatever rations they could find.  
Finally, the captain himself left the front with eight men to forage the rear area for food.319   
 Field kitchens located in the rear of the firing lines attracted hungry soldiers like moths to 
a flame.  The problem became so acute that one officer eventually placed a guard on his mess 
line and kitchen to keep stragglers “from sneaking in.”320  The staff of the V Corps noted, “It was 
found that permitting the Y.M.C.A. and other canteens to approach too close to the front lines 
induced straggling.  Many men who did not intend to become stragglers slipped away to get a 
cup of hot chocolate or some cigarettes and were picked up as stragglers.”321  In some cases the 
satiated soldiers returned back to the front following their repast.  One infantryman in the        
91st Division discovered at a kitchen by an artillery officer, told the lieutenant that “all of our 
officers is gone an’ we more or less shift for ourselves.”  He stated that he had come back for 
“some coffee an’ a night’s sleep,” and then planned to return to the fight in whatever place he 
saw fit.  The incredulous officer mused, 
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  They had discovered an excellent arrangement whereby they might commute to 
  the front with their bellies filled with hot coffee.  Presently they would be starting 
  for the Front again to take up their jobs where they had left them last night.  M.P.s 
  over at Very were beginning to round them up.  But they required no persuasion. 
  It was one thing to fight a war on a piecework basis and quite another to quit a job 
  and leave one’s friends holding the sack.322 
 
The last line explains much of why these “situational” stragglers continued to fight despite the 
failure of their leaders to uphold their end of the social contract.  However, the desire to not 
“leave one’s friends holding the sack” could only sustain cohesion for so long, especially when 
the list of “one’s friends” kept getting shorter. 
 Much of the problem with getting rations to the front was due to circumstances that were 
far beyond the control of the unit’s junior leaders.  Tangled supply routes and German actions 
frequently slowed the movement of supplies forward to a trickle.  However, there were also 
instances where the officers’ failure to plan for the re-supply of their units caused or exacerbated 
their soldiers’ hardships.  In a particularly egregious case, one officer took the idea that rank hath 
its privileges too far.  Lieutenant Joseph Lawrence reported that even though his company had 
been without food, water, or sleep for three days, the company commander took the lion’s share 
of the rations that managed to make it forward.323  Most cases involved less malice and 
forethought by officers, though they had the same effect on their soldiers.  After bewailing the 
inability of his mess sergeant to bring up hot food, Captain Thomas Barber later sheepishly 
admitted that he had ordered his company kitchen to remain in place until he ordered it forward, 
and then had forgotten about it for over two days.324 A veteran of the 5th Division, Major Merritt 
Olmstead, blamed the division’s disorderly withdrawal from combat on the failure of regimental 
commanders to keep their superiors accurately appraised of the actual situation at the front, 
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especially in the physical conditions of their soldiers.  He also noted that had “commanders been 
more interested in the welfare of their commands and given some personal attention to the 
supply of food, their men would not have gone hungry throughout 12-13 October.”325    
 Shortly after the war, the commander of the 52nd Infantry, Colonel E. V. Smith, reported 
that “the greatest difficulty was met with by me in getting officers to properly handle supply and 
administration.”  He noted that his officers lacked the time and training to adequately deal with 
these areas, and,  
  …since the war began most officers have been in a “mental fog” due to the  
  crowding and cramming process in vogue.  They had small chance to learn  
  company duties and, in consequence, discipline ran low, kitchens were neglected,  
  equipment and clothing overlooked.326   
 
As Smith realized, little in the training and education of the junior officers prepared them to 
adequately deal with issues of logistics.  As in Barber’s case, this resulted in the inability of 
many officers to “do routine things,” such as feeding their soldiers, “routinely.”  For the 
individual doughboy, it mattered not that his lack of food resulted from the failure of supply lines 
or of his leaders.  He was tired and hungry, and the duly appointed representatives of the army, 
his officers and NCOs, were unable to do anything about it. 
 Shortages of food also worsened other problems that wore away the soldiers’ health, 
stamina and morale.  During his unit’s time in the Argonne, Private Leslie Langille found that 
not only were his rations scarce, but also that none of his superiors was ensuring that the food 
that did reach the troops was edible.  He wrote, 
  We subsist on stuff called “camouflage” by the men because it looks like and  
  tastes worst than our camouflage nets would have tasted had we put them in a pot  
  of water and boiled them…It keeps one’s bowels in a constant state of uproar and  
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  dysentery rages rampant in the outfit.327  
 
An officer of the 36th Division recalled that the water situation in his infantry unit was more dire 
than shortages of rations.  In fact, the heavy salt in the corned beef rations served only to worsen 
the need for water.  Unfortunately, the nearest water point was over a mile away from his unit, 
and “the line was too thinly held to send details to the rear for water.”328  Another infantry 
officer stated that when the 35th Division’s soldiers began their attack in the Meuse-Argonne, 
  They carried a canteen of water and two days’ reserve rations.  As the drive  
  progressed, it was with great difficulty that rations could be brought forward to  
  the lines.  Canteens were soon emptied, and they drank water wherever they could 
  find it- in shell holes, crevices, and in fact any place that water was obtainable.   
  The eating of cold rations out of unwashed mess kits, this drinking of foul water,  
  and the exposure and strain, caused every man to suffer from dysentery.329  
 
Dysentery and exhaustion, brought about by the physical and mental exertion of combat and the  
lack of food and clean water, became as great of a scourge on the AEF’s infantrymen in the 
Argonne as German shot and shell.  
 On 19 October 1918, the 1st Army’s Inspector General reported that the 91st Division was 
in dire straights and needed at least seven days rest to rebuild its strength.  The division surgeon 
informed the inspector that after 19 days of fighting and marching, “none of the men were fit for 
duty owing to dysentery, fatigue and stomach trouble.”  He also noted that “the 2309 
replacements recently received are all contacts with influenza, 40% now being sick with that 
disease.”  Furthermore, the inspector discovered that there were a “considerable” number of 
stragglers from the unit and 955 men were still reported as missing.  The commander of one of 
the division’s infantry regiments concurred with the inspector’s grim assessments of the unit’s 
condition.  The commander of the 361st Infantry stated that “the fighting ability of the men he 
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had left was not over 20% of what it was on Sept. 26,” while the commander of the 362nd 
Infantry “believed he did not have a single man who is an effective in the proper sense of the 
word.”330 
 There were measures that junior leaders could have taken to lessen some of these 
physical discomforts endured by their soldiers.  As the veteran French infantryman-novelist  
Henri Barbusse observed, in combat, “Damp rusts men as it does rifles; more slowly, but 
deeper.”331 In this environment it was incumbent on junior leaders to see that their men were at 
least well clothed and equipped to deal with the cold and the damp.  A 32nd Division infantryman 
reported that by 19 October 1918, the lack of basic necessities in his unit was causing great 
hardship.  The soldier was still wearing summer weight underclothes, was suffering from 
dysentery, and he recalled that the “lack of food caused me to be very weak.”332  Another 
doughboy in the 82nd Division remembered that when the officers failed to supervise and 
discipline their soldiers, the men,  
  … threw away their raincoats and overcoats when they went over the top, so  
  that later they had nothing at all to protect them from the cold and the wet.  They  
  went for days and days, sleeping in shell holes filled with ice-water, living on  
  nothing but bully beef and water.333   
 
This failure of officers and NCOs to maintain even this level of discipline meant that the health 
and combat efficiency of the units quickly flagged.  During October, the 82nd Division's medical 
staff reported an average of 700 soldiers per day in their hospitals suffering from influenza, 
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diarrhea and exhaustion.334  Oliver Q. Melton, commander of K Company, 325th Infantry, 
reported that between 16 and 30 October, "everyone was sick and weak, many of the men were 
on the verge of a nervous breakdown."335  Although some of these problems were due to the 
inherent nature of combat, the failure of leaders to be more proactive in ensuring the comfort of 
their men certainly contributed to the predicament.   
 The 82nd Division was not the only combat unit suffering from the combined effects of 
high casualties, loss of leaders, battlefield exhaustion, and shortages of supply in the Argonne.   
Inspector General reports from other divisions revealed the same poor physical conditions and 
morale in their units. The lack of strong junior leadership to provide for the soldiers’ basic needs, 
build unit cohesion, and reinforce their soldiers’ morale could have striking consequences.  After 
only a week of the offensive, the 1st Army Inspector General reported a disturbing conversation 
with the 3rd Division G1, 
 Colonel Stone…stated that the 3rd Division relieved the 79th [the] day before  
  yesterday.  He says that the 79th Division was the most demoralized outfit that he  
  had ever seen; that the men had thrown away a great deal of their equipment and  
  that the 3rd Division has equipped a complete Machine Gun Company with the  
  machine guns thrown away by the 79th; that the men are dejected and demoralized 
  and apparently not the subject of any discipline.  From his talk with different men  
  of the 79th he was convinced that they were utterly unfit for any further   
  operations.336 
 
The situation only worsened as the campaign dragged onward.  After his unit lost over 9000 men 
in two weeks, the 1st Division’s Inspector General reported on 16 October that “the morale of the 
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unit is not nearly as high as it formerly was.  This is shown by the general demeanor of the men 
and the lack of snap and spirit which formerly prevailed in this unit.”337   After a series of costly 
attacks, the 3rd Division Inspector General reported on 15 October, “Although I am 
inexperienced in judging men under battle conditions, I wish to state that those officers and men 
whom I saw of the 38th Infantry appeared to me, to use a slang term, ‘all in.’ ” 338  The day after 
this report was made, the Military Police rounded up over 500 stragglers from the division 
loitering in the rear area.  Weeks of frontal attacks, combined with the leaders’ inability to care 
for their soldiers, had brought the AEF to exhaustion and the brink of dissolution.  
 While some doughboys straggled from the lines due to being lost, hungry, sick, or 
leaderless, other left the lines to deliberately avoid combat and the conditions described above.  
The Meuse-Argonne region was crisscrossed with dense woods and shelters, dugouts and 
barracks that had been constructed by the French and Germans over the past four years of the 
war.  The natural and man-made features provided a ready sanctuary for any doughboy seeking 
to escape combat.  While soldiers straggling in the immediate rear of the frontlines could offer 
the excuse that they were lost from their units, men hiding out in shelters and woods far behind 
the lines indicate that their straggling was a premeditated attempt to dodge the fighting.   
 It is impossible to determine how many of the stragglers left the front to avoid combat. 
There is some evidence to show that the numbers were relatively large.  The 82nd Division’s 
Inspector General reported on 12 October that while most of the division’s stragglers were 
simply lost, “a small minority, difficult to estimate, were undoubtedly, endeavoring to evade 
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their duty and were collected from dugouts in Chatel Chehery and elsewhere.”339  However, 
eight days later the division could still not account for 1019 men and the adjoining 78th Division 
reported that the woods in its area were “full of  stragglers” from the 82nd Division.340  On one 
occasion in early October 1918, a detail from the 32nd Division’s Military Police searching for 
stragglers in abandoned shelters found 90 men hiding in one large dugout.341  The “battle 
stragglers” could be a very inventive lot when it came to evading combat.  Lieutenant Colonel 
Troup Miller recalled, 
  In one instance back at the rear a man was found with an old saddle and some  
  other junk in a pile walking post guarding it, stating that he had been left there to  
  look after it.  Further investigation disclosed the 2nd and 3rd relief carefully tucked  
  away in a well camouflaged shelter tent in the bush nearby—apparently a very  
  efficient self-constituted guard.342 
 
These reports indicate that a number of men were seeking to dodge combat by straggling, and the 
fact that they were doing so with relative ease.    
 Another indication of the depth of the problem of combat avoidance was the number of 
men apprehended multiple times for straggling.  On 14 October 1918, military policemen from 
the 32nd Division complained that they had apprehended a number of stragglers from the           
5th Division and returned them to their units, only to find the same men shortly after again hiding 
out around the Montfaucon.343  The commander of H Troop, 2nd Cavalry, assigned to straggler 
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post duty with the 1st Army during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive reported that the 103rd 
Infantry’s Private Raymond Wellman was a “professional straggler” who had been caught by his 
posts on at least two different occasions. Upon capture, Wellman stated that “he didn’t want to 
go back to his outfit or any outfit.”344  These incidents tend to support the point that the AEF had 
men who were so adverse to fighting that they risked capture multiple times, that the fear of 
punishment in these men was rather small, and that despite repeated infractions, their small unit 
leaders were unable or unwilling to do much about it.    
 This last point needs further exploration. The acting first sergeant for Company K, 142nd 
Infantry, Archibald Hart, recalled finding a number of stragglers hiding in a German bunker 
while searching for water for his company.  Hart noted that they had picked a spot near a supply 
route where they could steal food by night, and then “return to their comfortable quarters near 
the water supply and, undisturbed, catch up on their sleep during the day.”  The sergeant opted 
no not report the men for several reason.  First of all, he believed that such activities were an 
officer’s purview, and he did not think his new commander would make an effort to follow up on 
the matter because the soldiers were not from his company.  Also, he concluded philosophically, 
“a cozy hideout, well to the rear and out of harms way, was a proper place for a skulker,” for “he 
definitely would be a liability in the front line, and his Company would function better if he kept 
himself out of the way.”345   
 It is hard to argue with Hart’s logic, but if his laissez faire attitude to straggling was 
indicative of the opinions of other AEF junior leaders, their inactivity only encouraged 
straggling.  One straggling soldier marveled “at the freedom I had in the advanced regions.”  He 
admitted that he frequently left the front lines and at times strayed over two miles from his unit. 
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The infantryman noted, “the peculiar thing is that usually I did not have permission to go and 
never once got into trouble for going.”346  In this situation, either the soldier’s officers and NCOs 
never realized that he was gone or turned a blind eye to his actions.  In either case, it was a lapse 
in basic combat leadership at the company level and below. 
 Unlike those soldiers who left the lines because they were lost or hungry, discovering 
why “battle stragglers” sought to avoid combat is much more difficult.  Since few admitted their 
motives, any discussion in this area must be based on the observations of third parties or 
speculation.  Some of the reasons certainly went back to issues with leadership in the AEF’s 
small combat units.  For example, Captain Thomas Barber attributed much of the straggling to 
poor leadership and with men becoming “fed up” with the uncertainties and pettiness of 
everyday military life.347  In some cases, the junior leaders set such a bad example for their 
soldiers by their own misconduct that the men were naturally bound to follow.  Private Ernesto 
Bisogno stated that at Chatel Chehery “some officers ran like sheep” and abrogated their 
responsibilities by trying to save their own skins.348  A 28th Division soldier recalled that when 
he, a sergeant, and two other enlisted men were ordered to scout the German lines prior to his 
unit’s attack in the Argonne on 1 October, soon after leaving the American lines, “our sergeant 
deserted us,” leaving the patrol alone and leaderless in no man’s land.349  Joseph Lawrence, an 
infantry officer in the 29th Division, reported that his company’s first sergeant deserted the unit 
in the middle of the Argonne fight, taking with him “several other men of the company.”  He 
also noted the poor example set by a company commander nicknamed “Dugout Pete” for his 
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refusal to leave the safety of his bunker during his unit’s attacks.350   
 After observing the 5th Division, Colonel J. A. Bauer informed his superior that “the 
officers with the troops of this division appear ‘jumpy’,” and suggested that this fact explained 
many of the unit’s 2500 stragglers.351  Bauer’s assessment of the 5th Division was close to the 
mark. During the 3rd Battalion, 61st Infantry’s attack on the Bois des Rappes on 15 October 1918, 
the unit’s adjutant broke down after witnessing the death of the battalion commander and two 
company commanders.  When the adjutant “became panicky and departed precipitately to the 
rear.  The few men in his immediate vicinity naturally followed.”  The terror-stricken officer 
soon reported to the regimental commander that the unit “was all cut to pieces and what was left 
of it was retreating.”  This bogus report led to the entire regiment being pulled back from the 
line, only to suffer heavy casualties over the next two days trying to recover the terrain it had 
previously taken.352   
 A similar case of officer straggling and poor leadership occurred in the 4th Machine Gun 
Battalion during one of the 2nd Division’s October 1918 attacks on Mont Blanc.  During a move 
to the front, Wendell Westover’s first sergeant reported that one of the company’s lieutenants 
had left the formation during the march claiming to have been wounded, and was no where to be 
found.  The sergeant offered his opinion that he hoped that the officer would not come back, and 
darkly hinted “he won’t live through the attack to-morrow if he does show up again.”353  The 
NCO’s veiled threat indicates the hatred that soldiers often felt for leaders who failed to live up 
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to the men’s expectations and, perhaps, the lengths that some soldiers would go to rid themselves 
of a particularly odious or incompetent leader.   
 Sergeant Archibald Hart recalled that the 142nd Infantry contained one such officer, a 
lieutenant “known by sight to every man in the Regiment; known and in varying degrees hated.”  
He noted of the officer, 
  He hadn’t what it takes to be a martinet, and so, employed and flaunted a constant 
  attitude of contempt for all enlisted personnel; on the drill grounds and off.   
  Whatever his behavior in [the] officers’ mess may have been, no enlisted man or  
  men ever encountered him when he wasn’t exhibiting by tone, manner and  
  expression his utter distaste and aversion.354   
 
In the Meuse-Argonne, one of Hart’s soldiers straggled from the line rather than follow the  
unpopular officer, and only the sergeant’s inadvertent intervention had kept another soldier who 
had already “drawn a bead on the Lieutenant’s back” from killing the despised leader.  Hart later 
recalled, 
  Sometimes in Camp Bowie one would hear vague predictions that this or that  
  man, not necessarily an officer, would certainly get his once the outfit reached the 
  front, but as a rule these ominous hints were ignored…The Lieutenant, however,  
  had planted his seeds of ill will over the entire regimental area, and no doubt on  
  more than one occasion had stepped far enough beyond the bounds of his usual  
  contumely to incur a bit of vindictive enmity.355  
 
It is impossible to determine how many unpopular officers or NCOs met their ends at the hands 
of their own soldiers, but Westover’s and Hart’s accounts illustrate that at least some disgruntled 
doughboys were pushed in that direction by poor leaders. 
 Some of the “battle stragglers” were simply men who had stayed at the front until they 
had reached the breaking point of physical and psychological collapse.  One officer later wrote 
that after grueling weeks at the front under constant fire, men tried to slip to the rear for “a few 
minutes of relief from the hell on the line.”  He recalled that “this kept up all night, making it 
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necessary for me to patrol the line…I would drive one man back to his position and another 
would try to slip by.”356  One infantryman blamed this type of straggling on the fact that  
commanders “had forgotten that there is a limit to human endurance.”357 
 Other “battle stragglers” were perhaps motivated to avoid combat long before this “limit 
to human endurance” was reached due to fear and the realization that neither their own, nor their 
leaders’, training had prepared them for battle.  The AEF’s soldiers were “thinking bayonets” 
who could not have helped to have been cognizant of these shortcomings.  Henderson, Shils and 
Janowitz all argued that one of the major pillars of small unit cohesion was the soldier’s faith 
that their leaders will be “duly considerate of their lives” and that the inevitable casualties of war 
will still be “minimal and justified.”358  The fact that the AEF had large numbers of men actively 
seeking to avoid combat indicates that there were major problems with cohesiveness within the 
army’s small units.  In many of the AEF’s small units, it was simply the case of the unwilling 
being led by the unready into the unknown.  As soldiers weighed their chance of survival in 
combat and opted to “vote with their feet,” the quality of their leaders was undoubtedly one of 
the factors that influenced their decision.      
 Even some of the more reliable soldiers opted to moderate their aggressiveness based on 
the odds of survival.  When Horace and his unit were ordered back to the front at 8:30 AM on  
11 November 1918, the soldier did not want to risk his life for nothing and decided to hide out 
for a few hours to see what happened.  After a bit of moral calculus, Baker decided that if 
fighting continued after the Armistice time of 11:00 AM, he would dutifully return to the fight; if 
the fighting ceased, he figured that no harm was done by his straggling and he had been right in 
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not tempting fate in the closing hours of the war.359  Similarly, Private George Dongarra 
admitted that when his truck broke down on 9 November 1918, rumors of a possible armistice 
led he and his fellow driver “to linger on the troubled motor” for two days until the fighting 
stopped.360  The remarkable thing is not that many enlisted men in the Meuse-Argonne opted for 
self-preservation by straggling, but rather those who chose to stay.  The difference must have 
been tied back to good leadership and the ability of junior officers and NCOs to beat the odds by 
establishing and maintaining cohesive units.  However, this is an area that requires much more 
study. 
 It is interesting to note that many officers and NCOs blamed the straggler problem on 
replacements.  The AEF Inspector General noted that when the replacements consisted of “men 
who do not know the rudiments of soldiering [they] soon become either ‘cannon fodder’ or 
skulkers.”  A soldier in the 42nd Division corroborated this observation by noting that most 
stragglers from his unit “had been replacements newly arrived.”361  Nine years after the 
Armistice, the war correspondent Thomas Johnson wrote in his aptly-titled Without Censor, that 
the war was hardest on those men, usually replacements, who had been shunted off to the front 
with very little training under the belt.  He noted, “We could always recognize them on the roads 
of the battle area.  They were paler, slighter, than the men who had had their proper hardening 
and had not just come from crowded transports, and they looked about nervously.  Who could 
blame them?”362  Johnson recalled that “Some of the youngest ones, scared boys, drifted to 
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Y.M.C.A. hotels where they were fed and warmed and often got their nerve and went back to the 
front.”363 
   If replacements did make up the majority of “battle stragglers” (and this point is far from 
certain), they had good reason to fly from battle.  An infantry first sergeant in the 32nd Division 
mourned the fact that “replacements get the end of dirty things in the Army.  They are shoved 
from pillar to post and back again…They acquire buddies one day to have them leave the next 
day…Their A[rmy] P[ost] O[ffice] number is changed before they receive mail from the folks at 
home.”364  If these indignities were not enough, in an army not known for the quality and 
quantity of its training, replacements were often the worst trained of the lot.   
 The stories that circulated that some replacements had to be told how to load their rifles 
just before H Hour, are far from apocryphal. Once the 83rd Division was transformed into the 2nd 
Depot Division, its intelligence officer began to track the level of training of the replacements 
that arrived in France in the summer and fall of 1918.  These reports provide sad evidence of the 
breakdown of the stateside training of replacements in the last four months of the war.  On        
12 August 1918, one of the officer’s agents reported that the 2500 men who just arrived at the 
division from Camps Gordon and Hancock had “been in the service only a few weeks.”  A 
month later, another agent reported that the 597 draftees that had just arrived from Camps Pike, 
MacArthur, and Gordon “had all been in the army less than a month and have had little or no 
training.”  The men who reported on 29 October from Camp Pike had only spent one day on the 
rifle range and had no gas training before being shipped overseas.  The men who arrived on the 
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same day from Camp MacArthur were little better off.  They had spent one or two days on the 
range and had been given six hours of gas training just before leaving for France.365  
 One 35th Division replacement had no real training in the 35 days between the time he 
was inducted to the point at which he sailed for France, and did not even receive his first uniform 
until he reached the embarkation point at Camp Mills, New York.  He recalled,  
  After we reached France, we were brigaded with English troops and given some  
  training, using our own officers in close order drill.  I was on the firing range  
  once.  No information or training was given about extended lines or attack tactics.  
  Now here I was, at the bottom of a hill, in a pit of fog and on the attack. 
 
He recalled hearing such commands as “deploy as skirmishers” and “advance in squad column” 
without understanding what they meant.366  To survive in combat, he simply tried to follow the 
directions of his squad leader and mimic his actions.  Lieutenant Hugh Thompson found that  
12 of the replacements assigned to his company just before the St. Mihiel Offensive had never 
fired their rifles before, and others “were not very sure of their rifles.”  The new men’s only 
training before going into combat was “each man was allowed to fire a clip (five rounds) into the 
soggy ground at his feet.”367 
 The commander of the 77th Division’s 307th Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Eugene 
Houghton, argued that the cohesion and morale of his unit suffered from the influx of new 
recruits.  Of the 850-900 men he received just before going into the Argonne battle, “90% of 
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them had never fired a rifle, nor thrown a grenade, nor had they the ordinary close order drill.”  
He went on to note, 
  Since the action started it has been frequently reported to me by company and 
  battalion commanders that it was practically impossible to handle these men 
  over the present terrain.  They had no idea what it meant to extend [formations] 
  and would have to be led around from place to place.  They were continually 
  getting lost and straggling, and their officers and N. C. O.’s were practically  
  strangers to them, it made them very difficult to handle them.368 
 
Sadly, there was little that a company’s officers and NCOs could do to address the problems 
caused by this massive influx of ill-trained men.  When his company received 30 exceptionally 
green replacements, 1SG Harold C. Woehl was moved to exclaim, “preparing such untrained 
men for battle was a nerve-wracking job.”369  After the company was again refilled with 
replacements during a rest in the Meuse-Argonne, Captain Fred Jankoska tried to solve these 
problems by placing the new men with “old timers” for training and mentoring while also 
seeking to keep “as far as possible, Army ‘Buddies’ and Hometown ‘Neighbors’” assigned 
together.370  In the end, the problem with replacement training was merely only one last straw to 
the litany of problems that dogged the AEF’s small unit leaders throughout the war.  
 On 18 October 1918 General Du Cane, the senior French liaison officer to the AEF, 
reported that the disjointed and ill-led American attacks in the Argonne did nothing but “suffer 
wastage out of all proportion to the results achieved.”371  While this criticism seems hypocritical 
coming from an army that a year previously had descended into mutiny as a result of equally 
disjointed attacks, Du Cane’s observations hit very close to their mark. A more sympathetic, or at 
least tactful, French officer simply noted, “These young Americans lost a good many of their 
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illusions in the depths of the Argonne.”372  Even Brigadier General Harold Fiske, Pershing’s 
Chief of Training, had to admit that in the final analysis, 
  ....It must be remembered that to the end most of our divisions were lacking in  
  skill. Given plenty of time for preparation, they were capable of powerful blows;  
  but their blows were delivered with an awkwardness and lack of resource that  
  made them unduly costly and rendered it impracticable to reap the full fruits of  
  victory.373 
 
Fiske’s sad confession was also an admission that the U. S. Army had failed to properly train and 
develop its officers, NCOs and soldiers to meet the challenges that confronted them on the 
battlefield without enduring soul-numbing casualties.  Pershing had intended that the AEF  fight 
like a master swordsman: a fighter able to dispatch his enemies with quick maneuvers and deadly 
thrusts.  The AEF, however, was more like a blind giant: a creature groping to find its opponent, 
suffering wound after wound in doing so, but finally crushing the enemy with its superior weight 
when it finally found him.   
 The changing nature of warfare demanded that the AEF’s junior officers and NCOs be 
comfortable with employing a host of new weapons and ready to use their initiative on the 
battlefield.  The junior leaders were not only unprepared for this challenge, the AEF seemed to 
work at times to keep the leaders from rising to the occasion.  The AEF’s huge combat 
formations were too ponderous for the half-trained leaders to adequately command and control.  
Improper and incomplete training, as well as the failure to instruct junior leaders to act 
independently, had not prepared the AEF’s junior officers and NCOs for the enemy and the 
environment that they encountered in combat.  Consequently, American operations throughout 
the war tended to be rather ham-handed, flat-footed, and tragically lethal affairs. These 
bloodlettings were deadly to unit cohesion, combat effectiveness, and the leaders themselves.  As 
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leaders sacrificed themselves while learning at this “school of hard knocks,” it created a deadly 
cycle of where leaders all too often killed themselves and their soldiers before gaining the critical 
battlefield wisdom required for survival.  In the final analysis, American junior officers and 
NCOs could not grasp those opportunities on the margins of attritional war that would have 
allowed them a degree of battlefield success without the unnecessary dead that littered the AEF’s 
battlefields.  
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Chapter 13 
Conclusions: A Tale of George and Henry 
 
 Serving in the Great War had given the two men a shared experience that had helped to 
grease the wheels of their working relationship.  Henry, the elder of the two, had risen to the rank 
of colonel and commanded an artillery regiment during the war.  George was promoted to the 
rank of temporary colonel and had served as a corps chief of staff.  Both men looked upon their 
military service during World War I as one of the great formative events of their lives.  Although 
the two worked extremely well together over the years, there was one subject that nearly ended 
their professional relationship. 
In March 1941, Secretary of War Henry Stimson was confronted with a number of 
problems.  Henry knew well that the United States was likely to be drawn into a war with 
Germany or Japan and that the nation was little better prepared for this eventuality than it had 
been in 1917.  A few months before, the Congress had approved the nation’s first peace-time 
draft, and the some of the draftees were already in training.  However, this growing force still 
needed officers.  While ROTC units across the nation were providing a pool of reserve officers 
with a better military education than those who had received military training in the land-grant 
colleges prior to World War I, there were still not enough of the men to lead the growing ranks 
of the army.  To solve this problem, Stimson proposed that the army reestablish the 90 day 
Officer Training Camp model used in the Great War.      
This proposal was abhorrent to the Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall.  
George was adamant that any future army raised for the approaching war be provided with 
competent junior leaders more realistically and thoroughly trained than the generation of 1917.  
For the first and only time in their long and fruitful relationship, George informed Henry that if 
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the Secretary went forward with his plan on resurrecting the OTC model, he would resign as 
Chief of Staff.1   
This rare confrontation between Stimson and Marshall was an indication of how deeply 
some of the army’s officers believed that the training and performance of the Great War’s junior 
officers had been flawed.  Although the post-war military draw-down and public apathy 
prevented the army from making good use of its “lessons learned” in the war, the generation of 
young officers that came of age in World War I still tried to keep the United States from making 
similar leadership mistakes in the nation’s future wars.  
 Marshall and other AEF veterans understood the price that the American soldier paid for 
serving under ill-prepared small unit leaders.  The AEF’s half-trained junior officers and NCOs 
usually fought bravely, but seldom fought skillfully.  At the “tip of the spear” in battle, these 
infantry leaders lacked the critical experience and the tactical and technical skills to take 
advantage of the slim opportunities available to the attacker on the margins of the attritional 
World War I battlefield.  This was a major failing because changes in the nature of combat 
brought about by improved weapons and the expanded breadth of the battlefield now required a 
decentralization of command and control which placed much greater responsibility upon small 
unit leaders.  As the war progressed, it was increasingly the junior leaders at the “tip of the 
spear,” and not the generals, that ultimately decided whether or not the senior commander’s 
grand plans were properly executed.  In the case of the AEF, this spear-point was made of a 
brittle and un-tempered metal.   
                                                 
1 Larry Bland, ed., The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Vol. 2 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986), 511-513., Henry L. Stimson, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1948), 348-350., Forrest Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope 1939-1942 (New York: Viking Press, 1965), 
102-103.  
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 The failure of the leadership “spear-point” was not due to the poor human material that 
comprised the weapon.  In the majority of cases, the AEF’s junior officers and NCOs were  
patriotic, adequately educated, dedicated to the cause, and brave to a fault.  They were eager to 
learn and often understood the limitations of their training and experience.  These leaders did the 
best they could under the conditions they faced, but, far too often, sacrificed themselves and their 
soldiers in mass, clumsy, ill-supported, and often frontal attacks.  Their maladroit tactics 
generally showed an awkward inability to match formations, maneuver and firepower to the 
terrain and the enemy they encountered. Furthermore, American officers and NCOs also tended 
to display a fatal lack of initiative which ceded hard-won and short-lived tactical gains or 
advantages to a more skillful and agile enemy.        
 Some of these problems were the result of the inherent realities of the Great War’s 
battlefields that all the major combatants had to contend with during the conflict.  Advances in 
communications and command and control had not kept pace with the changes in weaponry.  
Without reliable and responsive communications, it was exceedingly difficult for the attacker (a 
position the AEF was generally fated to play) to gain the reliable and responsive artillery fire he 
desperately needed to level the playing field between himself and the defender.  The lack of an 
effective system of tactical communications meant that it was also hard for the attacking junior 
leader to direct his soldiers, inform his superiors of his progress, or change orders in the heat of 
combat. 
Many of the difficulties faced by the AEF’s small unit leaders were due to systemic 
problems associated with the nation’s lack of preparation to fight a modern war, and to the 
inherent growing pains associated with building a mass army.  The United States was the least 
prepared of the major combatants: materially, numerically, administratively and intellectually 
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that entered the war on the Western Front in World War I.  From 1914 to mid-1916, the Wilson 
administration simply did not want to face the political pressure from socialists, old-line 
Populists, anti-British minority groups, and a host of other anti-war or “isolationist” groups that 
came with any serious preparations for the nation’s possible entry into the war. Under the 
pressures of the time, the quantity of soldiers that the United States could ship overseas took 
precedence over the quality of their junior leadership.   
 After the United States entered the war, the prodding of the desperate Allies, and the 
rapidly changing military situation in France that followed the Ludendorff offensives, ultimately 
forced the army to make compromises or shortcuts with the stateside training of its leaders and 
soldiers that later had detrimental affects on the battlefield.  The United States’ pressing need for 
officers in the spring of 1917 led the army to adopt the flawed OTC training and commissioning 
system.  Training in the OTCs failed to impart the leadership, tactical, and technical skills needed 
by the fledging officers in combat.  The OTCs, and later COTSs, placed far too much emphasis 
on close order drill, bayonet training and other skills of questionable importance, and too little 
stress on teaching their students critical subjects such as map reading, the military aspects of 
terrain, logistics and administration, and the tactics of combining firepower and maneuver in 
combat.   
 The army’s process for selecting and developing NCOs was even more defective.  The 
Regular Army’s prewar ad hoc system of company commanders selecting NCOs from long-
service privates was one that could not be readily adapted to the realities of a mass draftee army.  
Lacking the training and status to set them above the mass of doughboys, the AEF’s NCOs 
remained “privates with stripes.”  This institutional failure to more systematically train and 
develop NCOs placed additional burdens on the army’s already overtaxed junior officers and 
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greatly complicated small unit command and control in combat. The overall lack of junior officer 
and leader “know how,” combined with the systemic problems associated with mass 
mobilization, hobbled the army’s efforts to build cohesive and effective combat units. 
 The army itself must also bear its share of blame for its problems with junior leaders.  
The tactical doctrine promulgated by the Regular Army from 1914 to 1917 (and sometimes well 
into 1918) continued to exult the power of the rifleman and downplay the effectiveness of 
modern artillery and the machine gun despite all evidence to the contrary from the European 
fighting.  The U. S. Army’s attempt to close the intellectual/doctrinal gap between itself and the 
European combatants in 1917 and 1918, as well as Pershing’s effort to craft a uniquely American 
“open warfare” doctrine, led to such a mixing of “American,” “French,” and “British” “methods” 
that that the AEF never had a uniform doctrine during the war.  Faced with a deluge of often 
conflicting doctrinal publications, new support weapons, and evolving tactical techniques, the 
AEF’s small units tended to “freelance” their own doctrines or slavishly adhere to the formations 
presented in Offensive Combat of Small Units.  Both of these approaches had their own problems 
and contributed to the AEF’s flat-footed and ham-fisted performance at the tactical level of war.  
Through trial and error, some leaders and soldiers also picked up workable tactical methods and 
techniques from the unsparing “school of hard knocks.” However, this method of learning 
through hard experience was also problematic.  The AEF’s small units experienced such a vast 
and rapid turn over of leaders and soldiers due to casualties, schools, and other removals, that 
their ability to “learn lessons” from their combat experience was stunted.  This massive loss in 
the ranks of infantry and machine gun junior leaders led to an unbreakable cycle of 
ineffectiveness as half-trained leaders were supplanted by even less trained and experienced 
replacement officers and NCOs.  Although commanders and staffs at the regimental level and 
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above were able to puzzle-out some of the AEF’s tactical problems such as the effective 
employment of planned artillery fires, at the battalion level and below rapid changes in leaders 
often prevented these units from being effective learning organizations.  Too many junior leaders 
simply did not survive their first tactical missteps, mistakes, or blunders to get second chances to 
improve.      
 The U. S. Army further handicapped the ability of its junior leaders to succeed in combat 
by instituting short-sighted and self-inflicted personnel policies that undercut unit cohesion and 
morale.  The large-scale levying of personnel from American units training in the United States 
and France broke or disrupted the bonds that tied units together and wed the leader to the led.  
Pershing’s efforts to overcome his army’s inability to wage a modern war by establishing an 
expansive school system ironically hindered its combat effectiveness by further removing 
essential leaders from their units, to serve as instructors or students, at key times in their unit’s 
training and operations.  The AEF’s senior officers were either unaware or indifferent to the 
havoc that these policies wrought in the army’s companies and platoons.  When combined with 
other factors that undermined unit morale, such as heavy casualties, the loss of leaders, and the 
inability of junior officers to live up to their end of the social contract with their soldiers, these 
flawed policies led to small combat units with very fragile cohesion.  The end result was an 
explosion of stragglers in the last months of the war that further dulled the AEF’s combat 
effectiveness by depriving its units of large swaths of its manpower at the front.       
 Furthermore, unexpected changes in the military situation in the spring and summer of 
1918, and the high American casualties that resulted, threw the army’s system for training 
officers and NCOs in such disarray that the quality and quantity of leader training actually 
decreased as the war went on.  The press of events in 1918 added another burden on junior 
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leaders by filling the ranks of their units with replacements who were often so ill-trained as to be 
a greater threat to themselves and their comrades as they were to the Germans.       
 Lastly, the inability of the Regular Army officer corps to reconcile its demands for 
obedience with the need for its junior leaders to exercise initiative in combat hobbled the 
effectiveness of its units throughout the war.  The regular officers’ prewar assumptions about the 
discipline required of leaders and men to “cross the fire swept ground,” combined with their 
negative opinion of citizen soldiers, led commanders at the regimental level and above to 
demand an exacting degree of compliance to their orders by their subordinates.  This degree of 
obedience and micro-management by senior officers reflected conceptions of combat that were 
increasingly obsolete on the modern battlefield.  The micro-management by senior officers of 
their subordinates was further exacerbated by the command climate that Pershing instilled in the 
AEF.  Pershing’s willingness to sack senior officers who he believed lacked aggressiveness or 
ability created a climate of fear that permeated all levels of the AEF.  Regimental and brigade 
commanders, fearful that the mistakes of their subordinates would reflect poorly upon their 
command, made little effort to develop their wayward junior officers, and instead purged them 
from their units by sending the errant lieutenants and captains to the Reclassification Center at 
Blois.  These actions sapped the initiative of junior officers who were already hindered by the 
knowledge of their own inadequate training and the weight of being responsible for the lives of 
their soldiers.              
 The inability of the AEF’s junior leaders to live up to Pershing’s “open warfare” hype 
and gain tactical success without long casualty lists left an ambiguous legacy in the post-World 
War I American military.  George Marshall, for one, understood the Americans’ failings and 
worked during the interwar period to head off future leadership problems.  While serving as the 
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Assistant Commandant of the Infantry School, Marshall had tried to pass on some of the army’s 
hard-won battlefield wisdom to new generations of its junior leaders.   
  In 1934, the Infantry School at Fort Benning published its classic Infantry in Battle to 
give “peace-trained officers something of the viewpoint of the veteran.”2  The work contained 
vignettes on minor tactics and leadership, mostly drawn from American actions in the Great War, 
to better prepare a new generation of junior leaders for the realities of combat.  Marshall, the 
driving force behind the publication, understood all too well the limitations of America’s 
wartime leadership and its flawed training.  In the work’s introduction Marshall noted, “In our 
schools we generally assume that organizations are well-trained and at full strength, that 
subordinates are competent, that supply arrangements function, that communications work, that 
orders are carried out.  In war many or all of these conditions may be absent.”3  In stating this 
realistic view of combat, Marshall wanted his students to understand the nature of fighting 
modern wars and the skills required by officers to meet its challenges.   
There was also a darker legacy from World War I that Marshall brought to his subsequent 
military endeavors.  Historian Daniel Bolger has noted that the lessons of the war and the 
approach to tactics that Marshall attempted to convey in Infantry in Battle were too mired in the 
“infantry-centric” views of the World War.  He also argued that as the Assistant Commandant of 
the Infantry School, Marshall inculcated a generation of the school’s students with his own rigid 
ideas of tactics, discipline and leadership.  These men, most notably Omar Bradley, Courtney 
Hodges and J. Lawton Collins, later rose to senior command positions in World War II and 
placed Marshall’s narrow doctrinal views into practice.  As such, the operations of Bradley’s      
1st Army were characterized by a cautious set-piece approach to warfare and a tendency of 
                                                 
2 U.S. Army Infantry School, Infantry in Battle (Washington D.C.: Infantry Journal, 1939), first page of the 
Introduction.  
3 Ibid.  
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Hodges and Collins to micromanage and dampen the initiative of their subordinates.4   
Bolger maintained that the stern and forbidding Marshall also passed on to his Benning 
disciples a rather harsh view of how to deal with subordinates who failed to perform in combat.  
Those who failed had to be cut out of the unit like a cancer.  As a commander in Western Europe 
in 1944 and 1945, Bradley placed this merciless vision into practice and between June 1944 and 
May 1945, relieved two corps commanders, eight division commanders, and numerous brigade 
and regimental commanders.5  The result of these sackings created a “zero defect” command 
climate in the 1st Army that left its subordinate commanders fearful and unwilling to question the 
decisions of their superiors.   
What Bolger failed to discuss was that this willingness to relieve officers at the drop of a 
hat, and the poor command climate this practice created, was also a legacy of World War I.  It is 
sometime said that children who are abused grow up to be abusers themselves as adults.  As a 
senior AEF staff officer, Marshall saw first hand Pershing’s ruthlessness in ridding himself of 
those who failed to please him.  This experience left an indelible impression on Marshall; one 
that he later passed on to his Benning students.  One passage in Infantry in Battle even advises 
commanders to “relieve all unreliable junior officers.”6  As Bradley and his senior commanders 
sacked their subordinates with pitiless abandon, the ghost of Blois stalked in the shadows.          
Not all of the AEF’s legacy was negative or unproductive when it came to junior 
leadership.  Behind the American boasting about the power and skill of the AEF in the 
immediate aftermath of the Armistice, many officers looked past the period’s jingoism to admit 
that the army’s failure to properly train and develop its junior leaders had blunted the combat 
                                                 
 4 Daniel Bolger, “Zero Defects: Command Climate in the First U. S. Army 1944-1945,” in Military Review, 
71 (May 1991), 61-73. 
 5 Ibid. 
 6 Infantry in Battle, 199. 
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effectiveness of the AEF.  While officially adhering to the “party line” that superior American 
manpower and “know how” had decisively contributed to the Allied victory, many of the AEF’s 
senior leaders later admitted that the army had done a poor job of preparing for combat.  In April 
1919, the AEF GHQ convened an officer board headed by Major General Edward M. Lewis to 
“consider the lessons to be gained from the experiences of the present war in so far as they affect 
the tactics and organization of the Infantry.”7  A number of the board’s participants were critical 
of the leadership exhibited by the AEF’s junior officers and NCOs during the war.  Although the 
board’s recommendations regarding leadership were of a general nature, the board’s findings still 
indicated that the AEF’s infantry officers were cognizant of the problem and searching for a 
solution.  
The Great War experience also encouraged the army to expand its schools system and 
institutionally promoted professional development to counter flaws uncovered by the war in the 
Regular officer corps.8  Although it was bitter medicine, the Regulars had to admit that many of 
their ranks who rose to senior command and staff positions in the AEF were no better prepared 
for the shocks of modern war and the duties and requirements of their elevated positions than had 
been their “90-day-wonder” junior officers.  Eisenhower, Bradley and other future World War II 
commanders benefited from this renaissance of the “cult of professionalism.”  Recognizing the 
nation’s glaring wartime problems with equipping a mass industrial army, the War Department 
went so far as to create the Army Industrial College to encourage cooperation and an exchange 
of ideas between military and industrial leaders.    
The army and the nation also took steps to correct the problems of junior leadership that 
became apparent during the war.  As Superintendent of the Military Academy from 1919-1922, 
                                                 
 7 General Headquarters American Expeditionary Force, Report of Officers Convened By Special Orders 
No.98, GHQ AEF 09 April 1919, 9-10. (Here after cited as the Lewis Board) in USAMHI Library , 1. 
8 Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 361-362.  
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Douglas MacArthur changed the curriculum for the Corps of Cadets to address some of the 
conspicuous deficiencies in junior officer leadership that he had observed in France.  For the first 
time in the academy’s history, its curriculum included formal classes on military leadership.9  
While opposition from the Academy’s entrenched and conservative faculty meant that few of 
MacArthur’s reforms survived his departure from West Point, his actions still forced an 
examination of the cadets’ leadership and tactical training. 
After the war, the army did not allow the ROTC program to languish due to a lack of 
attention and direction as had its Land Grant College predecessor.  The National Defense Act of 
1920 strengthened the army’s commitment to the ROTC and provided for a more rational and 
regulated system for maintaining a trained Officer’s Reserve Corps.10  By 1922 even Pershing, 
the strongest guardian of the AEF’s reputation, tacitly admitted that leadership had been lacking 
in his army and that reform was necessary.  In a keynote address to the Reserve Officer 
Association, “Black Jack” stated, “A resolve has gone forth, embodied in the law of 1920, that 
never again shall our untrained boys be compelled to serve their country on the battlefield under 
the leadership of new officers with practically no conception of their duties and 
responsibilities.”11  Efforts to improve the quality of junior leaders in the 1920s and 1930s later 
bore fruit in World War II.  In fact, Army Chief of Staff George Marshall wrote in 1941, 
                                                 
9 D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, Vol I. 1880-1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1970), 264-265, 270-271, 275., Geoffrey Perret, A Country Made By War (New York: Random House, 1989), 351-
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10 National Defense Act of 1916, with Amendments to July 1924, 21-28., Michael S. Neiberg, Making 
Citizen Soldiers: ROTC and the Ideology of American Military Service (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2000), 22-34. 
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“without these [reserve] officers the successful rapid expansion of our Army . . . would have 
been impossible.”12  
Ultimately, the World War II officer corps would be composed mainly of ROTC and 
Officer Candidate School (OCS) graduates, with the majority coming from the candidate 
schools.  Unlike their World War One predecessors, these officers were commissioned after 
having proven themselves as competent enlisted men for a minimum of four-to-six months and 
after having demonstrated tactical and leadership abilities during their 17 week long OCS course.  
Most of these OCS officers went on to attend an additional two-to-three month branch advanced 
or company commander’s course for more intensive technical, tactical, and leadership training.13  
Although the World War II army also faced some of the same systemic problems with its mass 
mobilization (frequent levying of personnel from existing units for cadres or replacements, 
shortages of qualified instructors, etc) as had the World War I generation, it did a much better 
job of developing competent officers than did the army of the Great War.14   
Unlike their Great War predecessors, the officers and NCOs of World War II were 
generally given that most precious of wartime resources to hone their skills and leadership 
abilities: time.  The peacetime draft of 1940, and the fact that most of the army’s units did not 
see combat until after the late fall of 1942, allowed for a degree of training and experience that 
would have been the envy of the doughboys.  The Louisiana Maneuvers and other large-scale 
exercises allowed the army to work out some of the tactical and logistical bugs that had so 
                                                 
12 Quoted in Gene M. Lyons and John W. Massland, “The Origins of the ROTC,” Military Affairs Vol. 
XXIII, no. 1 (Spring 1959), 12.  
13 Robert R. Palmer, et al., The Army Ground Forces: The Procurement and Training of Combat Ground 
Troops (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), 93-95, 264-273, 335-345.  
14 Leonard L. Lerwill, ed., The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army (Washington 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954), 319-328., Peter R. Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of 
American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945 (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1999), 11-15, 20-21, 24-28, 
40-46.  Mansoor, Geoffrey Perret and Michael Doubler have all recently re-examined the American army’s combat 
effectiveness in World War II.  All of these historians have noted the army’s ability to select and develop good 
junior leaders to have an ability to adapt to changing battlefield situations.     
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plagued the army of 1918.  Furthermore, developments in tactical communications and increases 
in infantry, armor, artillery, and air mobile firepower during the interwar period and World War 
II, also eased many of the problems that had been faced by junior combat leaders in World War 
I.  Although the army’s system for procuring and training leaders and units in World War II was 
far from perfect, on the whole, it was a vast improvement over what had been done in the Great 
War.     
Unfortunately, “lessons learned” are sometimes forgotten in the heat of a new crisis.  The 
army in Vietnam faced problems with junior leadership that often resembled those of the Great 
War.  Vietnam also showed that the army’s problems with properly selecting and training junior 
leaders were not just limited to wars requiring mass mobilization.  Lyndon Johnson’s refusal to 
expand mobilization for the war and the army’s own flawed individual rotation policy created a 
constant drain of junior leaders from American combat units.  As an institution, the army was ill-
prepared to fight a protracted attritional war without a call-out of the National Guard and 
Reserves.  As such, it had to scramble to adapt its system for identifying, training, and 
developing junior combat leaders.  The growing unpopularity of the war complicated this task 
and further hindered army efforts to recruit suitable men for officers and NCOs.  As with their 
Great War predecessors, officers in Vietnam resorted to rapidly promoting privates and 
specialists to the NCO ranks.  These so-called “shake and bake sergeants” lacked specialized 
training for their jobs and usually owed their positions to their length of time “in country.”   
The officer situation was equally bad.  The widespread granting of educational 
deferments, the declining enrollment in ROTC programs, and the incessant demand for platoon 
leaders forced the army to turn to the OCS to obtain officers.15 By 1967 over half of the army’s 
lieutenants were the products of a four-month long OCS course. Given the strains of “supply and 
                                                 
 15 Neiberg, 112-150. 
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demand” the army could not afford to be very selective in the officers that it commissioned. As 
was the case with the World War I OTCs, the press of time forced the OCS programs to skimp 
on leadership and tactical training.  Thus the OCS programs often commissioned officers lacking 
the leadership ability and competency to lead soldiers in combat.   
Lieutenant William Calley, the infamous leader of the My Lai Massacre, was one such 
officer.  Calley, a college dropout and unemployed misanthrope, left OCS for Vietnam in 1968 
ill-trained and unfit for the position that he held.  But, in a larger sense, it was the army’s failure 
to properly screen, train, and develop its junior leaders that was one of the root causes of its 
morale and discipline problems from 1969 to the end of the war.  As one colonel noted at the 
time, “we have at least two or three thousand Calleys in the army just waiting for the next 
calamity.”16  While the American armies of the Great War and Vietnam had difficulty fielding 
competent junior leaders for different reasons, the end result was the same.  In both cases, ill-
trained and unprepared leaders caused unnecessary casualties and eroded unit morale and 
cohesion.  
 For all of its problems, in the end, the AEF accomplished its strategic goal.  At a time 
when its allies were experiencing a flagging of their strength and morale, the promise of fresh, 
numerous and young Americans gave heart and hope to the Allied cause.  The Allies’ combined 
weight of numbers and materiel slowly but surely ground the German army under the millstone 
of attritional war.  Unfortunately, the AEF was an army of 1914 thrust into 1918. To paraphrase 
Abraham Lincoln, in the clashes of 1914, the European powers were all “green alike,” and thus 
                                                 
16 Quoted in, Samuel Lipsman and Edward Doyle, Fighting for Time (Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 
1983), 112, and 96-101. For the army’s difficulty in procuring and retaining qualified officers and NCOs also see, 
Perret, 530-532.,  Shelby Stanton, The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965-
1973 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1985), 271-272.   
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developed at a pace that gave none a marked or lasting advantage when it came to the evolution 
of tactical thought or weapons.  From the time that the first American soldier stepped foot in 
France, the AEF suffered from having to play catch-up with armies that had been matriculating 
at the school of hard knocks for four years.  Although few American soldiers at the time would 
have agreed, the AEF was in fact fortunate that the German Army it faced in the summer and fall 
of 1918 was not the German Army of 1916, or the army of 1917, or even the army of March 
1918.  While the Germans remained tough school masters for the Americans to the very end of 
the war, the doughboys’ rather unskillful and costly attacks still wore down the strength and 
willpower of their Teutonic foes.17  Sadly, the difficulty that the AEF’s junior infantry officers 
and NCOs had in learning how to control their units while attempting to combine firepower with 
maneuver had caused the Americans a degree of casualties that outweighed the tactical gains that 
resulted from the sacrifice.  Despite the AEF’s blunt and costly approach to war, the doughboys 
and their leaders still bled Woodrow Wilson to a seat at the peace table.   
 Unfortunately, the AEF’s success at the strategic level was a cold consolation to those 
who slogged out the war in the army’s small units.  In 1924, Laurence Stallings and Maxwell 
Anderson wrote and produced the play What Price Glory?.  In the play, Stallings, who had 
served as a captain in World War I, told the story of Captain Flagg and his infantry company’s 
experience during the war.  Although the story was about Marines, it still realistically depicted 
some of the leadership challenges faced by the war’s army officers.  In one scene, an American 
soldier confronts Flagg after the officer’s costly attacks failed to breach a German stronghold in 
a French town.  The distraught young doughboy demands of his officer, 
                                                 
 17 Donald Scott Stephenson, “Frontschwene and Revolution: The Role of Front-Line Soldiers in the 
German Revolution of 1918,” PhD. Dissertation, University of Kansas, 2007.  Stephenson provides an excellent 
examination of the condition of the German Army in the last months of the war. 
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 What price glory now?  Why in God’s name can’t we go home?  Who gives a 
 damn about this lousy, stinking little town but the poor French bastards that live 
 here?... I won’t have the platoon asking me every minute of the livelong night 
 when they are going to be relieved…Flagg, I tell you, you can shoot me, but I 
 won’t stand for it…I’ll take ‘em out to-night and kill you if you get in my way.18   
   
These words reflect the soldier’s exasperation with a leader unable to deal with a battlefield 
situation or cognizant of the limitations of his soldiers.  The fictional Captain Flagg had risen too 
far too fast and was unprepared for the weighty responsibilities of command in battle.  The ranks 
of the AEF’s junior leaders were chocked full of “Captain Flaggs”; brave officers who wanted to 
do right and well, yet somehow fell short of their goals.  In the end, it was the army’s failure to 
properly train and develop these junior officers that prevented the AEF from truly achieving its 
full tactical and operational potential.  In the end, the “price of glory” was all too often the 
American dead and wounded who littered the AEF’s battlefields from Seicheprey to the Meuse-
Argonne due to shortcomings in the leadership and tactical skills of their officers and NCOs. 
                                                 
18 Maxwell Anderson and Laurence Stallings, “What Price Glory?,” {1924} in Twenty-Five Best Plays of 
the Modern American Theatre, ed. John Gassner (New York: Crown Publishers, 1952), 78.  Laurence Stallings 
served as infantry captain in the Marine Brigade of the 2nd Division.  His leg was amputated as a result of a serious 
wound he suffered at Belleau Wood.  His nonfiction work The Doughboys (1963) remains one of the best histories 
of the AEF. 
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Appendix A: NG and NA Infantry officers sent to Blois for reclassification by Month and DIV 
   JAN 
1918 
 FEB  MAR  APR  MAY  JUN  JUL  AUG  SEP  OCT  1-11 
 NOV 
   ALL  
  AFTER 
  11 NOV 
 1 DIV      1x LT          1x LT  2x LT      1x LT 
 2 DIV  1x LT            1x  
CPT 
 1x LT   1x MAJ  1x LT  8x LT 
 3 DIV         1x CPT  1x      
 CPT 
 2x LT
1x LT          6x LT 
 4 DIV                2x LT 2x LT 1x LT  1x LT  1x MAJ 
 3x LT 
 5 DIV                2x LT      2x CPT  4x CPT 
 3x LT 
 6 DIV                    4x LT    1x LT 
 7 DIV                1x CPT  1x LT      3x LT 
           JAN    FEB    MAR    APR   MAY    JUN    JUL    AUG    SEP   OCT  1-11 Nov/ After 
  26    
 DIV 
 1x LT  1x LT  2x LT    2x MAJ   2x     
 MAJ 
  2x   
 CPT 
 2x LT 
  4x   
 CPT 
   2x   
  MAJ 
 1x CPT
 2x LT 
   3x LT    2x   
 MAJ 
 1x MAJ 
  2x LT 
  27   
 DIV 
             1x    
 CPT 
   2x CPT    2x    
  MAJ 
   1x   
 CPT 
  1x   
 MAJ 
 1x LT 
   1x LT 
  28  
 DIV 
               3x   
 CPT 
 2x LT 
 1x CPT
 2x LT 
       1x MAJ 
 1x CPT 
  29  
 DIV 
              1x   
 MAJ 
 1x LT 
   3x   
  MAJ 
 2x CPT
 8x LT 
  1x   
 MAJ 
  4x   
 CPT 
 3x LT 
   2x  
  MAJ 
 1x LT 
 2x CPT  1x CPT 
 1x LT 
  30   
 DIV 
             2x LT    2x   
 MAJ 
 6x CPT
 7x LT 
   2x   
 CPT 
 1x LT     
  32  
 DIV 
       1x LT  1x MAJ  2x LT    2x   
 MAJ 
    2x  
  MAJ   
 1x LT 
 1x LT    1x  
  MAJ    
   2x   
  CPT   
 1x LT 
    1x   
  MAJ   
 1x CPT 
 1x MAJ  
 3x CPT  
 1x LT 
  33  
 DIV 
               2x CPT 
 1x LT 
   2x   
  CPT 
 1x LT 
   2x  
  MAJ 
2x CPT 
   1x CPT 
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  JAN 
 1918 
 FEB  MAR  APR   MAY   JUN   JUL   AUG   SEP   OCT   1-11 
 NOV 
    ALL 
  AFTER 
  11NOV 
  35 
 DIV 
               1x   
 CPT 
 5x CPT
 4x LT 
   1x    
 CPT 
  1x  
 MAJ 
    
  36    
 DIV 
                2x  
 MAJ 
 9x CPT
 12x LT
   2x   
  CPT 
 2x LT 
  2x   
 MAJ 
  1x   
 CPT 
 1x CPT 
 1x LT 
  
  37  
 DIV 
             1x LT    2x   
 MAJ 
 3x CPT
 14x LT
  1x   
 MAJ   
  5x   
 CPT 
 5x LT 
   6x  
 MAJ 
   4x   
 CPT 
 9x LT 
    1x CPT 
  2x LT 
  42  
 DIV 
    1x   
 CPT 
 1x LT 
 2x LT    1x  
 CPT 
   1x LT      1x   
  MAJ   
 1x LT 
   2x   
 CPT 
      1x CPT 
  1x LT 
  77   
 DIV 
         1x CPT     1x   
 MAJ   
 1x LT 
   1x  
 MAJ 
 2x CPT
  1x  
 CPT 
 1x LT 
  1x   
 MAJ 
    2x LT 
  78   
 DIV 
             1x LT  1x CPT
 3x LT 
     1x  
 CPT 
 2x LT 
    
  79  
 DIV 
               1x CPT
 1x LT 
     3x   
 CPT 
 5x LT 
   1x MAJ 
  80   
 DIV 
             1x LT   1x   
 MAJ 
 4x CPT
 5x LT 
  1x  
 MAJ   
 1x LT 
     1x  
 MAJ 
  1x CPT 
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    JAN 
 1918 
  FEB   MAR  APR   MAY   JUN   JUL  AUG   SEP   OCT   1-11 
 NOV 
   ALL 
 AFTER 
 11 NOV 
   81 
 DIV 
                     1x  
 MAJ 
   1x   
 CPT 
 2x LT 
    
   82    
 DIV 
               1x   
 CPT 
       1x  
 MAJ 
   1x CPT 
   88  
 DIV 
                 1x LT      1x LT 
   89 
 DIV 
                 1x  
 MAJ 
 3x CPT
   1x  
 MAJ 
 2x LT 
 4x LT    1x CPT 
 3x LT 
   90   
 DIV 
                 1x   
 MAJ 
 1x CPT
   3x   
 CPT 
   1x  
 MAJ 
 1x LT   
   91  
 DIV 
                 2x  
 MAJ 
 3x CPT
 2x LT 
     2x  
 MAJ 
   2x  
 CPT 
 6x LT 
    
   92  
 DIV 
             1x LT  1x CPT
 1x LT 
 2x LT    2x  
 CPT 
 5x LT 
 2x CPT 
 6x LT 
 4x CPT 
 4x LT 
   93   
 DIV 
             1x  
 MAJ 
 1x LT 
   2x  
 CPT 
 2x LT
 1x CPT
 3x LT 
   1x  
 MAJ 
   1x  
 CPT 
 1x LT 
   1x   
 CPT 
 1x LT 
   4x CPT 
 2x LT 
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Appendix B: NG and NA Infantry officers sent to Blois for reclassification by DIV and REGT 
 
1 DIVISION – arrived in France June 1917 (All arrival dates based on Div HQ and Infantry Regts) 
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
16 IN 
 
   2 
18 IN 
 
    
26 IN 
 
   1 
28 IN 
 
  1 1 
1 MG 
 
    
2 MG 
 
    
3 MG 
 
    
 
2 DIVISION- arrived in France Sept-Oct 1917 
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
9 IN 
 
  2 8 
23 IN 
 
1    
5 USMC 
 
    
6 USMC 
 
    
4 MG 
 
   1 
5 MG 
 
    
6 MG (USMC) 
 
    
Other  2 Am Tn-1   
3 DIVISION- arrived in France March-April 1918 
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
4 IN 
 
    
7 IN 
 
  1 1 
30 IN 
 
 1   
38 IN 
 
  4 2 
7 MG 
 
    
8 MG 
 
    
9 MG 
 
 1   
Other   Div QM-1 
3 Sup Tn- 1 
Unk-1 
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4 DIVISION- arrived in France April-May 1918 
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
39 IN 
 
  3 5 
47 IN 
 
1    
58 IN 
 
    
59 IN 
 
  1  
10 MG 
 
    
11 MG 
 
    
12 MG 
 
    
Other  4 Am Tn-1   
 
5 DIVISION- arrived in France April-May 1918 
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
6 IN 
 
    
11 IN 
 
 2 1  
60 IN 
 
 3 2 1 
61 IN 
 
    
13 MG 
 
    
14 MG 
 
  1  
15 MG 
 
    
Other  Unk-1 Unk-1  
 
6 DIVISION – arrived in France July 1918 
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
51 IN 
 
    
52IN 
 
    
53 IN 
 
  1  
54 IN 
 
  2 1 
16 MG 
 
    
17 MG 
 
    
18 MG 
 
    
Other   6 Sig Bn-1 
Unk-1 
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7 DIVISION- arrived in France August 1918 
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
34 IN 
 
 1   
55 IN 
 
   1 
56 IN 
 
   2 
64 IN 
 
    
18 MG 
 
    
20 MG 
 
    
21 MG 
 
   1 
 
 
26 Division- arrives in France Sept-Oct 1917 
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
101 IN 
 
2 1 2  
102 IN 
 
1 1 1 2 
103 IN 
 
2 1 1  
104 IN 
 
3 3 3 1 
101 MG 
 
  1 1 
102 MG 
 
   2 
103 MG 
 
    
Other 101 Am Tn-1 
Unk-1 
Unk-1 102 Am Tn-1  
 
27 Division- arrives in France May 1918 
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
105 IN 
 
 1   
106 IN 
 
1 2 2  
107 IN 
 
    
108 IN 
 
2    
104 MG 
 
    
105 MG 
 
    
106 MG 
 
    
Other  Unk-1 Unk-1  
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28 Division- arrives in France May 1918 
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
109 IN 
 
 2   
110 IN 
 
    
111 IN 
 
 1 1  
112 IN 
 
    
107 MG 
 
  2  
108 MG 
 
    
109 MG 
 
 2 1  
Other 56 Bde-1    
 
 
29 Division- arrives in France June 1918 
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
113 IN 
 
3 4 2 1 
114 IN 
 
2 2 4 2 
115 IN 
 
    
116 IN 
 
2    
110 MG 
 
  1 2 
111 MG 
 
 1  1 
112 MG 
 
 1   
  104 Am Tn-1 Unk-1  
 
 
30 Division- arrives in France May 1918 
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
117 IN 
 
 1 2  
118 IN 
 
1   1 
119 IN 
 
 1 1 2 
120 IN 
 
1 5 2 1 
113 MG 
 
    
114 MG 
 
    
115 MG 
 
 1   
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32 Division- arrives in France February 1918  
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
125 IN 
 
3    
126 IN 
 
1 1 1  
127 IN 
 
1 2 1 1 
128 IN 
 
2 3 1  
119 MG 
 
  1  
120 MG 
 
   1 
121 MG 
 
    
Other Unk- 1   107 Am Tn -1 
 
 
33 Division - arrives in France May 1918 
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
129 IN 
 
 3   
130 IN 
 
1 2  1 
131 IN 
 
1    
132 IN 
 
 2 1  
122 MG 
 
 1   
123 MG 
 
    
124 MG 
 
    
Other Unk-1 Div MP-1   
 
35 Division - arrives in France May 1918 
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
137 IN 
 
  2  
138 IN 
 
1 1   
139 IN 
 
 3   
140 IN 
 
 3 2  
128 MG 
 
    
129 MG 
 
    
130 MG 
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36 Division - arrives in France July 1918 
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
141 IN 
 
 2   
142 IN 
 
1 2 1 1 
143 IN 
 
 3 7  
144 IN 
 
1 3   
131 MG 
 
   1 
132 MG 
 
 1 2 2 
133 MG 
 
 1  1 
Other Unk-2 Unk-1 Unk-1  
 
 
37 Division- arrives in France June-July 1918  
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
145 IN 
 
2 2 10 3 
146 IN 
 
3 1 1  
147 IN 
 
1 4 3 3 
148 IN 
 
1 2 1 1 
134 MG 
 
    
135 MG 
 
 1 3 4 
136 MG 
 
1   1 
Other Unk-1 Unk-1 
112 Am Tn-2 
Unk-3 Unk-2 
 
41 Division (Designated I Corp Depot Division and later 1 Depot Division, 8 Dec 1917- 23 Jan 1919) 
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
161 IN 
 
    
162 IN 
 
    
163 IN 
 
    
164 IN 
 
 1   
146 MG 
 
 1   
147 MG 
 
    
148 MG 
 
    
Other 1st  Depot Div-1  1st  Depot Div-2  
  832
42 Division- arrives in France November 1917  
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
165 IN 
 
 1 1 4 
166 IN 
 
1    
167 IN 
 
 1   
168 IN 
 
    
149 MG 
 
 1  1 
150 MG 
 
    
151 MG 
 
 1   
Other  Unk-2   
 
77 Division- arrives in France April 1918  
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
305 IN  
 
    
306 IN 
 
 1   
307 IN 
 
1    
308 IN 
 
2 2   
304 MG 
 
    
305 MG 
 
   1 
306 MG 
 
 1   
Other   302 Am Tn- 1 
302 Sup Tn- 1 
Unk-1 
 
78 Division- arrives in France June 1918  
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
309 IN  
 
    
310 IN 
 
 1   
311 IN 
 
    
312 IN 
 
  1 1 
307 MG 
 
    
308 MG 
 
    
309 MG 
 
  1  
Other  303 Am Tn- 1 Unk- 1 
303 Am Tn- 1 
303 Am Tn- 1 
  833
 
79 Division- arrives in France July 1918  
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
313 IN  
 
 2 1 1 
314 IN 
 
 1 2 1 
315 IN 
 
 1  1 
316 IN 
 
1    
310 MG 
 
    
311 MG 
 
    
312 MG 
 
    
Other 304 Am Tn- 1    
 
 
80 Division- arrives in France May-June 1918  
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
317 IN  
 
  2  
318 IN 
 
  1  
319 IN 
 
 1  2 
320 IN 
 
 3 1 1 
313 MG 
 
    
314 MG 
 
1    
315 MG 
 
 1  1 
Other Unk-2    
 
 
81 Division- arrives in France August 1918  
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
321 IN  
 
    
322 IN 
 
1 1 1 1 
323 IN 
 
    
324 IN 
 
    
316 MG 
 
    
317 MG 
 
    
318 MG 
 
    
  834
 
 
82 Division- arrives in France May 1918  
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
325 IN  
 
    
326 IN 
 
    
327 IN 
 
 1   
328 IN 
 
    
319 MG 
 
    
320 MG 
 
    
321 MG 
 
    
 307 MP- 1 Unk- 1   
 
 
83 Division (Designated 2 Depot Division 27 June-31 Dec 1918) - arrives in France June 1918 
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
329 IN  
 
  2 1 
330 IN 
 
  1  
331 IN 
 
    
332 IN (Sent to 
Italy 25 July 1918) 
1 1 1  
322 MG 
 
    
323 MG 
 
    
324 MG 
 
    
 Unk-1  2nd Depot Div- 1  
 
88 Division- arrives in France August 1918   
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
349 IN  
 
   2 
350 IN 
 
    
351 IN 
 
    
352 IN 
 
    
337 MG 
 
    
338 MG 
 
    
339 MG 
 
    
  835
 
89 Division- arrives in France June 1918   
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
353 IN  
 
  1  
354 IN 
 
  2 3 
355 IN 
 
1    
356 IN 
 
 1   
340 MG 
 
    
341 MG 
 
 1 1 2 
342 MG 
 
 1   
 Unk-1 Unk-1   
 
90 Division- arrives in France June-July 1918   
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
357 IN  
 
 1   
358 IN 
 
 2   
359 IN 
 
1 1   
360 IN 
 
    
343 MG 
 
    
344 MG 
 
    
345 MG 
 
1    
Other    315 Am Tn- 1 
 
91 Division- arrives in France July 1918   
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
361 IN  
 
  1 1 
362 IN 
 
2   1 
363 IN 
 
 1  1 
364 IN 
 
1 3 1  
346 MG 
 
  2  
347 MG 
 
    
348 MG 
 
  1  
Other 181 In Bde- 1 Div MP- 1 
 
316 Sup Tn-1  
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92 Division- arrives in France June 1918   
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
365 IN  
 
 1  1 
366 IN 
 
  1  
367 IN 
 
 4 4 1 
368 IN 
 
 1 6 3 
349 MG 
 
    
350 MG 
 
  1 1 
351 MG 
 
 3  1 
 
 
93 Division (Never organized as a division and lacked machine gun, artillery, and support battalions.   As the 
infantry regiments units arrived in France between Dec 1917 and April 1918, the AEF GHQ assigned them to 
the French Army.  
Unit  /  Rank MAJOR CAPTAIN 1 LT 2 LT 
369 IN  
Arrived Dec 1917 
1    
370 IN 
Arrived Apr 1918  
1 6 3 3 
371 IN 
Arrived Apr 1918 
 1   
372 IN 
Arrived Apr 1918 
 4 3 3 
 
Divisions not shown: 
8th Division- arrived in France in early Nov. 1918 and sent no officers to Blois 
31st Division- ordered skeletonized 17 Oct. 1918 and sent no officers to Blois 
34th Division- ordered skeletonized 17 Oct. 1918 and sent no officers to Blois 
38th Division- ordered skeletonized 17 Oct. 1918 and sent no officers to Blois 
39th Division- designated 5th Depot Div on 14 Aug. 1918, was skeletonized on 29 Oct and  
 sent no officers to Blois 
40th Division- designated 6th Depot Div on 26 July 1918 and sent no officers to Blois 
76th Division- designated 3rd Depot Div on 3 Aug 1918.  One captain from the 301st Ammunition  Train 
sent to Blois.  
84th Division- ordered skeletonized 3 Oct 1918 and sent no officers to Blois 
85th Division- designated 4th Depot Div 28 July 1918 and sent no officers to Blois 
86th Division- ordered skeletonized 3 Oct 1918. One captain from the residual cadre of the  
            342nd Infantry sent to Blois.  
87th Division- assigned to SOS as labor/construction troops on 6 Sept 1918. One captain from the   
 347th Infantry sent to Blois while serving in the SOS.  
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National Guard and National Army/Reserve infantry officers sent to the Reclassification Center at 
Blois from non-divisional organizations and units… 
 
 Majors:    Captains:    
 1st Base Section 1- 1   813 Pioneer Infantry- 1 
      895 Pioneer Infantry-1 
      War Risk Insurance Section- 1 
      1st Base Section MP- 1 
      2nd Base Section- 1 
      1st Motor Mechanic BN- 1 
      VII Corps MP- 1 
      304 Motor Supply Train- 1 
      IV Corps- 1 
      IV Corps MP- 1 
        
 
 First Lieutenants:   Second Lieutenants: 
 Unknown-1    Unknown-2 
 Paris Depot QM- 1   Remount Depot- 1 
 II Corps Graves Registration- 1  AEF Liaison Detachment- 1 
 AEF Camouflage Section- 1  AEF Postal Service- 1 
 Infantry Specialist Course- 1  5th Base Section- 1 
 Base Section G2- 1   Paris Base Censor Section- 1 
      Air Service- 1  
      3rd Army MP-1 
      1st Replacement - 1 
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HQ PLT            RIFLE PLT        RIFLE PLT      RIFLE PLT     RIFLE PLT 
- CPT 
- 1LT XO 
- 1SG 
- Supply SGT 
- Mess SGT   
- 4 x Cooks 
- CO. Clerk 
- 4 x Mechanics 
- 2 x Buglers 
- 4 x PFC runners/ 
      signalmen 
- 5 x Waggoner 
  (From Regt Supply Co) 
 
- LT PLT LDR
- PLT SGT 
- 2 x SGT  
- 8 x CPL 
- 15 x PFC 
- 32 x PVT 
- LT PLT LDR
- PLT SGT 
- 2 x SGT  
- 8 x CPL 
- 15 x PFC 
- 32 x PVT 
- LT PLT LDR 
- PLT SGT 
- 2 x SGT  
- 8 x CPL 
- 15 x PFC 
- 32 x PVT 
- LT PLT LDR
- PLT SGT 
- 2 x SGT  
- 8 x CPL 
- 15 x PFC 
- 32 x PVT 
  
… … … … …
TOTAL STRENGTH & EQUIPMENT
  6 Officers, 48 NCOs, 207 Soldiers 
       - 219 x Rifles 
       - 16 x Automatic Rifles 
       - 30 x Rifle Grenade Dischargers* 
* Includes 6 spares held in company supply  
        
 
Information in table drawn from War Department, U. S. Army in the World War, Vol. 1, Organization, 347. 
Appendix C- 1: Infantry Rifle Company from 26 June 1918 AEF Table of Organization 
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From Plate 1, “Supplement to Instructions,” Offensive Combat of Small Units 
  
Half Platoon 
(Under Platoon SGT) 
Half Platoon 
(Under Platoon Leader) .. 
.. 
.. 
..
..
..
..
…
RIFLE SQUAD 
- Corporal & 7 x Riflemen
RIFLE SQUAD 
- Corporal & 7 x Riflemen
AUTO RIFLE SQUAD 
- Corporal, 2 x AR Gunners
   4 x Ammo Carriers 
   
    
AUTO RIFLE SQUAD 
- Corporal, 2 x AR Gunners
   4 x Carriers 
   
    RIFLE GRENADE SQUAD 
- Corporal, 6 x Rifle Grenadiers 
   1 x Carrier 
   
    HAND BOMBER SQUAD
- Corporal, 3 x Throwers  
   2 x Carriers, 2x Scouts 
   
    
SGT to Asst PLT SGT  
 
 
Platoon Leader commands the Platoon and directs a Half-Platoon 
Appendix C-2: Infantry Rifle Platoon, 26 June 1918 AEF TO&E- Formed as Half-Platoons
SGT & CPL to Asst PLT LDR  
LIAISON SQUAD 
- Corporal, 4 x Runners, 1 x Scout 
   1 x Carrier, 1x Hand Bomber 
   
    
TOTAL MEN & EQUIPMENT 
 
  1x Lieutenant , 3x Sergeants, 8x Corporals, 47x Privates 
  - 48 x Rifles 
  - 4 x Automatic Rifles 
  - 6 x Rifle Grenade Dischargers 
  840
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Scouts would lead each combat group in combat. 
From Plates 1, 4, and 5, “Supplement to Instructions,” Offensive Combat of Small Units. 
.. 
.. 
..
RIFLE SQUAD 
Corporal &  
7 x Riflemen 
AUTO RIFLE  
    SQUAD 
Corporal,  
2 x AR Gunners,
4 x Carriers 
   
    
 
Platoon Leader  
+
^ ^ Sergeant 
..
AUTO RIFLE  
    SQUAD 
Corporal,  
2 x AR Gunners,
4 x Carriers   
   
    
..
. LIAISON SECT. 
4 x Runners 
.
 
Sergeant 
3rd 
Group 
2nd 
Group 
4th 
Group 
1st 
Group 
HAND BOMBER SECT. 
Corporal, 1 x Thrower,  
1 x Carrier, 1x Scout* 
   
    
Appendix C-3: Infantry Rifle Platoon, 26 June 1918 AEF TO&E- Formed as Combat Groups 
 RIFLE SQUAD 
Corporal &  
7 x Riflemen 
^ ^ Platoon SGT
HAND BOMBER SQUAD 
Corporal, 3 x Throwers,  
2 x Carriers, 2x Scouts* 
   
    ..
RIFLE GRENADE SQUAD 
Corporal, 6 x Rifle Grenadiers,  
1 x Carrier    
 Corporal 
(File Closer)
 
TOTAL MEN & EQUIPMENT 
 
  1x Lieutenant , 3x Sergeants, 8x Corporals, 47x Privates 
  - 48 x Rifles 
  - 4 x Automatic Rifles 
  - 6 x Rifle Grenade Dischargers 
